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THE     CITIZEN'S    LIBRARY 


World  Politics 

At  the  End  of  the  Nineteenth  Century 


AS  INFLUENCED  BY  THE  ORIENTAL 
SITUATION 


BY 


PAUL  S.  REINSCH,  Ph.D.,  LL.B. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  IN  THE 
UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN 


"  La  politique  a  toujours  besoin  de  prevoir,  pour 
ainsi  dire,  le  present."  —  Turcot. 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON :  MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  Ltd. 
1904 

All  rights  rttirvtd 


7?  4  '-'- 


Copyright,  1900, 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped  May,  1900.     Reprinted  September, 
1900  ;   February,  1902 ;  July,  1904. 


TCorSuooti  l^rcsa 

J.  S.  Cushing  &  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

It  has  been  the  intention  of  the  writer  in  the 
present  volume  to  gather  into  a  harmonious  picture 
the  multitude  of  facts  and  considerations  that  go 
to  make  up  international  politics  at  the  present 
time.  The  treatment  is  of  necessity  suggestive 
rather  than  exhaustive,  but  it  is  believed  that, 
while  at  present  no  complete  historical  judgment 
as  to  the  great  forces  at  work  could  be  delivered, 
still  the  far-reaching  importance  and  dramatic  in- 
terest of  present  developments  would  justify  the 
attempt  to  obtain  a  bird's-eye  view.  These  con- 
siderations indicate  the  purpose  as  well  as  the 
necessary  limitations  of  the  present  work.  While 
the  author  has,  in  every  case,  sifted  his  evidence 
and  attempted  to  found  his  judgments  on  unim- 
peachable testimony,  the  subject  is  so  vast  that 
only  the  paradoxical  specialist  in  all  fields  could 
avoid  just  criticism.  The  author  has,  however, 
attempted  to  keep  himself  entirely  free  from  a 
priori  conceptions  and  prejudices,  and  to  view 
the  great  drama  of  contemporary  life  as  an  unim- 
passioned  beholder  who  forbears  to  censure  or 
commend. 

The  plan  of  the  book  may  need  a  word  of 
explanation.  The  first  part  is  an  introduction, 
and  gives  a  general  view  of  the  forces  at  work, 


vi  PREFACE 

covering  the  various  elements  of  intellectual  and 
economic  life  that  influence  modern  politics.  The 
second  part  treats  of  what  the  author  considers 
the  true  centre  of  interest  in  present  international 
politics,  namely,  the  Chinese  question :  the  conse- 
quences of  the  Chinese  situation  on  European 
politics  are  traced  in  part  third.  The  part  de- 
voted to  German  imperial  politics  attempts  to  pre- 
sent in  its  completeness  the  well-considered  policy 
of  a  great  empire,  while  in  the  last  part  some 
necessarily  fragmentary  considerations  upon  the 
position  of  the  United  States  as  a  world  power  are 
given.  The  whole  material  of  the  book,  therefore, 
is  focussed  upon  the  Chinese  problem.  The  docu- 
ments and  works  upon  which  the  author  bases  his 
conclusions  are  cited  at  the  end  of  each  part.  It 
was  thought  better  to  limit  the  number  of  page 
notes,  and  rather  to  give  the  sources  of  informa- 
tion in  the  above  manner. 

Acknowledgments  are  due  to  Professor  Richard 
T.  Ely,  the  editor  of  this  series.  President  Charles 
Kendall  Adams,  and  Professors  Frederick  J.  Tur- 
ner and  Charles  H.  Haskins,  of  the  University  of 
Wisconsin,  for  helpful  suggestions  as  to  the  subject- 
matter  of  these  lectures.  The  author  also  received 
invaluable  aid  in  the  revision  of  the  book  and  in 
proof-reading  from  Mr.  George  Ray  Wicker,  an 
honorary  fellow  in  the  University  of  Wisconsin. 

PAUL  S.  REINSCH. 

Madison,  Wisconsin, 
April  I,  1900. 


ANALYTICAL   TABLE   OF 
CONTENTS 

PART  I 

NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Transition  from  Nationalism  to  National  Imperialism 
IN  THE  Nineteenth  Century 

PAGE 

The  danger  of  exaggerating  the  principle  of  nationalism         .        6 
The  complete  change  of  social  and  political  ideals  since  the 

beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  ....  7 
International  rivalry  leads  to  territorial  expansion  ...  9 
The  moral  basis  upon  which  the  justification  of  expansion  is 

attempted il 

The  idea  of  world  empire 12 

The  idea  of  national  imperialism 13 

Machiavelli  as  the  philosopher  of  nationalism :  the  applica- 
bility of  his  methods  to  national  imperialism    .         .         .14 
The  broader   importance  of   Machiavellism :    Machiavellian 

methods  which  are  used  in  modern  international  politics  16 
The  utilitarian  aspects  of  national  imperialism  ...  20 
Attempts  to  raise  the  plane  of  competition  among  nations : 

the  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague  .  .  .  .22 
The  idea  of  world  unity  compared  with  the  present  state  of 

international  equilibrium 24 

CHAPTER  II 

Political  Methods  of  the  New  National  Imperlalism 

The  increased  importance  of  sea  power  .....      27 
Changes  in  the  functions  of  a  navy  .....      28 

vii 


VIU 


CONTENTS 


The  importance  of  sea  communication 

The   influence   of   missions   in   gaining   entrance    into    new 

territory 

The  French  protectorate  over  Roman  Catholic  missions 
The  relations  between  commerce  and  political  dominion 
The  policy  of  Great  Britain  in  regard  to  colonial  trade    . 
The  likelihood  of  a  change  in  this  policy  considered 
Industrial  undertakings  in  undeveloped  regions 
The  radical  change  in  English  economic  life  from  industrialism 

to  capitalism    ........ 

The  demand  for  policing  the  world  .... 

Investments  treated  in  the  spirit  of  nationalism  .  . 
The  political  importance  of  railway  undertakings  .  . 
The  formation  of  industrial  and  agricultural  colonies       . 


PAGB 

3» 

32 

33 
34 
37 
38 
40 

40 
41 
44 
45 
47 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Great  Powers  as  Colonizers 

The  success  of  Russia  as  a  colonizing  power   ....  49 

Germany  a  nation  with  multitudes  of  colonists,  but  few  colonies  50 
The  efforts  made  by  Germany  to  retain  the  political  allegiance 

of  its  colonists .         ........  51 

France  a  country  with  vast  territorial  possessions,  but  with  few 

colonists 52 

The  success  achieved  by  the  Dutch  in  their  government  of 

Java 54 

The  British  manner  of  action  with  regard  to  colonization        .  55 


CHAPTER   IV 

The  Connection  between  Colonization  and 
Imperialism 

The  doctrine  of  universal  protection  of  citizens  ...  58 
The    most   radical    method   of   imperial    expansion,    that   of 

directly  seizing  territory  .......  60 

Spheres  of  influence  and  spheres  of  interest    ....  60 

The  relative  influence  of  individual  initiative  and  unconscious 

social  development 61 


CONTENTS  ix 

PAOB 

What  British  and  French  imperial  expansion  owes  to  indi- 
vidual initiative        . 62 

The  conception  of  far-reaching  plans  of  national  expansion 

more  frequent  of  late 63 

Summary  of  the  present  position  of  the  great  powers      .        .      66 

CHAPTER  V 

Consequences  of  the  Policy  of  National  Imperialism 

The  phantom  of  world  empire  leading  to  mutual  suspicions 

among  the  nations   ........       68 

The  importance  of  national  solidarity  in  the  present  intensity 

of  international  competition     ......       70 

The   reaction   against   the   political  and   social  doctrines  of 

liberalism 71 

Imperial  expansion  favoring  the  growth  of  one  man  power  .  74 
The  contention  that  the  policy  of  expansion  will  advance  the 

cause  of  good  government  at  home  ....       77 

The  aristocratic  reaction  in  the  philosophy  of  the  last  half  of 

the  nineteenth  century 78 


P.A.RT  II 

THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

CHAPTER  I 

Social  and  Political  Characteristics 

Change  in  the  opinion  concerning  the  strength  of  Chinese 

civilization .86 

The  social  and  political  organization  of  China         ...  89 

The  essence  of  Chinese  morality  reverence  for  the  past  .         .  90 
The  formalism  and  conservatism  of  Chinese  society:    saving 

appearances     .........  91 

The  Chinese  class  system 92 

The  examinations  of  the  niandarinate  :  the  nature  of  Chinese 

education          .........  93 


X  CONTENTS 

PAOB 

The  sale  of  official  appointments 95 

The  Chinese  as  tradesmen,  working-men,  and  soldiers  .  .  98 
The  absence  of  patriotism  or  feeling  of  national  cohesion 

among  the  Chinese;  due  to  the  isolation  of  the  empire  .  99 
The  composition  and  purposes  of  the  reform  party  in  China  .  lOl 
The  reform  measures  aimed  at  the  stronghold  of  the  Chinese 

social  organization,  —  the  system  of  education  .         .     103 

The  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  reform  movement  and  the 

present  prospects  for  reform  in  the  empire  .  .  .  105 
The  bearing  on  international  politics  of  the  reform  movement 

and  its  overthrow 109 

The  resources  of  China,  and  their  incomplete  development: 

geomancy 109 

CHAPTER   II 

The  Actual  Nature  of  the  Interests  acquired  by 
Foreign  Nations  in  the  Chinese  Empire 

The   terms  sphere  of  inte7-est  and  sphere  of  influence  con- 
sidered   .        .         .        .        ,        .        .        .        .        .113 
The  importance  of  railway  concessions    .         .         .         .         .114 
The   railways  of  eastern    China,  in   Manchuria,  constructed 

and  operated  by  the  Russian  government  .  .  -US 
The  strategical  and  commercial  importance  of  the  Siberian 

railway  system II 6 

Further  concessions  demanded  by  Russia  in  northern  China  .  117 
The  original  Chinese  railway  and  its  extension  in  Pechili  .  120 
The  Russo-British  agreement  of  1899  in  regard  to  Chinese 

railways 121 

Concessions  to  Germany  in  Shantung      .         .         .         .         .121 

The  trunk  line  connecting  Peking  with  Nanking  constructed 

by  German  and  English  capital        .         .         .         .         .123 

The  great  central  trunk  line  of  China,  connecting  Peking  and 

Canton     ..........     124 

The  Peking-Hankow  division,  and  the  struggle  among  the 

European  powers  for  the  concession  regarding  it  .  ,126 
The   technical,   commercial,   and    industrial    aspects   of   the 

Peking-Hankow  line 127 


CONTENTS  xi 

PAGE 

The  southern  division,  between  Hankow  and  Canton,  con- 
ceded to  an  American  syndicate       128 

The  industrial  prospects  of  this  line 129 

The  importance  of  the  city  of  Hankow  .....  132 
Minor  Russian  and  English  concessions  in  central  China  .  133 
The  projected  railway  connecting  Burma  with  the  Yangtse 

Valley 134 

The  character  and  importance  of  the  French  lines  in  southern 

China 135 

The  general  policy  of  the  Chinese  government  with  regard  to 

railway  concessions  .         .         ,         .         .         .         .136 

Mining  concessions 138 

The  concession  to  the  Pritchard  Morgan  syndicate  in  Szechuen  139 
The  political  importance  to  be  attributed  to  these  concessions  144 
The  punishment  of  outrages  against  missionaries  used  as  a 

lever  for  obtaining  industrial  concessions  .         .         .     146 

The  general  commercial   advantages  enjoyed  by  all  of  the 

foreign  nations         ........     147 

Reform  in  the  administration  of  the  likin,  the  inland  customs 

revenue   ..........     149 

The   opening  of  river   navigation  in  the   provinces   having 

treaty  ports      .........     150 

The  actual  present  commercial  interests  of  the  various  nations 

in  China  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         -     '^S^ 

The  necessity  of  more  security,  and  of  better  protection  to 

invested  capital 155 


CHAPTER   in 

The  Political  Influence  of  the  Great  Powers  in 
China 

The  connection  of  commerce  with  politics :  the  commercial 

importance  of  political  prestige 156 

The  pubHc  debts  of  China 157 

The  special  position  of  Russia,  Germany,  and  France  in  China  160 
The  political  elements   in  the  present  control  exercised  by 

European  nations  in  China l6l 


zn 


CONTENTS 


favor 


Russian  political  influence  in  Manchuria:   the  garrison  and 
fiscal  administration  ..... 

Position  of  Germany  in  regard  to  a  partition  of  China 

The  political  purposes  of  France     .... 

The  plans  of  the  Russo-French  alliance  in  central  China 

Character  of  French  colonial  policy  in  Indo-China 

Non-alienation  promises  in  favor  of  France     . 

The  loss  of  British  prestige  at  the  Chinese  capital  . 

The  lease  of  Wai-hai-wei :  non-alienation  promises  in 
of  Great  Britain 

The  official  expressions  of  the  British  government  with  regard 
to  the  Yangtse  region 

The  present  colonial  and  foreign  policy  of  Italy 

The  interest  of  Japan  in  Chinese  affairs  . 

Secretary  Hay  and  the  "  open-door  "  policy    . 

Important  international  agreements  with  regard  to  China 

The  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan 

The  attempted  Chino-Japanese  alliance  . 


i6i 

164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 

170 

172 
173 
»74 
176 
178 
180 
181 


CHAPTER  IV 

Summary  of  the  Actual  Condition  of  Affairs  in 
China 


Views  on  the  strength  and  weakness  of  China         .        .        .     182 
The  industrial  revolution  impending  in  China,  and  the  con- 
sequences thereof  with  regard  to  foreign  influence  .         .     185 
Brigandage  and  piracy  as  existing  in  a  large  portion  of  the 

Chinese  territory 187 

The  condition  of  the  private  law,  and  its  administration  .  .188 
The  desire  of  Chinese  merchants  for  settled  legal  conditions  .  189 
The  central  and  local  organs  of  government  compared  with 

regard  to  their  efficiency  as  agents  of  reform  .  .  .  190 
Difficulties  in  the  way  of  acquiring  political  control  by  force  .  193 
Regulations  for  mines  and  railways  in  China  .        .        .        •199 


CONTENTS  xiu 


PART  III 

THB   CONSEQUENCES  OF   THE   OPENING   OF 
CHINA  IN   WORLD  POLITICS 

CHAPTER   I 

Russian  Imperial  Politics 

PAGE 

The  three  stages  of  Russian  expansion,  with  Constantinople, 

Afghanistan,  and  China  as  their  objective  points      .         .  206 

The  importance  of  Manchuria  to  Russian  expansion        .         .  207 

Reasons  for  the  Russian  peace  policy 208 

Russia  as  a  naval  power  ........  209 

Tendency  in  the  Russian  Empire  towards  an  Oriental  character  21 1 

The  strengthening  of  autocracy  by  the  recent  developments    .  21 1 
The  attitude  of   Russian  imperialism  toward  Western  civili- 
zation:  Pobedonostseff :  Slavophile  tendencies         .         .212 

The  importance  of  religion  and  cult  in  Russian  politics  .         .  214 
Plans  for  the  defence  of  the  southern  frontier  of  the  Russian 

Empire 216 

The  policy  of  fostering  the  merchant  marine  .        .        .        .218 

The  methods  of  Russian  manufacturers 219 

The  influence  of  lack  of  competition  on  Russian  industry        .  220 

The  true  nature  of  Russian  expansion  in  Asia         ...  221 

CHAPTER  II 

The  Influence  of  the  Oriental  Situation  on  the 
Western  European  Powers 

The   choice   between   Cobdenism   and  a  policy  of  imperial 

protective  federation        .......     223 

The  friendly  understanding  between  Great  Britain  and  the 

United  States;  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  .  225 
The  nature  of  English  anti- Russian  politics  radically  changed  226 
Germany's  recent  entry  upon  a  conscious  policy  of  imperial 

expansion 227 

Withdrawal   of  Russian   attention    from   the    Balkan   states 

and  its  effect  upon  the  fears  of  Austria        .        .        .     227 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

The  twofold  influence  of  the  opening  of  China  on  French 

politics 228 

The  identity  of  French  and  Russian  policy  in  the  Orient        .  229 

The  lesser  nations  losing  in  importance  ....  230 
The  arena  of  European  rivalries  broadened  to  include  the 

whole  world     .........  230 

The  animosities  engendered  by  the  affairs  of  the  continent  of 

Europe  perceptibly  assuaged 231 

The  shifting  of  the  centre  of  political  interest  in  Asia      .        .  232 

The  present  lessened  importance  of  Afghanistan  and  Persia  .  233 
The  effect  of  the  Oriental  situation  upon  the  position  of  Great 

Britain  in  India 234 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Meeting  of  the  Orient  and  Occident 

A  struggle  for  predominance  imminent  between  East  and  West  237 
The  facts  which  have  led  up  to  the  meeting  ....  238 
The  question  of  mutual   influence  different  in  China  from 

what  it  is  in  India    ........     239 

The  attitude  of  the  Chinese  toward  Christianity  .  .  .  240 
The   probable  influence  of  the  attempted  partition  on  the 

spread  of  Western  civilization 241 

The  probable  influence  of  the  civilization  of  the  Orient  on 

that  of  the  West 242 

Forcible    imposition    of    Western    civilization    upon    China 

impossible 245 

CHAPTER  IV 

General  Consequences  of  the  Opening  of  China 

China  as  a  future  centre  of  industry 246 

The  danger  to  European  and  American  industrial  predomi- 
nance         250 

The  advantages  to  be  obtained  from  the  opening  of  China      .  250 

The  question  of  the  currency  in  China 251 

The  Pacific  becoming  the  most  important  highway  of  commerce  252 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

A  wider  perspective  given  to  politics 254 

The  great   powers   aiming  at   complete  independence :   the 

day  of  alliances  past 255 

How  far  world  peace  is  strengthened  by  the  recent  develop- 
ments        256 


PART  IV 

GERMAN  IMPERIAL  POLITICS 
CHAPTER   I 

The  Nationalism  of  Bismarck  and  the  Imperialism 
OF  William  H 

The  German  Empire  as  an  illustration  of  the  various  char- 
acteristics of  an  expansionist  policy  ....  261 

Bismarck's  idea  of  strictly  commercial  expansion  and  coloni- 
zation         262 

German  expansion  becoming  political 263 

Expressions  of  representative  men  on  German  imperial  policy  264 

CHAPTER   II 

German  Interests  in  Africa  and  Asia 

The  South  African  colonies:   the  understianding  with  Great 

Britain 267 

Germany's  attitude  toward  the  Dutch  colonies         .         .         .  268 

The  position  of  Germany  in  China  ......  269 

The  protectorate  over  missions 269 

The  com.mercial  and  industrial  nature  of  German  interests  in 

China        ....  272 

The  policy  of  equal  opportunity  the  rational  one  for  Ger- 
many to  pursue         ........  273 

German  interests  in  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia        .  273 

The  emperor's  policy 274 

The  German  missions  of  this  region 275 

The  German  understanding  with  Turkey         ....  275 

Germans  as  colonizers  in  Asia  Minor  :  railway  concessions      .  276 


xvi  CONTENTS 

FAGB 

The  industrial  and  strategical  importance  of  Syria  .        .        .     278 
Germany's  attempt  to  retain  the  political  allegiance  of  her 

colonists 279 

CHAPTER  HI 

German  Colonization  in  South  America 

The  nature  of  German  colonization  in   South  America :    its 

commercial  basis .^Sl 

The  advance  of  German  commerce  in  South  America     .         .  "82 

The  political  aspects  of  commercial  expansion         .         .         .  283 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  expression  of  American  policy  in 

South  America         ........  284 

Its  moral  basis  in  the  light  of  recent  events     ....  285 

The  claim  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  can  only  be  respected 

as  an  expression  of  actual  material  interests     .        .        .  285 

CHAPTER   IV 

General  Characteristics  of  German  Imperial 

Politics 

Protection  of  German  citizens  abroad :  the  case  of  Hayti         .  287 

German  expansion  is  still  chiefly  commercial  ....  288 

The   policy  of  Germany  self-centred,  but   friendly  relations 

with  the  other  great  powers  fostered        ....  289 

The  present  relations  between  France  and  Germany        .         .  290 
Customs  unions :  imperial  protective  federation       .         .         .291 

The  idea  of  a  Central  European  league  .....  292 

The  position  of  Germany  as  a  naval  power      ....  294 

The  merchant  marine 295 

Technical  education 296 

The  methods  of  German  manufacturers 296 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Influence  of  Imperialism  on  Domestic  Politics 

The  growth  of  one  man  power        ......  298 

The  emperor's  plea  against  party  differences  .        .        .  298 

The  emperor's  concept  of  his  office  .....  300 

The  decrease  of  the  parties  of  moderation       ....  302 


CONTENTS  xvii 


PART  V 

SOME  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  THE  POSITION  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  AS  A  FACTOR  IN  ORIENTAL 
POLITICS 

CHAPTER   I 

The  Interests  of  the  United  States  in  the  Far 
Orient 

PAGE 

Change  in  the  attitude  of  popular  opinion  toward  international 

questions 309 

The  probable  share  of  the  United  States  in  the  development 

of  Chinese  resources         .         .         .         .         .         .         -313 

The  present  state  of  American  trade  with  China      .         .         .  314 

The  weakness  of  the  American  merchant  marine     .         .         .  314 

American  products  which  are  used  in  China    ....  315 

Siberia  an  important  market  for  machinery  and  manufactured 

goods 317 

Russia  inclined  to  encourage  friendly  commercial  relations 

with  the  United  States 318 

The  trade  of  the  United  States  with  the  Philippine  Islands     .  319 

The  future  importance  of  Manila  as  a  commercial  entrepot     .  320 

The  development  of  natural  resources  in  the  Philippines         ,  321 

The  needs  of  communication  and  transportation     .         .         .  321 

The  labor  question  in  the  Philippines      .....  322 

The  American  protective  system  and  the  Philippines      .         .  323 

The  importance  of  trade  routes        ......  324 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  with  regard  to  the  Asiatic 

mainland 325 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Influence  of  International  Politics  on  the 
Party  System 

The  importance  of  the  existence  of  two  great  parties       .         .  327 
Impossibility  of  making  questions  of  foreign  policy  effective 

subjects  of  party  controversy    ......  328 

The  party  system  in  Germany  and  France       ....  329 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

In  Great  Britain  the   party  system   most  successful   in   the 

period  of  domestic  reform 331 

The  degeneracy  of  party  government      .        .        .         .         -332 

Extent  of  influence  on  party  government  of  the  increased 

interest  taken  in  foreign  affairs         .....     333 

The  necessity  for  unanimous  action  in  external  matters  .        .     334 

CHAPTER   III 

The  Increased  Importance  of  the  Executive 

Germany  and  Russia  as  examples  of  increased  power  of  the 

executive          .........  337 

The  increased  difficulty  of  the  questions  of  American  politics  339 
The  method  of  selection  of  American  statesmen      .         .         .  340 
The  methods  of  selection  and  training  in  the  English  gov- 
ernment    341 

The  dramatic  character  of  English  parliamentary  life      .         .  343 
Tendencies  and  developments  that  should  be  encouraged  in 

American  public  life         ....                 .        .  345 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Influence  of  Imperialism  on  Home  Affairs  in 

THE  United  States 347 

CHAPTER  V 

International  Relations  in  the  United  States 

The  judgment  of  European  nations  as  affected  by  the  results 

of  the  late  war 356 

The  understanding  between  Great  Britain  and  America  .         .  357 

The  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Germany    .         .         .  358 

The  attitude  of  Russia  toward  the  United  States     .        .        .  359 


PART    I 
NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 


WORLD   POLITICS   AT   THE    END   OF 
THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY 

CHAPTER   I 

The  Transition  from  Nationalism  to  National 
Imperialism  in  the  Nineteenth  Century 

When  we  view  the  historical  development  of  the 
world  since  the  Renaissance,  we  find  that  the  one 
principle  about  which  the  wealth  of  facts  can  be 
harmoniously  grouped  is  that  of  nationalism.  Ever 
since  the  world-state  ideals  of  the  Middle  Ages 
were  left  behind,  this  principle  has  been  the  touch- 
stone of  true  statesmanship.  The  reputation  of  a 
statesman,  as  well  as  his  permanent  influence  on 
human  affairs,  depends  on  his  power  to  under- 
stand and  aid  the  historical  evolution,  from  out  the 
medieval  chaos,  of  strong  national  states.  Genius 
could  not  countervail  this  law  of  development. 
Even  Napoleon  was  unsuccessful  whenever  his 
policy  opposed  the  innate  strength  of  national- 
ism. As  we  enumerate  the  great  statesmen  whose 
personalities  have  left  a  permanent  impress  on 
the  institutions  of  their  countries,  such  as  Louis 
XL,    Wolsey,    Elizabeth,    Richelieu,    Henry    IV., 

3 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Cromwell,  Chatham,  Cavour,  and  Bismarck,  we 
find  that  their  title  to  greatness  rests  upon  the 
manner  in  which  they  aided  a  national  state 
in  realizing  its  independence  and  developing  its 
character. 

Especially  during  the  nineteenth  century  has 
nationalism  been  a  conscious  influence  in  political 
life.  The  nations  that,  at  its  beginning,  had  partly 
achieved  their  independent  political  existence, 
have  since  been  striving  for  the  attainment  of 
completely  self-sufficing  life;  while  those  races 
that  regard  themselves  as  unjustly  held  in  bondage 
by  others  have  been  engaged  in  a  stern  struggle 
to  obtain  national  independence.  Success  has 
not  been  the  equal  portion  of  the  striving  races. 
Germany  and  Italy,  which  have  most  nearly  ap- 
proached their  ideal,  are  still  looking  yearningly 
toward  the  completion  of  their  work  by  the  addi- 
tion of  Austria  and  Trieste  ^  to  the  national  states 
to  which  they  respectively  belong.  The  Hunga- 
rians, whose  nationalism  is  most  violently  enthusi- 
astic, have  carried  their  nativistic  policy  so  far  as 
to  destroy  the  economic  resources  of  other  parts 
of  the  Austrian  Empire,  as,  for  instance,  the 
forests  of  Dalmatia,  in  order  to  protect  their  own 
economic  existence.  Other  races  have  been  less 
successful,  either  from  a  lack  of  political  genius  or 
from  the  overpowering  strength  of  their  political 
superiors.     An  aid  to  the  successful,  the  principle 

1  In  Italian  political  literature  Trieste  is  usually  called  irredenta, 
the  unredeemed. 

4 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

of  nationalism  has  been  turned  against  the  less 
fortunate.  Under  its  influence  attempts  are  con- 
stantly being  made  to  force  races  like  the  Irish, 
the  Poles/  and  the  Finns  into  unwilling  assimila- 
tion with  nations  that  are  politically  organized  and 
superior  in  strength.  For  it  is  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish the  spirit  of  nationalism  from  that  of 
particularism  just  as  sharply  as  from  that  of 
the  world  state  of  the  Middle  Ages ;  it  does  not 
look  with  favor  upon  local  peculiarities  and  varia- 
ations,  but  rather  stands  for  a  thoroughgoing 
assimilation  of  all  the  component  parts  of  the 
nation. 

It  has  thus  come  about  that  the  successful 
nations  have  developed  a  clearly  marked  individu- 
ality. The  cosmopolitanism  of  the  Middle  Ages 
and  of  the  Renaissance,  the  dreams  of  world  unity, 
have  been  replaced  by  a  set  of  narrower  national 
ideals  concerning  customs,  laws,  literature,  and 
art,  —  by  a  community  of  independent  states,  each 
striving  to  realize  to  the  fullest  its  individual  apti- 
tudes and  characteristics.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
infer  from  this  a  universal  reign  of  chauvinism. 
The  idea  of  the  general  solidarity  of  mankind 
is  still  strong  enough  to  restrain  national  action 
in  some  measure.  In  ordinary  times  there  is 
a  healthy  competition  between  the  members  of 
the  international  commonwealth,  —  a  competition 
sharpened  by  the  knowledge  that  temporary 
weakness   may  mean    loss    of   national  existence. 

^  See  Brandes,  Polen,  for  a  description  of  Russian  methods. 

5 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Meanwhile  international  law  holds  a  balance  be- 
tween the  states  by  preventing  any  of  the  stronger 
members  from  unjustly  oppressing  the  smaller 
civilized  nations.  Under  these  conditions,  too 
great  uniformity  of  civilization  is  avoided,  and 
humanity  is  given  an  opportunity  to  develop  its 
varying  characteristics.  Thus  the  ideal  of  the 
period  is  as  far  removed  from  the  dead  uniformity 
of  a  world  empire  on  the  one  hand,  as  it  is  on  the 
other  from  the  distracting  anarchy  of  a  regime  of 
mere  local  custom.  The  world  community  idea  of 
the  great  founders  of  international  law,  Grotius 
and  Suarez,  and  of  philosophers  of  eternal  peace, 
like  Saint-Pierre  and  Kant,  is  reconcilable  with 
the  existence  of  national  states,  if  it  is  understood 
to  imply,  not  political  union,  but  the  active  coop- 
eration of  all  nations  in  the  common  work  of 
mankind. 

It  will,  however,  be  difficult  to  preserve  a  bal- 
ance of  this  kind,  as  the  nationaHstic  principle 
bears  within  it  the  possible  source  of  its  own  de- 
struction, and  unless  carefully  guarded  against 
exaggeration,  will  of  itself  lead  to  a  disturbance 
of  the  equilibrium  upon  which  the  diversity  of  our 
civilization  depends.  Within  the  latter  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  nationalism  has  been  thus 
exaggerated ;  going  beyond  a  healthy  desire  to 
express  the  true  native  characteristics  of  a  people, 
it  has  come,  in  some  quarters,  to  mean  the  decry- 
ing, as  barbarous  or  decadent,  of  everything  origi- 
nating outside  of  the  national  boundary.     Within 

6 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

the  state  itself,  there  is  a  growing  tendency  to 
enforce,  by  custom  and  law,  absolute  uniformity  of 
characteristics.  Languages  and  literatures  pecu- 
liar to  smaller  communities  are  not  encouraged, 
the  effort  being  rather  made  to  replace  them  by 
the  national  language.  In  international  politics  the 
motives  of  foreign  nations  are  being  constantly 
misunderstood.  Each  nation  looks  upon  itself  as 
the  bearer  of  the  only  true  civilization.  France 
makes  wars  as  a  herald  of  progress ;  and  when 
Germany  is  victorious,  she,  in  turn,  announces  a 
triumph  for  civilization.  Even  in  art  and  science, 
perhaps  the  most  cosmopolitan  of  all  pursuits,  this 
nationalizing  tendency  has  left  its  mark.  In 
order  to  give  to  a  work  of  art  a  national  tinge, 
idiosyncrasies  are  emphasized,  while  the  broad, 
human  way  of  looking  at  things,  the  art  that 
speaks  to  all  ages,  is  neglected.  Historical  writers 
are  especially  prone  to  yield  to  national  prejudices, 
and  even  scientists  may  be  found  who  import  the 
"national  equation  "  into  their  work.  Chauvinism 
is  not  confined  to  politics.  It  is  to  be  found  in 
contemporary  art  and  science  as  well. 

There  has  been  a  complete  change  of  ideals  dur- 
ing the  past  hundred  years.  The  century  opened 
with  a  broad  humanitarianism,  with  a  belief  in  the 
saving  power  of  general  culture,  and  the  main 
characteristic  of  the  time  was  a  rationalistic  opti- 
mism which  saw  in  reason  the  guiding  influence  in 
human  affairs.  This  age  of  reason,  of  which  Kant, 
Jefferson,  the  Humboldts,  and  Rousseau  are  the 

7 


WORLD   POLITICS 

most  prominent  and  distinctive  exponents,  was 
followed  by  what  may  be  called  the  age  of  force. 
Napoleon's  career  destroyed  much  of  the  first 
optimism  of  the  Revolution ;  but  it  was  the  period 
of  1848  that  finally  disappointed  the  hopes  with 
which  the  century  had  begun.  An  age  of  pessi- 
mism then  dawned,  in  which  it  was  recognized 
that  humanity  is  swayed,  not  so  much  by  reason, 
as  by  the  blind  and  passionate  forces  of  the  will. 
Schopenhauer's  great  work,  which  had  lain  un- 
noticed on  the  pubhshers'  shelves  for  thirty  years, 
now  suddenly  attracted  widespread  attention  and 
became  the  mirror  of  the  times.  It  is  only  within 
the  last  decade  that  this  pessimism  has  been  in 
turn  replaced  by  a  new  optimism,  the  optimism  of 
force,  which  sees  in  triumphant  energy  the  sole 
condition  of  happy  existence.^  The  serenely  quiet 
and  completely  harmonious  balance  of  an  existence 
such  as  Goethe's,  reflected  in  his  whole  art,  has 
given  way  to  a  rush  of  wild  spirits  that  fight 
their  way  through  storms  of  passions  where  only 
the  strongest  will,  the  most  violent  energy,  can 
prevail. 

This  general  character  of  the  age  is  written 
plainly  in  the  records  of  contemporary  political 
life.  The  nations,  having  passed  through  their 
historical  evolution,  stand  now,  with  fully  devel- 
oped individualities,  face  to  face.  Their  competi- 
tion in  all  the  fields  of  human  activity  has  taken 
on  tremendous  dimensions.     On    the    same  over- 

^  Of  this  tendency  Friedrich  Nietzsche  is  the  main  exponent. 
8 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

whelming  scale  as  that  of  their  armaments  for 
war  do  they  now  exert  their  energies  in  all  direc- 
tions. It  is  true  that  in  this  way  they  develop 
greater  vitality  and  ability  than  could  ever  be 
brought  about  in  a  condition  of  world  peace ;  but 
their  rivalry  may  become  suicidal.  At  present 
many  of  them  are  finding  their  territorial  basis 
too  limited.  Expansion  in  population  necessi- 
tates expansion  in  territory,  and  so  to  nationahsm 
they  add  imperialism,  —  a  desire  to  control  as 
large  a  portion  of  the  earth's  surface  as  their 
energy  and  opportunities  will  permit.  This  atti- 
tude in  international  politics  has  become  para- 
mount only  within  the  last  decades.  During  the 
middle  period  of  the  nineteenth  century,  colonial 
possessions  were  undervalued  by  the  continental 
states  of  Europe.^ 

It  was  the  example  of  England  that  led  other 
states  to  look  beyond  the  sea  for  a  reenforcement 
of  national  power  and  resources.  The  first  to 
develop  the  principle  of  nationalism,  and  to  estab- 
lish an  autonomous  state,  in  entire  independence 
of  the  Roman  imperial  idea,  England  has  also 
taken  the  lead  in  building  up  a  national  empire. 
Before  it  was  too  late,  she  ceased  to  look  upon  her 
colonies  as  mere  latifimdia  from  which  vast  in- 
comes might  be  drawn  by  absentee  lords;  and,  as 

^  Even  in  England  a  large  section  of  public  opinion  was  indiffer- 
ent to  colonial  affairs.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Manchester  school.  See,  for  instance,  John  Bright's  speeches  on 
Canada. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

a  result,  she  was  the  first  of  all  nations,  by  her 
wise  administration  and  lasting  settlement,  to  make 
her  possessions  truly  a  part  of  her  national  exis- 
tence. Now,  as  the  European  nations  look  about 
them  and  find  their  territorial  basis  too  limited,  as 
they  see  their  citizens  leaving  home  only  to  be- 
come naturalized  in  English-speaking  lands  and 
thus  to  lose  their  former  characteristics,  they  raise 
the  cry  of  "  selfish,  grasping  England."  There  is 
some  truth  in  Alfred  Austin's  expression,  "  the  en- 
vious nations,"  although,  of  course,  adverse  criti- 
cism of  England  is  not  by  any  means  always 
inspired  by  the  particular  feeling  charged  in  the 
laureate's  epithet.  When  a  realization  of  the 
state  of  affairs  had  fully  dawned  upon  the  conti- 
nental nations,  there  began  a  fierce  general  scram- 
ble for  those  portions  of  the  earth's  surface  which 
were  still  unoccupied ;  and  especially  since  it  has 
become  apparent  that,  sooner  or  later,  the  vast  and 
wealthy  realm  of  China  may  become  a  prey  to  for- 
eign invaders,  has  this  international  competition 
become  intense,  and  ominous  of  serious  strife. 

Various  motives  prevail  with  the  different  gov- 
ernments and  nations,  and  the  different  classes 
among  the  respective  peoples,  in  the  matter  of  ter- 
ritorial expansion.  Often  the  value  attached  to 
extended  dominion  is  purely  sentimental,  inasmuch 
as  many  of  the  colonies  hastily  acquired  by  Euro- 
pean nations  will  never  make  a  material  return  to 
the  people  as  a  whole,  for  the  outlay  involved  in 
their  administration.     Thus,  while  a  policy  of  colo- 

xo 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

nial  expansion  may  be  acceptable  to  individual 
capitalists  as  a  means  of  profitable  investment,  to 
the  common  people,  who  are  always  swayed  by  the 
imaginary  side  of  politics,  it  appeals  as  an  exten- 
sion of  national  prestige.  Nothing  will  arouse 
greater  enthusiasm  in  a  popular  meeting  than  an 
assurance  that  the  national  flag  has  been  unfurled 
upon  a  distant  island,  where,  perhaps,  unregener- 
ate  savagery  prevails;  nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
can  any  crime  exceed  in  enormity  the  act  of  haul- 
ing down  the  flag  where  it  has  once  been  raised. 

The  moral  basis  on  which  expansion  is  justified 
by  its  advocates  is  the  claim  that  large  portions  of 
the  earth's  surface  are  in  the  hands  of  nations 
or  tribes  who  are  guilty  of  an  under-development 
of  their  natural  resources.  As  the  world  becomes 
more  and  more  densely  populated,  —  so  runs  the 
argument,  —  the  natural  wealth  of  the  remoter 
regions  must  be  utilized  for  the  benefit  of  man- 
kind, and  if  any  nation  or  tribe,  by  the  use  of  anti- 
quated methods  of  production,  or  by  total  neglect 
of  certain  parts  of  its  resources,  such  as  mines  or 
forests,  stands  in  the  way  of  this  great  need,  that 
nation  or  tribe  must  pass  under  the  political  power 
or  tutelage  of  a  nation  that  will  draw  from  the  earth 
the  utmost  quantity  of  produce.  At  any  rate,  the 
world  must  be  policed,  so  that  in  every  part  of  it 
investments  of  capital  may  be  made  securely,  and 
so  that  industrial  works  may  be  carried  on  without 
annoyance  or  molestation  from  the  natives.  Few 
nations,  however,  stop  with  this  demand.     Most  of 

n 


WORLD    POLITICS 

them  frankly  regard  the  world  as  the  inheritance  of 
the  most  powerful  races,  which  have  a  right  to  re- 
place those  that  are  more  barbarous  or  less  well 
endowed  with  force  of  mind  and  character.  An 
advocate  of  radical  methods  of  colonization  says, 
"  It  is  an  inexorable  law  of  progress  that  inferior 
races  are  made  for  the  purpose  of  serving  the 
superior;  and  if  they  refuse  to  serve,  they  are 
fatally  condemned  to  disappear."^ 

Unhappily,  there  is  considerable  danger  that 
national  expansion,  if  animated  by  such  principles, 
may  lead  to  dreams  of  world  empire.  The  seed 
sown  by  the  Romans,  from  which  they  themselves 
harvested  great  power  and  influence,  and  from 
which  the  Germans  of  the  Middle  Ages  reaped 
both  romantic  fame  and  deep  sorrow,  is  still  sleep- 
ing in  the  thought  of  the  modern  world,  and  is 
likely  to  spring  up  again  unless  overweening 
national  ambitions  are  bridled.  The  fear  is  often 
expressed  that,  when  the  nations  shall  have  appro- 
priated the  surface  of  the  earth  and  shall  stand 
fully  armed,  facing  each  other,  the  elemental 
force  that  compels  expansion  will  not  then  down, 
but  will  bring  about  among  the  strongest  a  great 
final  struggle  for  dominion.  Often  those  who 
talk  most   of   peace    have  an    arrih'e  pens^e   that 

1  William  Harvey  Brown,  On  the  South  African  Frontier.  Lead- 
ing German  historians,  like  Mommsen,  Sybel,  Ranke,  and  Von 
Hoist,  uphold  the  theory  that  the  superior  nations  have  the  mission 
to  civilize  the  inferior,  if  necessary,  by  force.  See  Von  Hoist,  Con- 
stitutional  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  IH.,  pp.  269-272; 
also  Treitschke,  Politik,  §  4. 

12 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

through  the  particular  peace  which  they  favor  — 
that  between  France  and  Russia,  for  instance  — 
their  nation  may  become  great  enough  to  impose 
upon  the  world  the  pax  Romania}  It  is  paradoxi- 
cal but  true  that  the  very  accentuation  of  national- 
ism may  lead,  and  if  carried  out  to  its  ultimate 
conclusions  must  inevitably  lead,  to  a  revival  of 
the  Roman  idea  of  imperialism ;  so  that  from  out 
the  group  of  struggling  nationaUties  there  may 
again  arise  a  leader  who  will  enforce  upon  the 
world  that  great  peace  within  which  there  is  no 
progress,  but  only  stagnation.  At  the  present 
time  the  national  state  is,  indeed,  as  its  advocates 
claim,  a  necessary  condition  of  progress ;  but  if  it 
shall  exaggerate  its  nationalism,  it  will  ultimately 
defeat  the  very  purpose  by  which  its  adherents 
justify  its  existence. 

We  should  here  distinguish  between  the  spirit  of 
modern  national  imperialism  and  that  which  ani- 
mated the  Roman  Empire.  The  cardinal  differ- 
ence between  the  two  is  that  the  ideal  of  the 
latter  was  the  comprehension  of  all  civiHzed 
nations  under  the  sway  of  a  world  empire,  while 
the  former  recognizes  the  separate  existence  of 
national  states.  Orbis  terrarmn  and  iniperium 
were  convertible  terms  to  the  Romans ;  there  was 
only  one  empire,  which  embraced  the  world,  or 
at  least  its  desirable  parts.  Separate  nationalism 
was  not  respected  ;  in  the  words  of  Ihering,  "  The 
spiritual    substance    of    Rome   is    an    acid    which, 

^  See  Leo  Tolstoi,  Patriotism  and  Christianity,  Ch.  II. 
13 


WORLD   POLITICS 

when  brought  in  contact  with  the  living  organ- 
ism of  a  nationaHty,  acts  as  an  irritant  and  dissolv- 
ent." National  imperialism,  on  the  other  hand, 
takes  as  its  basis  a  national  state  and  is  not  in- 
consistent with  respect  for  the  political  existence 
of  other  nationalities ;  it  endeavors  to  increase  the 
resources  of  the  national  state  through  the  absorp- 
tion or  exploitation  of  undeveloped  regions  and 
inferior  races,  but  does  not  attempt  to  impose 
political  control  upon  highly  civilized  nations. 
Napoleon,  indeed,  strove  to  revive  the  Roman 
form  of  imperialism,  but  the  rising  spirit  of  na- 
tionalism was  too  strong  for  him ;  against  the 
forces  of  historical  development  his  genius  was 
of  no  avail. 

The  nineteenth  century  has  been  an  age  of 
nationalism.  The  twentieth  is  to  be  the  age  of 
national  imperialism.  The  treatment  of  Machia- 
velli  at  the  hands  of  modern  historians  and  lit- 
erary critics  fitly  illustrates  the  political  temper 
of  the  present  era.  The  philosopher  and  guide 
of  the  great  statesmen  who  with  firm  and  un- 
scrupulous hand  moulded  the  national  state  in 
its  first  beginnings,  Machiavelli  was  thereafter 
long  decried  as  the  spokesman  of  the  evil  one,  an 
advocattis  diaboli,  even  by  a  Machiavellian  of  the 
consummate  craft  of  Frederick  the  Great.  Within 
the  past  century,  however,  his  character  as  the 
apostle  of  nationalism  has  won  recognition  ;  and 
especially  in  those  countries  that  have  been  strug- 
gling  for   a   realization   of   national   existence,  — 

14 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

Germany  and  Italy,  —  his  fame  has  risen  so  high 
that,  as  a  political  philosopher,  he  ranks  second 
only  to  Aristotle.^  His  main  doctrine  —  that  in 
great  historical  developments,  as  at  the  birth  of 
nations,  ordinary  rules  of  morality  cannot  be  held 
binding  upon  a  statesman,  whose  sole  duty  is  to 
secure  the  existence  of  a  state  within  which 
morality  and  civilization  can  thrive  —  has  again 
become  the  guiding  influence  of  politics. 

As  the  founders  of  nationalistic  policy  looked  to 
Machiavelli  as  the  best  exponent  of  their  ambitions 
and  methods,  so  the  statesmen  of  the  present  re- 
gime of  national  imperialism  could  also  find  many 
lineaments  of  their  political  personality  mirrored 
in  the  pages  of  the  great  Italian  of  the  Renais- 
sance.^ When  the  philosophic  optimism  of  Rous- 
seau and  Hegel  had  passed  for  the  time,  real- 
ism and  a  realistic  policy  {Realpolitik)  came  into 
favor.  Such  ideas  as  that  of  a  world  peace,  of 
justice  to  a  hostile  nation,  of  development  of  civil- 
ization by  the  united  efforts  of  humanity,  were 
looked  upon  as  mirages  of  optimism.  The  state 
is  founded,  not  on  reason,  but  on  the  will,  and 
those  dark,  half-understood  forces  that  sway  man- 
kind, expressing  themselves  in  the  prejudices 
and  customs  of   nations,  are  of  more  importance 

^  Cf.  Treitschke's  Polilik,  §  3;  Lord  Acton's  introduction  to 
Burd's  edition  of  Machiavelli's  Prince. 

2  Greenwood,  "  Machiavelli  in  Modern  Politics,"  in  Cosmopolis, 
August,  1897  ;  "  The  Law  of  the  Beast,"  Nineteenth  Century,  Octo- 
ber, 1897  ;  Frederic  Harrison,  "The  Modern  Machiavelli,"  ibidem, 
September,  1897. 

»5 


WORLD   POLITICS 

to  the  statesman  than  are  the  rational  systems  of 
philosophers.^  The  idea  of  a  serene  equilibrium 
maintained  unchangeably,  a  balance  of  power, 
under  which  everybody  can  live  in  ease  and  peace, 
has  given  place  to  the  conception  of  a  great 
struggle  among  warring  forces.  A  people  is  no 
longer  satisfied  with  mere  security  and  with  a 
moderately  wealthy  national  existence.  Only  in  ex- 
ercising its  powers  to  the  utmost,  in  "living  itself 
out,"  does  a  nation  find  satisfaction.^  So,  in  the 
birth  struggle  of  national  imperialism,  just  as  cen- 
turies ago  in  the  birth  struggle  of  nationalism, 
Machiavellian  thought  and  Machiavellian  means 
are  characteristic  of  political  action. 

We  must  not  in  all  this  attribute  to  Machiavel- 
lism  any  narrow  meaning.  It  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  poison  and  crude  prevarication.  Its 
main  thought  is  rather  the  old  Greek  concep- 
tion that  the  state  is  the  ultimate  good  to  which 
everything  else  is  to  be  sacrificed,  since  outside  of 
the  state  no  civilized  existence  is  possible ;  that  it 
is  the  state  which  protects  morality,  the  civilized 
arts,  and  all  the  higher  pursuits  of  man,  and  that 
only  within  the  state  can  the  family  and  other 
forms  of  human  association  thrive  and  be  pro- 
tected ;  that,  therefore,  with  the  death  or  decadence 
of  the  state,  all  that  makes  life  endurable  is  swept 
away.     It  follows  that    for   the  preservation  and 

1  Cf.  Ferdinand  Brunetiere's  sneers  at  the  intelleciuels  in  Aprh 
le  Proces. 

2  Like  the  modern  man  of  Ibsen's  dramas. 

i6 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

strengthening  of  this  first  condition  of  civilized  life 
any  means  are  allowable.  This  extreme  doctrine 
of  the  state  as  the  ultimate  aim  of  existence  recog- 
nizes no  mutual  duties  among  the  various  states. 
On  the  contrary,  according  to  that  view,  hostile 
nations  face  each  other  with  the  vicious  cruelty 
and  cunning  of  wild  beasts.  Force  rules,  manip- 
ulated by  art  and  craft.  That  force,  indeed, 
need  not  be  mere  brutality.  Everything  that 
makes  a  nation  strong,  its  knowledge,  its  me- 
chanical skill,  its  industrial  capacity,  will  con- 
tribute to  its  force. 

To  Machiavellism  the  philosophers  of  the  mod- 
ern state  are  prone  to  superadd  a  finalism  derived 
from  Hegel  and  the  theory  of  evolution.  Force, 
with  them,  is  regarded  as  the  index  or  measure  of 
fitness  :  as  the  strongest,  the  most  resourceful,  sur- 
vive, these  must  be  the  true  agents  of  civilization 
—  through  them  the  human  spirit  realizes  itself.^ 
From  the  Egyptian  to  the  Greek,  from  the  Greek 
to  the  Roman,  the  torch  of  civilization  was  passed 
along  to  be  grasped  at  last  by  the  hand  of  the 
vigorous  Germanic  races.  To  Hegel,  it  is  the 
Prussian  state  which  is  the  ultimate  representative 
of  civilization.  Other  nations  argue  very  logically 
that  if  civilization  has  changed  its  agents  in  the 
past,  it  may  do  so  in  the  time  to  come.  Thus  the 
Russians  predict  the  greatness  and  civilizing  mis- 

^  See  opinions  of  eminent  historians  and  philosophers,  cited  by 
Lord  Acton,  in  his  introduction  to  Burd's  edition  of  Machiavelli's 
Prince, 

c  17 


WORLD   POLITICS 

sion  of  their  northern  empire  in  the  not  too  distant 
future. 

It  would  be  unwise  to  take  too  gloomy  a  view  of 
things,  but  we  must  notice,  unless  we  allow  our- 
selves to  be  duped  by  appearances  and  profes- 
sions, that  the  methods  of  Louis  XL  and  Thomas 
Cromwell,  of  Elizabeth  and  Richelieu,  are  again 
used  to-day,  with  only  such  differences  as  are  occa- 
sioned by  the  changes  of  time  and  circumstance. 
What  those  monarchs  and  ministers  did  to  found 
the  national  state,  modern  statesmen  are  doing 
to  found  the  national  empire.  Of  this  there  is  no 
lack  of  illustration.  Thus,  the  most  momentous 
political  actions  and  reprisals  are  based  upon 
claims  that  would  hardly  justify  more  than  a 
demand  for  indemnity.  Under  the  pretext  of 
exacting  satisfaction  for  the  murder  of  mission- 
aries, Germany  enters  the  territory  of  China  and 
obtains  there  a  permanent  foothold  and  most 
valuable  concessions.  Britain,  desirous  of  securing 
its  paramount  control  in  Southern  Africa,  seizes 
upon  the  pretext  of  Uitlander  grievances  to  make 
the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal  acknowledge  their 
dependence  on  the  empire,  and  to  interfere  in 
the  internal  organization  of  their  government, 
contrary  to  the  international  rules  governing  the 
relations  of  the  two  countries. 

Friendship  on  the  surface  too  often  goes  with 
concealed  enmity  and  the  employment  of  under- 
handed, treacherous  means.  Though  Russia, 
France,  and  England  are  nominally  on  terms  of 

i8 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

friendship,  the  former  two  countries,  through  their 
governments,  recently  rendered  aid  to  a  movement 
in  which  the  fierce  barbarian  tribes  of  the  Soudan 
were  attempting  to  overthrow  English  control  along 
the  Upper  Nile.  With  similar  disregard  for  ac- 
cepted rules  of  international  conduct,  Mr.  Rhodes, 
the  leader  of  the  imperial  policy  in  South  Africa, 
organized  a  raid  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  polit- 
ical control  over  a  country  nominally  on  the  most 
friendly  footing  with  Great  Britain.  Published 
treaties  are  supplemented,  and  often  rendered  nu- 
gatory, by  secret  engagements  with  other  powers. 
Thus  Germany,  nominally  the  ally  of  Austria, 
concludes  a  secret  engagement  with  Russia,  sup- 
posedly their  common  foe.  The  assurances  of 
Russian  diplomacy,  especially  with  regard  to  af- 
fairs in  the  far  Orient,  are  taken  by  all  diplomats 
to  be  a  mere  means  of  concealing  the  real  inten- 
tion of  that  power.^  Even  the  peace  programme 
of  Russia,  while  perhaps  emanating  from  the 
really  humanitarian  ideals  of  the  Czar,  was  sup- 
ported by  his  ministry  from  very  different  motives. 
Peace  in  order  to  gain  strength  for  the  execution 
of  ambitious  projects  in  Asia  is  a  very  different 
matter  from  peace  for  the  common  benefit  of 
humanity.  The  manner  in  which  the  cry  of 
"  humanity,  liberty,  and  civilization  "  is  abused,  is 
another  modern  instance  of  Machiavellism.  No 
matter  how  obvious  and  patent  the  motive  of  mere 

^  See  Rawlinson,  England  atid  Russia  in  the  East,  p.  317;   also 
Krausse,  Russia  in  Asia. 

19 


WORLD    POLITICS 

material  gain  may  be,  the  claim  that  savages  are 
to  be  civilized,  and  that  humanity  is  to  be  spread, 
never  comes  amiss.  That  the  promised  civiliza- 
tion often  consists  in  a  speedy  eradication  of  the 
savages  from  the  face  of  the  earth  must  be  read 
between  the  lines. 

The  manner  in  which  all  considerations  are 
subordinated  to  what  is  believed  to  foster  the 
greatness  and  strength  of  the  nation  or  its  peculiar 
interests  is  very  clearly  shown  by  the  incidents  of 
the  Dreyfus  trial,  and  by  the  fact  that  a  nation 
priding  itself  on  its  liberal  principles,  nevertheless 
concluded  an  alliance  with  Russia,  and  became 
almost  frantically  enthusiastic  at  the  prospect  of 
added  strength  which  that  arrangement  opened 
up.  Even  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  reports  of 
the  suffering  of  weavers  in  Saxony  and  Silesia, 
occasioned  by  the  closing  of  the  American  mar- 
kets through  protective  tariffs,  have  been  received 
with  joy  and  acclamation  as  a  proof  of  the  efficacy 
of  a  national  industrial  policy.  The  older  ideas  of 
the  soUdarity  of  humanity,  of  universal  brother- 
hood, have  largely  lost  their  force,  and  have  been 
replaced  by  a  narrow  national  patriotism.  Thus, 
a  prominent  member  of  the  American  Peace  Com- 
mission of  1898  stated  during  the  proceedings  at 
Paris  that  "  the  will  of  the  conqueror  is  the  treaty." 

The  utilitarian  aspect  of  national  imperialism  is 
very  clearly  stated  by  Edward  Dicey,  when  in  the 
following  language  he  explains  his  position  as  an 
expansionist  :  — 

20 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

"  In  every  part  of  the  world,  where  British  interests  are  at 
stake,  I  am  in  favor  of  advancing  and  upholding  these  inter- 
ests, even  at  the  cost  of  annexation  and  at  the  risk  of  war. 
The  only  qualification  I  admit,  is  that  the  country  we  desire 
to  annex  or  take  under  our  protection,  the  claims  we  choose 
to  assert,  and  the  cause  we  decide  to  espouse,  should  be  cal- 
culated to  confer  a  tangible  advantage  upon  the  British 
Empire."  ^ 

Using  the  case  of  Venezuela  as  an  illustration, 
Mr.  Dicey  expresses  the  belief  that  the  claims 
of  that  republic  were  utterly  unjust,  and  that  the 
intervention  of  the  United  States  was  legally  and 
morally  indefensible ;  but  that,  as  the  territory  in 
question  would  have  been  of  no  material  value  to 
the  British  Empire,  it  was  wise  not  to  enforce 
the  claim.  This  really  amounts  to  saying  that  no 
matter  how  good  the  right  of  a  nation  may  be,  it 
is  folly  to  insist  upon  the  enforcement  of  that  right 
unless  it  will  "pay."  Or,  perhaps,  it  would  be 
more  just  to  state  the  proposition  in  this  manner : 
The  statesmen  to  whom  the  welfare  of  a  nation  is 
intrusted  are  not  warranted  in  spending  its  blood 
and  treasure  for  any  merely  sentimental,  idealistic 
purposes,  no  matter  how  inspiring  they  may 
be ;  the  aim  of  statesmanship  must  always  rather 
be  to  further  the  real,  vital,  material  interests 
of  a  people,  and  only  where  these  can  clearly 
be  advanced  is  a  sacrifice  of  national  resources 
justifiable. 

^  Edward  Dicey,  "  Peace  and  War  in  South  Africa,"  Nineteenth 
Century,  September,  1899. 

21 


WORLD   POLITICS 

As  we  glance  over  the  incidents  that  shed  light 
upon  the  present  tendency  of  politics  and  seem  to 
mark  it  as  narrow  and  selfish,  we  are  likely  to 
overlook  the  fact  that  along  with  the  increased 
intensity  of  rivalry  there  has  come  also  an  honest 
desire  to  raise  the  level  of  competition  among 
nations.  Most  statesmen  to-day  would  rather  em- 
ploy honest  and  humane  means  ;  and  just  so  far 
as  they  are  assured  by  international  agreement 
that  other  nations  are  bound  to  the  same  condition, 
they  will  gladly  relinquish  the  use  of  the  instru- 
ments of  Machiavellian  politics. 

The  recent  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague  has 
marked  a  stage  of  real  progress  in  this  respect. 
Although  the  disarmament  proposals  were  from 
the  first  doomed  to  failure,  because  no  nation  will 
allow  its  military  strength  to  be  limited  from  with- 
out ;  still,  there  was  a  real  cooperation  among 
civilized  powers  for  the  better  adjustment  of  in- 
ternational difficulties.  The  arbitration  tribunal 
for  which  the  Conference  made  provision  is  by 
many  regarded  as  a  merely  nugatory  institution, 
which  may  serve  to  inspire  sentimentalists  with 
hope,  but  which  can  be  of  no  real  use  in  practical 
politics.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  all 
ordered  jural  relations  have  had  their  origin  in 
informal  arbitration.  By  the  Conference,  the  sys- 
tem of  arbitration  has  been  given  a  settled  form, 
and  even  though  no  effective  sanction  has  as  yet 
been  established,  the  habitual  regularity  of  inter- 
national  relations    has   certainly   been    promoted. 

32 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

Article  27  of  The  Hague  Convention  even  allows 
friendly  nations  to  use  their  moral  influence  to 
induce  neighbors  whose  interests  are  conflicting 
to  submit  to  arbitration.  How  effective  this  article 
is  considered,  though  it  does  not  provide  for  ob- 
ligatory arbitration,  is  evidenced  by  the  strong 
objections  which  are  made  to  it  by  the  German 
nationalists,  who  hold  that  it  savors  too  much  of 
gratuitous  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  other 
nations.^ 

Another  very  important  institution  created  by 
the  Convention  is  the  Commission  of  Inquiry, 
Too  often  national  conflicts  are  the  result  of  mis- 
understanding. If  time  be  taken  to  investigate 
and  clear  up  the  facts,  the  difficulties  generally 
disappear  of  themselves.  These  Commissions  of 
Inquiry  have  been  instituted  to  afford  a  regular 
means  of  obtaining  light  on  intricate  international 
questions,  and  their  use  has  been  recommended 
to  civilized  nations  in  the  hope  of  promoting  a 
better  understanding  among  them. 

Of  course,  from  these  results  to  the  effective 
establishment  of  a  world  peace  is  a  far  cry. 
World  unity  may  be  approached  by  either  of  two 
systems  :  by  federation,  gradually  growing  into 
compact  solidarity ;  or  by  unrestricted  competition, 
with  the  final  preponderance  of  one  great  power, 
which  shall  absorb    and    assimilate   all   the   rest. 

^  This  is  the  ground  of  criticism  taken  by  Professor  von  Stengel, 
a  German  member  of  the  Conference,  in  his  public  discussions  of  its 
results.     See  also  his  Der  ewige  Friede. 

23 


WORLD   POLITICS 

It  is  undoubtedly  the  former  ideal  for  the  gradual 
realization  of  which  most  men  are  hoping,  but  its 
time  has  not  yet  come.  The  world  is  not,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  a  community  with  complete,  con- 
scious solidarity  of  interests  and  ideals.^ 

It  is,  however,  very  doubtful  whether  political 
world  unity  is  in  any  case  desirable.  Our  imagi- 
nation instinctively  shrinks  from  the  thought  of 
a  regime  of  dead  uniformity  throughout  all  the 
countries  of  the  globe  :  whether  it  be  imposed  by 
the  harsh  will  of  a  despotic,  conquering  race,  or 
reached  by  the  gradual  assimilation  of  all  nation- 
alities, such  a  prospect  is  equally  uninviting.  We 
should  ponder  this  well  before  we  express  a  wish 
even  for  the  gradually  increased  paramountcy  of 
our  own  civilization ;  for  even  that  would  mean  in 
the  end  a  deadening  uniformity. 

Far  preferable  is  the  present  state  of  interna- 
tional equilibrium,  with  the  intense  rivalry  among 
peoples  that  brings  out  their  strongest  character- 
istics. Even  with  its  occasional  discords,  the  pres- 
ent general  harmony  of  the  concert  of  nations 
is  to  be  preferred  to  the  dead  monotone  of 
a  world  state.  Each  nationality  is  in  this  com- 
petition given  an  opportunity  to  develop  its 
characteristics  freely,  and   to   enrich  the  general 

^  The  procrastination  of  the  Delagoa  Bay  Arbitration  Commission 
has  just  at  present  given  rise  to  some  doubts  as  to  the  efficiency  of 
arbitration.  The  proceedings  extended  over  nine  years  (1891- 
1900).  It  may,  however,  be  confidently  expected  that  under  the 
newr  organization  such  delays  would  be  avoided. 

24 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

life  of  the  civilized  world  with  its  distinctive 
literature,  art,  music,  and  moral  ideals.  The  rapid 
social  progress  since  the  Renaissance  is  certainly 
due  in  great  measure  to  this  rivalry  of  independent 
nations,  constantly  invited  to  self-criticism  by  the 
successes  and  failures  of  their  neighbors.  At 
present,  civilization  has  the  benefit  of  the  constant 
mutual  criticisms  among  nations,  by  which  an 
intelligent  and  real  public  opinion  of  the  world  is 
created ;  in  this  manner  the  individual  bent  of 
a  particular  nation  is  restrained  from  becoming 
exaggerated  into  a  vice  or  engendering  a  danger 
to  the  general  welfare. 

The  rivalry  among  nations  is  sharp,  and  calls 
for  the  constant  exercise  of  all  their  intellectual, 
moral,  and  physical  powers,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
decadence  that  would  lose  them  their  position  in 
the  family  of  nations.  So  fierce  does  this  struggle 
at  times  become  that  to  men  of  pessimistic  mood 
a  great  world  warfare  seems  inevitable  within 
the  near  future.  We  should,  however,  avoid  the 
temper  of  mind  that  constantly  engenders  suspi- 
cions and  exaggerated  fears.  Thus  far,  happily, 
no  nation  has  acquired  enough  preponderance  to 
threaten  really  and  effectively  the  political  exis- 
tence of  its  neighbors.  Most  of  the  mutual  fear 
and  mistrust  that  mar  the  harmony  of  nations 
is  founded  on  misunderstanding.  There  is,  it  is 
true,  a  great  danger  to  civilization  in  this  constant 
misinterpretation  of  motives ;  and  it  were  well  if 
people  would  set  about  it  to  study  seriously  the 

25 


WORLD   POLITICS 

political  ideals,  motives,  and  aims  of  other  nations, 
rather  than  seize  upon  every  pretext  to  scent  a 
trace  of  bitter  enmity.  Thus,  though  the  expan- 
sion of  Russian  influence  in  Asia  is  undoubtedly  a 
serious  matter,  and  may  entail  very  grave  conse- 
quences on  Western  civilization,  that  gross  mis- 
representation of  every  act,  motive,  and  impulse 
of  the  northern  empire  and  its  government,  with 
which  we  are  constantly  meeting,  tends  to  obscure 
the  clear  vision  of  actual  political  facts,  and  at  the 
same  time  is  likely  to  engender  deep  resentment 
among  the  Russian  people.  It  is  in  the  interest 
of  civilization  that  nations  should  watch  each  other 
carefully,  and  that  they  should  not  permit  any 
one  power  to  obtain  undue  advantages  over  others ; 
it  is  equally  important  that  this  be  done  in  a  spirit 
of  mutual  understanding  and  amity,  without  sow- 
ing the  seed  of  hatred  and  unending  dissensions. 


36 


CHAPTER   II 

Political  Methods  of  the  New  National 
Imperialism 

After  these  more  general  considerations,  it  may 
be  in  place  to  review  briefly  the  specific  conse- 
quences of  the  new  spirit  in  world  politics,  and 
the  methods  adopted  by  the  various  nations  to 
meet  the  new  contingencies. 

With  the  recent  developments  in  imperialism, 
attention  has  been  directed  to  the  great  impor- 
tance of  sea  power.  The  struggles  among  the 
continental  nations  of  Europe  have  to  be  fought 
out  chiefly  on  land,  and  therefore  huge  armaments 
are  still  considered  necessary.  When  imperialism 
is  superadded  to  nationalism,  strong  navies  also 
become  a  condition  of  existence,  since  they  alone 
can  protect  transoceanic  possessions  and  ward  off 
invasion.  Among  imperial  powers  holding  trans- 
oceanic possessions,  naval  warfare  rather  than  land 
warfare  will,  in  many  cases,  be  decisive  in  the 
future,  and  an  empire  that  does  not  maintain  a 
navy  will  be  shorn  of  its  dependencies,  as  was 
Spain  by  the  United  States.  After  the  middle  of 
the   present   century,  the   navy   was   for   a   time 

27 


WORLD   POLITICS 

neglected  in  England ;  but  with  the  growth  of 
imperiahsm  since  the  time  of  Beaconsfield,  there 
has  been  a  remarkable  revival  of  interest  in  naval 
power.  This  has  been  taken  as  an  omen,  a  por- 
tent, by  the  continental  nations,  who  follow  the 
lead  of  England  as  rapidly  as  they  can.^ 

While  navies  are  highly  important  for  the  pro- 
tection of  colonies  and  sea-borne  commerce,  their 
efficiency  in  attacks  upon  the  mainland  coast  de- 
fences has  diminished.  The  protection  of  oceanic 
communication  is,  therefore,  the  chief  function 
of  modern  navies.  Formerly,  navies  exerted  an 
important  influence  by  attacking  the  coastwise 
trade  of  an  enemy.  Pressure  of  this  sort  can 
no  longer  be  exercised  to  the  same  extent,  since 
railways  can  now  be  used  to  transport  merchan- 
dise between  the  different  parts  of  a  national 
realm  and  neutral  ports.  Thus,  in  case  of  a  war 
with  a  continental  nation,  the  naval  position  of 
England  as  an  assailant  would,  in  this  respect,  not 
be  so  strong  as  at  the  beginning  of  this  century. 
However,  nations  of  the  first  class  are  no  longer 
confined  to  the  mainland  of  a  single  continent, 
and  hence  the  importance  of  navies  has  been 
increased,  while  the  number  of  their  functions  has 
diminished. 

^  The  actual  increase  at  present  planned  and  contemplated  in 
Russia  and  Germany  will  be  considered  in  a  later  chapter.  The 
importance  of  navies  as  protective  agencies  vi^ill  be  realized  when 
we  consider  that  at  present  seventy  per  cent  of  the  total  trade 
between  the  ten  leading  nations  is  sea-borne. 

28 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

The  effect  on  future  warfare  of  this  increased 
importance  of  navies  must  not  be  overlooked. 
War  will  be  waged  by  means  of  carefully  con- 
structed machines,  and  the  importance  of  engi- 
neering skill  and  marksmanship  is  constantly  being 
enhanced.  Decisive  battles  will  be  fought  with 
less  loss  of  life,  with  less  suffering,  carnage,  and 
rapine.  At  the  battle  of  Santiago,  when  the 
engines  of  war  had  been  demolished,  the  object 
of  warfare  had  been  gained,  and  the  victorious 
fleet  could  devote  itself  to  saving  the  lives  of  the 
vanquished.  By  surrounding  himself  with  a  co- 
lossal floating  armament,  man  can  exert  to  the 
utmost  his  ingenuity  and  skill.  Intellect  is  pro- 
tected, and  the  most  revolting  accessories  of  war- 
fare are  avoided.  Ships  suffer,  while  lives  are 
spared.  The  pride  which  nations  take  in  their 
majestic  battleships  is,  therefore,  justifiable,  since 
all  the  industrial  and  intellectual  energies  of  the 
nation  can  typify  themselves  in  these  instruments. 
Of  course,  wars  of  extermination  between  two 
powers  are  stiU  possible ;  but  as  conditions  will  be 
in  the  next  century,  a  power,  after  the  complete 
destruction  of  its  navy  and  commerce,  may  realize 
that  further  resistance  is  futile,  and  thus  the  terri- 
ble sufferings  of  land  warfare  may  be  avoided. 
To  a  modern  empire,  therefore,  a  strong  navy  is 
of  as  great  importance  as  a  strong  standing  army.^ 

^  On  account  of  the  compactness  of  the  Russian  dominions  and 
their  geographical  situation,  the  above  considerations  do  not  apply 
with  the  same  force  to  Russia  as  to  other  powers. 

29 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Navies  are  by  some  deemed  especially  compati- 
ble with  democracy,  while  standing  armies  are 
always  regarded  as  aristocratic  or  monarchical 
institutions,  —  aristocratic,  because  fostering  an 
official  military  caste ;  monarchical,  because  re- 
quiring the  single  and  permanent  headship  which 
is  best  afforded  in  a  strong  monarchy.^  The 
social  organization  favored  by  a  strong  army  is 
thoroughly  opposed  to  democracy;  an  artificial 
code  of  caste  honor,  special  privileges  for  a 
military  aristocracy,  subordination  of  all  interests 
to  those  of  the  army,  are  almost  inevitable  results 
of  militarism. 

The  navy,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  exert  such 
a  deep  and  immediate  influence  on  the  internal 
social  and  political  life  of  the  nation.  Without 
laying  too  much  stress  on  the  fact  that  Athens, 
Holland,  and  Great  Britain,  the  greatest  naval 
powers  of  the  ancient  and  modern  world,  were 
popular  repubhcs,  and  that  no  admiral  has  ever 
overturned  his  country's  liberties,  we  may  justify 
the  belief  that  large  navies  are  safer  instruments 
of  power  for  democratic  states  than  standing 
armies,  from  the  very  nature  and  character  of  the 
two.  The  navy  does  not  come  into  such  direct 
contact  with  the  life  of  the  people  as  to  influence 
social  organization  in  accordance  with  its  own 
system  of  official  aristocracy  and  popular  subordi- 
nation. Moreover,  the  life  on  board  a  man-of-war, 
among  officers  and  men,  is  more  democratic,  has 

1  See  Treitschke's  Politik,  Vol.  II.,  p.  356. 
30 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

more  of  camaraderie ^  than  is  the  case  in  a  land 
army. 

In  this  connection,  the  growing  importance  of 
sea  communications,  protected  trade  routes,  and 
naval  stations,  claims  our  attention.  Modern  im- 
perialism is  more  vitally  interested  in  commercial 
expansion  than  in  territorial  acquisition ;  the  great 
nations  are  becoming  more  and  more  dependent 
on  transoceanic  markets.  To  obtain  these  and  to 
secure  their  future  accessibility  and  development, 
the  trade  routes  leading  to  them  must  be  protected ; 
and  to  this  end,  navies,  as  well  as  coaling  stations 
and  trade  entrepots,  are  indispensable. 

Recent  history  can  be  correctly  and  fully  under- 
stood only  when  read  in  the  light  of  this  necessity 
of  safe  and  uninterrupted  communication  between 
the  older  nations  and  their  markets  and  depen- 
dencies. This  consideration  has  been  at  the  basis 
of  the  English  policy  in  the  Orient  and  in  Africa. 
Constantinople  had  to  be  protected  from  Russian 
encroachment,  and  Cyprus  was  virtually  annexed, 
in  order  that  the  Mediterranean  route  to  India 
might  not  be  menaced  ;  on  the  same  foundation 
rests  the  friendship  between  Great  Britain  and 
Italy  and  the  occupation  of  Egypt,  whose  impor- 
tance as  a  station  on  the  road  to  the  far  East 
Napoleon  with  the  intuition  of  genius  fully  realized. 
Even  South  African  politics  ^are  largely  influenced 
by  this  same  consideration.  The  Transvaal  war  is 
explained  and  defended  on  the  ground  that  Great 
Britain  must  protect  her  position  at  the  Cape,  the 
31 


WORLD   POLITICS 

most  important  station  on  the  alternative  route  to 
India,  against  attacks  from  the  rear,  and  that  for 
that  purpose  she  must  extend  her  dominion  as  far 
as  possible  into  the  interior  and  break  the  separatist 
ambition  of  the  Boers.  To  be  sure,  it  is  highly 
doubtful  whether  the  Boers  would  have  contem- 
plated an  attack  on  the  British  power  at  the  Cape, 
and,  even  so,  whether  the  price  paid  in  practically- 
allowing  Russia  free  hand  for  the  time  in  Asia  is 
not  too  heavy,  even  in  return  for  a  complete  accom- 
plishment of  English  policy  in  South  Africa.  But 
in  any  event  the  truth  remains,  that  the  whole 
political  situation,  from  Constantinople  to  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope,  has  been  influenced  by  England's 
need  of  protected  communications. 

German  imperial  policy  is  also  animated  by  the 
purpose  of  developing  oceanic  commerce  and  ac- 
quiring naval  bases  for  its  protection,^  while  the 
recent  developments  of  American  expansion  obtain 
their  chief  significance  from  the  fact  that  Cuba, 
Hawaii,  and  Manila  are  important  stations  on 
great  oceanic  trade  routes,  —  that  of  the  Nicara- 
guan  Canal,  and  that  leading  to  China  and  India 
from  our  western  coast. 

Coming  now  to  the  methods  by  which  national 
expansion  is  effected,  by  which,  in  other  words, 
entrance  is  gained  to  territory  not  yet  appropriated 
by  the  great  powers,  we  have  to  consider  in  the 
first  place  the  influence  of  missions.  There  is  a 
measure  of  truth  in  the  saying  that  the  flag  follows 

1  See  Part  IV.,  Ch.  IV. 
32 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

the  missionary  and  trade  follows  the  flag,  although 
the  favorite  example  cited  in  Germany,  —  that 
of  the  same  British  ship  taking  out  missionaries 
and  cheaply  manufactured  idols, — may  be  slightly 
tinctured  with  international  pleasantry.  The  im- 
portance attributed  to  this  agency  by  the  powers 
is  well  shown  by  the  struggle  between  France  and 
Germany  for  the  right  to  protect  the  Roman 
Catholic  missions  of  the  Orient.  France  has  been 
the  traditional  protector  of  Catholic  Christians  in 
the  East.  This  monopoly  it  has  been  the  constant 
effort  of  Germany  to  break  down  by  using  all  the 
influence  which  the  emperor  could  bring  to  bear 
at  the  Vatican.  The  emperor  has  asserted  his 
right  to  the  protectorate  over  certain  German 
communities  of  missionaries.  And  we  all  know 
how  a  protectorate  of  this  nature  was  utilized  in 
China,  the  emperor  demanding  reparation  for  the 
murder  of  missionaries  at  Kiao-chow,  and  making 
the  outrage  a  pretext  for  gaining  a  permanent 
foothold  in  the  Celestial  Empire.  His  exertions 
to  gain  from  the  Vatican  a  religious  protectorate 
in  Palestine  and  Syria  have  not  been  successful, 
but  he  has  nevertheless  declared  it  to  be  the  right 
and  the  policy  of  the  German  Empire  to  protect 
German  missionaries  wherever  found. ^  As  the  pri- 
ority of  appearance  of  a  nation  on  unappropriated 

^  See  an  article  on  "  La  Politique  Allemande  et  le  Protectorat  des 
Missions  Catholiques,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  September,  1898. 
Also  Etienne  Lamy,  "  La  France  du  Levant,"  ibid.,  January,  1899. 
See  further  treatment  in  Part  IV.,  Ch.  IL 

D  33 


WORLD   POLITICS 

soil  is  of  great  importance  under  the  doctrine  oi 
preoccupation,  the  emissaries  of  religion  who  begin 
the  civilizing  process  are,  under  the  present  ex- 
aggerated conditions  of  competition,  most  valuable 
advance  pickets  of  national  expansion. 

The  connection  between  expansion  and  com- 
merce has  next  to  be  considered.  There  has  been 
much  heated  controversy  as  to  the  relation  be- 
tween commerce  and  political  protection.  Does 
commerce  really  follow  the  flag  .-*  It  is  indeed  true 
that  the  English  have  lost  commerce  relatively  and 
even  absolutely  in  a  number  of  their  possessions 
and  protectorates,  including  Canada,  Egypt,  and 
even  India,  while  Germany,  without  any  political 
standing  in  these  regions,  is  everywhere  gaining 
heavily.^  At  the  present  time,  when  many  nations 
are  competing  for  the  world's  trade,  it  is  not  so 
easy  as  it  formerly  was  to  render  a  new  colony 
commercially  dependent.  Thus,  British  trade  is 
still  most  prominent  in  the  older  British  colonies, 
and  in  possessions  where  it  has  long  been  estab- 
lished, as  in  India,  Australia,  and  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope.  The  persistence  of  British-Australian  trade 
relations  is  attributable  to  the  fact  that  Australia 
was  settled  by  true  English  colonists,  who  naturally 
continue  to  supply  themselves  with  the  manufac- 
tures of  their  mother  country.  The  element  of 
mutual  needs,  coupled  with  that  of   similarity  of 

1  See  Farrer,  "Does  Trade  follow  the  Flag?"  Contemporary  Re 
view,  December,  1898;  Von  Brandt, "  Indien,"  Deutsche  Rundschau, 
August,  1S99. 

34 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

tastes  and  habits,  which  characterizes  the  relations 
between  manufacturing  England  and  her  agricul- 
tural colonies,  is  the  most  natural  cause  for  perma- 
nent trade  relations.  As  long  as  this  mutual 
helpfulness  continues,  it  will  be  difficult  to  divert 
trade  from  these  channels. 

In  Canada,  the  element  of  geographical  situa- 
tion becomes  prominent,  that  country  taking  only 
thirty-three  per  cent  of  its  imports  from  the  mother 
country,  while  Australia  takes  seventy-one  per  cent. 
The  influence  of  geographical  situation  is  also  seen 
in  the  predominance  of  American  trade  in  Cuba, 
and  in  the  great  volume  of  commerce  transacted 
between  Algiers  and  France,  Naturally,  with 
increasing  facility  of  communication,  the  factor 
of  geographical  situation  becomes  steadily  less 
important. 

It  is  also  necessary  to  consider  the  mechanism 
of  trade,  —  banking  relations  and  the  merchant 
marine.  The  conquest  of  South  American  trade 
by  British  and  German  merchants  has  been  due 
entirely  to  these  instrumentalities.  Geographically 
and  politically  the  United  States  would  seem  to 
have  a  decided  advantage  in  the  competition  for 
this  trade,  but  there  are  no  direct  banking  relations 
and  very  few  direct  sea  communications  between 
North  and  South  America.  The  old  world,  on 
the  other  hand,  has  established  such  means  of 
commercial  intercourse  with  the  Latin  republics, 
and  an  ascendency  has  thus  been  created  which 
can  only  be  replaced  by  the  fostering  of  similar 

35 


WORLD   POLITICS 

institutions  to  connect   the  various    parts   of   the 
Western  continent. 

The  great  strides  which  German  commerce  has 
made  in  the  last  two  decades  afford  sufficient  proof 
that  commerce  and  industry  can  flourish  in  foreign 
lands  without  territorial  annexation.  The  German 
merchants  of  South  America  have  even  been 
favored  by  the  very  fact  of  their  abstention  from 
poHtics.  When  we  consider  the  other  elements,  — 
racial  affinity,  long-established  trade  connections, 
geographical  situation,  and  efficient  financial  and 
transportational  communications, — the  bare  fact 
of  political  supremacy  seems  to  afford  very  little 
aid  in  the  effectual  or  permanent  fostering  of  com- 
mercial relations. 

The  one  advantage  which  political  control  clearly 
bestows  upon  its  holder  is  a  financial  influence,  by 
means  of  which  many  of  the  large  contracts  for 
internal  improvements  may  be  thrown  into  the 
hands  of  citizens  of  the  controlling  power.  France 
has  made  the  effort  to  use  her  political  influence 
for  this  purpose  in  Indo-China,i  but  it  will  hardly 
be  claimed  that  the  vast  amount  of  treasure 
which  has  been  spent  in  acquiring  and  maintain- 
ing that  control  has  as  yet  been  justified  by  an 
adequate  return.  It  is,  therefore,  very  question- 
able whether  a  nation  incurring  large  colonial 
expenditures' can  reasonably  cherish  the  hope  of 
reimbursing  itself  or  its  citizens  by  the  exploitation 
of  inland  resources  in  backward  colonies. 
1  See  Part  II.,  Ch.  III. 
36 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

As  affecting  the  true  importance  of  the  question 
just  discussed,  we  must  also  consider  the  small  vol- 
ume of  the  total  colonial  trade  as  compared 
with  the  commerce  among  independent  nations. 
The  highly  civilized  countries  of  Europe  and 
America  offer  far  better  markets  to  each  other 
than  could  ever  be  expected  of  the  colonies. 
Great  Britain  is  a  specially  rich  and  favorable 
market  to  the  other  nations;  they  would,  there- 
fore, be  involved  in  the  suffering,  should  that 
empire,  a  marvellous  political  and  economic  organ- 
ism, be  destroyed.  Great  Britain  alone  buys  as 
much  of  Russia  as  do  all  the  other  leading  conti- 
nental powers  taken  together.  As  to  colonial 
trade,  it  has  been  computed  that  it  amounts  to 
only  9.5  per  cent  of  the  total  exports  and  11.6 
per  cent  of  the  total  imports  of  all  the  commercial 
nations.^ 

When  Great  Britain  was  alone  in  the  field  of 
colonization  and  colonial  commerce,  it  was  quite 
true  that  trade  followed  the  flag ;  but  with  the 
growing  competition,  matters  have  changed  :  hence 
the  free-trade  principles  of  England,  under  which 
the  whole  British  Empire  has  been  so  liberally 
thrown  open  to  the  world's  commerce,  have  re- 
cently found  many  opponents  at  home.  These 
protectionists  point  with  apprehension  to  the  pol- 
icy of  Russia  and  France,  who,  as  soon  as  they 
acquire  new  territories,  erect  about  them  a  pro- 

1  See  Flux,  "  The  Flag  and  Trade,"  in  the  Journal  of  the  Royal 
Statistical  Society,  September,  1899. 

37 


WORLD   POLITICS 

tective  wall  in  the  hope  of  exploiting  them  for  the 
exclusive  benefit  of  the  home  country.  From  this 
they  argue  that  England  must  in  self-defence 
adopt  similar  measures.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
a  growth  of  protectionist  feeling  and  policy  is 
going  hand  in  hand  with  the  growth  of  imperial- 
ism. Germany  and  the  United  States  are  intensely 
protectionist  at  home,  and  there  will  of  course  be 
the  strongest  pressure  brought  to  bear  by  the 
protected  interests  to  induce  them  to  extend 
these  principles  to  their  colonial  possessions.  In 
England  herself,  the  stronghold  of  "  Manchestri- 
anism,"  it  is  not  unlikely  that  modifications  will  be 
made,  which,  to  use  the  language  of  Chamberlain, 
"do  not  comport  with  old  free-trade  doctrines." 
In  the  last  few  decades  the  policy  of  England 
toward  her  self-governing  colonies  has  been  to 
allow  them  complete  freedom  of  fiscal  and  rev- 
enue arrangements,  and  to  grant  to  all  countries 
the  same  treatment  in  these  dependencies  which 
she  herself  enjoys.  In  her  protectionist  colonies 
the  mother  country  has  paid  the  duties  without  ask- 
ing any  favor  on  account  of  her  position.  This 
unusual  liberahty  was  guaranteed  by  the  most 
favored  nation  clauses  in  the  German  and  Belgian 
treaties  with  England.^  In  1897  Canada,  whose 
overtures  for  closer  commercial  relations  with  the 

^  The  Belgian  treaty  of  1862,  the  German  Zollverein  treaty 
of  1865.  Article  5  of  the  latter  declares  that  "any  favor,  privilege, 
or  reduction  in  the  tariff  of  duties  which  either  of  the  contracting 
parties  may  concede  to  any  third  power,  shall  be  extended  immedi- 

38 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

United  States  had  not  received  sufficient  en- 
couragement, desired  to  give  the  mother  country 
preferential  treatment,  and  here  it  was  that  the 
traditional  policy  of  England  was  for  the  first 
time  abandoned.  In  1898  the  treaties  with  Ger- 
many and  Belgium  were  rescinded,  and  the  way 
was  thus  cleared  for  a  preferential  tariff  in  favor 
of  Great  Britain,  which  was  soon  passed  by  the 
Canadian  Parliament.^  This  is  the  first  step 
toward  the  realization  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  pro- 
ject of  a  great  British  ZoUvercin,  within  which 
products  are  to  be  freely  exchanged,  but  which  is 
to  be  walled  off  from  the  outside  world  by  pro- 
tective duties.^ 

The  danger  threatened  in  this  growth  of  pro- 
tectionist sentiment  is  that  of  cutting  up  the  world 
into  a  number  of  mutually  exclusive  spheres, 
making  trade  national,  and  accentuating  still 
further  the  excessive  antagonisms  between  various 
countries.  It  cannot  be  expected  of  Great  Britain 
that  she  alone,  of  all  powers,  shall  keep  her  pos- 


ately  and  unconditionally  to  the  other."  Article  7  excludes  dis- 
crimination in  favor  of  the  mother  country  by  the  British  colonies 
as  against  the  Zollverein. 

^  The  preferential  rates  in  favor  of  Great  Britain,  India,  and 
New  South  Wales,  are  25  per  cent  lower  than  the  general  rates. 

"^  He  first  definitely  outlined  his  policy  in  a  speech  before  the  Con- 
gress of  the  Chambers  of  Commerce  of  the  empire,  on  June  8, 
1896.  Free  trade  is  to  be  adopted  throughout  the  empire,  but  the 
individual  parts  are  to  be  left  free  to  impose  duties  on  foreign  im- 
ports. Great  Britain  herself  is  to  lay  a  tariff  on  agricultural  pro- 
ducts, so  as  to  favor  her  colonies  against  the  rest  of  the  world. 

39 


WORLD   POLITICS 

sessions  open  to  all  the  world,  and  at  the  same 
time  submit  to  exclusion  by  hostile  tariffs  from  the 
markets  of  Russia,  Germany,  France,  and  the 
United  States.  Russia  and  France  are  completely 
committed  to  an  exclusive  commercial  policy.  It 
remains  then  for  the  other  three  nations  to  main- 
tain in  their  new  protectorates  the  policy  of  equal 
opportunity  for  all  civilized  nations.  If  the  ex- 
pansion of  trade,  naturally  cosmopolitan,  is  to  be 
interfered  with  for  the  purpose  of  building  up 
mutually  exclusive  national  empires,  commerce 
and  industry  will  have  to  pay  the  cost  of  expan- 
sion, and  the  growth  of  the  world's  wealth  will 
be  infinitely  retarded. 

Commercial  intercourse  with  remote  regions  of 
the  globe  leads  naturally  to  industrial  undertak- 
ings, to  the  fostering  of  waterways,  to  the  building 
of  railways,  to  the  mining  of  coal  and  metals, 
and  finally  to  manufacturing  enterprises. 

Within  the  last  two  decades  there  has  been  a 
radical  change  in  English  economic  life.  Up  to 
the  eighties,  the  tendency  was  to  make  England 
the  industrial  centre  of  the  world.  English  manu- 
facturers, English  workmen,  and  English  exports 
were  the  chief  consideration.  But  when  English 
industry  had  been  developed  to  its  utmost  capacity, 
and  when  inviting  foreign  fields  beckoned  the  in- 
vestor, Great  Britain  had  to  become  more  and 
more  capitaHstic  rather  than  industrial.  Since 
hostile  tariffs  were  keeping  out  from  the  American 
market   the   goods   of   England,    the   overflowing 

40 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

capital  of  that  country  founded  huge  manufactur- 
ing establishments  in  the  "  States,"  where  the 
protected  articles  are  now  manufactured.  So, 
too,  in  Asia,  Africa,  South  America,  —  wher- 
ever natural  wealth  is  waiting  for  develop- 
ment, —  the  British  investor  has  been  at  hand. 
Vast  returns  are  received  by  England  in  the 
form  of  dividends.  The  balance  of  trade  is 
constantly  against  England,  but  almost  one-third 
of  the  imports  which  she  receives  consists  of  re- 
turns on  capital  invested  abroad  and  in  the  colonies. 
Hence  has  arisen  the  more  modern  conception  of 
England  as  a  financial  centre  from  which  the  in- 
dustrial operations  of  the  whole  world  are  to  be 
conducted,  from  which  capital  is  to  flow,  and  to 
which  produce  is  to  return  again,  —  the  concep- 
tion of  another  and  a  better  Rome,  drawing  its 
sustenance  from  distant  provinces. ^ 

It  is  this  development  that  causes  the  demand 
for  poUcing  the  world.  Governments  in  many  parts 
of  the  world  are  too  unstable,  too  corrupt,  to  admit 
of  safe  investments  being  made  under  them.  Civil 
courts  in  these  backward  lands  are  often  ruled  by 
favoritism  or  bribery,  so  that  the  property  of  a 
foreigner  is  not  secure.  From  this  naturally 
arises  the  demand  that  stable,  responsible  govern- 

^  A  development  of  economic  life,  similar  to  that  above  traced, 
is  also  going  on,  though  on  a  smaller  scale,  in  France  and  Germany. 
According  to  a  report  issued  by  the  German  government  in  March, 
1900,  German  capitalists  have  invested  7,500,000,000  marks  in  over- 
sea manufactures,  trade,  and  agriculture. 

41 


WORLD   POLITICS 

ment  be  established  so  as  to  make  possible  the 
development  of  resources,  even  against  the  will  of 
the  inhabitants,  where  they  stubbornly  oppose  all 
industrial  progress. 

In  this  way,  the  real  needs  of  the  expanding 
human  race  are  united  with  the  self-interest  of 
capitalism  to  form  a  lever  for  expansion.  Though 
true,  it  is  a  one-sided  view  that  imperialism  is  the 
selfish  policy  of  capital.  Did  it  not  represent  the 
real  demands  of  the  human  race,  which  is  increas- 
ingly in  want  of  available  sources  of  sustenance, 
imperiahsm  could  not  have  become  the  force  it  is 
in  modern  politics.  It  is  often  difhcult  to  distin- 
guish the  narrow  selfishness  of  individuals,  craving 
fields  of  exploitation,  from  the  real  demands  of 
human  progress ;  at  all  events,  we  must  beware  of 
a  too  easy  optimism  which  forgets  that  often  a 
harsh  and  cruel  struggle  for  existence  is  really 
going  on  between  superior  races  and  the  stubborn 
aborigines. 

The  seriousness  and  sadness  of  this  struggle 
cannot  be  hidden  under  optimistic  cant.  Even 
those  who,  like  Miss  Kingsley,^  are  most  friendly 
to  the  savages,  hold  that  they  cannot  be  civilized 
according  to  European  standards.  There  are  but 
few  who,  like  Robert  Louis  Stevenson,^  appreci- 
ate the  real  virtues  of  these  humble  members  of 
the  human  family,  sympathize  with  their  inner 
life,  and  find  there  things  as  worthy  of  love  as  are 

^  Mary  H.  Kingsley,  fVesf  African  Studies,  London,  1 899. 
'  Robert  Louis  Stevenson,  Vailima  Letters. 
42 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

the  more  vaunted  virtues  of  a  higher  civilization. 
The  men  who,  as  civilization  pushes  forward  its 
outposts,  come  in  contact  with  the  savages,  usually 
have  no  ability  or  desire  to  understand  them.  Cruel 
methods  of  conquest  and  subjection  are  pursued, 
and  most  of  these  races  would  be  happier  if  they 
had  never  seen  their  civilizers.^  It  is  well,  then,  to 
look  the  facts  clearly  in  the  face  and  to  recognize 
that  it  is  a  serious  and  sad  duty  which  the  white 
race  is  performing  in  making  way  for  its  own  fur- 
ther expansion.  The  white  man  has  burden 
enough  of  his  own  to  carry,  and  too  often  his 
interference  makes  the  existence  of  the  inferior 
races  yet  more  toilsome  and  weary.'^ 

The  mere  supplying  of  capital,  however,  is  only 
the  first  stage  of  industrial  expansion.  In  many 
regions,  there  is  no  local  material  which  can  be 
utilized  in  building  up  the  managing  personnel, 
and  works  have,  therefore,  to  be  constructed  and 
industries  organized  by  Europeans.  Adherents  of 
modern  national  imperialism  urge  it  as  a  duty  which 

^  Bryce,  Impressions  of  South  Africa  ;  as  to  forced  labor,  p.  370. 
Isabelle  Massieu,  on  Burma  and  the  Shan  States,  in  the  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  for  1899. 

^  Discussions  in  the  German  Reichstag  have  brought  out  many 
instances  of  great  cruelty  against  natives  on  the  part  of  colonial 
officials.  Herr  Bebel,  a  socialist  deputy,  has  repeatedly  called  the 
attention  of  the  government  to  such  outrages,  notably  in  the  case 
of  Dr.  Carl  Peters,  the  noted  explorer,  and  of  a  certain  Prince  of 
Arenberg,  both  of  whom  were  guilty  of  gross  cruelty  and  wanton 
disregard  of  life  in  the  African  colonies.  Mutato  coelo  mores  mu- 
taniur.  Men  often  change  their  moral  principles  with  the  climate. 
See  Reichstag  T>&hz.\.t%,  February,  1900. 

43 


WORLD   POLITICS 

capitalists  owe  to  their  country  not  to  furnish  means 
for  the  construction  of  works  by  alien  entrepre- 
neurs, but  to  use  all  the  resources  at  their  disposal 
for  industries  organized  by  their  own  countrymen. 
"  High  finance  "  {la  haute  finance)  itself  is  thus  be- 
coming nationalized.  Cosmopolitan  as  it  essen- 
tially is,  it  has  nevertheless  been  made  the  servant 
of  patriotic  ambitions.  The  "high  finance"  of 
Germany  originally  invested  in  foreign  state  paper 
and  railway  bonds.  Thus  Servia  became  one  of 
the  greatest  debtors  of  Germany,  borrowing  money 
to  be  used  in  industries  marshalled  by  Belgians 
and  Frenchmen.  The  Germans  received  only  the 
interest  on  their  bonds;  the  others,  all  the  industrial 
and  economic  advantages  connected  with  the  con- 
struction of  extensive  public  works.  Governor  von 
Wissmann  declared  that  the  non-participation  of 
German  capital  was  a  chief  hindrance  to  the 
development  of  German  East  Africa.  After  hav- 
ing been  backward  so  long,  German  capital  has 
suddenly  changed  its  policy,  and  is  now  rivalling 
Great  Britain  in  the  direct  development  of  trans- 
oceanic industry.  German  mining  enterprises  and 
factories  are  becoming  common  in  China  and  in 
Asia  Minor.  South  America  counts  three  great 
German  banks  with  a  capital  of  over  two  mil- 
lion dollars  each,  besides  numerous  lesser  banking 
firms,  through  whose  instrumentality  commercial 
relations  with  Germany  are  facilitated  and  vast 
industrial  undertakings  are  marshalled. 

In  their  bearing  upon  political  power,  the  most 
44 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

important  industrial  undertakings  are  railways; 
and  for  this  reason  railway  concessions  are  most 
eagerly  sought  after  and  defended,  even  when 
their  industrial  value  is  not  immediately  apparent. 
In  the  first  place,  railways  are  necessary  for  the 
purpose  of  developing  concessions  in  mining  and 
forestry.  The  government  that  controls  the  rail- 
ways not  only  determines  the  opening  of  these 
resources,  but  also  directs  the  entire  intercourse 
of  adjacent  regions. 

This  industrial  control  very  readily  passes  into 
political  control  when  disturbances  of  any  kind 
occur.  The  political  character  of  railways  is  per- 
haps most  apparent  in  Manchuria,  where  the 
Russian  army  of  occupation,  now  permanently 
stationed  in  that  province,  was  brought  in  under 
the  pretext  of  protecting  and  policing  the  Rus- 
sian railway  leading  to  Port  Arthur.  But  while 
this  is  the  most  striking  example  of  the  political 
use  of  railway  concessions,  very  significant  in- 
stances may  be  found  elsewhere.  Thus,  in  order 
to  strengthen  her  hold  on  India,  as  well  as  to 
secure  a  paramount  position  in  the  states  along 
the  Persian  Gulf,  and  also  to  counterpoise  the  ad- 
vantages derived  by  Russia  from  its  Siberian  rail- 
way, Great  Britain  has  been  planning  a  railway 
from  Alexandria  to  Shanghai,  which,  following 
along  the  Gulf  of  Persia,  is  to  pass  through  India 
and  down  the  Yangtse  Valley  in  China.  The 
Indian  railway  system,  comprising  about  two  thou- 
sand miles  already  constructed,  would  be  used  as  a 

45 


WORLD   POLITICS 

part  of  this  transcontinental  line,^  which,  however, 
Russian  influence  may  seriously  interfere  with. 

The  railways  of  Asia  Minor  and  Syria  are  being 
constructed  by  German  and  French  capital.  The 
British  railway  plans  for  that  region  have  been, 
at  least  temporarily,  abandoned  on  account  of  the 
advantageous  position  at  present  held  by  German 
diplomacy  in  matters  concerning  Asia  Minor. 
There  are  further  railway  undertakings  planned 
in  the  Chinese  Empire,  some  of  which  are  already 
in  the  course  of  execution.^  Canton  is  to  be  con- 
nected with  Peking  by  a  trunk  line.  The  north- 
ern portion  of  this  concession,  from  Peking  to 
Hankow,  is  in  the  hands  of  a  Belgian  syndicate, 
which  is  backed  by  Russian  and  French  capital. 
The  fact  that  this  concession  enters  into  the  very 
heart  of  the  Yangtse  region  may  lead  to  serious 
political  complications  in  case  the  Russian  and 
French  connection  with  the  undertaking  is  kept 
up.  The  southern  portion  of  the  same  line,  lead- 
ing from  Hankow  to  Canton  and  commercially 
more  important  than  the  northern  section,  is  to  be 
constructed  by  a  syndicate  which  was  originally 
American,  but  which  is  now  also  supported  by 
British  influence  and  capital. 

The  political  importance  of  railways  in  China 
was  recognized  by  Germany  when  that  country 
opposed   the   concession   to   the  Anglo-American 

1  Cf.  C.  A.  Moreing,  '*  An  All-British  Railroad  to  China,"  Nine- 
teenth Century,  September,  1899. 

"  For  a  fuller  account  of  these,  see  Part  II.,  Ch.  II. 
46 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

syndicate  of  the  right  to  build  a  railway  from 
Tientsin  to  Chingkiang  across  the  province  of 
Shantung.  The  compromise  which  was  finally 
concluded  with  Great  Britain  in  this  matter  ac- 
knowledges British  control  of  industrial  under- 
takings in  the  Yangtse  region,  while  reserving  to 
Germany  the  entire  field  within  Shantung.  That 
the  politics  of  China  are  the  politics  of  railways  is 
a  statement  as  extreme  as  it  is  epigrammatic,  but 
it  contains  more  than  a  grain  of  truth. ^ 

Industrial  undertakings  of  the  kind  just  dis- 
cussed naturally  lead  to  colonization.  Whenever 
capital  is  applied  on  a  nationalistic  basis,  the  entre- 
preneurs and  managers,  the  engineers  and  foremen, 
who  undertake  the  development  of  resources,  will 
belong  to  the  same  nation  and  will  form  an  indus- 
trial settlement.  It  is  becoming  an  article  of 
nationalistic  faith  that  the  capitalists  of  a  nation 
shall  give  preference  to  engineers  and  master 
workmen  belonging  also  to  that  nation.  This  is 
the  type  of  colonization  especially  fostered  by  Ger- 
many. The  industrial  colonization  of  Asia  Minor 
and  of  South  America  is  assuming  very  considera- 
ble proportions.  Colonization  by  agricultural  set- 
tlements is  also  at  times  encouraged,  especially 
when  it  is  probable  that  the  colonists  can  be  kept 
together  and  retained  in  allegiance  to  their  mother 
country. 

*  Valentine  Chirol,  The  Far  Eastern  Question,  London,  1896. 


47 


CHAPTER   III 

The  Great  Powers  as  Colonizers 

In  considering  the  principal  powers  as  colo-* 
nizers,  there  appears  a  vast  diversity  of  methods 
and  ideas.  Russian  colonization  has  been  almost 
entirely  agricultural.  In  past  centuries,  spreading 
gradually  from  Little  Russia  over  the  plains  and 
steppes  to  the  north  and  east,  Russian  population 
advanced  with  an  avalanche-like  motion  which 
continued  even  when  the  boundary  of  Asia  was 
reached.  And  to-day,  though  the  political  methods 
of  Russia  have  become  more  consciously  system- 
atic, agricultural  colonization  is  still  the  keystone 
of  her  expansion.  Intensive  farming  has  never 
been  common  in  Russia,  and  vast  tracts  of  new  soil 
are  therefore  necessary  to  sustain  the  constantly 
expanding  population.  As  the  way  to  the  west 
was  barred  by  Germans,  Poles,  and  Hungarians, 
the  star  of  Russian  empire  has  constantly  moved 
toward  the  rising  sun. 

In  its  latest  phases,  the  character  of  Russian  colo- 
nization has  undergone  significant  changes.  The 
original  occupation  of  Central  Asia  by  Russia  was 

48 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

largely  military  in  method,  a  fact  clue  to  the  initia- 
tive and  ambition  of  military  officers  stationed  in 
that  country.  Thus,  under  the  veil  of  punitive 
expeditions,  tribe  after  tribe  of  the  natives  was  con- 
quered and  subdued,  and  a  firm  military  adminis- 
tration introduced.  The  methods  pursued  by  the 
Russians  in  these  regions  were  at  first  harsh  and 
relentless.  By  striking  memorable  blows,  they 
terrified  the  population  and  deprived  the  people  of 
their  leaders.  After  these  first  steps,  however,  they 
adopted  more  suave  methods.  The  surviving 
leaders  they  endowed  with  ofificial  appointments, 
and  took  them  to  the  West  to  admire  the  power  and 
splendor  of  the  Czar.  Russian  industry  and  com- 
merce were  gradually  introduced  and  tracts  of  land 
hitherto  unoccupied  were  settled  by  Russian  colo- 
nists. There  was  no  attempt  to  introduce  religious 
uniformity  by  state  action  ;  in  Asia  the  empire  has 
shown  itself  tolerant  toward  all  beliefs.  The  nat- 
ural affabihty  of  Russian  character  was  given  an 
opportunity  to  bear  fruit  in  the  establishment  of 
closer  relations  and  a  better  understanding  with 
the  natives.^ 

Of  all  European  powers,  Russia  is  in  some 
respects  the  most  successful  as  a  colonizer  in  Asia. 
Herself  semi-Oriental,  she  is  not  so  far  above  the 
various  tribes  of  the  Asiatic  plains  as  to  misunder- 
stand them.  The  Russians  have  an  insinuating 
manner  and  great  tact  in  diplomatic  intercourse, 
and  at  the  same  time  a  political  system  the  splen- 

1  See  Curzon,  Russia  in  Central  Asia. 
B  49 


WORLD   POLITICS 

dor  and  concentrated  majesty  of  which  impress 
the  Oriental  mind  far  more  than  do  the  simple 
business  methods  of  the  Briton.  They  know  when 
to  use  corruption,  when  to  use  force,  and  when  to 
soothe  with  honors  and  decorations.  Above  all, 
their  military  and  administrative  officers  fraternize 
with  the  leaders  of  the  conquered  peoples,  and  a 
feeling  of  solidarity  between  conquered  and  con- 
querors is  the  result.  Indeed,  many  writers  seri- 
ously question  whether  any  other  power  can  be 
permanently  successful  as  a  colonizer  in  Asia, 
when  opposed  by  the  craft  and  abihty  of  Russia, 
Her  perfect  mastery  of  Oriental  diplomacy,  her 
ability  to  manage  the  most  refractory  materials, 
is  proved  by  her  recent  unforeseen  successes  at 
Peking.  It  is  by  combining  strength  of  purpose, 
irresistible  will,  and  the  show  of  great  force,  with 
the  milder  methods  of  corruption  and  official  blan- 
dishment, that  Russia  is  so  successful  in  the  Orient. 
Germany,  though  a  great  colonizer,  has  not  thus 
far  been  prominent  in  the  establishment  of  politi- 
cal dependencies,  as  up  to  the  present  decade  most 
of  her  colonists  have  been  lost  to  the  nation.  Going 
chiefly  to  North  America,  they  have  rapidly  be- 
come Americanized,  and  even  though  they  may 
continue  to  cherish  German  culture  and  literature, 
they  have  changed  their  political  allegiance  com- 
pletely. Like  the  Russians,  the  Germans  have 
been  very  successful  as  agricultural  colonists.  In 
many  portions  of  the  United  States,  they  have  re- 
placed the  Anglo-Americans  and  the  Irish  in  the 

50 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

farming  industry.  Like  the  Dutch  colonists  in 
South  Africa,  the  Germans  are  content  to  settle 
in  a  wilderness  in  the  hope  of  turning  it  into  an  in- 
viting abode  and  making  it  their  permanent  home. 
They  shun  no  hardships ;  their  regularity  of  work 
and  their  endurance  assure  them  permanent  success 
as  agriculturists. 

In  our  day,  Germany  is  making  great  efforts  to 
retain  the  political  allegiance  of  the  many  colonists 
who  leave  her  borders ;  she  now  endeavors  to 
direct  immigration  to  her  own  colonies  and  to  Asia 
Minor,  parts  of  which  she  hopes  by  ultimate  polit- 
ical occupation  to  save  for  the  German  Empire. 
German  agricultural  and  industrial  colonies  are 
also  common  in  Brazil,  in  the  Argentine  Republic, 
and  in  Chile.  In  this  connection,  too,  our  attention 
may  well  be  turned  for  a  moment  to  the  fact  that 
the  Germans  have  within  the  last  decades  developed 
remarkable  ability  as  traders.  The  highly  trained 
German  clerks  are  to-day  the  admiration  of  the 
commercial  world,  and  the  German  merchant 
colonies  in  places  like  Hongkong  and  Rio  de 
Janeiro  are  rapidly  gaining  on  the  supremacy  so 
long  held  by  British  commerce.^ 

In  the  political  colonies  and  protectorates  which 
Germany  has  established  in  East  Africa  and  in  the 
Cameroons,  as  well  as  in  the  Pacific  Islands, 
real  colonization  has  been  slow  to  take  root,  be- 
cause, in  addition  to  the  disadvantageous  climate, 

1  Cf.  A.  Bellessort,  "  Villcs  d'ExtrSme-Orient,"  Revue  de:  Deux 
Mondes,  July,  1899. 

51 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  German  administrative  restrictions  are  unfavor- 
able. The  governmental  bureaucracy  of  Germany, 
not  being  so  flexible  and  adaptive  in  its  modes  of 
procedure  as  are  the  commercial  classes,  tries  to 
apply  to  new  settlements  in  the  wilderness  the 
methods  of  the  Prussian  police  sergeant,  with  the 
result  of  so  hampering  the  movements  and  activi- 
ties of  colonists  that  many  prefer  to  settle  in  non- 
German  territory. 

The  colonies  of  France  cover  a  vast  territory, 
although  large  tracts  of  it  are  practically  worthless. 
For  various  reasons  the  French  are  not  good  colo- 
nizers. In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  noted  that 
there  is  no  over-population  in  France  forcing  fam- 
ilies to  seek  sustenance  in  foreign  countries.  Most 
important  of  all,  perhaps,  as  a  cause  of  failure  in 
colonization  is  the  fact  that  to  Frenchmen  the  life  of 
their  home  is  too  attractive  to  permit  a  thought  of 
permanent  residence  elsewhere.  As  recent  French 
writers  have  emphasized,  there  is  too  much  attach- 
ment to  the  settled  conditions  of  a  civiUzed  country, 
too  little  spirit  of  enterprise.^  Young  men  are  sat- 
isfied with  a  moderate  income  from  an  official 
position  which  enables  them  to  enjoy  the  advan- 
tages of  social  life  in  the  mother  country.  Again, 
the  equal  distribution  of  family  property  among 
children  deprives  France  of  the  large  class  of  pen- 
niless but  venturesome  younger  sons  who  carry 
on  so  much  of  the  imperial  work  of  Great  Britain.^ 

1  Demolins,  A  quoi  Tient  la  Superiorite  des  Anglo-Saxons? 
*  Beaussire,  Principes  du  Droits  p.  269. 

52 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

It  is  therefore  remarked  by  all,  that  in  French  col- 
onies very  few  Frenchmen,  outside  of  the  ofificial 
hierarchy,  are  to  be  found.      Indeed,  during  the 
present  century  there  has  been  very  little  true  col- 
onization  by  Frenchmen  in  foreign   lands.     The 
French  colonies  in  Canada,  Louisiana,  and  South 
,  America  have  not  been  reinforced  by  accessions 
from  the  home  country.     Even  in  Algeria,  which 
I  by  its  geographical  situation  is  almost  a  province 
'of  France  itself,  there  are  only  318,000    French- 
men  against   446,300   subjects   of    other    states.^ 
The  gospel  of  colonization  preached  by  M.  Jules 
Lemaitre  has  borne  little  fruit. 

On  account  of  the  rigid  and  illiberal  colonial 
system  introduced  by  the  French  bureaucracy, 
French  colonies  have  very  little  attraction  for  for- 
eigners, who  wish  to  be  free  from  constant  irrita- 
tion and  interference  by  the  administration.  The 
French  colonies,  therefore,  have  been  an  expen- 
sive luxury,  and  they  have  not  become  a  field  for 
investment  and  industrial  exploration  to  the  same 
extent  as  have  the  colonies  of  other  nations.  By 
discouraging  her  colonies  from  entering  into  com- 
mercial and  industrial  relations  with  any  but  the 
mother  country,  France  is  really  excluding  from 
them  the  capital  and  men  that  alone  could  make 
them  profitable. 

1  Figures  from  the  Statesman's  Year  Book,  for  1899.  Louis 
Bertrand's  novel,  Le  Sang  des  Races,  which  portrays  life  in  the 
Algiers  of  to-day,  treats  of  Arabs,  Spaniards,  Englishmen,  and  Ger- 
mans, but  not  of  Frenchmen. 

53 


WORLD   POLITICS 

It  may  be  well  in  this  place  to  call  attention  to 
the  remarkable  success  achieved  by  the  Dutch  in   i 
their  government  of  Java.^     In  the  present  period 
of  great  territorial  expansion,  we  are  likely  to  over- 
look the  more  modest  colonial  establishments  of  a 
country  from  which  its  mightier  neighbors  might 
learn  many    a    lesson    in   colonial   administration.  , 
The  Dutch  are  free,  on  the  one  hand,  from  the  ,• 
rigid  officialism  and  the  formal  routine  which  em-  m 
barrasses  their  continental  neighbors ;  and  on  the  j 
other,    from  the  overbearing  behavior   {Hoogmoe-  \ 
digkeit)  that  characterizes    the    Enghsh   in   their  ^ 
intercourse  with  other  nations.     The  Dutch,  there- 
fore,  win   the   affection    of    their   subject    races, 
although  by  no   means  indiscriminately  fraterniz- 
ing with   them.      Their   flexible   methods   enable 
them  to  take  account  and  make  use  of  all  the  local 
native  social  institutions  for  the  purposes  of  good 
government.     By  allowing  the  tribes   to   observe 
their  traditional  customs  and  by  maintaining  native 
dignitaries,  the  Dutch  govern  with  very  little  fric- 
tion,   retain    the    confidence    and    love    of   their 
subjects,  and  are  enabled  to  exert  far  greater  in- 
fluence than  the  use  of   harsher   methods   would 
permit.     For  the  judicious  management  of  native 
populations,  and  for  the  moulding  of  native  institu- 
tions  to  the  ends  of  a  more   enlightened  policy, 
the  Dutch  colonial  administration  may  serve  as  a 
model.     Where,  by   untoward  circumstances,   the 

1  Alleyne  Ireland,  Tropical  Colonization,  the  chapter  on  "  Forms 
of  Government "  ;   Money,  Java  ;  or  How  to  Manage  a  Colony. 

54 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

Dutch  have  been  compelled  to  use  force  and  harsh 
measures,  they  have  encountered  great,  almost  in- 
superable, obstacles  on  the  part  of  the  Malay 
population ;  such  is  the  case  in  Acheen,  where 
they  have  been  warring  unsuccessfully  against 
revolt  for  almost  twenty-five  years.^ 

Compared  with  the  colonizing  methods  of  the 
other  great  powers,  the  English  manner  of  action 
in  regard  to  colonization  is  notable  for  its  lack 
of  rigid  system.  Sir  George  Goldie's  advice  to 
Americans,  "  In  colonization  there  must  be  no 
precedents,"  is  the  first  rule.  More  than  any 
other  nation,  the  English  give  free  rein  to  the 
initiative  of  trusted  individuals,  and  avoid  em- 
barrassing their  representatives  with  detailed  in- 
structions, which  would  act  as  a  brake  on  original 
enterprise.  The  home  government  uses  its  knowl- 
edge to  warn  its  servants  against  dangerous 
measures  of  policy  rather  than  to  bind  them  to 
a  settled  system  of  action  by  minute  anticipative 
directions.  As  a  result,  the  financial  confusion 
and  general  economic  distress  which  had  reigned 
in  Egypt  was  in  fifteen  years,  by  the  efforts  of 
Lord  Cromer,  turned  into  marvellous  prosperity 
and  flourishing  credit,  and  in  the  same  manner 
a  valuable  industrial  organization  has  been  created 
in  the  forbidding  Niger  region,  through  the  ef- 
forts of  Sir  George  Goldie.  Few  administrative 
restrictions,    equitable   enforcement   of    a    simple 

1  Hugh  Clifford,  "  A  Lesson  from  the  Malay  States,"  Atlantic 
Monthly,  November,  1899. 

55 


WORLD   POLITICS 

law,  equal  opportunities  to  all,  unlimited  trust 
in  tried  and  proved  character,  —  these  are  the 
principles  which  have  made  England  the  most 
successful  colonizing  nation  of  to-day,  and  which 
have  constantly  attracted  to  regions  under  her 
control  the  most  enterprising  and  able  coloniz- 
ing material.  To  her  colonies  flock  the  men  who 
seek  a  free  field  for  the  development  of  their 
energies  and  capacities,  and  who  at  the  same  time 
desire  an  administration  uninfluenced  by  the  ordi- 
nary Oriental  methods  of  corruption  and  favoritism. 
The  motley  gathering  of  races  at  Hongkong, — 
all  of  them  thriving  and  carrying  on  prosperous 
business  under  English  protection,  —  is  perhaps 
the  most  remarkable  instance  of  English  suc- 
cess.^ 

In  purely  agricultural  colonization,  as  small 
farmers,  the  English  have  not  been  so  successful 
as  have  the  Germans  and  Boers.  Englishmen,  it 
is  true,  own  great  ranches  in  Mexico,  in  South 
America,  and  in  Africa,  but  the  small  homestead 
farms  in  these  regions,  so  far  as  they  are  not  the 
property  of  natives,  are  largely  in  the  hands  of 
others  than  the  British.  This  condition  lies  at 
the  centre  of  the  South  African  controversy.  The 
Boers,  the  small  farmers  of  the  region,  naturally 
fear  that  by  English  enterprise  and  managerial 
genius,  and  by  modern  methods,  they  are  to  be 
forced  out  of  their  free  and  independent  existence 
and  into  a  more  highly  organized  social  system  in 

1  See  Bellessort,  article  cited  above. 
56 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

which  the  special  capacities  of   the  English  are 
bound  to  carry  the  day. 

In  organizing  and  executing  great  industrial 
undertakings,  such  as  railways,  mines,  and  facto- 
ries, in  arranging  for  commercial  communication 
between  various  nations,  and  in  buying  up  the 
produce  of  colonies  and  exchanging  it  for  articles 
of  European  manufacture,  the  English  are  still  the 
leading  nation,  though  Germany  and  the  United 
States  are  rapidly  coming  to  rival  their  position. 


57 


1 


CHAPTER   IV 

The  Connection  between  Colonization  and 
Imperialism 

The  connection  between  colonization  and  impe- 
rialism is  intimate,  although  the  two  are  by  no 
means  identical.  Germany,  for  instance,  as  has 
been  said,  sent  millions  of  emigrants  to  the  new 
world  before  she  thought  of  utilizing  colonization 
for  empire.  With  the  present  increase  of  interna- 
tional competition,  efforts  to  produce  such  identity 
by  using  colonization  as  a  means  for  the  extension 
of  political  dominion  are  constantly  made.  Coloni- 
zation is  now  consciously  directed  toward  the  forma- 
tion of  immediate  or  prospective  possessions  and 
protectorates  for  the  mother  country.  Wherever 
industrial  or  agricultural  colonies  are  formed,  the 
mother  country  has  already  obtained  a  foothold. 
It  is  a  characteristic  mark  of  the  new  national  im- 
perialism that  the  duty  of  protecting  citizens  wher- 
ever they  may  be  is  more  emphatically  asserted  and 
more  broadly  interpreted  to-day  than  ever  before. 

The  South  African  controversy  affords  a  strik- 
ing illustration  of  this  mode  of  action.  When  the 
Boers  had  "  trekked  "  to  their  present  home  beyond 
the  Vaal,  they  thought  that  they  had  found  for 

58 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

themselves  a  home  far  enough  from  the  influence 
of  European  powers  to  be  secure  from  further 
interference.  They  tilled  their  soil  faithfully,  and 
adhered  fondly  to  the  customs  of  their  fathers. 
Unfortunately  for  them,  however,  rich  gold  fields 
were  discovered,  which  brought  in  a  vast  and  con- 
glomerate population,  among  whom  the  British 
formed  the  chief  element.  The  Boers,  clinging 
tenaciously  to  their  political  rights,  believed  that 
they,  the  first  and  permanent  settlers,  were  entitled 
to  keep  the  actual  control  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
transient  population  of  the  Rand  country.  But 
they  counted  without  the  protecting  mother  coun- 
try. The  English  Uitlanders,  making  the  some- 
what paradoxical  claim  that  the  mother  country 
should  help  them  to  become  citizens  of  another 
state,  called  aloud  for  protection,  and  thus  fur- 
nished the  English  government  a  welcome  occa- 
sion for  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Transvaal.  Advocates  of  interference  may  urge 
that  the  Transvaal  was  never  independent.  But 
its  independence  in  internal  matters  was  solemnly 
assured  in  the  two  conventions  of  1881  and  1884, 
and  the  suzerainty  retained  by  Great  Britain  in 
the  first  convention  must  be  interpreted  with 
reference  to  the  suzerain  right  explicitly  reserved, 
namely,  the  right  to  give  or  refuse  consent  to 
foreign  treaties.^ 

^  Mr.  Chamberlain  himself  said  in  1896,  "We  have  recognized 
the  South  African  Republic  as  a  free  and  independent  state  as 
regards  all  its  internal  affairs  not  reached  by  that  convention." 

59 


WORLD   POLITICS 

German  industrial  and  agricultural  colonies  are 
now  being  founded  in  Asia  Minor  and  in  South 
America,  and  the  emperor  has  taken  occasion  to 
announce  most  ostentatiously  that  German  citizens 
wherever  found  shall  be  assured  of  the  protection 
of  the  German  Empire.  Should  any  of  these  colo- 
nies be  disturbed  by  the  neighboring  population, 
or  be  aggrieved  in  any  way  by  the  political  or 
civil  legislation  of  the  state  within  which  it  is 
founded,  a  plausible  case  for  interference  could 
very  easily  be  made  out;  and  if  political  conditions 
should  be  favorable,  the  emperor  would  not  be 
slow  in  fulfilling  his  "  moral  duty  "  of  protection.^ 

The  most  radical  method  of  imperial  expansion 
is  that  of  directly  seizing  territory  or  the  control 
or  protection  thereof,  without  waiting  for  the  nor- 
mal expansion  of  trade,  industry,  and  colonization. 
The  degree  of  control  exercised  over  territory  thus 
obtained  varies  from  the  diplomatic,  veiled  pro- 
tectorate exercised  by  England  in  Egypt  and  the 
imaginary  "  spheres  of  influence "  delimited  in 
China,  through  a  long  range  of  variations,  to  com- 
plete and  direct  government  as  exercised  in  the 
English  crown  colonies.  The  term  sphere  of 
influence  or  spJiere  of  interest,  has  been  given 
an  extended   meaning    by   recent    developments. 

^  The  emperor's  words  in  a  speech  of  the  i8th  of  January,  1896, 
are  to  the  effect  that  the  German  Empire  has  become  a  world  em- 
pire; and  that  wherever  Germans  abroad  are  injured  or  in  danger, 
formal  constitutional  and  public  law  objections  cannot  hold  against 
the  right  of  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  German  Empire. 

60 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

Formerly,  it  was  used  to  signify  a  region  wherein 
a  nation,  through  its  citizens,  had  acquired  com- 
mercial or  industrial  interests  without  having 
serted  any  political  protectorate  or  suzerainty. 
To-day,  as  used  in  China  and  elsewhere,  the  term 
applies  rather  to  a  region  preempted  for  further 
exploitation  and  possibly  for  political  control. 
Thus  in  modern  expansion  the  growth  of  interests 
is  anticipated  and  provided  for  by  the  reservation 
of  suitable  territory  and  the  exclusion  therefrom 
of  other  political  influences. 

Carried  to  an  extreme,  this  policy  of  reserving 
spheres  of  influence  must  be  very  dangerous  to 
the  world's  peace.  It  encourages  a  habit  of  look- 
ing upon  the  whole  world  as  available  territory  for 
partition  among  civilized  powers,  and  stimulates 
national  ambitions  unduly  and  unnaturally.  The 
older  method  of  advance  by  the  gradual  expansion 
of  commerce  and  industry  was  far  more  natural 
and  less  liable  to  abuse,  because  under  it  any 
nation,  before  entering  upon  new  territory,  must 
prove  by  economic  services,  already  rendered,  its 
ability  to  benefit  that  region  and  its  inhabitants ; 
while  to-day  a  country  like  Russia,  having  as  yet 
no  important  commercial  or  industrial  relations 
with  China,  by  mere  dint  of  force  and  shrewd 
diplomacy,  establishes  a  claim  to  a  vast  portion  of 
that  empire  for  future  exploitation. 

The  field  of  imperial  expansion  is  one  in  which 
the  relative  influence  of  private  individual  initiative 
and  unconscious  social  activity  on  human  develop- 

6i 


WORLD   POLITICS 

ment  can  be  profitably  studied.  The  question  as 
to  which  is  the  more  important  element  in  human 
progress  can  perhaps  not  be  settled  definitely  and 
ultimately,  since  social  activity  always  includes  that 
of  individuals,  and  the  respective  value  and  effi- 
ciency of  the  two  agencies  is  not  easily  determined. 
It  is  possible,  however,  in  certain  historic  develop- 
ments to  distinguish  with  considerable  precision 
between  these  two  factors.  There  is  still  a  further 
mode  of  action,  —  conscious  social  and  political 
activity,  —  which  has  become  increasingly  promi- 
nent in  recent  times,  when  states  and  governments 
systematically  through  decades  plan  a  regular  ad- 
vance and  carefully  adjust  all  their  actions  with  a 
view  to  the  gradual  extension  of  their  dominion. 

Russia's  advance  to  the  East  in  former  centuries, 
which  has  already  been  mentioned,  might  be  char- 
acterized as  an  unconscious  social  progress,  since 
no  particular  individual  was  exceptionally  active  in 
extending  the  boundaries  inhabited  by  Russians, 
but  rather  the  spontaneous  social  activity  of  many 
individuals  brought  about  this  result.  In  English 
colonization,  and  also  in  the  Russian  expansion 
of  more  recent  times,  the  initiative  of  individ- 
uals has  been  a  more  prominent  factor.  By  the 
word  individuals  we  do  not  mean  isolated  persons 
alone,  but  also  private  trading  corporations.  Thus, 
the  English  empire  in  India  is  the  fruit  of  individ- 
ual exertions,  and  especially  of  the  genius  of  such 
men  as  Clive,  Warren  Hastings,  and  Wellesley. 
The  advance  of  Russia  into  Turkestan  and  Central 

62 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

Asia  was  largely  due  to  the  private  initiative  of  am- 
bitious military  officers  stationed  in  those  regions, 
who,  on  their  own  responsibility  and  under  the 
plea  of  necessity,  conducted  expeditions  against 
the  natives  which  led  to  the  annexation  of  new 
territories.^  The  boundary,  always  threatened  by 
neighboring  natives,  was  constantly  extended  under 
the  plea  of  gaining  greater  security. 

The  manner  in  which  individual  men  like  Mr. 
Cecil  Rhodes  and  Sir  George  Goldie  have  left  their 
impress  on  imperial  expansion  in  Africa  is  matter 
of  most  recent  history.  Without  any  considerable 
encouragement  from  the  authorities  at  home,  Sir 
George  Goldie  has  constructed  a  valuable  colonial 
protectorate  on  the  banks  of  the  Niger,  a  region 
apparently  most  unfavorable  to  European  enter- 
prise.^ The  rapid  expansion  of  British  influence 
toward  the  centre  of  Africa  from  the  south  is  due 
primarily  to  the  initiative  of  that  imperial  plotter, 
Mr.  Rhodes.  French  advance  into  the  Soudan  is 
also  largely  the  work  of  ambitious  individuals. 
Following  the  lead  set  by  General  Faidherbe  in  the 
fifties,  French  officers  have  repeatedly  undertaken 
exploring  or  punitive  expeditions  which,  when 
their  results  were  ratified  by  the  home  government, 
led  to  the  constant  extension  of  French  dominion. 

^  George  Curzon,  Russia  in  Central  Asia.  The  acquisition  of 
the  Amur  territory  by  Muravieff  in  1858  was  also  a  matter  of  indi- 
vidual initiative, 

^  On  the  opposite  side  of  the  continent,  Sir  William  MacKinnon, 
Sir  John  Kirk,  and  the  British  East  Africa  Company  were  meanwhile 
preparing  the  way  for  British  occupancy. 

63 


WORLD   POLITICS 

The  unfortunate  outcome  of  the  last  of  these 
expeditions  —  that  of  Major  Marchand  —  is  well 
known ;  but  even  this  event  illustrates  the  advan- 
tages of  the  system.  The  action  of  such  officers, 
not  having  been  authorized  by  the  home  govern- 
ment, or  at  least  not  having  been  openly  sanctioned, 
may,  as  circumstances  demand,  be  either  approved 
and  utilized  or  disavowed.  When  no  powerful 
enemy  seeks  to  prevent  the  expansion,  the  action 
will  as  a  rule  be  ratified,  —  cases  in  which  a  nation 
has  voluntarily  withdrawn  from  a  field  once  occu- 
pied are  exceedingly  rare,  —  but  should  a  strong 
nation  block  the  way  and  attempt  to  prevent  the 
consummation  of  the  plan,  the  action  of  the  officer 
is  ordinarily  disavowed  without  difficulty. 

From  a  consideration  of  these  facts  it  may  be 
seen  that  imperial  expansion  has  not  ordinarily 
followed  a  system  preconceived  or  thought  out 
beforehand  and  executed  according  to  well-devel- 
oped plans.  Either  individuals  act  in  an  isolated 
manner,  by  their  own  impulses  and  on  their  own 
responsibility,  or  national  advance  is  impelled  by 
the  force  of  uncontrollable  circumstances.  The 
latter  is  well  illustrated  by  the  manner  in  which 
the  United  States  has  entered  upon  its  policy  of 
expansion  in  Asiatic  regions.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  war  there  was  perhaps  not  a  soul  in  the 
whole  Republic  who  so  much  as  thought  of  the 
possibility  of  his  nation  becoming  a  sovereign 
power  in  the  Orient, 

Recently,  however,  there  have  been  conceived 
64 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

far-reaching  and  systematic  plans  of  colonization 
and  national  expansion.  This  is  especially  true  of 
the  two  powers  which,  on  account  of  their  strong 
monarchial  government,  are  in  a  position  to  carry 
out  a  permanent  and  continuous  policy  through  all 
the  shifting  changes  of  diplomacy.  Germany  and 
Russia  to-day  are  both  acting  on  a  definite  system. 
But  in  the  conception  of  such  ambitious  plans  the 
other  great  European  nations,  France  and  Great 
Britain,  do  not  lag  far  behind.  The  construction 
of  the  Siberian  railway  and  the  creation  of  a  large 
navy,  the  movement  of  armed  forces  and  expres- 
sions by  certain  Russians  who  are  high  in  author- 
ity, show  that  there  has  been  going  on  careful  and 
systematic  planning  to  reach  in  Asia  a  rich  coun- 
try, such  as  Manchuria,  which  possesses  ice-free 
harbors,  and  which  will  become  a  radiating  centre 
for  the  eastern  expansion  of  the  empire.  Germany 
is  likewise  looking  for  available  territory  where  its 
citizens  may  settle  permanently  without  danger  of 
becoming  dissociated  from  their  allegiance.^  As 
for  Great  Britain,  we  need  only  mention  the  Cape- 
to-Cairo  railway  scheme  and  its  connection  with 
the  plans  for  a  trunk  line  from  Alexandria  to  the 
Yangtse  Valley,  which  is  to  bind  together  the  Asi- 
atic and  African  empires  of  Britain  with  a  chain 
of  iron.  It  is  apparent  that  powers  whose  govern- 
ments are  so  continuous  and  highly  concentrated 
as  to  allow  of  a  consistent  and  permanent  policy, 

1  The  various  elements  of  the  German  plan  will  be  discussed  in 
Part  IV. 

65 


WORLD   POLITICS 

which  follows  out  definite  traditions,  have  a  great 
advantage  in  the  recent  developments  of  world 
politics. 

To  sum  up  the  general  position  of  the  great 
powers  at  present,  it  may  be  stated  that  all  are 
straining  every  nerve  to  gain  as  large  a  share  as 
possible  of  the  unappropriated  portions  of  the 
earth's  surface.  Wherever  sharp  methods  of  com- 
petition are  necessary  to  accomplish  this  object, 
they  will  be  employed.  By  rapid  preemption  the 
available  area  is  becoming  exceedingly  limited,  so 
that  the  eyes  of  the  civilized  world  are  already 
turned  to  the  South  American  continent  for  further 
fields  of  exploitation.  Already  tracts  far  beyond 
their  present  assimilating  capacity  have  been  pre- 
empted by  the  nations,  and  in  consequence  col- 
onization is  at  present  quite  unprofitable  to  some 
of  them,  however  valuable  it  may  become  after  the 
due  development  of  colonial  resources.  In  this 
contest,  Asia  is  the  principal  prize,  because  with 
its  marvellous  resources  and  its  great  laboring 
population  it  is  bound  to  become  the  industrial 
centre  of  the  future. 

Interest  in  the  contest  is  increased  when  men 
become  conscious  that  the  questions  to  be  solved 
involve  not  merely  commerce  and  industry,  but  the 
deeper  interests  of  civilization  as  well.  The  whole 
cast  of  thought  that  characterizes  the  West,  its 
ideals  and  principles,  may  be  modified  by  the  inti- 
mate contact  with  the  Orient  into  which  it  is  now 
being  brought  by  imperial  expansion.     On  account 

66 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

of  her  mediating  position  between  the  Orient  and 
the  West,  the  character  and  policy  of  Russia  are 
at  present  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the  world. 
Her  civilizing  capacity,  her  true  aims  and  ideals, 
her  attitude  toward  Oriental  and  Western  civiliza- 
tion, the  scope  of  the  means  at  her  disposal,  are 
matters  of  supreme  importance  to  every  thoughtful 
man. 


<57 


CHAPTER   V 

Consequences  of  the  Policy  of  National 
Imperialism 

Having  now  discussed  the  methods  employed 
in  imperial  expansion,  let  us  next  turn  to  a  con- 
sideration of  some  of  the  consequences  —  already 
apparent  —  which  can  be  attributed  to  the  more 
recent  developments.  The  phantom  of  world 
empire  is  again  beginning  to  fill  men's  minds  with 
vague  fears  and  imaginings,  and  is  everywhere 
a  most  potent  agency  for  the  creation  of  inter- 
national animosities.  The  continental  nations  as- 
cribe to  Great  Britain  the  desire  to  Anglicize  the 
world,  while  Russia  is  by  her  rivals  looked  upon 
as  the  relentless  plotter  for  imperial  power  over 
all.  It  is  true  that  the  Russian  Empire  considers 
itself  the  lineal  descendant  of  the  Byzantine 
Roman  Empire,  and  is  therefore  to-day  the  expo- 
nent of  Roman  traditions  of  imperialism.'^  This  is 
the  sentimental  side  of  the  Russian  desire  to  gain 

1  See  W.  D.  Foulke,  Slav  or  Saxon  ? 

2  Russian  writers  compare  their  nation  to  Rome,  while  they  find 
the  counterpart  of  Great  Britain  in  Rome's  great  rival,  Carthage. 

68 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

Constantinople.  Some  of  the  expressions  of  re- 
cent Russophiles,  like  Pobedonostseff,  indicate  not 
only  contempt  for  Western  civilization,  but  even  a 
hatred  of  it  strong  enough  to  inspire  a  desire  to 
subdue  it  by  Russian  effort  and  valor.  On  the 
other  hand,  even  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  side,  we 
often  encounter  a  belief  that  the  world  would  be 
better  off  if  forced  to  adopt  Anglo-Saxon  methods 
of  thought  and  government.  The  existence,  side 
by  side,  of  a  group  of  virile  and  powerful  nations 
happily  renders  impossible,  for  the  present  at  least, 
the  consummation  of  such  schemes  of  despotic 
imperialism  with  all  the  dead  monotony  and  uni- 
form decadence  which  it  would  entail.  Still,  if 
every  act  of  a  foreign  nation,  by  which  it  desires 
reasonably  to  strengthen  its  vitality  and  to  extend 
its  sphere  of  usefulness,  is  to  be  interpreted  as  a 
deliberate  attack  on  the  liberty  and  civilization  of 
other  nations,  far  too  much  mutual  suspicion  and 
acrimony  will  be  engendered  in  international  life. 
This  idea  of  world  empire,  therefore,  though  still 
a  mere  phantom,  has  nevertheless  to  be  con- 
sidered, if  only  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the 
absurdity  of  the  thought  of  its  realization  at  the 
present  time. 

Should  the  unreasonable  international  competi- 
tion which  is  favored  by  many  extremists  carry  the 
day,  it  would  ultimately  lead  to  a  world  conflict. 
To  counteract  this  danger  we  must  constantly  em- 
phasize the  thought  that  there  is  sufficient  work  for 
all   nations  in  developing  and  civilizing  primitive 

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WORLD   POLITICS 

regions.  Each  one  of  the  leading  nationalities  can 
fully  develop  its  own  character  and  impress  its  best 
elements  on  the  civilization  of  the  world,  without 
desiring  the  downfall  and  ruin  of  other  powers. 
Conflicts  of  interest  may,  to  be  sure,  bring  about 
great  struggles  ;  but  to  interpret  these  as  deliber- 
ate wars  of  extermination  is  to  attribute  to  the 
whole  human  race  a  viciousness  that  actually  exists 
only  among  the  worst  criminal  classes. 

With  the  increasing  intensity  of  competition, 
national  solidarity  is  coming  to  be  regarded  as  the 
first  requirement  for  success  in  world  politics. 
Russia,  that  nation  of  complete  solidarity,  in  which 
religion,  or  at  least  cult,  still  acts  as  a  firm  bond  of 
political  union,  where  individualism  is  discounte- 
nanced and  banished  to  Siberia  unless  exercised 
for  the  direct  benefit  of  the  government,  —  this 
nation  has  many  advantages  that  arouse  the 
envy  of  its  competitors.  Everything  that  weakens 
perfect  solidarity  is  coming  to  be  antagonized. 
Either  alien  races  are  forcibly  assimilated,  as  is 
the  case  with  the  Poles  in  Germany  and  Russia, 
and  with  the  Finns  in  the  latter  country ;  or,  where 
assimilation  is  impossible,  the  strong  and  bitter 
hostility  is  displayed  that  has  so  often  been  vis- 
ited upon  the  Jews.  By  centuries  of  isolation  the 
Jews  have  been  trained  into  individualism  and 
cosmopolitanism ;  they  hold  aloof  from  national 
life,  and  as  a  result  are  subjected  to  pitiless  per- 
secution. 

Everywhere  individualism  is  on  the  wane. 
70 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

Though  theoretical  socialism,  with  its  democratic 
manifestations,  meets  with  strenuous  opposition 
from  every  quarter,  yet  the  internal  social  soli- 
darity which  that  theory  demands  is  fostered  by 
the  nations  with  all  their  power.  This  is  very 
clearly  shown  by  the  recent  general  reaction 
against  the  political  doctrines  of  liberalism,  which 
affects  even  English  politics.  When  liberalism 
extended  the  suffrage  to  democracy,  it  was  be- 
lieved that  the  permanent  dominion  of  liberal 
ideas,  of  individualistic  principles,  was  at  last 
assured.  But  democracy  in  power  shows  a  re- 
markable disregard  for  those  checks  on  govern- 
ment and  those  merely  structural  elements  of 
politics,  which  are  so  dear  to  liberalism.  Hence 
it  is  that  in  England  interest  in  the  question  of 
reforming  Parliament  and  the  House  of  Lords,  of 
Disestablishment,  of  Home  Rule,  of  the  Local 
Veto,  of  free  competition  in  industries,  and  even 
of  free  trade,  has  entirely  waned.  The  old  liber- 
alism of  Gladstone,  which  until  1886  reigned 
supreme,  is  now  practically  dead.  The  simple 
questions  of  national  greatness  and  glory,  and  of 
such  social  legislation  as  that  of  old-age  pensions, 
are  of  greater  interest  to  the  new  democracy,  — 
and  of  these  two,  the  former,  with  its  constant 
appeals  to  patriotic  feeling,  has  the  stronger 
hold  on  the  masses.  The  Liberal  party  in  Eng- 
land, which  is  certainly  the  true  representative  of 
the  real  interests  of  the  masses  of  the  people,  lost 
its  hold  upon  them  on  account  of  its  weak  foreign 

71 


WORLD   POLITICS 

policy  under  Gladstone,  —  a  policy  of  scrupulous 
justice,  but  not  one  of  national  glorification.^  On 
the  other  hand,  the  hold  on  the  people  which 
the  Conservative  party  has  in  large  portions  of 
England  is  readily  explained  by  the  manner  in 
which  it  combines  a  programme  of  social  reform 
with  a  strong  foreign  policy.  Social  reform  alone, 
especially  when  proceeding  from  the  upper  classes, 
does  not  seem  to  attract  the  masses  sufficiently, 
because  they  rather  disdain  the  hand  that  deals 
out  favors  to  them. 

In  this  connection  we  must  also  notice  the 
impatience  with  any  criticism  of  its  policy  or 
individual  acts  which  is  so  often  manifested  by 
the  party  of  expansion.  The  moderate  and  just 
speech  of  Sir  Vernon  Harcourt,  in  which  he 
criticised  both  the  Transvaal  and  Great  Britain, 
—  the  one  for  demanding  complete  sovereignty, 
the  other  for  asserting  complete  independence,  — 
was  immediately  decried  as  treason ;  the  same 
epithet  has  been  applied  in  our  own  country  to  the 
course  of  those  who  criticise  the  administration 
with  respect  to  its  policy  in  the  PhiHppines. 

On  the  continent  of  Europe  this  repression  of 
individual  liberty  in  all  matters  where  national 
passions  are  aroused  is  very  common.  We  need 
only  cite   the  discussions  and  recriminations  con- 

1  The  feeling  is  growing  within  the  Liberal  party  that  a  strong, 
aggressive  foreign  policy  is  a  sine  qua  non  for  success  in  English 
politics,  and  a  reorganization  of  the  party  under  the  leadership  of 
Lord  Rosebery  is  at  present  much  discussed. 

^2 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

nected  with  the  Dreyfus  case  in  France,  where  any 
one  differing  from  the  hall-marked  patriotism  was 
immediately  stamped  a  traitor.  Conditions  in 
France  are,  by  many  writers,  interpreted  as  fore- 
boding inevitable  political  reaction.  The  tyranny 
exercised  by  the  army,  the  alleged  influence 
wielded  over  the  army  by  the  clergy,  the  fact 
that  the  military  organization  is  used  as  a  means 
of  propaganda  for  royalism,  the  vicious  opposition 
on  the  part  of  the  majority  of  the  press  to  all 
truly  liberal  ideas  and  motives  of  action,  the  un- 
scrupulous distortion  by  the  same  press  of  all 
facts  opposed  to  its  own  ideas  of  patriotism,  — all 
these  may  be  regarded  as  portents  and  symptoms 
of  social  retrogression.  The  strength  of  repub- 
lican feeling  among  the  masses  is  on  the  wane. 
The  reactionary  daily  press,  vicious  in  its  methods 
of  personal  attack,  appealing  to  the  coarsest  form 
of  so-called  patriotism,  is  constantly  gaining  more 
influence  among  the  lower  classes.^ 

In  Germany  the  political  forces  are  coming  to 
be  divided  between  the  camps  of  reactionary  con- 
servatives and  clericals  on  the  one  hand,  and  radi- 
cal socialists  on  the  other,  leaving  the  ideas  of 
liberalism  without  considerable  representation  in 
the  national  councils.  Moreover,  the  influence  of 
the  parliament   is   cut   down   by  the  increase  in 

^  While  Urbain  Gohier,  the  author  of  many  current  writings  on 
contemporary  French  politics,  is  certainly  an  extremist  in  his  fears 
of  a  threatening  reaction,  he  presents  many  facts  that  indicate  the 
insinuating  influences  hostile  to  a  liberal  republic. 

73 


WORLD   POLITICS 

standing  appropriations  and  by  the  gradual  with- 
drawal of  important  subjects  from  parliamentary 
discussion. 

The  fact  must  also  be  emphasized  that  in  the 
struggle  for  national  greatness  the  existence  of 
one-man  power  in  a  government  gives  a  great 
advantage  to  a  state.  The  two  countries  in  which 
one-man  power  is  most  predominant  —  Russia  and 
Germany  —  are  at  present  executing  the  most 
systematic  plans  of  national  expansion.  The 
supreme  authority  and  permanence  of  rule  of 
an  imperial  monarch  gives  to  their  national  pol- 
icy a  unity  and  continuity  which  is  sought  in 
vain  by  other  nations.  It  is  significant  that 
Beaconsfield,  the  real  founder  of  modern  British 
imperialism,  was  also  the  statesman  who  carried 
one-man  power  farther  than  any  other  English 
minister  of  this  century.  On  his  own  responsibil- 
ity he  concluded  treaties  that  involved  the  most 
vital  interests  of  England,  and  brought  colonial 
troops  to  Cyprus  so  as  to  be  ready  to  strike 
decisive  blows  in  Europe. 

A  nation  which  engages  in  the  perilous  business 
of  competing  for  transoceanic  possessions  must 
have  a  leader  in  whose  judgment  and  discretion  it 
can  repose  absolute  confidence,  —  a  leader  in 
whom  power  and  responsibility  may  safely  be  con- 
centrated. This  becomes  evident  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  in  such  a  national  policy  decisions 
involving  the  entire  destiny  of  a  colonial  pos- 
session or  of  the  nation  itself  have  at  times  to 

74 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

be  made  rapidly  and  without  preliminary  discus- 
sion. When  we  consider  what  truly  tremendous 
interests  depend  upon  the  action  of  Lord  Salisbury 
and  his  colonial  secretary,  when  we  consider  that 
the  whole  future  of  civilization  may  be  conditioned 
by  their  policy  with  respect  to  China,  we  gain 
some  insight  into  the  high  responsibilities  and  the 
far-reaching  influence  of  their  position.  The 
cabinet  system  of  England  supplies  the  concentra- 
tion, if  not  the  continuity,  of  absolute  authority,  in 
selecting  as  leaders  men  whose  character  and  abili- 
ties have  been  subjected  for  years  to  a  strenuous 
test ;  statesmen  who  are  familiar  with  all  the  ins 
and  outs  of  legislation  and  administration  at  home 
and  abroad  ;  who  have  proved  their  mastery  in 
dealing  with  public  affairs,  not  only  on  the  floor  of 
Parliament,  but  in  the  offices  of  the  administration, 
and  are  finally  by  an  informal  but  effective  selec- 
tion designated  for  supreme  leadership.  As  both 
parties  aim  to  give  continuity  to  the  foreign  policy 
of  the  country,  and  as  the  same  men  often  remain 
for  decades  leaders  of  their  parties,  the  English 
government,  with  all  its  advantages  of  freedom 
and  popular  representation,  has  also,  to  some 
extent,  those  characteristics  of  continuity  and  per- 
manence which  are  essential  to  success. 

The  danger,  in  these  recent  developments,  of 
an  undue  increase  of  one-man  power  must  not  be 
overlooked.  It  is  certain  that  since  the  great  suc- 
cess in  colonial  expansion  of  Russia  and  Germany, 
the  imperial  authority  in  both  of  these  countries 

75 


WORLD   POLITICS 

has  been  remarkably  fortified.  These  nations,  be- 
lieving that  the  sum  total  of  national  well-being  is 
being  increased  by  the  initiative  of  the  heads  of 
the  state,  will  not  countenance  any  effective  oppo- 
sition to  the  foreign  policy  decided  upon  by  their 
emperors. 

The  emperor  of  Germany,  much  to  the  disgust 
of  the  liberal  element  among  his  subjects,  has 
shown  himself  anxious  to  rival  the  position  of  the 
Czar  of  Russia  as  a  religious  potentate,  a  vice- 
regent  and  representative  of  God.  He  has  allowed 
no  occasion  to  pass  to  add  another  ray  to  the  illu- 
mination of  sanctity  by  which  he  surrounds  his 
house.  Whenever  he  can  associate  himself  with 
Divinity,  he  may  be  counted  upon  to  do  so.  This 
habit  may  seem  merely  ridiculous,  but  as  indicat- 
ing the  frame  of  mind  of  the  most  powerful  man 
in  one  of  the  most  powerful  governments,  —  a 
sentiment,  moreover,  which  is  very  likely  to  influ- 
ence his  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  —  it  becomes 
important  enough  to  deserve  attention.  When  in 
connection  with  it  we  consider  the  persecutions 
which  in  Russia  have  been  directed  against  reli- 
gions that  do  not  recognize  the  Czar  as  their  head, 
and  when  we  bear  in  mind  the  rigorous  and  fre- 
quent punishment  of  the  offence  of  Ihe  7najest^  in 
Germany,  it  becomes  clear  that  these  vauntings  of 
the  emperor  have  a  serious  side. 

It  is  often  affirmed  that  the  policy  of  expansion 
tends  to  advance  the  cause  of  good  government 
at  home,  and,  as  conclusive  proof  of  this  assertion, 

76 


NATIONAL   IMPERIALISM 

the  reform  in  the  English  civil  service  is  cited. 
This  reform  is  looked  upon  by  those  making  the 
argument  as  a  result  of  the  sense  of  national 
responsibility  felt  in  consequence  of  the  colonial 
expansion  of  the  last  century.  We  may  better 
judge  how  colonial  expansion  affected  English  pol- 
itics from  the  expressions  of  Lord  Chatham  regard- 
ing the  corruption  caused  by  the  free  use  of  the 
wealth  of  rich  colonial  magnates.^  It  must  also  be 
remembered  that  England  had  been  a  colonial 
power  for  two  centuries  and  a  half  before  her  civil 
servdce  was  reformed,  and  that,  during  those  centu- 
ries, there  were  periods  characterized  by  such  cor- 
ruption as  that  of  the  Cabal  and  Walpole.  It  is  not 
safe,  therefore,  to  draw  optimistic  conclusions  from 
what  seem  to  be  the  evident  necessities  of  an 
expanding  nation.  Those  whose  prime  interest  is 
in  pure,  honest,  and  efficient  government  at  home, 
will,  in  the  future,  have  to  be  more  careful  and 
exert  greater  energy  than  ever. 

The  tendency  of  politicians  to  secure  an  advan- 
tage from  the  withdrawal  of  public  opinion  from 
home  affairs  by  an  interesting  foreign  policy,  is 
shown  by  the  efforts  recently  made  in  our  own 
country  for  the  abolition  or  restriction  of  civil  ser- 
vice reform, —  efforts  which  have,  to  a  certain  extent, 
been  successful  in  influencing  political  action.  The 
argument  often  heard  that  to  succeed  as  a  colonial 
power  we  need  a  pure  administration,  and  that  we 
shall  consequently  get  it,  seems,  therefore,  rather 

1  See  Part  V.,  Ch.  IV. 

77 


WORLD   POLITICS 

unsafe  for  the  friends  of  reform  and  good  govern- 
ment to  rest  upon.  It  would  seem  that,  as  national 
attention  is  centred  on  the  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory and  national  glory  abroad,  less  attention  and 
energy  is  left  for  the  rational  regulation  of  home 
affairs,  and  that  the  cause  of  good  government 
must  therefore  suffer.  Moreover,  there  is  little 
doubt  that  the  exertions  for  social  betterment,  and 
for  purer  methods  in  politics,  have  already  sus- 
tained an  impairment  from  the  exaggerated  interest 
taken  in  imperiahsm.  If  energy  is  expended  in 
one  direction,  other  matters  must  wait  in  conse- 
quence. Every  one  who  is  familiar  with  the  cur- 
rent thought  and  feehngs  in  Europe  knows  that 
the  governing  classes  are  beginning  to  neglect 
true  social  reform  in  favor  of  the  more  ambitious 
branches  of  politics.  National  greatness  to  them 
lies  in  strong  military  and  naval  forces,  in  the 
strengthening  of  national  industry  and  credit,  and 
to  these  ends  all  other  matters  are  subordinated. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  point  out,  in  this 
connection,  the  aristocratic  tendency  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. The  great  leaders  of  continental  European 
thought  in  this  period,  Schopenhauer  and  Renan, 
Comte  and  Nietzsche,  are  not  at  all  favorable  to 
the  cherished  ideas  of  liberalism  and  democracy. 
With  them,  the  destiny  of  humanity  is  not  found 
in  the  happiness  of  multitudes,  but  in  the  great- 
ness of  rare  and  select  individuals.  The  politi- 
cal  machinery  which   liberalism   has   constructed 

78 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

for  the  protection  of  popular  rights  they  do  not 
value,  but  would  rather  replace  by  a  less  formal, 
more  compact,  social  organization.  There  are 
many  symptoms  of  a  reversion  to  the  symbolism 
and  idealism  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  with  it  of  a 
return  to  the  social  ideas  dominant  at  that  time. 
The  human  intellect,  wearied  with  long  scientific 
exertions  which  have  led  merely  to  the  amassing 
of  a  vast  congeries  of  facts,  is,  according  to  these 
philosophers,  yearning  for  new  ideals,  and  a  more 
mystical,  emotional  interpretation  of  Hfe. 

As  we  turn  from  this  consideration  of  certain 
drawbacks  in  the  present  political  tendencies,  the 
question  suggests  itself :  Is  humanity  the  helpless 
victim  of  historical  forces,  or  can  it  consciously 
modify  and  control  its  destiny  ?  Political  fatalism 
is  very  common  at  present ;  it  is  in  fact  the  mental 
attitude  created  in  many  by  the  study  of  historic 
evolution.  The  manner  in  which  the  United  States 
was  drawn  into  Oriental  politics  and  incurred  far- 
reaching  duties,  without  any  clear  recognition 
among  the  public,  or  even  among  statesmen,  of  a 
national  purpose  or  poHcy,  strengthens  this  feeling. 
Conscious  purpose  and  reasoned  action  seems  in- 
deed to  have  been  but  a  small  factor  in  these  work- 
ings of  "  destiny."  In  a  like  manner,  world  politics 
appear  to  be  entering  a  stage  where  grim,  silent, 
passionate  forces  will  hurry  humanity  along,  like 
leaves  in  a  torrent.  But  as  the  human  will  and 
intellect  has  tamed  the  fierce  powers  of  the  light- 
ning and  the  storm,  can  it  not  also  master,  in  some 

79 


WORLD   POLITICS 

measure  at  least,  the  tumultuous  energies  that  are 
now  stirring  its  own  deeper  nature  and  breaking 
forth  into  the  battle  cry  of  action,  conquest,  ex- 
pansion, glory,  and  might  ?  The  forces  that  find 
triumphant  expression  in  Kipling's  song  are  not  in 
need  of  encouragement  from  political  theory ;  it  is 
the  more  modest  and  unromantic  task  of  the  pub- 
licist to  analyze  their  nature  and  to  point  out  the 
dangers  that  follow  in  their  train. 

Bibliographical  Note 

Andrews  (Charles  M.),  Historical  Developtnent  of  Modern 

Europe.     Vol.  II.   New  York,  1898. 
Aubin  (M.  Eugene),  Les  Anglais  aux  Indes  et  en  Egypte. 

Paris,  1899. 
Bloch  (J.  von),  Der  Krieg  (translation  from  the  Russian). 

6  vols.    Berlin,  1899. 
Bluntschli  (J.  K.),  The  Theory  of  the  State.     Oxford,  1895. 
Brandes  (George),    Pole7i     (translated    from    the  Danish). 

Munich,  1898. 
Bright  (John),  Speeches.     London,  1869. 
Brown   (William  Harvey),  On  the  South  African  Frontier. 

New  York,  1898. 
Bryce  (James),  The  Holy  Roman  Empire.     New  York,  1892. 

Impressions  of  South  Africa.     New  York,  1896. 

Burd's  edition  of  Machiavelli's  Prince.     Oxford,  1890. 
Burgess  (John  W.),  Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law. 

Boston,  1896. 

Caldecott  (Alfred),  English  Colonization  and  Empire.     Lon- 
don, 1891. 

Davidson   (John),  "  England  and  her  Colonies,"  in  Political 
Science  Quarterly^  March  and  June,  1899. 
80 


NATIONAL  IMPERIALISM 

Demolins,  A  qnoi  Tient  la  Suptrioritl  des  Anglo-Saxons  f 
Paris,  1898. 

Faguet  (Emile),  Politiques  et  Moralistes.     Paris,  1898. 

Questions  Poliiiqiies.     Paris,  1899. 

Funck-Brentano  (Th.),  La  Politique  —  Principes,  Critiques, 
Reformes.     Paris,  1893. 

Giddings  (F.  H.),  Democracy  and  Empire.  New  York,  1900. 

Guilland  (A.)>  VAllemagne  Nouvelle  et  ses  Historiens.  Paris, 
1900. 

Hamelle  (Paul),  Hommes  et  Choses  d''Outremer.    Paris,  1899. 

Harrison  (F.),  "John  Stuart  lAWX,''''  Nineteenth  Century,  Sep- 
tember, 1896. 

Holland  (Thomas  Erskine),  Studies  in  International  Law. 
Oxford,  1898. 

Hyslop  (James  H.),  Democracy.     New  York,  1899. 

Ireland  (Alleyne),  Tropical  Colonization.     New  York,  1899. 

Kant  (Immanuel),  Der  ewige  Friede. 

Lecky  (W.  E.  H.),  Detnocracy  and  Liberty.    New  York,  1896. 

Leroy-Beaulieu  (Pierre),  De  la  Colonisation  chez  les  Peuples 
Moderties.     Paris,  1898. 

Lowell  (A.  L.),  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental 
Europe.     Boston,  1897. 

Lublinski  (S.),  Litteratur  und  Gesellschaft  im  XIX.  Jahr- 
hundert.     Berlin,  1899. 

Mahan  (Alfred  T.),  Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain.  Boston, 
1899. 

Milner  (Sir  Alfred),  Etigland  in  Egypt.     London,  1892. 

Moore  (J.  Bassett),  History  and  Digest  of  the  International 
Arbitrations  to  which  the  United  States  has  been  a 
Party.     Washington,  Government  Printing  Office,  1898. 

Morley  (John),  Machiavelli.     London,  1897. 

Nietzsche  (Friedrich),  Unzeitgemasse  Betrachtungen.  Leip- 
zig, 1895. 

G  81 


WORLD  POLITICS 

Passy  (Frederic),  D Arbitrage  International.     Paris,  1892. 
Penfield  (F.  C),  Present-Day  Egypt.     New  York,  1899. 
Pollock  (Sir  Frederick),  History  of  the  Science  of  Politics. 

London,  1896. 
Rosebery  (Lord),  Appreciations  and  Addresses.     London, 

1898. 

Schmidt-Weissenfels,  Das  neiinzehnte  fahrhundert.  Berlin, 
1890. 

Scholes  (Theophilus  E.  S.),  The  British  Empire  and  Alli- 
afices.     London,  1899. 

Schopenhauer  (Arthur),  Parerga  und  Paralipomena.  Leip- 
zig, 1895. 

Seeley,  The  Expansiofi  of  England.     London,  1896. 

Steffen  (G.  F.),  England  als  Wcltmacht  und  Kulturstaat 
(translated  from  the  Swedish).   Stuttgart,  1899. 

Stengel  (C.  von),  Der  ewige  Friede.     1899. 

Treitschke  (  H  einrich  von) ,  Politische  Aufsiitze.  Leipzig,  1 87 1 . 
Politik.     Beriin,  1898. 

Tolstoi  (Count  Leo),  Patriotism  and  Christianity. 
Villari  (Pascale),  Machiavelli  and  his  Times. 
Zimmermann    (Alfred),   Die  Kolonial- Politik   Gross-Briiatt' 
niens,  Part  II.     Berlin,  1899. 


83 


PART   II 
THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 


CHAPTER  I 

Social  and  Political  Characteristics  of  China 

The  suddenness  with  which  the  entire  perspec- 
tive of  the  political  world  has  been  changed  by 
recent  developments  in  China  is  unprecedented. 
That  countr}^,  without  question,  has  become  the 
focal  point  of  international  politics.  Vast  interests 
are  there  under  contention,  —  even  the  very  com- 
position of  the  world  civilization  of  the  future  is  at 
stake  upon  the  issue.  Rarely  have  statesmen  been 
under  a  graver  responsibility  than  are  the  ministers 
in  whose  hands  are  the  threads  of  Chinese  politics, 
for  they  are  in  a  position  to  determine  the  future 
course  of  history  in  such  measure  as  they  under- 
stand and  intelligently  influence  the  forces  there 
at  work. 

True,  there  are  other  important  areas  which  are 
already  the  object  of  contest,  or  which  may  in 
future  be  fought  for  in  diplomacy  and  war.  The 
mineral  and  agricultural  wealth  of  South  Africa 
is  at  present  the  stake  in  an  important  struggle : 
Turkey  in  Asia  affords  a  tempting  field  for  coloni- 
zation, and  South  America,  too,  attracts  the  eager 

85 


WORLD   POLITICS 

glances  of  expanding  world  powers.  But  China 
exceeds  them  all  as  a  field  for  commercial  expan- 
sion. More  populous  than  all  Europe,  it  contains 
provinces  which  singly  have  a  wealth  of  natural 
resources  that  reduces  European  figures  to  in- 
significance. The  one  province  of  Szechuen, 
with  its  sixty-odd  millions  of  inhabitants,  its 
vast  and  apparently  inexhaustible  coal  fields,  its 
agricultural  and  mining  wealth,  is  an  empire  in 
itself. 

There  has  been  a  marked  change  in  opinion 
concerning  China  since  the  war  between  that 
country  and  Japan.  Some  thinkers,  like  Schopen- 
hauer^ and  Renan,^  it  is  true,  foresaw  the  down- 
fall of  China  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  its 
pedantic  civilization ;  but  others,  and  prominently 
among  them,  General  Wolseley,^  were  at  the  same 
time  predicting  for  it  an  increasing  strength.  The 
latter  were  even  frightened  at  a  vision  of  a  "Yel- 
low Terror,"  which  was  to  sweep  the  older  civiliza- 
tions from  the  globe  when  the  full  possibilities  of 
the  Chinese  race  should  come  to  be  realized.  The 
empire  was  looked  upon  as  difficult  for  European 
powers  to  deal  with  in  matters  of  international 
moment,  and  as  bound,  therefore,  to  pursue  for  an 
indefinite  time  its  own  destiny,  free  from  outside 
interference.  Since  the  war,  however,  opinion  has 
passed  to  the  other  extreme.     Hopeless  corruption 

^  Parerga  und  Paralipomena,  Vol.  II.,  §  124. 

2  Essais  de  Morale  et  de  Critique  (1859),  p.  42. 

^  Wolseley,  Narrative  of  the  War  2vith  China  ir  i860. 

86 


THE   OPENING  OF   CHINA 

and  stubborn  conservatism  on  the  part  of  the 
rulers,  accompanied  by  unmanly  cowardice  and 
lack  of  all  patriotism  on  the  part  of  the  masses, 
are  now  believed  to  make  the  empire  an  easy  prey 
for  the  powers,  who  have  only  to  color  the  map  of 
China  to  bring  about  its  dissolution.  There  is 
reason  in  both  views ;  but,  being  extreme,  they  are 
distorted.  There  are,  to  be  sure,  in  the  Chinese 
people  elements  of  strength  which,  if  coordinated 
and  developed,  will  make  China  and  the  Chinese 
nation  the  centre  of  the  industrial  world.  The 
present  weakness  of  the  empire  is  due  not  to  the 
degeneracy  of  individuals,  but  to  a  disorganized 
political  system  and  to  false  political  ideals. 

It  is  not,  perhaps,  remarkable  that,  in  a  matter 
about  which  so  little  is  known,  there  should  be  so 
many  mistaken  generalizations.  At  the  present 
time  theories  about  China,  about  its  partition, 
about  the  alliances  of  the  powers,  and  about 
spheres  of  influence,  are  both  abundant  and  flour- 
ishing ;  but  most  of  them  lack  the  solid  foundation 
of  fact.  It  is  therefore  necessary,  in  order  to 
understand  the  forces  at  work,  to  set  clearly  before 
our  minds  the  actual  conditions  in  China  and  the 
leading  facts  with  regard  to  the  present  situation. 
We  must  know  the  characteristics  of  Chinese  gov- 
ernment and  society,  the  philosophy  on  which  its 
social  system  rests,  the  nature  and  distribution  of 
its  resources,  the  accessibility  and  security  of  the 
various  parts  of  the  empire,  the  reforms  which 
have  been  attempted  as  well  as  the  reforms  which 

«7 


WORLD   POLITICS 

are  possible,  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  inhab- 
itants in  dealing  with  strangers  and  with  enter- 
prises managed  by  foreigners,  and  the  inroads 
already  made  by  foreign  political  and  economic 
influence. 

It  is  a  complex  situation  which  no  one  for- 
mula can  explain.  Even  in  a  homogeneous  state, 
political  life  is  of  an  intricate  nature ;  in  a  vast 
empire  wherein  all  the  leading  nations  of  the 
world  are  struggling  for  a  foothold,  and  whither 
all  are  bringing  with  them  their  traditional  pol- 
icies and  ideas,  the  complexity  of  the  situation 
assumes  bewildering  proportions.  Details,  appar- 
ently insignificant,  and  to  the  Occidental  mind 
puerile,  must  often  be  given  delicate  consideration, 
as  in  the  matter  of  the  prejudices  of  the  people 
or  their  peculiar  methods  of  doing  business,  any 
neglect  of  which  may  lead  to  the  failure  of  an 
important  enterprise.  The  whole  situation  is 
fraught  with  fateful  possibilities  for  mankind ;  for 
whether  the  empire  itself  is  destined  to  regain  its 
strength  and  enter  upon  a  marvellous  career  of 
industrial  development ;  or  whether  Russia  is  fated 
to  gain  the  upper  hand,  and  make  of  China  the 
real  seat  and  centre  of  her  power ;  or  whether, 
finally,  the  European  powers  shall  succeed  in 
preserving  a  balance  under  which  the  forces  now 
at  work  may  develop  without  disturbance  —  in 
any  event,  the  issue  is  bound  to  exert  a  radical 
influence  on  the  civilization  of  the  world. 

If  a  careful  consideration  of  the  powers  engaged 
88 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

in  the  Chinese  struggle,  their  policies  and  ten- 
dencies, is  of  the  greatest  necessity,  it  is  not  less 
a  study  of  the  most  absorbing  interest,  for  a  drama 
is  about  to  be  enacted,  the  like  of  which  the  world 
has  never  seen.  It  dwarfs  the  conquests  of  Alex- 
ander ;  compared  with  this  titanic  contest,  the  ex- 
ploits of  Napoleon  seem  a  passing  diversion,  and 
previous  meetings  between  Orient  and  Occident 
seem  the  merest  frontier  skirmishes.  Western 
spirit  and  Western  enterprise  are  now  penetrating 
to  the  very  heart  and  stronghold  of  the  Orient. 
The  result  only  the  future  can  reveal ;  but  to 
those  who  understand  what  is  going  on,  the  drama 
must  be  of  engrossing  interest.  In  the  quiet  years 
between  1870  and  1890,  some  of  us  may  have  felt 
at  times  that  a  little  of  that  excitement  which 
Caesar  and  Napoleon  gave  the  world  might  prove 
a  not  unwelcome  diversion.  These  late  years  have 
shown  that  the  stage  on  which  those  actors  played 
their  part  was  after  all  but  a  small  affair,  com- 
pared with  that  on  which  the  twentieth  century 
drama  is  to  be  presented. 

When  we  consider  the  spirit  and  temper  of 
Chinese  society  and  civilization,  we  are  struck  first 
of  all  by  its  homogeneous  character,  its  power  of 
assimilation.  The  repeated  conquests  of  China  by 
foreign  invaders  have  left  little  or  no  impression 
on  her  ancient  morality  and  polity,  the  conquerors 
having  fallen  instead  into  Chinese  ways  and  forms. 
Thus,  the  last  conquerors  —  the  Manchus  —  have 
become  even  ultraconservative  of    Chinese  tradi- 

89 


WORLD  POLITICS 

tions,  while  the  true  Celestials  themselves  are 
recruiting  the  reform  parties. 

The  chief  characteristic  of  Chinese  society  and 
the  essence  of  Chinese  morality  is  reverence  for 
the  past.  Noting  the  fact  that  the  present 
state  forms  have  existed  practically  for  twenty- 
five  hundred  years,  and  that  within  this  time  and 
under  these  forms  untold  millions  have  been 
enabled  to  lead  a  civilized  and  peaceful  life,  we 
shall  cease,  perhaps,  to  wonder  at  the  canoniza- 
tion and  worship  of  the  originators  of  the  system. 
Thus,  China  still  looks  to  the  past  for  exemplars 
of  perfection  and  for  guidance.  In  the  same 
way,  the  individual  looks  to  the  more  immediate 
past,  the  principal  tenet  of  private  morality  being 
reverence  for  ancestors.  It  is  considered  highly 
moral,  for  instance,  for  an  individual  to  expose  his 
children,  in  cases  where  such  a  course  seems  to 
him  necessary  in  order  to  insure  and  safeguard 
the  means  for  providing  for  his  aged  parents.  To 
desecrate  a  grave  is  the  greatest  crime.  As  illus- 
trating the  effect  of  Chinese  tradition  upon  busi- 
ness relations,  it  may  be  noted  here  that  all  the 
present  railway  concessions  specially  provide  that 
the  feelings  of  the  people  regarding  the  sacred- 
ness  of  graves  are  not  to  be  offended. 

The  Chinese  state  has  become  remarkably 
formalized,  and  this  formalization  has  reacted  on 
the  various  parts  of  society  within  the  empire. 
Conservatism  and  formalism  naturally  go  together, 
and   as   the   state   form    which  was   the    original 

90 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

foundation  is  still  in  existence,  there  has  been  an 
overemphasizing  of  the  external,  and  a  desire  to 
conform  to  the  old  ideals,  at  least  in  outward 
appearance,  which  have  had  the  most  disastrous 
effect  upon  Chinese  politics.  To  save  appearances 
is  the  first  rule  of  the  Chinese  official.  Thus,  along 
with  the  constant  outward  profession  of  the  moral 
platitudes  of  Confucius  and  Mycins,  which  are 
drilled  into  the  mandarin  from  his  youth  up,  there 
exists  a  very  shrewd  selfishness  which  seeks  the 
greatest  personal  gain  that  can  be  reconciled  with 
appearances.  The  manner  in  which  public  works 
are  constructed  illustrates  this  characteristic.  Re- 
pairs in  the  walls  of  the  capital  or  on  the  roads 
are  executed  in  a  manner  so  superficial  as  to  be 
barely  satisfactory  even  on  immediate  inspection. 
At  times  the  inspection  itself  is  only  a  blind,  as 
was  the  case  in  one  instance  where  an  imperial 
command  had  ordered  the  investigation  of  a  long 
tunnel.  Several  men  were,  in  the  inspectors'  pres- 
ence, sent  down  into  the  tunnel ;  within  the  tunnel 
and  near  the  other  end  another  party  of  men,  simi- 
larly dressed,  had  already  been  stationed.  When 
the  party  of  inspection  arrived  at  the  lower  end, 
the  second  group  came  out,  and  by  that  very  fact 
proved  the  tunnel  in  perfect  condition  !  When- 
ever the  emperor  rides  through  the  streets  of  his 
capital,  they  are  carpeted  in  such  a  way  as  to  shut 
out  from  his  sight  the  refuse  of  ages  which  is 
there  accumulated,  and  the  gateways  of  the  walls 
are  whitewashed  only  to  the  height  to  which  he 

91 


WORLD   POLITICS 

can  view  them  from  beneath  his  baldachin.^  These 
may  be  extreme  examples,  but  they  certainly 
testify  to  a  characteristic  which  all  observers  have 
noted.  The  ridiculous  frauds  perpetrated  by  the 
Chinese  in  furnishing  ammunition  and  army  stores 
in  their  last  war  are  familiar  to  all.  Bombs  filled 
with  charcoal  could  in  the  matter  of  appearance 
pass  upon  inspection,  and  would  thus  satisfy  the 
Chinese  official. 

The  general  plan  of  organization  of  the  Chi- 
nese state  and  society  is  well  known.  There  are 
four  regular  classes,  —  the  mandarins  and  literati, 
the  agriculturists,  the  mechanics,  and  the  mer- 
chants. The  fact  that  farmers  rank  considerably 
above  merchants  is  evidence  of  the  ancient  origin 
of  this  system.^  The  military  profession  is  not  the 
most  honored,  military  mandarins  being  considered 
inferior  to  the  civil.  To  the  same  effect,  a  Chi- 
nese proverb  says,  "  You  do  not  take  good  iron  for 
a  nail,  nor  a  good  man  for  a  soldier."  In  some 
respects,  and  especially  in  having  for  its  essential 
element  government  by  an  educated  class,  —  the 
mandarins,  —  this  social  system  is  remarkably  like 
the  ideal  system  of  Plato's  Republic.  The  entire 
conservatism  of  China,  with  its  effectual  resistance 
to  those  ordinary  fluctuations  of  historical  forces 
which  the  Western  world  has  undergone,  is  largely 

^  For  other  similar  examples,  see  Leroy-Beaulieu's  articles  on 
China,  in  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  1898,  1899. 

2  Cf.  the  low  estimate  in  which  retail  trade  is  held  by  Plato  and 
Aristotle. 

92 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

due  to  this  form  of  organization,  which  puts  at  the 
head  of  the  state  a  cold,  educated  reason. 

The  mandarinate  is  democratic  in  its  origin, 
being  regularly  recruited  from  the  masses  of  the 
people  by  a  series  of  most  rigid  examinations. 
These  examinations  are  attested  to  be  generally 
fair  and  impartial,  although  the  sons  of  the  very 
highest  officials  are  sometimes  given  a  preference. 
Beginning  with  the  district  town  (Jisicfi)  examina- 
tion, the  candidate  for  governmental  honors  must 
pass  through  a  series  of  rigid  tests  in  his  depart- 
ment, circuit,  and  province,  until,  if  successful  in 
all,  he  finally  reaches  the  Peking  or  imperial  ex- 
amination. This  is  held  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  the  emperor,  who,  according  to  the 
doctrine  of  Confucius,  is  primarily  a  teacher.  Thus 
the  emperor's  first  official  act  is  usually  the  giving 
of  a  set  lesson  in  formal  ethics  to  his  ministers. 

The  vast  importance  of  these  examinations  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  the  reform  party  and  the  Em- 
peror Kwang  Su  directed  their  first  efforts  toward 
a  modification  of  their  form.^  At  the  present  time, 
the  subjects  in  which  candidates  are  examined  are 
the  Chinese  classics,  style,  and  calligraphy.  The 
ancient  Five  Classics  and  the  four  books  recording 
the  doctrines  of  Confucianism,  especially  the  trea- 
tise of  Mencius,  have  to  be  memorized,  and  in  addi- 
tion to  this,  the  vast  scholastic  critical  apparatus 
that  has  accumulated  for  centuries  must  be  mas- 

^  Kang  Yeu  Wei,  "The  Reform  of  China,"  Contemporary  Re- 
view, August,  1899. 

91 


WORLD   POLITICS 

tered  by  the  candidate  for  final  graduation.^  The 
examination  in  style  is  chiefly  a  test  in  the  use  of 
unusual  word  signs,  a  fine  style  consisting  in  the 
ability  to  employ  word  signs  which  the  ordinary 
man  does  not  understand.  The  prime  purpose  of 
education  in  this  field  is  therefore  to  fill  the  mind 
of  the  student  with  the  largest  possible  number  of 
word  images.  In  order  that  the  number  of  can- 
didates may  be  thinned  out,  the  requirements  are 
continually  increased  in  severity.  The  numerous- 
ness  of  applicants  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that 
at  a  recent  session  in  Shanghai  at  which  150  de- 
grees were  to  be  given,  14,000  candidates  appeared 
in  the  lists. 

The  benumbing,  stupefying  effect  of  this  educa- 
tion is  apparent  in  the  helplessness  of  vast  num- 
bers of  mandarins  when  they  are  confronted  with 
anything  like  the  problems  of  modern  science.  The 
ultraconservatism  of  the  mandarins  in  general  is 
also  explained  by  the  artificial  nature  of  their  train- 
ing. Any  reform  along  Western  lines  would  ren- 
der worthless  the  knowledge  that  gives  prestige 
to  the  members  of  the  present  official  class. 
Even  the  introduction  of  an  alphabet  would  at  one 
blow  take  away  the  raison  d'etre  of  the  promi- 
nence of  thousands  of  them.     The  man  of  memory 

1  As  specific  examples,  the  following  may  be  given.  An  essay  is 
required  to  be  written  on  the  topic,  "  Heaven  alone  is  grand,  and 
Yao  alone  was  worthy  of  it.  How  high  was  his  virtue  !  "  (an  ex- 
tract from  Confucius).  Questions  like  the  following  are  asked: 
"  Why  is  the  written  character  signifying  moon  closed  at  the  base, 
while  that  representing  the  sun  is  open  ?  " 

94 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

—  even  of  phenomenal  memory  —  is  in  modern 
times  at  a  tremendous  disadvantage  when  con- 
fronted with  the  man  of  trained  powers  of  obser- 
vation and  reasoning.  But  the  whole  system  of 
Chinese  education  rests  on  memory ;  and  a  radical 
change  must  therefore  be  effected  in  this  system 
before  reform  can  become  general.  No  one  has 
recognized  this  more  fully  than  have  the  emperor 
and  his  chief  reforming  minister,  Kang  Yeu  Wei. 
Even  after  a  student  has  successfully  passed 
the  final  examination  at  Peking,  —  its  severity 
often  costs  the  lives  of  many  candidates,  —  he 
is  not,  by  that  fact  alone,  assured  of  a  position, 
since,  in  China,  the  sale  of  offices  is  a  recognized 
institution,  accepted  by  every  one  as  a  matter  of 
course.  In  order  to  secure  an  appointment,  there- 
fore, the  successful  candidate  must  have  financial 
backing.  This  backing  is  often  provided  by 
native  syndicates,  consisting  of  capitalists  who, 
recognizing  the  ability  and  promise  of  a  graduate, 
furnish  him  the  necessary  means  wherewith  to 
buy  a  position.  As  the  salaries  are  ridiculously 
inadequate,  the  mandarin,  after  his  appointment,  is 
able  to  repay  the  syndicate  and  also  to  provide 
for  his  underlings,  relatives,  and  friends,  only  by 
dint  of  continued  and  systematic  exactions  from 
those  over  whom  he  has  been  vested  with 
authority.  Very  often  the  court  party  retains  a 
lien  on  the  income  of  an  appointee  who  has  been 
specially  favored.  Thus,  a  provincial  governor- 
ship, which  in  no  case  has  attached  to  it  a  salary 

95 


WORLD   POLITICS 

exceeding  five  thousand  dollars  a  year,  is,  never- 
theless, purchased  at  tenfold  that  amount.  To 
mention  another  instance,  the  overseer  of  native 
customs  at  Canton,  who  is  appointed  for  three 
years,  and  is  able  to  make  several  millions  by 
exactions,  is  bound  to  hand  over  by  far  the  larger 
part  of  the  proceeds  to  the  palace  favorites  at 
Peking.^  The  exactions  take  two  forms :  either 
money  belonging  to  the  government  is  retained 
under  some  pretext — usually  only  about  one-tenth 
of  the  taxes  levied  ever  reach  the  imperial  treas- 
ury ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  excessive  impositions 
are  laid  wherever  the  resistance  will  not  be  too 
strong.  As  an  instance  of  this  latter  form  of 
exaction,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  collectors 
of  likin — the  internal  taxes  levied  on  traffic  along 
the  rivers  —  usually  make  a  special  bargain  with 
every  carrier  that  passes  their  custom-house. 

Looking  at  Chinese  government  as  a  whole,  we 
see  in  it  a  partial  embodiment  of  the  entrancing 
ideal  which  filled  the  mind  of  Plato  and  the 
medieval  popes,  the  ideal  of  government  by  a 
carefully  selected  class  of  educated  men.  As  this 
system  has  moderated  the  natural  working  of 
the  more  passionate  political  forces,  it  may  be 
fairly  concluded  that  the  ultraconservatism  of 
the  Chinese  government  is  primarily  due  to  this 
form  of  organization.  Should  the  system  be 
abolished  or  even  greatly  modified,  should  China 

^  See  Gundry,  "The  Yangtse  Region,"  Fortnightly  Review,  Sep- 
tember, 1899. 

96 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

choose  a  less  formal  method  of  selecting  her 
governors  and  leaders,  the  rigid  stability  of  the 
empire  would  cease.  The  attack  of  the  reform- 
ing emperor  on  the  system  of  examinations,  his 
attempt  to  substitute  for  it  a  modern,  scientific 
test,  therefore,  looks  not  merely  to  an  educa- 
tional reform,  but  would  lead  to  a  change  in  the 
vital  character  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  That  with 
this  government,  purporting  to  be  a  government 
"of  the  best,"  selected  without  favor,  there  goes 
the  most  hopeless  corruption  and  cynical  indiffer- 
ence to  public  welfare,  is  a  grave  commentary  on 
the  dangers  of  a  shallow,  optimistic  idealism. 
The  system  is,  however,  so  firmly  intrenched  in 
the  hearts  of  the  people  that  a  radical  remodelling 
seems  almost  impossible.  A  whole  province 
does  honor  to  a  successful  graduate,  and  the 
humblest  family  knows  that  the  day  may  come 
when  one  of  its  members  will  stand  high  in 
governmental  power.  It  is  this  that  makes  it 
possible  for  such  a  system  to  exist  without  caus- 
ing great  popular  dissatisfaction.  It  is  accepted 
calmly  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  those  in  ofifice 
should  provide  for  themselves  and  their  relatives, 
while  every  group  of  relatives  hopes  in  turn  to  be 
made  happy  by  the  preferment  of  one  or  more  of 
its  members. 

To  conclude  from  the  general  cynical  contempt 

of    honesty  which   prevails  in  ofificial  circles  that 

Chinese  society  lacks  morality  would  be  to  fall 

into    serious    error.       Whatever    laxity    Chinese 

H  97 


WORLD   POLITICS 

morality  may  permit  in  official  relations,  from  the 
working-man,  the  tradesman,  and  the  servant  it 
exacts  most  scrupulous  honesty.  That  the  Chi- 
nese merchant's  word  is  as  good  as  his  bond,  is 
fully  attested  by  all  who  are  familiar  with  East- 
ern commerce,  and  that  as  employees  the  Chinese 
are  absolutely  reliable,  is  an  equally  well-known 
truth. 

The  character  of  the  Chinese  as  soldiers  has 
been  a  subject  of  much  dispute.  In  considering 
this  matter,  it  must  be  remembered  first  of  all  that 
the  soldiers  hired  by  the  military  mandarins  are 
the  merest  rabble  that  can  be  gathered  from  the 
streets  and  highways ;  for  the  mandarin,  being 
paid  a  fixed  sum  for  furnishing  a  certain  contin- 
gent, is  of  course  bent  upon  getting  the  cheapest 
material  available.  Another  point  which  should 
be  kept  carefully  in  mind,  in  judging  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  Chinese  soldiery,  is  the  treatment  of 
the  men  by  their  superiors.  Thus,  it  is  known 
that  at  the  end  of  the  last  war,  the  soldiers, 
although  their  pay  was  heavily  in  arrears,  were 
dismissed  with  a  dollar  apiece,  while  their  com- 
manders had  from  some  source  vast  sums  to  invest 
in  Shanghai  real  estate.  It  is  not  strange  that  the 
army,  under  such  conditions,  did  not  show  any 
patriotism. 

As  to  the  Chinese  of  the  better  classes,  it  is 
undoubtedly  true,  as  Lord  Wolseley  holds,  that 
they  are  magnificent  material  for  soldiers.  They 
have  proved  this  when  under  efficient  leadership, 

98 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

as  in  the  campaign  of  Gordon  against  the  Taiping 
rebels.  Their  whole  view  of  life  is  favorable  to 
a  soldierly  character ;  for,  like  all  Orientals,  they 
hold  individual  existence  cheap,  and  are  impassive 
under  physical  pains  that  to  a  Westerner  would 
be  unendurable.  Chinamen  have  been  known  to 
continue  eating  calmly,  while  the  most  horrible 
tortures  were  being  inflicted  upon  them.  The 
attitude  of  the  Chinese  as  soldiers  was  well  illus- 
trated in  the  French  Tongking  campaign  of  1882, 
when,  instead  of  holding  out,  they  ran  away  and 
allowed  themselves  to  be  made  prisoners,  but  yet 
preferred  death  to  the  doing  of  any  act  of  menial 
service  which  conflicted  with  their  inherited  cus- 
toms and  sense  of  dignity.  Should  the  Chinese 
be  disturbed  in  their  long-cherished  habits  and 
prejudices  by  an  invasion  of  foreign  enterprise 
or  political  control,  they  would  become  fierce 
defenders  of  their  local  civilization. 

It  is  commonly  believed  that  the  Chinese  are 
not  patriotic ;  that  the  idea  of  national  patriotism 
is  foreign  to  their  minds.  Indeed,  all  enthusiasms 
are  inexplicable  to  the  matter-of-fact,  prosaic  China- 
man. Thus,  too,  the  Chinese  are  the  only  people 
whose  native  religion  is  free  from  all  mysticism. 
Confucianism  is  a  morality  of  common  sense,  deal- 
ing with  the  most  obvious,  the  nearest  relations 
of  human  life ;  leaving  out  of  consideration  every- 
thing that  is  doubtful  or  mystical ;  and  based,  in 
short,  upon  the  words  of  Confucius,  "  Why  should 
we  have  cares  about  a  life  beyond  the  grave  when 

99 


WORLD   POLITICS 

there  are  so  many  duties  to  fulfil  to  the  living  ? " 
Thus  the  Chinaman  tries  to  excel  in  the  punctili- 
ous observance  of  nearer  duties,  of  the  ceremonies 
and  of  the  honor  due  to  those  immediately  about 
him.  He  acknowledges  no  ideal  suzerainty.  If 
he  is  affected  in  the  immediate,  intimate  relations 
of  his  life, — those  of  his  family  or  village,  —  he 
is  ready  to  sacrifice  himself.  But  the  ideal  unity 
involved  in  the  concept  of  a  state,  an  idea  which 
leads  Western  nations  into  frenzies  of  enthusiasm, 
leaves  him  quite  cool  and  composed.  All  the 
patriotism  of  which  the  Chinese  are  capable  is 
concentrated,  therefore,  on  their  immediate  sur- 
roundings. Loyalty  to  a  great  society  and  to  its 
civilization  has  never  been  inculcated  into  their 
minds. 

Nor  is  the  reason  for  all  this  far  to  seek. 
Their  isolation  and  long-continued  freedom  from 
contact  with  other  forms  of  civiUzation  have  pre- 
vented the  Chinese  from  forming  the  concept  of 
national  patriotism.  If  there  were  a  world  state, 
patriotism  would  lose  its  meaning ;  but  to  the 
mind  of  the  Chinese  there  has  always  been  a 
world  state,  since  to  them  their  empire  is  the 
world  —  outside  of  it  nothing  is  worthy  of  their 
notice.  Any  rude  or  careless  interference  by  for- 
eign nations  with  the  cherished  ideas  or  institutions 
of  the  Chinese  would  start  into  life  the  notion  of 
Chinese  national  individuality,  and  would  immedi- 
ately bring  forth  a  feeling  of  mutual  relationship 
and  dependence.     Foreign  statesmen  will  do  well 

IOC 


THE   OPENING   OF  CHINA 

to  avoid  the  fatal  error  of  looking  upon  the 
Chinese  as  mere  helpless  pawns  to  be  moved 
about  at  the  will  of  a  European  manipulator. 
The  establishment  by  European  nations  of  any 
real  protectorate  or  sphere  of  control  in  China 
would  require  so  delicate  a  perception  and  appre- 
ciation of  national  characteristics,  so  judicious  a 
management,  that  even  the  complicated  conditions 
in  Egypt  seem  simple  as  compared  with  the  com- 
plexities of  such  an  undertaking. 

The  alarming  weakness,  the  total  helplessness, 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  as  revealed  in  the  Japanese 
war  astonished  and  disconcerted  the  natives  as 
much  as  it  did  the  Europeans.  The  accounts  of 
the  emperor's  mental  suffering  as  the  reports  of 
defeat  after  defeat  came  in,  and  especially  when 
he  was  forced  to  sign  the  humiliating  Treaty  of 
Shimonoseki,  are  really  pathetic.  The  emperor's 
father  and  adviser,  Prince  Chun,  had  already 
turned  his  attention  to  Western  civilization,  espe- 
cially in  the  matter  of  armaments  and  navies.  The 
emperor  himself  looked  to  Western  methods  and 
Western  knowledge  for  guidance  out  of  the  laby- 
rinth of  troubles  into  which  he  had  been  driven. 
He  was  rather  a  student  than  a  ruler,  having  been 
brought  up  in  the  artificial  atmosphere  of  Chinese 
politics,  in  which  the  strong,  relentless  spirit  of 
single-handed  rule  is  not  developed.  Nevertheless, 
when  he  began  his  attempts  at  reforming  the 
social  order,  he  did  not  content  himself  with 
palUatives,  but  attacked  the  main  centre   of  the 

lOI 


WORLD   POLITICS 

difficulty,  the  educational  system.  In  pursuance 
of  his  policy,  he  provided  himself  with  European 
treatises  on  government,  industry,  philosophy,  and 
education,  and  drew  about  him  the  progressive 
elements  among  the  younger  Chinese  scholars.^ 

The  leader  among  these  is  Kang  Yeu  Wei,  a 
man  of  very  brilliant  intellect,  famous  for  his  com- 
mentary on  the  Confucian  classics,  and  thoroughly 
imbued  with  enthusiasm  for  Western  progressive- 
ness.  His  article  on  "  The  Reform  of  China,"  in 
the  Contemporary  Review  for  August,  1899,  is  a 
striking  presentation  of  the  attitude  of  the  Chinese 
reformers.  It  is  nafvely  enthusiastic,  and  reveals 
no  technical  mastery  of  Western  civilization,  but 
only  a  general  blind  faith  that  China's  sole  hope 
of  salvation  lies  in  studying  Western  books  and  in 
acquiring  Western  methods  of  government  and 
industry.  In  reading  his  essay,  and  particularly 
that  part  of  it  which  gives  an  account  of  the 
emperor's  mental  sufferings  and  thoughts  of  re- 
form, one  is  carried  back  in  thought  to  the  Con- 
fucian classics  and  their  nafve  account  of  the 
doings  of  great  men. 

Others  who  have  sympathized  with  plans  for 
reform  are  Chang  Chi  Tung,  the  great  viceroy  of 
Hankow;  Shang  Yeu  Hwan,  former  minister  to 
the  United  States ;  and  Weng  Tung  Ho,  the  em- 
peror's tutor.  Although  the  empress,  even  after  her 

^  A  good  account  of  this  movement  is  given  by  George  S.  Owen, 
in  his  article,  "  Reform  Policy  of  the  Chinese  Emperor,"  in  the 
National  Review,  August,  1899. 

I02 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

withdrawal  from  active  government,  still  retained 
the  power  of  appointment  and  the  great  seal,  the 
emperor,  nevertheless,  succeeded  in  gathering 
about  him  a  reform  party,  and,  supported  by  them, 
he  began  to  issue  a  series  of  edicts  which  were 
inspired  by  the  new  enthusiasm.  So  thoroughly 
had  the  defeats  in  the  Japanese  war  discredited 
the  conservative  party  that  for  a  time  it  seemed 
as  if  the  emperor  would  have  a  free  hand  in  his 
reforms.  True,  the  Manchus  were  against  him 
from  the  first,  as  were  most  of  the  older  influential 
ofBcials.  But  there  was  a  wave  of  popular  enthu- 
siasm for  reform.  The  masses  expected  better 
times.  Then,  too,  the  reformers  identified  them- 
selves with  the  Chinese  as  distinguished  from  the 
Manchu  nationality.^  They  celebrated  the  birth- 
day of  Confucius.  They  went  far  enough  herein 
to  give  the  empress  a  pretext  to  look  upon  them 
as  rebeUious  agitators  whose  cry  was  for  China, 
but  not  for  the  Manchu  dynasty. 

The  active  reform  policy  began  with  the  issuance 
of  the  edict  of  January  29,  1898.  This  edict  pro- 
vided for  the  holding  of  special  examinations  in 
scientific  and  technical  studies,  and  abolished  the 
artificial  essay  system  which  up  to  that  time  had 
been  a  main  element  in  the  examinations.  The 
Weng  Chang  —  the  literary  essay  of  the  govern- 
ment examination  —  is  an  artificial,  inflated  form 
of   composition,  which   calls   for  the   use  of   the 

^  The  party  of  reform  was  really  a  party  of  nationalism  in  its 
beginnings. 

103 


WORLD   POLITICS 

largest  possible  number  of  unusual  words  and  ex- 
pressions ;  it  is  divided  into  arbitrary  sections,  and 
is  altogether  so  factitious  and  foreign  to  ordinary, 
rational  ways  of  thought  that  it  took  the  greater 
part  of  a  student's  course  to  acquire  satisfactorily 
this  Hterary  method.  The  edict  also  ordered  the 
establishment  of  schools  on  Western  models  in 
the  district  towns  and  prefectural  cities,  and  of 
universities  in  the  provincial  capitals.  To  com- 
plete the  system,  a  great  imperial  university  with 
a  faculty  trained  in  modern  science  was  to  be 
established  in  Peking.  Even  in  the  lower  parts 
of  the  curriculum,  such  studies  as  geography,  his- 
tory, and  science  were  introduced  by  the  side  of 
the  old  classics. 

While  education  was  the  principal  matter  with 
which  the  reform  movement  concerned  itself,  other 
progressive  measures  were  not  neglected.  Railway 
building  was  urged,  and  a  bureau  of  mines  and 
railways  established,  as  also  an  intelligence  depart- 
ment for  the  translation  of  foreign  technical  and 
scientific  literature.  Inventions  were  to  be  encour- 
aged by  the  granting  of  patents.  Extensive  army 
reforms  were  planned.  Thus,  the  old  examination 
of  the  military  mandarin,  which  consisted  of  a  trial 
in  accuracy  with  the  bow  and  in  lifting  heavy 
weights,  was  replaced  by  more  modern  tests. 
Reform  newspapers  were  everywhere  established. 
In  the  granting  of  railway  concessions  to  foreign 
corporations,  it  was  always  made  a  condition  that 
schools  for  the  practical  training  of  the  Chinese  in 

104 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

railway  engineering  and  mining  should  be  estab- 
lished in  connection  with  the  works.^ 

It  may  be  seen  from  this,  therefore,  that  the 
Chinese  reformers  were  by  no  means  inclined  to 
cast  to  the  winds  the  old  prominence  of  education 
in  the  empire,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  they  meant 
to  use  it  as  the  most  powerful  lever  of  progress 
and  reform.  Of  late  it  has  become  fashionable 
to  jeer  at  the  Chinese  as  unpractical  pedants  who 
have  turned  their  empire  into  a  school  and  their 
governors  into  schoolmasters,  with  all  the  weak- 
ness, conservatism,  and  lack  of  any  practical 
character  that  some  people  so  gladly  attribute  to 
that  profession.  But  those  who  yield  to  this  fash- 
ion of  speaking  forget  or  disregard  the  fact  that 
in  this  very  system  the  Chinese  have  a  marvellous 
instrument  for  rapid  progress.  When  once  the 
leaders  become  convinced  of  the  necessity  of 
Western  reform,  the  educational  system  can  be 
utilized  to  bring  about  a  transformation  in  the 
methods  of  thought  and  work  far  more  rapidly 
than  that  process  could  be  effected  in  a  Western 
nation. 

The  emperor,  after  having  taken  these  general 
measures,  entered  upon  more  detailed  reforms  by 
abolishing  specific  sinecures.  Here  great  caution 
was  necessary,  because  at  once  all  office-holders 
began  to  tremble  for  their  incumbencies,  and  out 
of  their  common  fears  it  was  easy  to  construct 
an  ultraconservative   party    that    would    resist  as 

^  See  Consular  Reports,  September,  1899,  p.  69. 
105 


WORLD   POLITICS 

dangerous  any  suggestion  of  reform.  It  was  here 
that  the  emperor  encountered  resistance  from  the 
empress  dowager.  Caring  more  for  persons  than 
for  principles,  when  she  saw  those  from  whose 
adherence  she  drew  her  power  and  prestige  fall 
victims  to  the  new  movement,  this  imperious  woman 
soon  formed  suspicions  which  were  rapidly  fanned 
into  violent  distrust  of  the  emperor.  It  is  quite 
probable  that  the  emperor  had  been  advised  to 
gather  into  his  own  hands  the  full  powers  of  the 
government ;  but  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether 
any  direct  steps  against  the  person  of  the  empress 
had  been  contemplated. 

Her  prompt  decision  and  action  are  now  matter 
of  common  knowledge.  Gathering  about  her  the 
many  dissatisfied  and  disaffected  elements,  she 
seized  again  the  reins  of  government,  dismissed 
at  once  the  reform  cabinet,  executed  eight  of  its 
members  1  and  forced  the  others  to  flee  for  their 
lives.  All  this  was  most  adroitly  done  in  the  name 
of  the  emperor.  Upon  second  thought  and  deep 
consideration  of  the  circumstances,  so  ran  the 
imperial  announcement,  he  had  concluded  that  his 
reform  advisers  were  not  wishing  him  well !  The 
spirit  of  his  reforms  he  desired  to  be  carried  out, 
but  not  so  the  letter !  The  reform  edicts  were, 
therefore,  practically  revoked  and  the  old  methods 
of  examination  and  administration  were  reintro- 
duced ;  the  new  institutions  created  for  the  admin- 

1  They  made  a  touching  declaration  that  they  were  martyrs  in  a 
great  cause,  and  that  they  died  in  trying  to  save  their  country. 

1 06 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

istration  of  mines  and  railways  were,  however, 
allowed  to  continue.  The  reform  newspapers 
were  suppressed,  and  all  adherents  of  the  reform- 
ing policy  were  subjected  to  petty  persecution. 
The  emperor,  thus  robbed  of  all  authority,  had 
nothing  left  to  do  but  to  write  touching  letters  to 
his  exiled  minister,  Kang  Yeu  Wei,^  imploring  his 
sympathy.  He  has  since  been  several  times  re- 
ported dead,  and  in  February,  1900,  it  was  an- 
nounced that  he  had  resigned  his  office  in  favor 
of  Prince  Pu  Chun,  a  nine-year-old  child  who  is  com- 
pletely under  the  control  of  the  empress-dowager. 
At  any  rate,  whether  still  alive  or  not,  he  has 
ceased  to  be  a  factor  in  Chinese  politics. 

Various  conclusions  have  been  drawn  from  this 
reform  episode.  The  most  common  view  is  that 
Chinese  officialdom  is  corrupt  to  such  a  degree 
that  reform  from  within  has  become  impossible, 
unless  there  shall  arise  some  great  and  powerful 
genius,  with  the  inclination  and  the  personal  power 
to  force  the  corrupt  and  decadent  mandarins  into 
a  new  policy.  It  is  readily  apparent  that  the 
emperor,  while  intelligent,  patriotic,  and  well- 
meaning,  lacked  the  personal  force  and  strength 
of  character  necessary  to  accomplish  a  complete 
reform.  By  such  as  share  this  view  it  is  there- 
fore concluded  that  China  can  best  be  saved  by 
the  tactful  interference  of  foreign  powers  firmly 
pushing  her  along  the  path    of   progress   by  the 

^This  reformer  was  early  in  1900  engaged  in  fomenting  a  rebel- 
lion against  the  empress  in  southern  China. 

107 


WORLD   POLITICS 

establishment  of  new  industries  and  new  methods 
of  education. 

Others  see  in  the  emperor's  defeat  only  a  tem- 
porary set-back  to  progress.  The  seed  has  been 
sown,  as  one  of  the  eight  martyrs  said,  and  it  is 
certain  to  bring  forth  fruit  before  long.  The  fact 
that  railway  concessions  continue  to  be  granted; 
that  Western  industrial  methods  are  more  and 
more  being  adopted ;  and  that  popular  resistance 
to  the  exploring  parties,  or,  in  general,  to  the  con- 
struction of  railways  and  mining  enterprises,  is 
infrequent  and  confined  to  certain  provinces,^  may 
be  cited  as  a  sufficient  indication  of  the  dawning  of 
a  new  era. 

When  all  is  considered,  the  emperor's  attempts 
cannot  be  stigmatized  as  too  radical.  His  inter- 
ference with  the  administration  was  narrowly 
limited.  He  addressed  himself  rather  to  the 
intelHgence  of  the  nation,  hoping  to  accomplish 
the  desired  results  by  familiarizing  that  national 
intelligence  with  Western  modes  of  thinking.  The 
intense  interest  shown  by  all  classes  in  the  West- 
ern learning  recently  opened  up  to  them  is  a  guar- 
antee of  a  reform  which  no  coalitions  among  the 
officials  can  long  render  nugatory.  The  party  of 
progress  may  be  silenced  for  a  time,  but  the 
Chinese  nation  is  too  practical  to  have  missed  the 
lesson  given  it  by  the  emperor.  Manchu  conser- 
vatism may  for  a  time  stand  in  the  way  of  reform, 
but  it  cannot  render  futile  this  great  movement. 

1  Especially  Shantung  and  Szechuen. 
io8 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

One  point  is  of  special  political  importance  in 
this  connection.  The  Manchus,  who  are  the  con- 
servatives, are  naturally  allied  with  Russia  and 
Russian  interests,  while  the  reformers  look  to 
Great  Britain  as  the  champion  of  their  ideals. 
Nothing  could,  therefore,  aid  the  cause  of  reform 
more  surely  than  the  effective  display  of  British 
authority  and  power.  It  is  conceded  by  all  that 
Russia  has  obtained  her  numerous  concessions 
through  the  fear  she  inspires  in  the  mind  of  the 
Chinese.  They  have  come  to  look  upon  the  north- 
ern empire  as  the  irresistible  power,  and  all  official- 
dom bows  before  the  emissaries  of  the  Czar.  A 
strong,  consistent,  unwavering  poUcy  is  necessary 
to  impress  the  minds  of  these  Orientals. 

Turning  now  to  the  resources  of  China,  we  find 
that  their  development  has  been  retarded  by  the 
same  ideas  which  we  have  seen  dominating  Chi- 
nese politics.  The  unequalled  natural  wealth  of  the 
empire  has  hardly  been  touched.  The  coal  fields 
in  one  province,  according  to  a  geological  author- 
ity,^ could,  at  the  present  rate  of  consumption,  pro- 
vide the  world  with  coal  for  twenty  centuries.  In 
close  proximity  to  this  store  of  energy  are  found 
the  minerals  and  ores  in  the  extraction  and  indus- 
trial preparation  of  which  it  is  destined  to  be 
employed.  The  reason  that  this  wealth  has  not 
been  more  fully  exploited  lies  in  the  fact  that  until 
very  recent  times  agriculture  was  considered  —  as  it 
was  also  by  Aristotle  and  Plato  —  the  only  true  and 

*  Baron  von  Richthofen,  China. 
109 


WORLD   POLITICS 

permissible  wealth-producing  activity.  In  the  hier- 
archy of  classes,  the  farmers  rank  immediately 
below  the  mandarins.  Moreover,  use  of  the  soil 
in  agriculture  is  not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  disturb 
the  spirits  which,  according  to  Chinese  belief, 
inhabit  the  earth.  This  geomancy  of  China  is 
still  of  great  practical  importance.  Thus,  because 
high  towers  would  disturb  the  flight  of  the  good 
spirits,  there  cannot  be  found  in  any  of  the  cities 
of  the  empire  towers  exceeding  a  hundred  feet  in 
height.  For  the  same  reason,  any  penetration  into 
the  soil  more  than  that  wrought  by  the  plow  is 
believed  to  be  an  offence  against  the  mystic  pow- 
ers. It  was  on  this  ground  —  that  subterranean 
dragons  would  suffer  and  be  irritated  by  the  har- 
rowing of  the  earth  necessary  for  the  construction 
of  railways  —  that  mandarins  of  the  old  school 
based  their  opposition  to  railway  concessions.  In 
the  contract  under  which  the  great  mining  con- 
cession in  Szechuen  was  granted  last  year  to  Mr, 
Pritchard  Morgan,  the  attitude  of  the  present  gov- 
ernment in  this  matter  is  clearly  indicated.  One 
of  the  articles  of  the  contract  reads  :  "  Let  no  one 
obstruct  the  work  on  the  ground  that  it  is  injurious 
to  Feng  Shui  (the  earth  spirit)  as  long  as  the  gal- 
leries dug  below  the  ground  are  not  injurious  to 
the  soil  above."  ^  It  would  appear,  therefore,  from 
many  recent  occurrences  that  while  geomancy  is 
still  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with,  its  adherents  are 
becoming  the  minority  party. 

^  Consular  Reports,  September,  1899,  p.  69. 
IIO 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

The  present  work  is  not  a  fitting  place  in  which 
to  detail  at  length  the  varied  resources  of  the 
Chinese  provinces.  For  purposes  of  political  treat- 
ment, it  is  sufficient  to  state  the  general  conclusion 
reached  by  all  who  have  investigated  the  matter. 
According  to  them,  it  may  be  predicted  with  abso- 
lute certainty  that  the  coal  and  general  mineral 
wealth  of  China,  taken  in  connection  with  the  vast 
and  highly  trained,  frugal,  and  capable  population, 
will,  during  the  coming  century,  make  China  the 
industrial  centre  of  the  world,  and  the  Pacific  the 
chief  theatre  of  commerce. 


Ill 


CHAPTER   II 

The    Actual    Nature   of    the    Interests 

ACQUIRED    BY    FOREIGN    NATIONS    IN    ChINA 

Having  now  considered  the  internal  conditions 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  we  have  arrived  at  a  point 
where  we  can  properly  view  the  actual  inroads 
made  upon  the  empire  by  foreign  powers.  It  is 
of  the  greatest  importance  to  ascertain  clearly  what 
has  actually  been  done;  what  concessions  and  privi- 
leges have  been  obtained ;  to  what  degree  these 
concessions  and  privileges  are  purely  industrial  and 
commercial,  and  how  far,  on  the  other  hand,  they 
have  a  political  bearing.  It  has  become  too  com- 
mon to  make  rash  and  sweeping  overstatements  in 
this  matter  of  concessions ;  to  say,  for  instance, 
that  some  government  has  obtained  control  of  a 
province  of  China,  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
grant  of  some  limited  mining  rights  to  a  foreign 
corporation  is  the  sole  basis  of  the  report.  It  is 
essentia]  to  see  how  much  the  Chinese  government 
reserves  to  itself  and  to  its  subjects  in  making  the 
different  concessions,  and  also  to  note  clearly  the 
nature  and  extent  of  all  differences  in  its  treat- 
ment of  the  various  European  nations. 

112 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

The  idea  that  China  is  the  feeble,  unresisting 
prey  of  European  nations,  who  are  at  Hberty  to 
help  themselves  to  any  part  of  its  territory  and 
establish  protectorates  there,  is  preposterous  —  and 
almost  ridiculous.  The  concessions  so  far  obtained, 
with  the  exception  of  those  in  which  the  political 
nature  and  political  origin  were  openly  and  in  terms 
avowed,^  are  strictly  limited  in  scope.  Before  they 
could  be  turned  into  complete  political  control,  great 
sacrifices  of  blood  and  treasure  would  have  to  be 
made,  if  indeed  such  control  were  at  all  possible. 

The  terms  sphere  of  interest  and  sphere  of  influ- 
ence are  constantly  being  used  as  if  they  implied 
the  exercise  of  actual  political  authority  within  the 
"  sphere."  It  is  for  us  to  see  how  far  such  political 
interference  is  possible  in  China  at  the  present 
time.  The  technical  meaning  of  the  term  sphere 
of  interest  is  an  area  or  territory  within  which 
a  nation  claims  the  primary  right  of  exploitation 
of  commercial  and  natural  resources.  The  term 
sphere  of  influence  is  by  some  thought  to  refer  to 
a  certain  degree  of  political  control,  however  slight 
it  may  be ;  but  it  is  continually  used  interchange- 
ably with  sphere  of  interest.  The  terms  are 
therefore  flexible.  To  mention  an  instance  of 
one  extreme  in  the  meaning  of  the  term,  the  veiled 
protectorate  in  Egypt  might  be  called  a  sphere  of 

*  Thus  certain  concessions  to  Russia,  Germany,  and  France  were 
confessedly  of  political  origin,  growing  out  of  the  interference  of 
those  countries  in  behalf  of  China,  in  matters  consequent  upon  the 
Japanese  war. 

I  113 


WORLD   POLITICS 

influence.  At  the  other  extreme  is  the  meaning 
of  the  term  as  appHed  in  China  at  the  present  time, 
where  it  signifies  a  portion  of  territory  wherein  a 
nation  has  expressly  or  imphedly  declared  that  it 
will  permit  no  other  nation  to  exert  political  influ- 
ence, and  that  itself  will  lead  in  the  exploitation  of 
natural  resources.  Of  course,  should  a  partition 
of  China  actually  come  about,  these  spheres  of 
influence  would  be  regarded  as  preemptions  of 
Chinese  territory  ;  but  to  regard  them  at  present  as 
anything  other  or  more  than  spheres  of  influence 
for  a  priority  of  industrial  exploitation,  is  to  antici- 
pate history,  or  to  imagine  events  that  may  never 
be  realized.  We  must  avoid  allowing  ourselves  to 
be  confused  by  the  possibilities  of  the  situation, 
and  must  endeavor  rather  to  see  clearly  the  actual 
character  of  the  rights  and  concessions  thus  far 
acquired. 

If,  then,  we  turn  to  an  enumeration  of  the  inter- 
ests and  concessions  thus  far  acquired  in  China  by 
Russia,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Japan, 
we  shall,  upon  investigating  them,  have  a  firm  basis 
upon  which  to  rest  our  judgment  of  the  immediate 
course  of  development  of  Chinese  history. 

It  will  be  best  to  study  railway  concessions  first 
of  all.  It  has  been  said  that  the  politics  of  China 
are  railway  politics,  and,  as  we  have  shown  before 
the  manner  in  which  railways  are  used  in  modern 
imperial  expansion  gives  considerable  color  to  this 
assertion,  though  we  do  not  grant  to  it  the  full 
force  which  some  have  attributed  to  it.     We  must 

114 


THE  OPENING   OF  CHINA 

first  rid  our  minds,  however,  of  the  idea  that  the 
railway  concessions  in  China  are  in  all  cases  made 
directly  to  European  governments.  In  no  instance 
have  the  Chinese  parted  with  the  ultimate  property 
in  the  railway  for  which  concessions  have  been 
granted.  In  the  case  of  even  the  largest  railways, 
concessions  limited  strictly  to  the  right  of  construct- 
ing and  exploiting  the  lines  are  granted  to  foreign 
capitalists,  while  property  in  the  line  and  the  larger 
share  of  the  profits  of  operation  are  reserved  to  a 
Chinese  corporation  and  the  Chinese  government.^ 

As  the  railway  politics  of  China  are  considered 
of  extreme  importance  with  regard  to  the  future  of 
the  country  and  the  influence  of  European  nations 
there,  it  will  be  well  to  speak  a  little  more  in  detail 
about  the  various  railway  systems  proposed  and 
about  those  actually  begun.  Altogether,  conces- 
sions covering  about  ten  thousand  kilometres  of 
railway  lines  have  so  far  been  granted.  There  is 
now  evident  on  the  part  of  China  a  disposition  to 
put  a  stop  for  the  present  to  the  policy  of  con- 
cessions, in  order  that  the  working  of  the  present 
plan  of  operations  may  be  tested  before  further 
undertakings  are  planned. 

Beginning  at  the  north,  we  have  first  the  Rus- 
sian system,  operated  as  the  "  Railways  of  East 
China  "  by  the  Russian  government.  The  con- 
cession was  first  obtained  with  the  object  of  ex- 
tending the  trans-Siberian  railroad  from  the  Baikal 

1  See  Regulations  for  Mines  and  Railways  in  China,  at  the  end 
of  this  Part.    The  Russian  lines  are  an  exception. 

"5 


WORLD   POLITICS 

region  through  Manchuria  directly  to  Vladivostok. 
The  line  as  now  surveyed  will  pass  through  Bo- 
dune,  and  will  be  1425  kilometres  in  length. 
After  Port  Arthur  was  acquired  by  the  Russians, 
a  spur,  passing  through  Kirin  and  Moukden,  and 
having  a  total  length  of  800  kilometres,  was 
planned  and  begun.  This,  again,  is  connected 
with  the  important  port  of  Newchwang.  The  con- 
cessions to  Russia  are  the  most  liberal  in  their 
terms  that  have  been  granted  to  any  country, 
giving  to  the  Russian  company,  —  which  is  simply 
a  mask  for  the  Russian  government,^  —  complete 
latitude  in  the  matter  of  construction  and  exploi- 
tation. By  the  contract,  the  line  is  to  revert  to 
the  Chinese  government  after  eighty  years,  but 
there  may  be  many  a  slip  before  that  reversion  is 
enforced. 

Some  writers  are  inclined  to  believe  that  the 
value  of  the  entire  Siberian  system  will  be  chiefly 
strategic,  since,  in  their  opinion,  the  population  of 
the  country  through  which  the  road  passes  is  so 
sparse  and  the  important  towns  so  few  that  the 
freight  and  passenger  traffic  will  hardly  pay  the 
expenses  of  the  line.  This  view  of  the  purely 
strategic  character  of  the  Siberian  railway  is,  how- 
ever, already  shown  to  be  false,  or  at  least  one-sided, 
by  the  remarkable  amount  of  traffic  over  the  new 
route,  so  far  as  it  has  been  completed.     The  num- 

1  For  the  organization  of  the  company,  see  the  extract  from  the 
Official  Messenger  of  the  Empire,  cited  in  the  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  Vol.  CXLVIII.,  p.  834. 

116 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

ber  of  passengers  transported  on  the  western 
and  central  division  rose  from  244,000  in  1896 
to  512,000  in  1897,  and  to  948,000  in  1898;  while 
in  the  same  period  the  amount  of  freight  rose 
from  191,666  tons  to  616,000  tons.^  As  a  result 
of  this  development,  the  prosperity  of  the  caravan 
industry  has  been  materially  impaired,  and  it  is 
believed  that  the  burning  of  railway  bridges  is  to 
be  laid  to  the  carriers,  who  have  already  suffered 
a  loss  of  income.  Travellers  describe  a  veritable 
glut  of  merchandise  on  the  Russo-Siberian  fron- 
tier, waiting  to  be  transported  to  the  interior  of 
Asia.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that  the  col- 
onization of  Siberia  is  progressing  with  rapid 
strides;  it  is  estimated  that  in  1898,  400,000  immi- 
grants entered  Siberia.  The  country  has  shown 
itself  well  adapted  to  agricultural  settlement,  and 
its  mineral  wealth  is  amazing.  It  is  also  expected 
that,  as  soon  as  the  hue  to  Port  Arthur  shall  be 
completed,  a  flood  of  immigrants  will  pour  into 
Manchuria.  Then,  too,  the  time  between  western 
Europe  and  Shanghai  will  be  reduced  by  six  or 
seven  days,  so  that  not  only  mail,  but  also  pas- 
senger traffic,  will  seek  the  Siberian  line,  at  least 
until  other  and  still  more  direct  means  of  com- 
munication shall  have  been  constructed.  More- 
over, while  it  is  doubtless  true  that  the  railway  can 
never  supersede  sea  navigation  for  the  carriage  of 
ordinary  bulky  freight  from  Europe  to  China,  still 
the  numerous  new  colonies  that  are  now  growing 

1  Consular  Reports,  November,  1S99,  p.  410. 
117 


WORLD   POLITICS 

up  along  the  line  will  assure  to  it  a  considerable 
amount  of  freight  traffic.  The  Russian  govern- 
ment itself  did  not  foresee  the  rapid  development 
of  Siberia.  Strategical  purposes  may  therefore 
have  been  quite  prominent  when  the  construction 
of  the  railway  was  decided  upon.  The  line  has 
been  built  very  economically ;  it  has  steep  grades, 
sharp  curves,  and  a  poor  quality  of  rolhng  stock 
and  stations  ;  all  of  these  facts  show  how  little 
traffic  was  originally  expected.  In  fact,  the  line 
will  practically  have  to  be  rebuilt  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  a  great  transcontinental  railway. 

Since  the  Russo-British  agreement  of  April, 
1899,  which  was  supposed  to  settle  all  questions 
of  railway  extension  as  between  the  two  countries, 
Russia  has  asked  for  a  new  concession  from  New- 
chwang  to  Peking.  As  there  is  already  connecting 
these  two  points  a  line  which  is  partly  in  the  hands 
of  British  capitalists,  this  act  of  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment has  been  interpreted  as  a  political  move, 
designed  to  gain  control  of  the  present  Chinese 
seat  of  government.  In  this  connection  the  ques- 
tion of  road  gauge  has  an  important  bearing.  The 
Russian  gauge  is  the  "broad  gauge,"  1.52  metres, 
or  5  feet,  in  width,  while  the  regular  gauge  used  in 
western  Europe,  in  America,  and  in  the  European 
systems  of  China,  commonly  known  as  the  "stand- 
ard gauge,"  is  1.43  meters,  or  4  feet  8  1-2  inches. 
The  fact  that  rolling  stock  can  therefore  not  pass 
from  the  Russian  system  to  the  other  Chinese  sys- 
tems, furnished  a  strong  motive  for  the  extension 

118 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

of  the  Russian  line  to  the  interior  of  China.  In 
view  of  the  remarkably  rapid  development  of 
Siberia,  this  extension  might  be  interpreted  as 
a  purely  commercial  measure,  designed  to  facili- 
tate the  transportation  of  freight  from  the  centre 
of  China  through  Siberia.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
political  purpose  might  also  be  understood,  since 
in  case  of  war  it  would  be  of  exceedingly  great 
importance  to  Russia  to  be  able  to  transport  her 
troops  on  her  own  lines  to  the  very  centre  of 
China.  Up  to  the  present  moment,  however, 
Russia  has  contented  herself  with  the  assurance 
from  China  that  she  shall  be  offered  the  first 
chance,  should  a  direct  concession  between  Peking 
and  Newchwang  ever  be  granted. 

Manchuria,  a  province  exceedingly  rich  in 
natural  resources,  is,  as  compared  with  other  prov- 
inces, thinly  populated,  having  only  about  eight 
million  inhabitants,  so  that,  more  than  any  other 
part  of  China,  it  can  be  looked  upon  as  a  possible 
field  of  colonization.  It  will  take  some  decades  to 
begin  the  effective  development  of  the  vast  re- 
sources of  this  province,  but  even  if  Russia  should 
not  extend  her  political  influence  beyond  its  bor- 
ders, she  would  none  the  less  be  in  a  position  to 
build  up  a  powerful  empire  in  this  extreme  portion 
of  her  realm.  The  territory  through  which  the 
Manchurian  railway  passes  presents  great  difficulty 
on  account  of  mountain  ranges  and  marshes,  and 
it  is  therefore  not  probable  that  the  railway  can  be 
finished  before  1905.  Persons  who  are  inclined  to 
119 


WORLD   POLITICS 

give  a  political  interpretation  to  everything  now 
passing  in  China  say  that  that  year  marks  the  term 
of  the  lease  of  life  granted  to  the  Celestial  Empire. 
Should  she  succeed  in  strengthening  herself  and  in- 
itiating a  reform  before  that  date,  her  future,  they 
say,  need  not  be  despaired  of ;  but  otherwise,  she 
will  fall  an  easy  prey  to  Russian  power  and  intrigue. 
The  next  line  to  be  considered  is  that  between 
Shan-hai-kwan  and  Newchwang,  a  distance  of  415 
kilometres.  This  line  is  an  extension  of  the  origi- 
nal Chinese  railway  from  Tientsin  to  Shan-hai- 
kwan.  It  was  planned  by  The  British  and  Chinese 
Corporation,  in  which  The  Hongkong  and  Shang- 
hai Banking  Corporation  is  interested,  and  was 
conceded  to  that  company.  It  is  constructed  with 
the  standard  gauge,  and,  connecting  two  important 
ports,  is  of  considerable  commercial  value.  As  the 
road  was  to  be  managed  by  British  capital,  its 
construction  was  opposed  on  political  grounds  by 
the  Russian  government,  which  claimed  the  ex- 
clusive right  of  exploitation  north  of  the  great 
wall,  or  beyond  Shan-hai-kwan.  An  arrangement 
was  finally  made,  however,  by  the  terms  of  which 
the  rights  of  foreclosure  usually  reserved  by 
foreign  capitalists  as  security  for  loans  were  not 
to  apply  to  this  line;  the  promoters  and  capitalists 
concerned  in  the  construction  and  management 
were  to  have  a  lien  simply  on  the  income  and  not 
on  the  body  of  the  line,  so  that  the  likelihood  of 
its  passing  into  the  hands  of  foreigners  was  ex- 
cluded. Under  this  arrangement,  Russia  gave  her 
120 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

consent  to  the  construction  of  the  road,  the  whole 
matter  being  settled  in  the  Russo-British  agree- 
ment of  the  spring  of  1899.  Political  writers  are 
inclined  to  look  upon  the  acceptance  of  this  con- 
cession by  British  capital  as  a  mistake,  because 
in  case  of  war  with  Russia  it  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  hold  the  railway.  They  even  go  so  far 
as  to  urge  an  exchange  of  the  British  rights  in 
the  Newchwang  railway  for  the  concession  which 
has  been  granted  to  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  of 
a  line  south  of  Peking  in  a  region  where  English 
capital  is  already  interested.^ 

The  lines  in  the  province  of  Pechili  are  owned 
and  managed  by  Chinese  capitalists  with  the  aid  of 
European  employees.  The  first  permanent  railway, 
—  to  which  reference  was  made  in  the  last  para- 
graph,—  was  the  one  built  by  Li  Hung  Chang 
from  Tientsin  to  his  mines ;  later  extended  to 
Shan-hai-kwan  ;  and  then,  after  the  war,  to  Peking. 
The  personnel  of  the  service  is  Chinese,  except  in 
the  case  of  engineers,  who  are  still  mostly  Euro- 
peans, but  who  are  being  gradually  replaced  by 
natives.  The  railway  is  exceedingly  profitable, 
even  though  the  rates  are  comparatively  low  —  for 
instance,  one  cent  per  kilometre  for  first-class 
fare.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  Pechili  system 
earned  last  year  $1200  net  profits  per  kilometre, 
the  gross  earnings  being  $6000  per  kilometre. 

South  of  Peking  and  Tientsin  extremely  impor- 
tant railway  concessions  have  been  granted.     Ger- 

1  See  p.  133. 

121 


WORLD   POLITICS 

many  has  obtained  exclusive  exploitation  privileges, 
including  the  right  to  make  railway  concessions,  in 
the  province  of  Shantung.  The  gist  of  the  indus- 
trial concessions  made  to  Germany  in  that  prov- 
ince is  contained  in  the  following  paragraph  of  the 
agreement  between  the  Chinese  and  German  gov- 
ernments :  ^  — 

"  If  the  Chinese  government  or  individual  Chinese  subjects 
should  at  any  time  have  plans  for  the  development  of  Shan- 
tung, for  the  execution  of  which  foreign  capital  is  required, 
they  shall  in  the  first  place  apply  to  the  German  capitalists  for 
it.  Similarly,  in  the  event  of  machines  or  other  material 
being  required,  German  capitalists  shall  in  the  first  instance 
be  applied  to.  Only  when  German  capitalists  or  manufacturers 
have  refused  their  assistance,  shall  the  Chinese  be  entitled  to 
apply  to  other  nations." 

On  the  strength  of  these  concessions,  a  triangu- 
lar line  connecting  Kiao-chow  with  Tsinan  on  the 
Yellow  River  has  been  planned,  surveyed,  and  work 
thereon  begun.  This  triangle  encloses  the  rich 
mining  region  of  Shantung,  making  it  accessible 
from  all  sides.  Although  mountainous.  Shantung 
is  one  of  the  most  populous  agricultural  provinces 
of  China,  having  220  inhabitants  per  square  kilo- 
metre—  570  per  square  mile.^     Its  coal  and  iron 

1  Published  in  the  Peking  Official  Gazette,  March  6,  1898. 

2  Compare  with  this  the  following  figures  representing  the  density 
of  population  of  other  parts  of  the  world  with  which  the  reader  is 
probably  more  familiar :  — 

Pl'R   SQ.    M. 

Belgium  (1897} 579-" 

England  and  W^ales  (1891) 497-4 

Rhode  Island  (1890)       318.4 

132 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

deposits  are  esteemed  especially  rich,  and  its  prox- 
imity to  the  sea  makes  it  the  ideal  manufacturing 
province  of  the  empire.  The  line  between  Kiao- 
chow  and  Tsinan  will  be  used  to  convey  to  the 
ocean  the  vast  inland  traffic  received  from  the  rich 
provinces  of  Honan  and  Shanse.  It  is  even  stated 
that  railway  preemption  rights  along  the  whole 
valley  of  the  Hoangho  or  Yellow  River  have  been 
granted  to  Germany,  in  which  case  the  British 
sphere  of  influence  along  the  Yangtse  River  and 
the  German  sphere  of  influence  along  the  Yellow 
River  would  extend  side  by  side  to  the  western 
confines  of  the  empire.  If  the  report  of  this  con- 
cession is  founded  on  fact,  the  danger  of  collision 
between  Russia  and  England  would  be  lessened, 
inasmuch  as  Germany  practically  thus  inserts  a 
wedge  between  the  regions  coveted  by  the  other 
two  powers. 

Coming  now  to  the  principal  English  concessions, 
we  first  note  the  line  between  Tientsin  and  Ching- 
kiang,  near  Nanking.  This  line  follows  the  route 
of  the  old  imperial  canal,  which  has  become  so  ob- 
structed that  it  can  be  used  only  for  local  service 
and  can  offer  little  effective  competition  with  the 
railway  freight  traffic.  The  line,  as  surveyed, 
passes  through  Tsinan,  and,  as  it  will  connect  the 
capital  with  the  region  of  Shanghai,  is  bound  to 
be  one  of  the  great  trunk  lines.  B)^  arrangement 
between  German  and  English  capitalists,  the  con- 
struction and  exploitation  of  this  line  is  to  be 
divided  territorially  between  the  two  nations.  The 
123 


WORLD   POLITICS 

northern  portion,  extending  as  far  south  as  the 
boundary  of  Shantung,  has  been  surveyed  by 
German  engineers,  and  is  to  be  constructed  by 
German  capital.  This  region  presents  special  dif- 
ficulty on  account  of  the  soft  soil  in  the  valley  of 
the  Yellow  River.  Fifty  years  ago  that  majestic 
stream  suddenly  changed  its  entire  course,  so  that 
its  mouth  is,  at  the  present  time,  three  hundred 
miles  north  of  where  it  formerly  was  ;  and  although 
this  performance  marked  the  extreme  point  in  the 
erratic  character  of  the  stream,  it  is  still  by  no 
means  constant  to  any  regular  river  bed,  but  often 
changes  its  course  and  causes  heavy  losses  and 
frightful  devastations  by  its  frequent  floods.  The 
southern  portion  of  the  line,  which  is  to  be  built  by 
English  capital  and  skill,  is  in  territory  more  favor- 
able for  construction.  For  commercial  purposes, 
however,  the  entire  extent  of  the  line  offers  the 
most  exceptional  advantages.  In  the  Yangtse 
River  basin.  The  British  and  Chinese  Corporation 
has  obtained  a  concession  for  a  line  from  Nanking 
to  Shanghai  and  on  to  Ningpo  by  way  of  Hang- 
chow,  measuring  in  all  seven  hundred  kilometres. 
These  railways,  connecting,  as  they  do,  commercial 
centres  of  the  empire,  all  promise  to  be  exceed- 
ingly profitable.  They  are  granted  on  the  same 
basis  as  are  the  Hankow  lines,  which  will  next  be 
discussed. 

The  right  to  construct  the  great  central  trunk 
line  of  China,  extending  from  Peking  to  Canton  by 
way  of  Hankow,  has  been  granted  by  the  Chinese 
124 


THE   OPENING  OF   CHINA 

government  in  two  concessions.  The  history  of 
the  northern  concession,  covering  that  part  of  the 
line  which  extends  from  Peking  to  Hankow  and  is 
called  briefly  the  Lou  Han  line,  is  especially  inter- 
esting. As  far  back  as  February,  1896,  a  Chinese 
company  was  formed  for  the  building  of  a  trunk 
line  between  the  imperial  capital  and  Canton,  Only 
Chinamen  were  to  be  allowed  to  subscribe  and  own 
stock  in  this  corporation,  whose  capital  is  fixed  at 
thirty  millions  of  taels.^  By  October,  1896,  the  con- 
struction of  both  sections  of  the  line  was  authorized, 
and  the  famous  iron  founderies  that  Chang  Chi 
Tung  erected  near  Hankow  were  then  bought  to 
assist  in  providing  the  material  for  construction. 

As  the  undertaking  was  managed  by  mandarins, 
Chinese  capitalists  were  slow  in  subscribing,  and 
it  was  impossible  to  raise  sufficient  money  to  war- 
rant the  actual  beginning  of  the  enterprise.  One 
of  the  purposes  of  Li  Hung  Chang  on  his  trip 
around  the  world  was  to  interest  foreign  capitalists 
in  the  industrial  undertakings  of  his  home.  Vari- 
ous offers  to  provide  the  Chinese  government  and 
syndicate  with  the  necessary  funds  were  received, 
but  finally  that  of  a  Belgian  syndicate,  called  La 
Soci^t^  d' Etude  des  Chemins  de  fer  en  dime,  and 
having  its  seat  at  Brussels,  was  accepted.      This 

1  The  Chinese  tael  is  the  unit  of  the  money  of  account,  varying 
in  value  with  the  fluctuations  in  the  price  of  silver  and  also  from 
place  to  place.  Thus,  in  January,  1900,  the  Shanghai  tael  was 
quoted  at  63.1  cents  (American  gold),  the  Haikwan  tael  at  70,3 
cents.  The  latter  (the  Hk.  tael)  is  the  standard  recognized  by 
the  customs  authorities. 

"5 


WORLD   POLITICS 

syndicate  was  assisted  at  the  Peking  court  by  the 
ministries  of  France  and  Russia,  and  also  by  the 
influence  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank.  In  May, 
1897,  it  obtained  the  right  of  furnishing  to  the 
government  a  loan  of  twenty  million  dollars  at  five 
per  cent  interest,  for  which  government  bonds 
were  issued  at  a  discount  of  ten  per  cent.  The 
syndicate  also  obtained  the  right  to  construct  the 
line  from  Peking  to  Hankow.  The  engineering 
personnel  for  the  building  of  the  road  and  the 
materials  of  construction  were  to  be  furnished  by 
Belgium. 

When  the  nature  of  this  transaction  became 
known  to  the  ministries  of  England  and  Germany, 
they  protested  violently,  basing  their  protest  on 
"the  most  favored  nation"  clause  of  their  respec- 
tive treaties.  The  influence  of  Russia,  however, 
was  at  that  time  so  strong,  that  despite  all  protests 
the  Belgian  syndicate  was  successful  in  obtain- 
ing the  important  contract.  The  imperial  decree 
authorizing  the  construction  of  the  line  was  not 
issued,  however,  until  June,  1898,  The  transaction 
is  looked  upon  as  an  important  diplomatic  victory 
for  France  and  Russia,  and  it  is  not  to  be  won- 
dered at  that  political  importance  is  attached  to 
the  control  of  this  line,  which  will  form  a  connect- 
ing link  between  the  Russian  and  French  spheres. 
The  capital  was  actually  furnished  by  French  as 
well  as  Belgian  financiers,  the  company  now  hav- 
ing seats  both  at  Brussels  and  at  Paris. 

As  the  English  were  in  very  bad  humor  over  the 
126 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

capture  of  this  valuable  concession  by  their  politi- 
cal opponents,  it  seemed  expedient  to  the  Chinese 
to  make  a  sacrifice,  in  order  to  appease  British 
displeasure.  A  victim  was  found  in  the  person  of 
Li  Hung  Chang,  who  was  formally  dismissed  from 
some  of  his  high  offices.  At  that  time  it  was 
openly  stated  that  Li  Hung  Chang  had  counselled 
the  Tsungli  Yamen  to  make  this  grant  because 
Russia  was  so  much  more  formidable  than  Eng- 
land. The  English  government  made  the  conces- 
sion a  pretext  for  demanding  from  the  Chinese 
government  important  privileges,  and  among 
others,  the  concession  of  the  Tientsin-Chingkiang 
line,  which  was  to  some  extent  to  counterbalance 
the  advantages  of  the  trunk  line  to  Hankow. 

The  English  government  was  very  emphatic  in 
its  remonstrances  and  demands.  A  naval  demon- 
stration which  was  made  in  the  Sea  of  China  had 
the  desired  effect.  The  Tsungli  Yamen  promised 
all  that  was  demanded,  including  concessions  for 
English  lines,  which  have  been  mentioned  above, 
together  with  the  permission  to  the  Peking  syndi- 
cate to  construct  its  exploitation  railways  in  Shanse 
and  Honan.  The  same  provisions  were  to  be 
made  with  regard  to  interest,  mortgage  rights,  and 
rights  of  exploitation  as  had  been  granted  in  the 
case  of  the  Hankow  line. 

Considering  now  the  technical   aspects  of  the 

Peking-Hankow  line  which  has  caused  so  much 

excitement  and  comment,  we  find  that  it  passes 

through  the  very  richest  region  of  China.      The 

127 


WORLD   POLITICS 

soil  of  Honan  —  loess  —  which  is  soft  and  at  least 
fifteen  feet  deep,  is  so  inexhaustible  that  from  the 
very  beginnings  of  Chinese  history  it  has  been  cul- 
tivated constantly  without  need  of  fertilizers.  It 
supports  a  vast  and  well-to-do  population.  Those 
very  qualities  of  the  soil,  however,  which  make  it 
so  valuable  for  agriculture,  make  railway  construc- 
tion difficult.  There  is  no  rock  within  a  reason- 
able distance  of  the  projected  line,  and  the  soil  is 
so  soft  that,  especially  near  the  Yellow  River,  it 
will  not  make  a  safe  foundation  for  a  railway. 
Opinions  differ  as  to  the  difficulty  of  bridging  the 
river  at  Kaifong.  It  was  just  below  this  point 
that  the  river  changed  its  course  in  185 1,  Above 
Kaifong,  the  bed  of  the  stream  is  more  regular, 
and  even  at  Kaifong  engineers  believe  that  the 
construction  of  a  bridge  is  possible,  although  at  an 
enormous  expense.  The  construction  of  the  line 
has  been  begun  from  the  north,  and  as  the  nec- 
essary capital  has  already  been  furnished,  its  com- 
pletion may  be  looked  for  at  a  not  distant  date. 

The  southern  portion  of  the  main  trunk  line  — 
between  Hankow  and  Canton  —  has  been  conceded 
to  an  American  syndicate,  The  American  China 
Development  Company,  on  practically  the  same 
conditions  as  those  obtained  by  the  Belgian  com- 
pany. Surveys  for  this  line  have  been  made,  the 
large  surveying  party  meeting  with  no  opposition 
on  the  part  of  the  natives  at  any  place  along  the 
whole  course.  The  conditions  regarding  loans, 
construction,   and  exploitation  are  practically  the 


THE   OPENING   OF  CHINA 

same  as  in  the  case  of  the  Belgian  syndicate.^ 
The  main  line  will  measure  about  1650  kilome- 
tres, while  branches  will  swell  the  total  mileage 
to  about  1850  kilometres.  As  the  Peking-Hankow 
line  has  a  length  of  1300  kilometres,  the  entire 
railway  will  be  about  3150  kilometres,  or  over  2000 
miles  long.  British  capital  is  also  extensively 
interested  in  this  undertaking,  in  which  several 
large  American  trusts,  including  the  Standard  Oil 
Company  and  the  American  Sugar  Refining  Com- 
pany, are  participants. 

The  territory  through  which  this  line  passes  is 
not  so  phenomenally  rich  as  is  the  northern  por- 
tion ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  construction  will, 
it  is  believed,  be  much  easier,  and  the  trade  between 
Canton  and  Hankow  promises  even  to  exceed  that 
on  the  northern  division.  Inasmuch  as  the  conces- 
sions have  been  made  to  private  individuals  and 
corporations,  and  the  capital  has  been  furnished  by 
them,  it  is  hardly  possible  as  yet  to  attribute  to  this 
line  any  political  significance  beyond  the  possibility 
of  interference  for  protection.  As  considerable 
English  capital  is  invested  in  the  enterprise,  the 
concession  is  ordinarily  enumerated  among  the  Brit- 
ish railways ;  and  yet,  judging  from  its  founders, 
—  Senator  Washburn,  ex-Senator  Cary,  and  the 
late  Senator  Brice, — the  line  belongs  rather  to 
America. 

Weighing  the  comparative  probabilities  of  future 
success  of  the  two  branches  of  the  central  line, 

^  See  p.  136. 
K  129 


WORLD  POLITICS 

and  their  respective  advantages  and  disadvantages, 
the  balance  seems  to  inchne  sHghtly  in  favor  of  the 
American  concession.  It  is  true,  the  northern  sec- 
tion traverses  a  richer  agricultural  region,  and  it  also 
opens  up  by  its  branch  lines  most  extensive  mining 
resources.  Moreover,  the  provinces  which  it  trav- 
erses are  the  most  civilized  in  China,  provinces  in 
which  unprovoked  disturbances  would  hardly  occur. 
The  region  is  a  vast  plain,  without  any  topographi- 
cal difficulties  in  the  way  of  mountains  or  ravines. 
On  the  other  hand  is  to  be  counted  the  considera- 
tion already  mentioned,  that  the  soil  of  this  region, 
wonderfully,  even  inexhaustibly  fertile,  affords  no 
sound  substructure  for  a  railway  embankment. 
Again,  as  has  also  been  noted  above,  neither  rock 
nor  wood  in  sufficient  quantities  can  be  found  within 
reasonable  distance.  Timber  will  have  to  be  im- 
ported from  Manchuria,  or,  perhaps,  even  from 
the  American  continent,  while  to  procure  rock  will 
involve  huge  expense. 

Furthermore,  to  recall  another  consideration,  the 
situation  is  rendered  difficult  by  the  frequent  floods 
of  the  Yellow  River,  which  would  certainly  destroy 
any  embankment  not  built  of  the  most  solid  mate- 
rial. English  engineers  have,  therefore,  advised 
placing  the  rails  and  ties  immediately  upon  the 
soil  without  substructure,  and  abandoning  the  line 
during  the  flooded  season  after  the  method  prac- 
tised in  Egypt.  The  line,  not  offering  any  resist- 
ance to  the  floods,  would  thus  remain  undisturbed, 
and,  after  the  flood  had  departed,  it  would  only 

130 


THE   OPENING   OF  CHINA 

be  necessary  to  remove  the  accumulated  rubbish. 
Still  another  disadvantage  affecting  the  financial 
success  of  the  northern  section  is  the  fact  that  it 
will  have  to  stand  the  competition  of  river  naviga- 
tion and  of  other  lines  already  projected,  such  as 
the  Tientsin-Chingkiang  line.  Indeed,  most  of 
the  products  of  the  mines  of  Shanse  and  Shense 
could  be  transported  down  the  Yellow  River  and 
the  Hankiang.  Thus,  though  the  line  will  un- 
doubtedly be  a  paying  undertaking,  fabulous  profits 
for  the  European  investors  can  by  no  means  be  an- 
ticipated, especially  as  the  Chinese  government  and 
corporation  have  reserved  to  themselves  the  larger 
portion  of  the  net  earnings.  This  seems  to  have 
been  recognized  by  the  commission  sent  by  the 
Credit  Lyonnais  to  investigate  the  situation. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  southern  section,  the 
American  concession,  will  pass  through  regions 
that  are  mountainous  and  desolate.  For  a  part 
of  its  course,  it  will  encounter  the  competition  of 
navigation  on  the  Siang  and  Kan  rivers.  More- 
over, the  natives  of  the  interior  of  Hoonan  are  said 
to  be  especially  savage  and  hostile  to  foreign  inva- 
sion, although  the  experiences  of  the  surveying 
expedition  did  not  include  any  disturbance  or  mol- 
estation by  natives.  The  district,  however,  is  one 
of  the  richest  mining  regions  in  China,  Hoonan 
having  about  thirty  thousand  square  miles  of  min- 
ing territory,  while  the  agricultural  resources  of 
other  sections  of  the  route  are  similarly  extensive. 
Though  the  region  is  mountainous,  it  does  not 
131 


WORLD   POLITICS 

offer  any  serious  obstacles  to  construction,  while, 
of  course,  rock  for  embankments  is  present  in  the 
desired  quantities.  There  are  no  large  rivers  to 
bridge,  no  floods  that  will  demolish  bridges  and 
embankments.  The  line  joining  Hankow  —  with 
its  three  million  inhabitants  —  to  Canton  and  Hong- 
kong, which  together  have  an  equal  population, 
must,  by  the  very  nature  of  its  termini,  ultimately 
be  a  success.  Once  constructed,  it  can  be  looked 
upon  as  permanent,  and  the  expenses  for  repair 
need  not  be  excessive.  To  many  engineers,  there- 
fore, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  at  first  sight 
conditions  along  the  northern  line  seem  more  ad- 
vantageous, the  southern  section  seems  to  have  a 
more  assured  future  financially. 

The  city  of  Hankow,  at  the  middle  point  of  this 
central  trunk  Hne,  has  perhaps  a  more  brilliant 
future  than  that  of  any  other  city  in  the  world.  It 
is  at  the  head  of  the  deep-sea  navigation  on  the 
Yangtse,  and  although  it  is  five  hundred  miles 
from  the  Pacific,  the  largest  vessels  can  penetrate 
to  the  Hankow  wharves  at  most  times  of  the  year. 
With  its  adjacent  towns,  Hanyang  and  Wuchang, 
it  has  already  three  miUions  of  inhabitants,  a 
magnificent  manufacturing  population.  The  great 
iron  works  founded  at  Hanyang  some  years  ago 
are  now  furnishing  a  large  part  of  the  rails  for 
the  central  line,  and  the  iron  industry  has  there- 
fore taken  a  firm  footing  in  this  city.  The  great 
trunk  lines  of  China  and  three  mighty  rivers,  as 
well  as  the  ocean,  all  aid  therefore  in  concentrating 
132 


THE  OPENING   OF  CHINA 

trade  and  manufactures  in  this  central  town  of 
China,  which  is  surely  destined  to  be  the  industrial 
capital  of  the  empire. 

Some  very  important  railway  concessions  have 
been  granted  in  the  rich  mining  provinces  of 
Shanse  and  Shense,  southwest  of  Peking.  Much 
to  the  surprise  and  annoyance  of  England,  the 
Russo-Chinese  Bank  has  obtained  the  railway 
concessions  from  Chengting  to  Taiyuan,  with  a 
preemption  of  an  extension  to  Singan,  the  capital 
of  Shense.  As  Singan  is  the  terminus  of  the 
trans-Asiatic  caravan  route,  it  is  believed  that  this 
concession  was  obtained  by  Russia  with  the  pur- 
pose of  fixing  her  hold  on  the  northern  portion  of 
China.  A  portion  of  this  line  has  already  been 
surveyed  by  the  engineers  of  the  Credit  Lyonnais, 
while  the  French  Covipagnie  de  Fives-Lille  is 
charged  with  the  construction  by  the  Russo- 
Chinese  Bank,  which,  with  French  aid,  furnishes 
the  capital.  When  it  is  remembered  that  Singan, 
the  ultimate  objective  point  of  this  line,  is  an 
important  town,  —  it  had  already  been  suggested 
that  the  Chinese  capital  be  removed  thither,  in 
order  to  escape  Russian  influence,  —  it  is  evident 
that  political  significance  may  easily  be  attributed 
to  this  undertaking.  Neither  French  nor  Russian 
industry  has  any  interests  in  this  region  at  the 
present  time.  The  line  constitutes,  therefore,  a 
preemption  on  the  future. 

The  Peking  syndicate,  in  which  Italian  and 
English    capital    is    interested,    and    which    has 


WORLD   POLITICS 

valuable  mining  privileges  in  Honan  and  Shanse, 
has  also  obtained  the  right  to  build  railways  con- 
necting these  mines  with  rivers  and  with  the  trunk 
lines.  A  railway  between  Lungan  and  Siang-yang 
has  already  been  determined  upon,  and  it  is  evident 
that  the  invasion  of  this  territory  by  Russian  lines 
will  cause  considerable  irritation. 

Coming  now  to  the  projected  railroads  in  the  far 
south  of  China,  we  may  first  speak  of  the  English 
proposal  to  connect  the  head  of  navigation  of  the 
Yangtse  with  the  terminus  of  the  Indo-Burmese 
line.  From  Kunlon  ferry,  in  Burma,  by  way  of 
Yunnan,  to  Loo,  near  the  head  of  the  Yangtse 
navigation,  is  a  distance  of  about  eight  hundred 
miles.  The  line  would  meet  with  the  most  for- 
midable obstacles  to  construction,  as  its  course 
is  crossed  by  the  high  mountain  ranges  of  the 
boundary,  so  that,  as  one  engineer  has  said,  the 
excavation  of  six  or  seven  Mont  Cenis  tunnels 
would  be  necessary.  A  recent  exploring  party 
has,  however,  discovered  a  route  which  is  con- 
sidered practicable.  The  commercial  advantages 
of  this  route  are  small,  inasmuch  as  Yunnan  is 
sparsely  populated,  and,  although  possessed  of 
considerable  mineral  wealth,  is  not  adapted  to 
manufactures.  The  strategical  value  of  the  road 
is,  however,  of  the  utmost  importance,  as  a  con- 
test for  China,  or  for  influence  in  China,  would 
have  to  be  decided  chiefly  on  land,  and  access  by 
rail  to  the  centre  of  the  empire  is  a  necessary 
condition    of   continued     political    authority    and 

134 


THE  OPENING   OF  CHINA 

influence.  Though  this  line  has  been  projected, 
and  written  about  and  talked  about  considerably, 
definite  surveys  have  not  yet  been  made,  nor  has 
any  definite  concession  been  granted.  The  con- 
struction of  the  line  is,  however,  part  of  the 
declared  policy  of  Great  Britain  in  China.^ 

The  extreme  south  of  China  is  to  be  traversed 
by  several  French  lines,  parting  from  Hanoi,  in 
Tongking.  One  line  is  to  be  constructed  from 
Hanoi  to  Yunnan,  and  another  to  Nanning,  a  part 
of  which,  in  Tongking  territory,  is  already  com- 
pleted. Nanning,  again,  is  to  be  connected  with 
the  harbor  of  Pakhoi.  The  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  these  lines  are  very  considerable.  The  Yunnan 
line  is  to  be  of  narrow  gauge, —  one  metre.  While 
it  is  hoped  that  the  mining  resources  which  it  is  to 
open  up  will  ultimately  make  it  a  paying  invest- 
ment, yet  the  aid  which  the  French  government 
so  liberally  accords  to  these  undertakings  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  it,  because  no  private 
capital  could  be  enlisted  in  enterprises  whose 
financial  success  is  so  problematical.  In  the  last 
Indo-Chinese  budget  of  the  French  Chambers, 
seventy  million  francs  were  set  aside  for  the  con- 
struction of  these  lines,  which  will  be  immediately 
pushed  with  vigor.  Their  importance  seems  to  be 
rather  strategical  than  commercial. 

There  are  some  smaller  lines,  the  concessions 

^  See  the  speech  of  the  Right  Honorable  St.  John  Brodrick, 
Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  the  House  of  Com« 
mons,  June  9,  1899. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

for  which  have  already  been  granted,  and  projects 
for  possible  constructions  are  innumerable.  As 
has  been  said,  however,  there  seems  to  be  a  desire 
on  the  part  of  both  the  Chinese  government  and 
the  foreign  investors,  to  await  the  result  of  the 
opening  of  the  present  lines  before  any  further 
great  undertakings  are  planned  or  concessions 
granted. 

It  might  be  in  place  at  this  point  to  state  the 
outline  of  the  general  poHcy  of  the  Chinese  gov- 
ernment with  regard  to  the  more  important  rail- 
way concessions.  The  contracts,  which  may  be 
taken  as  typical  expressions  of  a  matured  policy,^ 
are  made  between  the  native  Company  of  Chinese 
Railways  and  the  foreign  exploitation  syndicates. 
The  foreign  syndicate  furnishes  the  loan  necessary 
for  construction  at  an  interest  rate  of  five  per  cent, 
the  loan  being  issued  at  ten  per  cent  below  par, 
payable  in  equal  annual  payments  in  the  twenty 
years  following  1909.  Then  the  construction  com- 
pany procures  in  the  open  market  and  at  the 
best  price  all  necessary  materials  and  employs 
engineers  and  workmen.  The  land  for  the  road 
is  bought  by  the  Chinese  company  and  remains 
within  its  ownership.  Government  lands  are  in 
most  cases  given,  over  to  the  Chinese  company 
without  other  payment  than  the  ordinary  land  tax. 
When  the  railway  is  completed,  the  Chinese  com- 

1  The  provisions  here  given  are  found  both  in  the  contract  with 
the  Belgian  syndicate  and  in  that  with  The  American  China  Devel- 
opment Company,  which  may  be  taken  as  typical  contracts. 

136 


THE   OPENING    OF   CHINA 

pany  takes  charge  of  the  financial  side  of  the 
administration,  while  the  technical  management 
remains  in  the  hands  of  the  foreign  syndicate. 
Of  the  net  profits,  the  syndicate  receives  twenty 
per  cent,  while  the  remainder  is  divided  between 
the  government  and  the  Chinese  corporation. 

From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Chinese  by  no 
means  make  the  liberal  form  of  grant  to  which  we 
have  been  accustomed  in  American  politics,  where 
whole  empires  have  been  granted  along  with  the 
right  to  construct  a  line.  In  return  for  the  risks 
of  its  loan,  and  for  the  labor  of  management,  the 
construction  company,  under  the  terms  of  the  con- 
cession just  described,  obtains  only  five  per  cent 
interest  on  the  total  cost  of  construction  and 
twenty  per  cent  of  the  net  profits  of  operation. 
The  Chinese  exploitation  company,  on  the  other 
hand,  whose  only  service  has  been  the  purchase 
of  the  land  for  the  right  of  way,  takes  forty  per 
cent  of  the  profits;  and  the  government,  in  addition 
to  the  reservation  of  the  right  to  use  the  lines  at 
half  rates  for  transporting  troops  and  ammunition, 
takes  forty  per  cent  of  the  net  profits  and  has  the 
final  reversion  of  the  lines.  Although  the  rail- 
ways so  far  planned  will  doubtless  be  enormously 
profitable,  on  account  of  the  wealth  of  the  regions 
through  which  they  are  to  pass,  yet  it  may  be 
noticed  that  the  Chinese  capitalists  and  govern- 
ment have  reserved  for  themselves  the  lion's  share 
of  the  income.  Despite  all  the  natural  advantages, 
therefore,  which  China  possesses,  European  capital 
137 


WORLD   POLITICS 

has  been  rather  backward  about  enlisting  in  the 
work  of  Chinese  railway  building.  Thus  the  Credit 
Lyomiais,  after  sending  exploration  parties  through 
China,  has  recently  refused  to  support  exploitation 
on  the  above  basis. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  in  railway  construc- 
tion the  Chinese  government  prefers  trunk  lines,^ 
which  will  bind  the  various  parts  of  the  nation 
together  and  afford  means  of  rapid  communication 
for  troops  and  officials,  while  the  merchants  prefer 
branch  lines,  because  these  may  be  used  for  open- 
ing up  industrial  regions  by  connecting  them  with 
waterways.  There  is,  therefore,  a  constant  strug- 
gle between  the  commercial  and  political  interests 
in  China,  and  all  forward  movement  is  the  result 
of  compromise  between  the  two. 

Turning  now  to  the  mining  concessions  that 
have  so  far  been  granted,  we  find  that  very  little 
has  yet  been  done  from  which  one  can  form  an 
estimate  of  the  possible  value  to  foreigners  of  such 
concessions.  The  question  of  residence  outside  of 
treaty  ports  has  not  yet  been  settled,  and  until  for- 
eign industrial  colonies  can  with  safety  be  formed 
in  the  mining  areas,  a  successful  management  of 
the  exploitation  of  mines  seems  impossible. 

It  will,  however,  be  interesting  and  useful  to 
consider  the  exact  nature  of  the  concessions  thus 
far  granted.  Russia  and  Germany  have  obtained 
exclusive  concessions  within  Manchuria  and  Shan- 

1  See  memorial  approved  by  the  Chinese  emperor,  in  Consular 
Reports,  May,  1899,  p.  66. 

138 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

tiing  respectively.  By  this  it  is  to  be  understood 
that  the  governments  of  these  nations  are  author- 
ized to  grant  mining  concessions  without  further 
appeal  to  the  Peking  government,  and  that  Rus- 
sian and  German  capital,  respectively,  is  to  be 
given  rights  of  priority  in  exploitation.  So  far 
as  has  yet  become  known,  only  one  development 
company  has  been  formed  in  Shantung.  Outside 
of  these  exclusive  concessions,  we  may  mention 
the  engagement  of  the  Chinese  government  to 
treat  French  and  English  alike  in  the  two  prov- 
inces of  Yunnan  and  Szechuen.^ 

It  remains  now  to  consider  the  direct  grants  by 
the  Chinese  government  to  foreign  private  corpora- 
tions, two  characteristic  examples  of  which  are 
the  concessions  to  the  Peking  company  and  to  the 
syndicate  founded  by  Mr.  Pritchard  Morgan.  The 
Peking  syndicate,  composed  chiefly  of  English 
capitalists,  but  founded  by  an  Italian,  has  a  capi- 
tal of  ;^6,C)00,ooo.  It  has  been  granted  the  right 
to  exploit  the  iron  and  coal  mines  of  Honan  and 
of  Shanse  for  sixty  years  and  to  build  all  neces- 
sary railways.  The  mining  district  of  Shanse, 
extending  in  a  southerly  direction,  is  230  miles  in 
length  by  30  miles  in  width.  According  to  the 
German  geologist,  von  Richthofen,  it  is  the  richest 
mining  region  in  the  world,  being  able  to  furnish 
coal  and  iron  for  the  world's  manufactures,  at  the 
present  rate  of  consumption,  for  two  thousand 
years.     The  Chinese  government  reserves  to  itself 

^  By  the  Siam  Convention  of  January  15,  1896. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  net  receipts,  and  the 
reversion,  at  the  end  of  sixty  years,  of  all  the 
mines,  railways,  and  machinery  of  the  company. 
The  manner  in  which  the  undertaking  will  be 
organized  and  conducted  has  not  as  yet  been 
determined. 

The  other  important  concession  is  the  one  in 
Szechuen  which  has  been  granted  to  Mr.  Pritchard 
Morgan.  The  text  of  the  contract  for  this  under- 
taking has  been  published  in  extejiso,  and  from 
it  we  can  gain  a  clear  conception  of  what  the 
Chinese  policy  of  mining  exploitation  is.  As  we 
have  seen  above  in  the  case  of  railways,  so  in  the 
matter  of  mining,  two  companies  are  formed,  the 
Hua  Yi  company  and  the  Hui  Tung  company. 
The  former,  with  a  capital  of  one  million  taels,  is 
exclusively  Chinese  and  is  organized  for  the  pur- 
chase of  the  land.  It  is  to  buy  and  own  all  the 
mining  lands  which  the  exploiting  company  may 
wish  to  work,  and  is  to  carry  on  all  negotiations. 
The  shares  of  the  Hui  Tung  company,  which  has 
a  capital  of  ten  million  taels,  are  to  be  held  half  by 
Chinese,  half  by  foreigners.  The  one  corporation 
might  be  called  the  landlord  company ;  the  other, 
the  exploitation  company.  In  the  first  place,  the 
exploitation  company  will  send  out  engineering 
expeditions  to  determine  what  lands  are  promising, 
what  mines  are  worth  opening.  Mines  thus 
selected  will  thereupon  be  bought  by  the  landlord 
company  for  a  reasonable  price.  The  exploitation 
company  is   to  pay  as  rent  five  per  cent  of   the 

140 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

value  of  the  output.  A  further  five  per  cent  is 
to  be  paid  to  the  Chinese  government  as  a  tax. 
An  export  duty  must  also  be  paid  according  to  a 
tariff  now  in  existence.  The  contract  goes  on  to 
say:  — 

"  The  area  of  Szechuen  is  very  extensive,  and  all  sorts  of 
mines  exist.  Chinese  who  work  on  their  own  property  are 
only  required  to  obtain  the  necessary  permission,  pay  the 
necessary  taxes  according  to  the  rules  in  force,  and  they  are 
in  no  way  restrained.  But  if  foreign  merchants  undertake  to 
work  the  mines,  their  operations  must  be  limited  in  some 
way  or  other.  They  must  confine  their  operations  to  certain 
intendancies,  prefectures,  or  districts,  and  not  take  the  whole 
province  as  their  sphere  of  work.  Work  must  be  started  in 
the  interior  first  and  at  the  boundaries  afterward.  The  Hui 
Tung  company  shall  send  engineers  to  find  out  first  where 
are  mines  to  be  opened  and  what  mines  they  are.  If  the 
same  be  in  districts  apportioned  to  savages,  the  Hui  Tung 
must  wait  till  they  can  find  out  whether  the  advantages 
will  be  greater  than  the  injury,  and  devise  other  means  to 
open  them.  The  Hui  Tung  company  in  such  event  cannot 
compel  the  Hua  Yi  company  to  buy  the  lands  quickly  and  hand 
them  over  for  working.  Any  possible  cause  of  disturbance 
must  be  avoided." 


"  If,  after  mines  are  opened,  cemeteries  or  mortuary  shrines 
are  met  with,  some  plans  must  be  devised  to  avoid  them.  If 
the  owners  do  not  like  to  remove  them  for  money  given,  no 
excavation  will  be  allowed.  In  excavating,  as  long  as  the 
galleries  dug  below  the  ground  are  not  injurious  to  tlie  soil 
above,  rascals  are  not  allowed  to  obstruct  the  work  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  injurious  to  Feng  Shui  (the  earth  spirit). 
Local  authorities  must  be  applied  to  for  protection."  ^ 

^  See  Consular  Reports,  September,  1899,  p.  67. 
141 


WORLD   POLITICS 

It  is  further  stipulated  that  the  exploitation 
company  shall  establish  a  school  of  mining 
and  railway  engineering,  in  some  convenient 
locality  in  the  mining  district,  so  that  Chinese 
youths  may  there  obtain  the  necessary  technical 
education.  This  same  requirement  is  also  gener- 
ally attached  to  railway  concessions  made  to  for- 
eign corporations.^  The  Chinese  never  omit  the 
educational  view  of  an  undertaking.  The  exploita- 
tion company  is  to  have  control  of  every  mine  for 
a  period  of  fifty  years,  reckoning  from  the  date  on 
which  the  mine  is  opened.  At  the  expiration  of 
that  time  the  mines,  with  all  the  plant,  machinery, 
buildings,  and  roads,  are  to  be  handed  over  to  the 
Chinese  government  without  compensation.  The 
capital  employed  is  to  receive  interest  at  six  per 
cent.  Ten  per  cent  of  the  profits  is  to  be  set  aside 
as  a  sinking  fund  for  the  repayment  of  capital. 
Of  the  remaining  profits,  twenty-five  per  cent  goes 
to  the  Chinese  government,  and  the  rest  to  the 
exploitation  company.  It  will  be  seen  that  here, 
as  well  as  in  the  case  of  railways,  the  Chinese 
government  has  reserved  to  itself  an  important 
share  in  the  earnings  as  well  as  the  ultimate  rever- 
sion of  the  entire  property.  Financial  journals  do 
not  look  with  much  favor  on  investments  in  mining 
undertakings  to  be  conducted  under  such  conces- 
sions as  Mr.  Pritchard  Morgan's.  The  data  as  to 
difficulties  of  exploitation  and  local  security  are  in- 
conclusive.    It  is  only  where  a  strong  government 

1  See  Note  2,  at  the  end  of  this  Part. 
142 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

practically  guarantees  security  of  investment,  as 
is  the  case  with  Germany  in  Shantung,  that  in- 
vestments are  viewed  with  favor,  or  great  and 
certain  returns  are  expected. 

The  efforts  of  the  Chinese  government  to  cen- 
tralize the  administration  of  mining  undertakings 
are  witnessed  by  the  following  extract  from  a 
despatch  of  the  Tsungli  Yamen,  communicated  to 
the  various  governments  in  1898  :^  — 

"  In  view  of  the  undeveloped  state  of  the  mineral  resources 
of  the  various  provinces  of  the  empire  and  the  initial  stage 
in  the  construction  of  trunk  and  branch  lines  of  railroads,  it 
has  been  this  Yamen's  policy  to  allow  foreign  capital  to  be 
used  for  these  purposes,  to  the  end  that  both  Chinese  and 
foreigners  may  derive  advantages  therefrom.  But,  in  order  to 
obtain  good  results,  affairs  must  be  well  managed  and  money 
must  be  economically  expended.  It  is  feared  that  there  may 
be  unscrupulous  Chinese  persons  who,  claiming  with  fraud- 
ulent intent  to  be  concessionnaires  of  this  road  or  that  mine, 
may  enter  into  private  agreements  with  foreign  capitalists  for 
the  purpose  of  obtaining  money  under  false  pretences,  and 
that  foreign  capitalists  may  become  unwitting  victims  of  such 
fraud,  and  waste  their  substance  to  no  purpose.  This  certainly 
is  not  the  object  of  our  government  in  developing  the  re- 
sources of  the  empire,  by  opening  mines  and  constructing 
railroads  for  the  mutual  benefit  of  Chinese  and  foreigners. 
Now,  this  government  desires  to  give  it  the  widest  publicity, 
that  all  contracts  for  foreign  loans  to  be  expended  for  the 
opening  of  mines  and  construction  of  railroads  in  China,  in 
order  to  be  valid,  must  be  certified  and  approved  by  the  de- 
partment of  mining  and  railroads,  and  that  all  agreements 
privately  entered  into  with  foreign  capitalists  without  the 
certification  and  approval  of  the  department,  no  matter  how 

1  See  Consular  Reports,  April,  1899,  p.  559. 

143 


WORLD   POLITICS 

large  the  amount  of  subscribed  capital  may  be  for  the  purpose 
of  opening  mines  and  constructing  railroads,  shall  be  deemed 
null  and  void,  so  as  to  put  a  stop  to  all  fraud  and  deception 
and  encourage  fair  and  honest  dealing." 

By  many  writers,  all  these  industrial  concessions 
are  immediately  given  a  political  meaning.  Be- 
cause an  English  syndicate  has  obtained  conces- 
sions in  Shanse  or  Szechuen,  they  add  these 
provinces  to  the  British  sphere  of  influence.  It 
may  be  proper  to  repeat  here  that  the  only  direct 
interest  which  a  government  has  on  account  of 
such  a  concession  is  the  duty  of  protecting  its  citi- 
zens in  the  section  in  which  the  concessionary 
privileges  have  been  granted,  a  duty  which  may, 
of  course,  eventually  lead  to  interference,  and  may 
possibly  even  bring  about  foreign  occupation.  But 
this  is  a  far  road  to  travel,  and  the  prompt  attribu- 
tion of  political  importance  to  all  mining  conces- 
sions leads  only  to  confusion. 

It  is  certain  that  China  offers  the  most  promis- 
ing, the  most  marvellously  remunerative  field  for  in- 
dustrial exploitation,  but  whether  the  conditions  are 
such  that  European  capital  can  safely  risk  invest- 
ment without  the  strong  and  interested  backing  of 
a  home  government  remains  doubtful.  The  fact 
that  the  terms  which  the  Chinese  government 
makes  to  investors  are  apparently  not  liberal 
enough  to  invite  the  taking  of  great  risks  leads 
many  writers  to  believe  that  unless  an  investment 
corporation  has  political  backing  which  assures  it 
financial  support  by  its  home  government  or  which 

144 


THE   OPENING   OF  CHINA 

promises  effectual  protection,  investments  will  not 
be  made. 

That  capital  is,  however,  in  some  countries 
enthusiastic  concerning  Chinese  development,  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  the  first  issue  of  the  Peking- 
Hankow  railway  loan  was  subscribed  for  twice 
over,^  while  the  first  issue  of  the  loan  raised  by 
the  French  government  for  Indo-Chinese  develop- 
ments, including  the  railways  in  southern  China, 
—  a  loan  of  two  hundred  miUion  francs  in  shares 
of  five  hundred  francs,  —  was  subscribed  for  thirty- 
six  times  over  in  one  day.^  The  fact  that  there 
were  110,000  single-share  subscriptions  shows  that 
the  middle  classes  in  France  are  taking  a  very 
active  interest  in  Chinese  development. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  political  interference  is 
constantly  being  invited  in  China  on  account  of  the 
insecurity  which  capital,  unsupported  by  govern- 
mental backing,  must  necessarily  feel.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  possibility  of  such  intervention  leads 
large  syndicates  into  political  intrigues ;  on  the 
other  hand,  it  induces  most  writers  to  take  a 
political  view  of  all  commercial  undertakings, 
and  thus  tends  to  prevent  an  open  and  frank  policy 
of  international  development  and  exploitation  of 
China,  with  equal  chances  for  all,  and  to  substitute 
for  such  a  policy  a  system  of  suspicions,  secret 
negotiations,  and  mutual  recriminations.     Thus,  in 

^  A.  A.  Fauvel,  "  Le  Transsinien  et  les  Chemins  de  Fer  Chinois," 
Revue  Politique  et  Parlementaire,  Vol.  XXL,  p.  473. 
*  Consular  Reports,  April,  1899,  p.  563. 

L  145 


WORLD  POLITICS 

China,  commerce  and  industry,  which  might  be  and 
which  should  be  the  harmonious  work  of  civilized 
nations,  are  turned  instead  into  an  instrument  for 
sharpening  international  animosities  which  were 
already  too  sharp,  and  for  increasing  hostilities 
which  were  already  only  too  intense. 

In  connection  with  this  topic,  it  is  also  of  interest 
to  inquire  what  missionaries  are  worth  to  European 
nations,  industrially  and  commercially.  France 
and  Germany  have  made  especially  successful  use 
of  claims  for  damages  for  injury  done  to  mission- 
aries and  missions.  Never  before,  perhaps,  has 
so  much  material  value  been  attached  to  ministers 
of  the  Gospel  in  foreign  lands,  and  the  manner  in 
which,  after  their  death,  they  are  used  to  spread 
civilization  is  somewhat  foreign  to  our  older 
ideas  of  the  functions  of  the  bearers  of  spiritual 
blessings. 

Thus,  the  French  consul  at  Choongking,  who  is 
famous  for  his  expansionist  intrigues,  demanded 
as  compensation  for  damages  inflicted  on  French 
missions,  mining  rights  in  six  districts  of  Szechuen, 
extending  over  six  degrees  of  longitude,  together 
with  an  indemnity  of  i,200,cxx)  taels.^  In  May, 
1898,  Pere  Berthollet,  a  French  missionary  in 
Quangsi,  was  murdered.  Among  other  compen- 
sations for  this  outrage,  the  French  government 
obtained  the  right  to  build  a  railway  from  Pakhoi  to 
Nanning.     This  concession  was  sought  mainly  in 

1  See  Gundry,  "The  Yangtse  Region,"  Fortnightly  Review,  Sep- 
tember, 1899. 

146 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

order  to  prevent  a  grant  of  the  concession  to  Great 
Britain.  The  manner  in  which  religious,  indus- 
trial, and  political  considerations  are  combined  in 
this  case  produces  a  somewhat  incongruous  result. 
The  far-reaching  and  immensely  valuable  conces- 
sions obtained  by  Germany  for  the  murder  of  two 
missionaries  in  Shantung  are  now  a  matter  of  com- 
mon knowledge  and  illustrate  the  same  political 
method. 

Small  wonder  that  the  empress  dowager  in  a  re- 
cent decree  ^  enjoined  all  officials  of  the  empire  to 
give  missionaries  and  churches  special  protection ! 
The  murder  of  a  European  missionary  is  one  of 
the  most  expensive  indulgences  the  Chinaman  can 
nowadays  permit  himself.  The  empress  dowager 
says,  in  the  characteristically  naive  language  of 
Chinese  state  papers:  "There  have  been  several 
cases  of  riot  in  Szechuen  which  have  not  been 
settled.  The  stupid  and  ignorant  people  who 
circulate  rumors  and  stir  up  strife,  proceeding  from 
light  to  grave  offences,  are  most  truly  to  be  de- 
tested." Then  follow  instructions  to  the  officers 
to  afford  careful  protection  to  Christians. 

It  will  be  profitable  to  consider  at  some  length 
the  general  commercial  advantages  enjoyed  by  all 
of  the  foreign  nations  under  "  the  favored  nation 
clause."  Up  to  the  present  time,  twenty-four  treaty 
ports  have  been  opened  by  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment. In  these,  foreigners  may  reside  and  carry 
on  business.     In  addition,  about  fourteen  custom- 

^  The  decree  appeared  in  the  Peking  Gazette,  October  6,  1898. 
147 


WORLD   POLITICS 


houses  have  been  established  at  other  places  for 
the  reception  of  foreign  goods.  Since  the  Treaty 
of  Shimonoseki,  the  right  of  foreigners  to  establish 
manufactures  in  the  treaty  ports  has  also  been  con- 
ceded, and  a  marvellous  advance  in  Chinese  industry 
has  already  been  brought  about  by  this  concession. 
The  manufactures  of  Shanghai  are  especially  pro- 
ductive and  prosperous.  1 

^  Following  are  the  lists  of  treaty  ports  in  the  order  of  the  value 
of  their  foreign  imports,  given  in  the  Consular  Reports,  1899:  — 


1896. 

1898. 

I. 

Shanghai. 

I. 

Tientsin. 

2. 

Tientsin. 

2. 

Shanghai. 

3- 

Hankow. 

3- 

Hankow. 

4- 

Chingkiang. 

4- 

Chefoo. 

5. 

Canton. 

5- 

Swatow. 

6. 

Chefoo. 

6. 

Chingkiang. 

7- 

Ningpo. 

7- 

Canton. 

8. 

Swatow. 

8. 

Newchwang. 

9- 

Newchwang 

(Manchuria), 

9- 

Ningpo. 

10. 

Amoy. 

10. 

Choongking. 

II. 

Choongking. 

II. 

Amoy. 

12. 

Kiukiang. 

12. 

Kiukiang. 

13- 

Foochow. 

13. 

Foochow. 

14. 

Wuhu. 

14. 

Wuhu. 

15- 

Pakhoi. 

15- 

Woochow. 

16. 

Kiungchow. 

16. 

Hangchow. 

17- 

Ichang. 

17- 

Pakhoi. 

18. 

Wenchow. 

18. 

Kiungchow. 

19- 

Hangchow. 

19. 

Sanshui. 

20. 

Shashe. 

20. 

Kongmoon. 

21. 

Soochow, 

21. 
22. 

23- 

24. 

Wenchow. 
Soochow. 
Ichang. 
Shashe. 

See  the  map 

for  the  chief  treaty  ports  and  custom-houses. 

148 

THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

Since  the  administration  of  the  foreign  mari- 
time customs  has  been  systematized  and  regulated 
under  the  excellent  management  of  Sir  Robert 
Hart,  trade  with  the  seaports  has  been  freed  from 
the  inconveniences  which  formerly  attended  the 
irregular  custom-house  examinations.  A  further 
advance  was  made  in  1899,  when  the  administra- 
tion of  the  likin,=^  the  inland  customs  revenue  in 
the  Yangtse  region,  —  was  placed  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  administration  of  the  imperial  customs. 
Before  that  time,  special  likin  had  to  be  paid  in 
every  district  through  which  imported  goods 
passed.  At  every  custom-house  endless  bargain- 
ing and  haggling  was  necessary  to  secure  reason- 
able terms,  and  even  then  the  accumulated  taxes 
were  so  great  as  to  prohibit  importation  to  points 
far  inland.  The  origin  of  this  most  recent  re- 
form was  in  connection  with  the  Anglo-German 
loan,  contracted  in  1898.  Some  sufficient  security 
was  needed,  —  the  maritime  customs  being  already 
fully  pledged  to  European  nations  and  to  Japan, 
the  likifi  had  to  be  resorted  to,  and  the  Yangtse 
inland  customs  were  pledged  for  the  loan.^  This 
systematized  administration  will  not  only  be  a  great 
gain  to  the  Chinese  government  in  preventing  the 
immense  leakage  that  formerly  took  place,  when 
more  than  two-thirds  of  the  entire  tax  was  wont  to 

1  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  connection  between  finance 

and  reform,  so  characteristic  of  English  history,  may  also  to  some 

extent  be  traced  in  China.    Thus  in  the  reform  of  the  inland  likin  a 

fiscal  need  was  made  the  lever  of  an  important  commercial  reform. 

149 


WORLD   POLITICS 

disappear  into  the  pockets  of  officials,  without  ever 
reaching  the  treasury,  but  will  also  render  possible 
a  profitable  commerce  with  the  inland  provinces. 

The  system  of  river  passes  which  was  used  for 
some  time  and  which  was  especially  enforced  by 
Sir  George  MacDonald,  British  ambassador,  —  a 
system  by  which  foreign  vessels  were  given  the 
right  of  paying  the  complete  duties  at  the  final 
place  of  landing  the  goods,  —  did  not  prove  satis- 
factory under  the  old  regime.  With  the  new  form 
of  administration,  the  system  of  giving  river  passes 
will  be  continued,  but  a  strict  supervision  will  ren- 
der impossible  the  petty  exactions  to  which  mer- 
chants have  always  been  subjected  at  the  various 
inland  custom-houses. 

Early  in  1898,  river  navigation  was  opened  in 
all  provinces  that  have  treaty  ports, —  that  is,  in 
practically  the  entire  empire,  with  the  exception  of 
some  inland  regions.^  On  its  face,  this  seems  to 
be  a  far-reaching  and  important  concession.  Its 
importance,  however,  is  greatly  lessened  by  the 
fact  that  with  the  concession  there  have  not  been 
designated  any  additional  localities  where  foreign- 
ers may  reside,  and  where  they  may  carry  on 
business  and  have  depots  and  warehouses.  With- 
out such  an  additional  concession,  foreign  com- 
merce will  be  at  the  mercy  of  native  tradesmen, 
and  it  is  therefore  generally  believed  that  it  cannot 
be  carried  on  profitably  away  from  the  treaty  ports. 

The  new  Yangtse  River  regulations  designate, 

^  See  Consular  Reports,  July,  1898. 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

in  addition  to  the  eight  treaty  ports  along  the  river, 
five  other  towns  where  goods  may  be  landed. 
When  we  consider  that  the  navigable  portion  of 
this  river  is  over  twelve  hundred  miles  long,  the 
real  meagreness  of  the  concession  becomes  evident. 
Shipment  or  discharge  of  cargoes  at  other  points 
is  prohibited,  and  it  is  required  that  the  system  of 
river  passes  be  used  by  all  vessels  bound  for  treaty 
ports.  Chinese  merchants  have  become  intensely 
dissatisfied  with  the  system  of  river  passes,  because 
under  the  new  form  of  administration,  there  has 
come  to  be  an  actual  differential  advantage  in  favor 
of  the  foreign  merchants.  A  complete  remodelling 
of  the  inland  customs  system,  including  the  native 
Chinese  trade,  may,  therefore,  be  looked  for, 
because  the  Chinese  are  anxious  to  adopt  reforms, 
wherever  a  practical  advantage,  measurable  in 
dollars  and  cents,  may  be  gained  by  the  change. 
A  study  of  the  interests  of  the  various  nations 
in  Chinese  commerce  is  also  important,  because  it 
casts  a  strange  light  on  the  political  pretensions 
of  some  of  them.  In  considering  Chinese  trade 
statistics,  it  must  be  remembered  that  many  for- 
eign imports,  although  originally  brought  from 
continental  countries  or  from  America,  are  entered 
as  British,  because  they  come  immediately  from 
British  possessions.  Thus,  the  entire  Hongkong 
trade  with  China,  amounting  to  1^120,000,000  a 
year,  is  usually  reckoned  as  British,  although  over 
one-third  of  it  is  composed  of  American,  French, 
and  German  imports. 

151 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Following  are  the  figures  giving  the  value  of 
the  trade  of  various  countries  with  China  during 
the  year  1 897  :  ^  — 


Countries. 

Imports  into  China. 

Exports  from 
China. 

Total. 

Hk.  taels. 

Hk. taels. 

Hk.  taels. 

Great  Britain     .     . 

40,015,587 

$29,571,519 

12,945,229 

$9,566,524 

52,960,816 

$39,138,043 

United  States     .     . 

12,440,302 

9.193.383 

17,828,406 

13.875.192 

30,268,708 

22,358.574 

Continent  of  Europe 

(Russia  excepted) 

8,565,807 

6,330,131 

25,878,118 

19,123,929 

34.443.925 

25.454.061 

Japan   (excluding 

Formosa)   .     .     . 

17,564,284 

12,980,006 

15,832,034 

".719,873 

33,396,318 

24,679,879 

All  the  Russias  .     . 

3.442,449 

2,542.971 

16,410,439 

12,127,314 

19,852,888 

14,671,384 

Hongkong     .     .     . 

90,125,887 

66,603,030 

60,402,223 

44,637.243 

150,528,109 

111,240,273 

All  the  rest  of  the 

world 

35,120,678 

26,954,181 

13,410,206 

9,930,142 

48,530,884 

35,864,323 

In  January,  1898,  there  were  in  all  11,660 
foreign  residents  in  the  open  ports  of  China.  The 
principal  nations  were  represented  as  follows  :^  — 


Nation. 

Number  of 

Number  ok 

Persons. 

Firms. 

England 

4929 

374 

United  States . 

1564 

Japan 

1 106 

Portugal . 

975 

Germany 

950 

France    . 

698 

Norway  and  Sweden 

439 

Spain 

362 

1  From  Commercial  Relations  of  the  United  States,  l[ 

2  Statesman's  Year  Book  for  1899,  p.  458. 


8,  p.  127. 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

While  the  other  countries  show  an  increase, 
French  population  in  China  had  fallen  off  from 
933  in  1896  to  the  698  given  in  the  table  above 
for  1898.  Another  index  of  the  relative  com- 
mercial interests  which  the  nations  have  in  China 
is  contained  in  the  statistics  of  shipping.  Dur- 
ing 1897,  44,500  vessels,  registering  33,752,362 
tons  (34,566  being  steamers,  registering  32,519,729 
tons),  entered  and  cleared  Chinese  ports.  Of  these, 
21,140  (21,891,043  tons)  were  British;  18,889 
(7,  819,980  tons),  Chinese;  1858  (1,658,094  tons), 
German;  653  (660,707  tons),  Japanese;  333 
(269,780  tons),  American;  464  (423,122  tons), 
French.^  Statistics  for  steam  vessels  entering  the 
port  of  Shanghai  in  1898  show  percentages  even 
vastly  more  favorable  to  England.  They  are  as 
follows : — 

Number  of  Steam 
Ownership.  Vessels  entering 

Shanghai. 

English 3157 

Chinese 1470 

Swedish  and  Norwegian          .         .         .  859 

German  .......  376 

Japanese 268 

French    .         .         .         .         .         .         .112 

American 52 

Of  the  total  tonnage  of  vessels  entering  and 
clearing  Chinese  ports  in  1898,  Great  Britain  had 
62  per  cent,  China  24  per  cent,  and  all  other 
nations  14  per  cent.^ 

1  Statesman's  Year  Book  for  1 899,  p.  466. 

2  Consular  Reports  for  1899. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Lack  of  security  is  the  chief  impediment  to 
the  development  of  the  foreign  trade  in  China. 
The  British  China  Association,  in  a  memorandum 
drawn  up  in  response  to  a  suggestion  of  Lord 
Charles  Beresford,  attributes  the  slow  progress  in 
the  development  of  foreign  trade  with  China  to 
three  principal  causes :  first,  the  entire  absence  of 
good  faith  on  the  part  of  China  in  the  matter  of 
treaty  obligations ;  secondly,  the  absence  of  secur- 
ity for  the  investment  of  foreign  capital  in  China 
anywhere  outside  of  the  treaty  ports  ;  thirdly,  the 
general  want  of  knowledge  regarding  Chinese 
affairs.  The  memorandum  summarizes  the  situ- 
ation in  the  following  words  :  — 

"  We  say  then  that  the  one  thing  needed  for  the  develop- 
ment of  trade,  for  the  protection  of  capital,  and  for  the  exten- 
sion of  enterprise  in  China,  is  security,  and  we  say  that  such 
security  must  be  sought  in  fiscal  and  administrative  reform 
together,  which  can  only  be  effected  through  pressure  from 
without  ;  and  we  further  say  that  the  vast  preponderance  of 
British  interests  in  China  clearly  demands  that  Great  Britain 
shall  lead  and  guide  the  movement.  We  attribute  the 
hitherto  neglect  of  the  China  question  by  our  government  to 
a  policy  of  drift  into  which  we  have  fallen,  and  a  mistaken 
estimate  of  the  strength  of  British  prestige  in  the  far  East, 
coupled  with  a  fallacious  belief  in  the  power  of  China  herself. 
Other  nations,  newer  in  the  field  and  comparatively  unham- 
pered by  traditions  of  the  past,  have  seemingly  been  better 
able  to  interpret  events  in  the  light  of  common  experience, 
and  have  found  opportunity  in  our  complaisance  and  inactivity 
to  exploit  the  situation  to  our  disadvantage.  Great  Britain's 
sphere  of  influence  should  be  wherever  British  trade  prepon- 
derates, with  the  door  open  for  equal  trading  opportunity  to 

154 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

aL  This  is  an  ideal  which  can  never  be  reached  without 
a  resolute  determination  on  the  part  of  the  British  cabinet  to 
lead  and  not  to  follow  in  Peking."  ^ 

This  extract  clearly  shows  the  connection  be- 
tween politics  and  commerce  in  the  far  East,  a 
connection  which  has  become  especially  prominent 
of  late.  Thus,  in  1896,  Mr.  Chamberlain  said  in 
a  speech  in  Parliament :  — 

"All  the  great  offices  of  state  are  occupied  with  commercial 
affairs.  The  Foreign  Office  and  the  Colonial  Office  are 
chiefly  engaged  in  finding  new  markets  and  in  defending  old 
ones.  The  War  Office  and  the  Admiralty  are  mostly  occupied 
in  preparations  for  the  defence  of  these  markets  and  for  the 
protection  of  our  commerce.  The  Boards  of  Agriculture  and 
of  Trade  are  entirely  concerned  with  those  two  great  branches 
of  industry.  Therefore,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  com- 
merce is  the  greatest  of  all  political  interests,  and  that  that 
government  deserves  most  the  popular  approval  which  does 
the  most  to  increase  our  trade  and  to  settle  it  on  a  firm  foun- 
dation." 

Note. — The  accompanying  map  shows  the  railway  concessions 
and  the  principal  treaty  ports,  custom-houses,  and  other  towns,  in 
the  eighteen  provinces  of  China,  and  in  southern  Manchuria.  The 
names  of  treaty  ports  and  custom-houses  in  China  proper  are  under- 
lined. The  spelling  of  Chinese  names  is  a  matter  of  as  much  dis- 
pute and  uncertainty  as  is  that  of  Shakespeare's  name;  all  that  an 
author  can  hope  for,  in  this  matter,  is  consistency. 

1  See  Consular  Reports,  June,  1899. 


155 


CHAPTER   III 

The  Political  Influence  of  the  Great 
Powers  in  China 

It  is  noted  by  all  authorities  familiar  with  affairs 
in  the  far  Orient  that  political  prestige  is  of  the 
utmost  importance  commercially.  Political  pres- 
tige and  the  demonstration  of  a  firm  purpose  have 
given  to  Russia  and  Germany  the  exceptional 
advantages  which  they  enjoy  in  their  respective 
portions  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  Through  her 
alliance  with  Russia,  France  has  succeeded  in 
securing  similar  advantages.  The  conclusion  to 
be  drawn  from  these  facts  is  not  that  nations 
should  use  their  political  influence  to  grasp  at 
exclusive  concessions,  but  that  at  the  present  time 
political  influence  is  essential  for  obtaining  com- 
mercial advantages  in  China.  The  Chinese  are 
willing  to  follow  the  lead  of  the  strongest.  They 
are  willing  to  reform  their  institutions  and  methods, 
if  a  strong  nation  will  aid  them  in  meeting  the 
consequences.  Whether  a  nation  in  its  dealings 
with  China  is  engaged  in  a  policy  of  narrow,  self- 
ish exploitation,  or  in  the  broader  policy  of  keep- 
ing vast  markets  open  to  international  competition, 
in  either  case  its  object  can  be  attained  only  by 

156 


THE   OPENING   OF  CHINA 

a  diplomacy  which  is  backed  by  demonstrated 
poHtical  strength  and  a  firm  purpose  to  use  it. 

One  very  effective  method  by  which  the  influ- 
ence of  foreign  powers  in  China  has  been  extended 
has  been  the  making  of  loans  to  the  government. 
Ordinarily,  Chinese  revenue  is  sufficient  for  the 
rather  frugal  requirements  of  the  state.  The 
nominal  salaries  of  the  officials  are  very  small,  and 
the  general  expenses  of  government  comparatively 
low.  Thus,  although  between  fifty  and  seventy 
per  cent  of  the  total  revenue  collected  disappears 
in  the  form  of  costs,  or  remains  in  the  hands  of 
the  collectors,  the  imperial  treasury  has  usually 
been  able  to  meet  its  obligations  without  difficulty. 
The  sources  of  revenue  are  a  land  tax,  foreign 
marine  customs  duties,  a  salt  duty,  and  the  likin 
on  merchandise.  From  these  sources,  just  before 
the  Japanese  war,  an  annual  income  of  about 
89,000,000  taels  was  derived. ^  Of  this  amount 
about  20,000,000  taels  went  to  the  metropolitan 
administration  and  the  imperial  household,  while 
36,000,000  taels  went  to  the  provincial  adminis- 
tration, including  the  cost  of  the  army.  The  re- 
mainder was  divided  among  various  branches  of 
the  central  government. 

The  debt  before  the  Japanese  war  was  com- 
paratively trifling.  In  1887,  a  German  loan  of 
5,000,000  marks  in  gold  was  raised,  followed  in 
1894  by  a  foreign  silver  loan  of  ;£  1,63 5, 000,  and 

^  Report  by  Consul  Jamieson,  of  Shanghai,  cited  in  the  States- 
man's Year  Book,  1899,  p.  460. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

in  1895  by  a  gold  loan  of  p^5,ooo,ooo.  The  last 
two  were  secured  by  the  foreign  maritime  customs 
revenue.  With  the  Chino-Japanese  war  began  the 
financial  difficulties  of  the  Chinese  government, 
which  have  been  used  as  a  strong  lever  by  foreign 
nations  for  obtaining  influence  in  the  councils  of 
the  empire.  The  war  indemnity  paid  to  Japan 
amounted  to  200,000,000  taels,  to  which  there  was 
added  as  compensation  for  the  retrocession  of 
some  territory  occupied  by  the  Japanese  the  sum 
of  30,000,000  taels.  The  European  nations  were 
at  hand,  and  briskly  competed  for  the  privilege 
of  supplying  the  needs  of  China.  Russia  and 
France  were  successful  in  placing  the  first  loan 
of  400,000,000  francs  (^77,200,000)  in  1895.  That 
Russia  recognized  the  political  advantage  to  be 
obtained  from  the  position  of  a  creditor  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  she  her- 
self borrowed  the  money  in  order  to  lend  it  to  China, 
a  proceeding  not  common  in  public  finance. 

In  1896,  a  loan  of  ;^  16,000,000  at  five  per  cent 
was  furnished  by  English  and  German  capitalists. 
A  further  loan  of  ;!^  16,000,000  was  furnished  in 
1898  by  The  Hongkong  and  Shanghai  Banking 
Corporation  and  the  Deutsch-Asiatische  Bank. 
The  conclusion  of  this  loan  was  part  of  the  nego- 
tiations among  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  China 
with  regard  to  the  Tientsin-Chingkiang  Railway. 
The  total  amount  of  Chinese  foreign  indebtedness 
for  the  year  1899  is  given  as  ;£53,02i,840.^    This 

1  Consular  Reports,  October,  1899,  p.  328. 
158 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

debt  will  entail,  between  the  years  1899  ^^^  I934. 
an  annual  payment  of  $12,474,605,  principal  and 
interest.  Thereafter,  the  payments  will  be  materi- 
ally reduced,  and  by  1942  the  total  remainder  of  the 
present  debt  will  be  only  ^^799,275  ($3,889,343). 

When  we  consider  the  enormous  resources  of 
the  Chinese  Empire,  the  indebtedness  will  seem 
almost  trifling,  especially  if  we  compare  it  with  the 
national  debts  of  European  countries  in  1899,  as 
shown  in  the  accompanying  table.^     It  will  be  seen 


Country. 


Debt. 


England  . 
France 

Germany  , 
Prussia . 
Bavaria 

Total 
Russia 


Austria- Hungary : 
Austria 
Hungary 
Common  debt 


Total 


Italy 
Spain 


Grand  total 


^683,000,000 
1,284,000,000 


107,717,015 

324,261,103 

70,919,205 


502,897,323 


978,000,000 


119,000,000 
181,000,000 
229,000,000 


529,000,000 


510,184,900 
369.645.700 


^4,856,727,923 


53.323.819.500 
6,248,586,000 


524,204,853 

1,578,016,666 

345,128,311 


2,447,349,830 


4.7S9.437.000 


579,113,500 

880,836,500 

1,114,428,500 


2.574,378.500 


2,482,814,812 
1,798,880,799 


;?23,635,266,44i 


1  Table  of  the  national  debts  of  Europe  in  1899,  Consular  Rf 
ports,  October,  1899. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

from  this  table  that  the  debt  of  England  is  twelve 
times  that  of  China,  while  the  debt  of  France  is 
almost  twice  as  large  as  that  of  Great  Britain. 
This  would  seem  to  argue  that  the  Chinese  Empire 
could  very  well  bear  a  much  heavier  indebtedness 
without  at  all  putting  itself  in  a  position  of  em- 
barrassing dependence.  On  account  of  the  general 
corruption  and  intense  conservatism  of  the  Chinese 
government,  however,  it  is  very  difficult  to  increase 
the  ordinary  revenue,  so  that  special  needs  of  the 
Chinese  state  have  to  be  satisfied  by  outside  aid. 
This  consideration,  notwithstanding  the  great  re- 
sources of  China,  renders  the  empire  especially 
liable  to  foreign  influence  through  the  instrumen- 
tality of  loans. 

As  the  railway  loans,  though  guaranteed  by  the 
Chinese  government,  are  not  made  directly  to  it, 
but  are  mostly  secured  by  the  property  of  the  rail- 
ways themselves,  and  are  to  be  paid  out  of  the 
income  of  the  latter,  they  have  not  here  been  con- 
sidered. In  the  event  of  corrupt  and  wasteful  man- 
agement of  these  railways  by  the  Chinese  adminis- 
tration, it  might,  however,  also  become  possible  to 
turn  these  loans  into  instrumentalities  for  exerting 
pressure  upon  the  government  for  political  ends. 

In  the  code  of  regulations  for  mines  and  rail- 
ways which  was  issued  in  1898,  the  imperial 
Chinese  government  declares  :  — 

"  The  mines  and  railways  of  Manchuria,  Shantung,  and 
Lungchow  are  affected  by  international  relations,  and  there- 
fore will  not  be  allowed  to  form  precedents  either  for  Chinese 

160 


i 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

or  foreigners.  .  .  .  Railway  agreements  giving  mining  rights 
along  the  route  will  not  be  allowed  to  form  precedents  in  the 
future."  1 

This  declaration  places  in  a  separate  category, 
governed  by  international  —  that  is,  political  — 
considerations,  the  concessions  given  to  Russia 
in  Manchuria,  to  Germany  in  Shantung,  and  to 
France  in  Lungchow,  and  it  specially  provides 
that  these  exceptional  political  concessions  are  not 
to  be  made  a  precedent  in  the  ordinary  adminis- 
tration of  mining  and  transportation  grants  in  the 
empire. 

It  will  be  well,  therefore,  to  investigate  the 
nature  of  the  privileges  granted  to  these  three 
powers  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  whether  they 
have  obtained  any  rights  of  a  purely  political 
nature,  and  whether  they  have  given  to  their 
industrial  operations  a  character  into  which  polit- 
ical purposes  may  be  said  to  enter.  We  have 
already  noted  how  important,  in  the  present  state 
of  world  politics,  apparently  insignificant  conces- 
sions may  be.  A  nation  once  obtaining  a  foothold, 
whether  through  missions,  or  railroads,  or  com- 
mercial concessions,  cannot  easily  be  dislodged, 
and  is  often  by  the  current  of  events  urged  to  look 
forward  to  more  complete  influence  and  even  po- 
litical control. 

In  Manchuria,  Russia  has  leased  Port  Arthur 
and  Talien-wan  with  the  adjacent  parts  of  the 
Liao  Tung  Peninsula.     The  northern  limit  of  the 

1  §  3;  see  Note  2,  appended  to  this  Part. 
M  l6l 


WORLD   POLITICS 

concession  has  not  been  strictly  defined  as  yet. 
Within  this  area  the  naval,  military,  and  civil 
administration  is  controlled  by  Russia;  to  the 
north,  Chinese  political  control  still  nominally  con- 
tinues, although  Chinese  troops  may  not  be  quar- 
tered there  without  the  consent  of  Russia.  This 
provision,  taken  in  connection  with  the  uncertainty 
of  the  boundary  and  the  introduction  of  Russian 
garrisons,  is  a  sufficient  indication  of  the  poHtical 
purposes  of  the  northern  empire.  Port  Arthur 
has  been  turned  into  a  strongly  fortified  naval 
base  and  is  closed  to  foreign  commerce  and  traffic. 
Talien-wan,  on  the  other  hand,  or,  as  it  has  since 
been  renamed,  Dalny  has  been  opened  to  the 
commercial  fleets  of  all  the  nations,^  and  exten- 
sive improvements  are  contemplated  by  the  Russian 
government.  The  tax  administration  of  northern 
Manchuria  is  controlled  largely  by  Russian  officials 
under  the  veil  of  friendly  advice  to  the  local  man- 
darins. In  addition  to  all  this,  Russia  has  obtained 
exclusive  mining  privileges  within  the  province  of 
Manchuria.  In  other  words,  mining  concessions 
within  that  region  are  no  longer  granted  by  the 
imperial  government  at  Peking,  but  by  the  Russian 
administration. 

That  the  Chinese  government  is  still  clinging  to 

1  "  In  view  of  the  commercial  development  of  the  future  city,  we 
confer  upon  it  for  the  whole  term  during  which  that  territory  has 
been  leased  to  Russia  by  China,  under  the  agreement  dated  the 
I5lh-27th  of  March,  1898,  the  rights  of  free  trade  which  belong  to 
free  ports."  —  Imperial  decree  of  July  30,  1899. 

162 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

the  semblance  of  sovereignty  in  Manchuria  is  evi- 
dent from  a  Chinese  imperial  decree  of  December, 
1898,  regarding  railway  construction.  The  decree 
mentions  the  Shan-hai-kwan  line  as  most  impor- 
tant, and  then  goes  on  to  say:  "Beyond,  Moukden 
and  Newchwang  are  strategical  points,  and  rail- 
ways must  be  built."  ^  As  we  have  seen,  the 
Newchwang  concession  was  actually  given  to  a 
British  corporation,  but  Russia  did  not  discontinue 
her  opposition  to  this  grant  until  she  had  made 
China  deny  to  the  concessionaries  the  ordinary 
mortgage  and  foreclosure  rights,  and  had  also 
secured  from  the  Peking  government  the  exclusion 
of  all  British  control  of  the  new  lines. 

That  the  Siberian  and  Manchurian  railway,  the 
industrial  value  of  which  has  already  been  dis- 
cussed, has  also  a  great  strategical  and  political 
importance  must  not  be  overlooked.  According 
to  a  Russian  imperial  decree,  the  railway  is  to  have 
"  sufficient  rolling  stock  to  be  able  to  form  three 
sets  of  army  trains  per  twenty-four  hours."  The 
railroad  in  Manchuria  is  already  garrisoned  by  a 
force  of  10,000  men.2  Considering  that  England 
keeps  India  in  order  with  a  European  force  of 
80,000  men,  the  protection  of  the  construction  of 
a  railway  seems  to  be  most  abundantly  provided 
for  by  the  Russian  government.  Wherever  a 
railway  station  is  erected,  the  flag  of  Russia  is  un- 
furled, usually  above  that  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

1  See  Consular  Reports,  May,  1899,  p.  66. 
*  Ibid.,  March,  19CX),  p.  275. 

163 


WORLD   POLITICS 

The  railway  company  which  was  organized  to 
build  the  Manchurian  branch  is,  as  has  been  said, 
merely  a  mask  for  the  Russian  government,  and 
has  a  trusted  coadjutor  in  financial  matters  in 
the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  at  Peking  and  Shanghai 
—  a  bank  which  is  in  close  touch  with  the  political 
purposes  of  the  Russian  Empire. 

The  German  Empire  is  fully  aware  of  the  im- 
portance of  political  influence  and  prestige  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Orient.  Thus,  the  emperor  sent  his 
own  brother  to  represent  the  interests  of  Germany 
in  China,  and  Prince  Henry  has  missed  no  oppor- 
tunity to  impress  upon  the  Oriental  mind  the  dig- 
nity of  the  German  imperial  house  and  government. 
He  is  the  first  foreigner  who  was  ever  presented 
to  the  Chinese  emperor  without  the  ceremony 
of  kotow,  —  i.e.,  abject  prostration  before  the  Son 
of  Heaven,  —  and  greeted  by  him  on  a  footing  of 
equality.  To  impress  central  China  with  the 
greatness  of  Germany,  Prince  Henry  undertook 
a  trip  up  the  Yangtse  River.  The  Germans  are 
evidently  preparing  to  take  advantage  of  any 
opportunities  which  the  shifting  conditions  of 
China  may  afford.  As  Minister  von  Buelow  said 
in  a  speech  in  the  Reichstag :  — 

"  Mention  has  been  made  of  a  partition  of  China.  Such  a 
partition  will  not  be  brought  about  by  us  at  any  rate.  All 
that  we  have  done  is  to  provide  that,  come  what  may,  we  our- 
selves shall  not  go  empty-handed.  The  traveller  cannot  de- 
cide when  the  train  is  to  start,  but  he  can  be  sure  not  to  miss 
it  when  it  does  start.  The  devil  take  the  hindmost." 
164 


THE  OPENING  OF   CHINA 

In  addition  to   the  lease  of  the  port  of  Kiao. 

chow,  where  she  exercises  the  same  control  as 
does  Russia  at  Port  Arthur,  Germany,  as  has 
already  been  noted  above,  has  obtained  exclu- 
sive mining  and  railway  concessions  in  Shantung. 
Syndicates  desiring  to  develop  mines  must  there- 
fore obtain  their  concessions  through  the  German 
government  and  not  from  Peking.  The  initial 
works  for  the  construction  of  the  railway  were 
interfered  with  by  Chinese  mobs  who  did  not 
like  the  high-handed  manner  of  the  German  mili- 
tary and  German  officialdom.  Troops  for  garri- 
sons were  therefore  landed  and  encounters  took 
place  between  natives  and  soldiers.  Should  diffi- 
culties of  this  kind  continue,  they  would  inevitably 
lead  to  a  military  occupation  of  the  entire  province, 
against  which  protests  would  be  of  little  avail. 

In  the  case  of  France,  the  political  purposes  of 
industrial  undertakings  are  very  evident.  Organs 
of  French  colonial  expansion  have  long  discussed 
with  evident  favor  the  policy  of  establishing  com- 
munication between  the  Russian  and  French 
spheres  of  interest  in  China,  with  the  object  of 
preventing  Great  Britain  from  exercising  para- 
mount control  along  the  whole  of  the  Yangtse 
Valley  and  connecting  her  sphere  of  interest  in 
China  with  her  Indian  possessions.  It  is  not 
strange,  therefore,  that  political  importance  should 
be  attributed  to  the  Hankow-Peking  railway 
undertaking,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  both  Russia 
and  France  used  their  diplomatic  influence  in 
i6s 


WORLD   POLITICS 

securing  the  concession.  The  rapidity  with  which 
the  stock  for  this  undertaking  was  subscribed  at 
Paris,  notwithstanding  the  unfavorable  report  of 
the  Credit  Lyonnais,  may  also  to  some  extent  be 
attributed  to  political  enthusiasm. 

The  Russians  and  French  have  long  had  their 
eyes  on  the  city  of  Hankow,  the  natural  centre  of 
industrial  China.  As  far  back  as  1896,  an  exclusive 
territorial  concession  was  obtained  here  by  Russia. 
Russian  methods  were  illustrated  by  the  ousting 
of  many  old  inhabitants  and  by  the  contesting 
of  titles  that  had  been  registered  for  more  than 
thirty  years  in  the  British  consulate.  At  present 
attempts  are  being  made  to  gain  an  additional  ter- 
ritorial concession  in  Hankow  as  a  railroad  termi- 
nal for  the  Hankow-Peking  line.  Politicians  are 
inclined  to  look  upon  this  as  an  attempt  to  form 
a  Russo-French  enclave  in  the  Yangtse  Valley. 

In  1898,  the  French  government,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  Russia,  attempted  to  obtain  an  exclusive 
territorial  concession  at  Shanghai.  Pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  on  the  viceroy  of  Nanking,  which 
was  only  relieved  by  the  appearance  of  some 
British  men-of-war.^  The  French  demands  were 
recently  renewed  with  Russian  support;  but  the 
requests  of  the  ministers  of  other  nations  for  an 
extension  of  the  cosmopolitan  settlement  were 
granted,  all  the  representatives  except  those  of 
France  and  Russia  signing  the  agreement.     When 

1  "  The  Far  East :  Extension  of  Shanghai,"  London  Times,  Sep- 
tember 2,  1898. 

166 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

we  remember  the  fact  that  the  commercial  interests 
of  France  in  Shanghai  are  inconsiderable,  and 
that  at  present  they  are  actually  decreasing,  we 
can  scarcely  escape  the  conclusion  that  political 
motives  were  preponderant  in  all  this  agitation, 

France  has  obtained  a  concession  for  the  occu- 
pation of  Quangchow  Bay  in  Quangtung  on  a 
ninety-nine  year  lease,  with  rights  and  conditions 
similar  to  those  of  Russia  in  Port  Arthur.  The 
French  railway  undertakings  in  southern  China 
are  financed  and  managed  entirely  by  the  French 
government.  Their  commercial  importance  is 
avowedly  small,  and  their  predominant  purpose  is 
therefore  generally  considered  to  be  political  and 
strategical. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the 
expression  of  French  colonial  policy  in  Indo-China 
contained  in  a  speech  by  the  governor  of  that 
province,  M.  Dumer,  before  the  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce at  Rouen  early  in  1899 :  — 

"The  quod  libet  which  has  presented  itself  to  the  adminis- 
trators of  this  colony  was  the  proper  action  or  means  to  be 
taken  in  order  to  create  and  increase  a  market  there  for  the 
manufactured  products  of  France.  For  it  may  be  said  that 
this  is  a  colony's  raison  cfetre;  in  other  words,  the  purely 
administrative  government  of  a  colony  is  a  relatively  easy 
matter  to  deal  with,  when  compared  with  the  development  of 
its  commerce.  Those  appointed  to  guide  the  destinies  of  our 
foreign  possessions  should  spare  neither  effort  nor  application 
in  widening  the  outlet  therein  for  the  fruits  of  our  home  labor 
and  industry.  ...  I  have  asked  the  French  government  for 
a  loan  of  two  hundred  million  francs  in  order  to  further  im- 
167 


WORLD   POLITICS 

prove  the  condition  of  its  eastern  colony.  Some  consider 
this  too  much,  but  it  must  not  be  imagined  that  the  two  hun- 
dred million  francs  will  be  taken  away  from  France,  nor  that 
the  loan  will  be  like  so  much  money  withdrawn  from  circula- 
tion, for  more  than  two-thirds  will  be  expended  in  nourishing 
French  industries.  Your  founderies  will  send  us  iron  for 
bridges  and  buildings  ;  your  rolling  mills,  rails  ;  your  forests, 
sleepers  ;  your  car  shops,  rolling  stock ;  your  quarries,  slate  ; 
your  hills,  cement.  All  these  will  be  carried  to  the  Orient  by 
French  ships,  giving  employment  to  French  people.  Our 
colonies  in  Tongking  in  particular  have  cost  us  a  great  deal. 
We  have  already  spent  there  one  thousand  million  francs  and 
lost  many  human  lives.  The  time  has  now  come  to  reap  the 
harvest  of  our  expenditure  and  the  fruit  of  our  labors."  ^ 

The  loan  asked  for  by  the  governor  was  granted 
by  the  French  government,  the  proceeds  to  be 
used  exclusively  in  the  construction  of  railways; 
and,  as  has  been  said  before,  the  first  issue  of 
stock  was  bid  for  thirty-six  times  over  in  one  day. 
According  to  the  terms  of  Article  4  of  the  Law  of 
December  25,  1898,  creating  the  loan,  any  mate- 
rial necessary  for  the  construction  of  the  above 
mentioned  railroads  which  is  not  obtainable  in 
Indo-China  must  be  purchased  of  French  dealers 
and  must  be  carried  in  vessels  flying  the  French 
flag.  According  to  the  new  Indo-Chinese  tariff, 
export  duties  are  collected  on  all  merchandise 
leaving  the  colony,  except  that  going  to  France. 

In  1897,  the  French  government  obtained  from 
the  Tsungli  Yamen  the  promise  not  to  alienate 
any  portion  of  Hainan  Island  to  any  other  foreign 

^  Translation  given  in  the  Consular  Reports,  1 899. 
168 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

power.  In  1898,  this  promise  was  extended  to 
the  three  boundary  provinces  of  Quangtung, 
Quangsi,  and  Yunnan.  No  industrial  concessions 
were  connected  with  this  agreement,  but  certain 
industrial  preferences  had  already  been  given  to 
the  French  government  in  the  two  preceding 
years. 

The  official  agreement  for  the  Lungchow-Nan- 
ning  railroad  was  signed  at  Peking  on  September 
15,  1899.  The  Chinese  government  is  to  provide 
3,000,000  taels  of  the  capital  required,  but  only 
French  engineers  and  materials  are  to  be  employed 
in  the  construction  of  the  line.  The  Russo-Chinese 
Bank  furnishes  the  necessary  funds.  On  his  return 
to  Indo-China,  Governor  Dumer  went  in  person  to 
Yunnanfou,  where  he  tried  to  prevail  upon  the 
Chinese  governor  to  grant  some  important  terri- 
torial concessions  in  connection  with  the  terminus 
of  the  French  railway  line.  On  this  occasion  the 
French  flag  was  unfurled  in  the  centre  of  the  town. 
Anti-French  feeling  is  reported  to  be  so  strong  in 
Yunnan  that  the  viceroy  felt  himself  called  upon 
to  warn  the  people  not  to  molest  the  engineers  on 
their  surveying  expeditions.  Persons  interested  in 
the  development  of  Yunnan,  both  French  and  Brit- 
ish, maintain  that  the  resources  of  that  province  are 
far  beyond  what  has  ordinarily  been  beheved  on 
the  basis  of  former  reports. 

While  the  inroads  upon  Chinese  sovereignty 
which  have  been  described  in  the  above  para- 
graphs were  being  made,  the  British  government 
169 


WORLD   POLITICS 

appeared  to  be  so  singularly  supine  and  so  indif- 
ferent or  ignorant  regarding  the  importance  of 
Chinese  affairs,  that  for  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  Brit- 
ish influence  at  Peking  would  be  entirely  super- 
seded by  that  of  Russia,  France,  and  Germany. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  during  this  time  British 
prestige  received  a  decided  set-back,  from  which 
British  interests  in  China  still  suffer,  and  which, 
unless  repaired  within  a  very  short  time,  must  nec- 
essarily leave  permanent  marks  on  the  history  of 
the  Celestial  Empire.  The  British  government 
was  at  that  time  concentrating  all  its  efforts  on 
the  task  of  reconquering  the  Soudan  and  render- 
ing futile  French  and  Russian  intrigues  in  Abys- 
sinia and  Bahr-el-Ghazal.  In  February,  1898, 
however.  Great  Britain  shook  off  her  previous  in- 
difference and  obtained  the  well-known  agreement 
on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  government  never  to 
alienate  any  territories  in  the  province  adjoining 
the  Yangtse  to  any  other  power,  under  lease, 
mortgage,  or  any  other  designation.  No  exclusive 
privileges  were  claimed  in  connection  with  this 
agreement,  and  the  British  government  has  so  far 
adhered  to  its  policy  of  making  its  influence  the 
aegis  of  equal  industrial  and  commercial  opportu- 
nities for  all  nations. 

On  July  I,  1898,  a  convention  was  signed  at 
Peking,  by  which  the  Chinese  government  leased 
to  England  Wei-hai-wei  and  the  adjacent  waters 
for  so  long  a  period  as  Port  Arthur  shall  remain 
in  the  possession  of  Russia.     The  grant  comprises 

170 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

a  belt  of  land  ten  miles  wide  along  the  entire  coast 
line  of  the  bay  of  Wei-hai-wei.  Chinese  admin- 
istration is  still  to  go  on  except  where  it  would  be 
inconsistent  with  naval  and  military  requirements. 

In  the  same  year  the  British  government  also 
obtained  the  lease  of  an  additional  slice  of  Kow- 
lun,  while  at  the  same  time  the  Shanghai  foreign 
settlement  was  extended,  chiefly  through  the  influ- 
ence of  Great  Britain.  The  Chinese  government 
has  also  been  prevailed  upon  to  give  verbal  assur- 
ances that  the  provinces  of  Yunnan  and  Quang- 
tung  should  not  be  alienated  to  any  other  power. 
With  regard  to  these  two  provinces,  therefore,  the 
same  promise  has  now  been  given  to  both  France 
and  Great  Britain.  But  as  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment lacks  both  power  and  inclination  to  stand  by 
its  promises  and  keep  them  to  the  fullest  extent, 
they  are  really  to  be  regarded  rather  as  manifes- 
toes declaring  the  intention  of  the  power  in  whose 
favor  they  are  made.  Thus,  in  the  promise  given 
to  France,  the  latter  really  declares  its  wish  to 
exclude  the  interference  of  other  governments  in 
the  boundary  provinces,  and  a  similar  purpose 
lies  at  the  basis  of  the  Anglo-Chinese  convention. 

Many  writers  interpret  these  conventions  as 
implying  the  definite  seizure  and  occupation  of 
certain  portions  of  the  Chinese  Empire  by  foreign 
powers ;  but  such  an  interpretation  is  entirely  un- 
justified and  misleading.  On  the  contrary,  it  must 
be  emphasized  that  they  do  not  necessarily  involve 
any  immediate  or  future  political  control,  but,  leav- 
171 


WORLD   POLITICS 

ing  the  sovereignty  of  China  otherwise  undisturbed, 
simply  demand  from  her  that  non-interference  shall 
be  insisted  upon,  and  that  no  exclusive  advantages 
shall  be  granted  to  other  foreign  powers.  Should 
the  partition  of  China  become  an  actuality,  how- 
ever, the  spheres  thus  delimited  will  be  insisted 
upon  by  the  powers  respectively  interested  as  a 
basis  for  partition.  But  as  Quangtung,  Szechuen, 
and  Yunnan  are  regarded  as  special  spheres  of 
interest  by  both  Great  Britain  and  France,  far- 
reaching  international  complications  are  to  be 
apprehended  in  case  of  the  dissolution  of  China. 
Discussion  of  these  possible  compHcations  is  for 
the  present  deferred. 

The  Yangtse  region  being  commonly  regarded 
as  the  sphere  of  interest  of  Great  Britain,  it  be- 
comes important  to  note  the  official  expressions  of 
the  British  government  with  regard  to  this  basin. 
The  region  was  defined  by  Mr.  Brodrick,  Under- 
Secretary  of  State,  as  consisting  of  the  provinces 
bordering  on  the  Yangtse,  together  with  Chekiang 
and  Honan.  In  the  Anglo-German  agreement  of 
September,  1898,  it  is  defined  as  consisting  of  those 
districts  through  which  streams  flow  into  the  Yang- 
tse. The  British  sphere  of  interest  is  ordinarily 
interpreted  as  also  including  the  eastern  two-thirds 
of  Quangtung,  which  contains  the  city  of  Canton, 
and  in  which  English  commercial  interests  are  far 
in  the  ascendant.  This  interpretation  confines 
French  interests  to  the  western  part  of  that  prov- 
ince, which  is  tributary  to  the  harbor  of  Pakhoi. 

172 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

The  policy  of  the  British  government  with  regard 
to  the  Yangtse  region  was  outlined  in  the  speech 
by  the  Right  Honorable  Mr.  Brodrick,  in  Parlia- 
ment, on  June  9,  1899,  ^^  which  reference  has 
already  been  made.     He  said  in  substance  :  — 

"  We  hold  the  Chinese  government  to  their  undertaking 
not  to  alienate  any  province  in  the  Yangtse  basin  and  to  per- 
mit the  extension  of  the  Burma  railroad  into  Yunnan  to  con- 
nect us  with  Chingkiang.  We  regard  the  improvement  of 
the  Yangtse  gorges  as  a  question  for  British  engineers.  We 
shall  keep  what  force  is  necessary  between  Ichang  and  the 
mouth  of  the  Yangtse.  These  measures  are  purely  precau- 
tionary, and  are  taken  with  the  object  of  giving  security  to 
our  merchants  and  traders." 

Speaking  of  the  open  door  and  of  spheres  of 
interest,  he  continued  :  — 

"  I  deny  that  we  have  abandoned  the  one  policy  or  adopted 
the  other.  We  are  endeavoring  to  secure  that  a  full  share  of 
railway  and  mining  concessions  shall  fall  to  British  investors. 
We  shall  endeavor  to  provide  that  trade  shall  be  free  from 
undue  taxation.  We  are  looking  forward  to  the  opening  of 
inland  waters  besides  the  Yangtse  and  ports  that  are  not  now 
treaty  ports  to  trade."  ^ 

Turning  now  to  a  consideration  of  Italy  in  her 
relations  to  China,  we  note  that  at  the  beginning 
of  1899  she  was  engaged  in  an  effort  to  secure  a 
footing  in  China,  having  selected  as  her  field  of 
exploitation  the  province  of  Chekiang.  Although 
supported  by  British  influence,  she  did  not  meet 
with  a  favorable   response  at  Peking.     For  this 

1  Cited  in  "The  Problem  of  China,"  Edinburgh  Review,  July, 
1899. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

reason,  and  also  on  account  of  the  popular  oppo- 
sition which  the  Italians  manifested  toward  the 
further  acquisition  of  territory  or  to  an  expansion- 
ist policy,  the  Italian  foreign  minister  declared,  in 
June,  1899,  that  the  wisest  course  for  Italy  to  pur- 
sue was  to  avoid  territorial  expansion  and  to  util- 
ize the  commercial  opportunities  in  China.  The 
present  policy  of  Italy  in  China,  therefore,  is  purely 
industrial  and  commercial.  Trained  consuls  are  to 
be  sent  to  various  parts  of  the  empire,  and  a  com- 
mercial attache  is  to  be  added  to  the  legation  at 
Peking.  The  government  expects  to  give  steady 
support  to  private  undertakings,  and  demands  for 
mining  concessions  are  vigorously  pressed  at  the 
Chinese  capital. 

The  last  country  whose  relations  with  China  we 
have  to  consider  is  Japan,  which  obtained  the 
island  of  Formosa  as  a  part  of  the  war  indemnity 
in  1896,  and  exacted  a  promise  of  non-alienation 
with  regard  to  the  province  of  Fokien,  opposite 
Formosa.  There  has  been  no  further  interference 
on  the  part  of  this  power,  although  Japan  is  in 
close  sympathy  with  the  reform  party  and  the 
nativistic  tendencies  in  the  Chinese  Empire.  In 
Corea,  Russian  ascendency  has  been  temporarily 
supplanted  by  the  Japanese,  on  account  of  the 
overbearing  harshness  and  financial  incompetence 
of  the  Russian  representatives.  The  Japanese  in 
Corea  encourage  every  attempt  at  reform,  while 
the  Russians  oppose  it.  Large  numbers  of  Jap- 
anese citizens  are  emigrating  and  settling  there, 
174 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

the  free  port  of  Mokpo  alone  having  received  a 
Japanese  population  of  twelve  hundred  since  1897. 
Corea  has  been  kept  open  for  exploitation,  and 
American  and  German  gold  mine  concessions  are 
worked  with  vigor,  while  the  French  are  inactive, 
having  drawn  but  little  profit  from  their  Russian 
alliance  in  this  section  of  the  Orient.  The 
Japanese  systematically  and  tenaciously  counter- 
act every  Russian  attempt  to  gain  territorial 
concessions  or  a  political  foothold  of  any  kind  in 
Corea.  It  would  seem  that  ultimately  an  armed 
conflict  between  Russia  and  Japan  over  the  con- 
trol of  Corea  will  be  unavoidable. 

It  remains  for  us  now  to  review  briefly  the 
international  arrangements  recently  concluded 
with  regard  to  China.  We  must  first,  in  this 
connection,  call  attention  to  the  importance  of 
"  the  most  favored  nation  "  clauses  in  the  various 
treaties  formerly  concluded  between  China  and 
foreign  powers.  The  upholding  of  this  clause  is  a 
necessary  condition  of  the  policy  of  the  open  door ; 
but  it  has  been  shown  repeatedly,  during  the  last 
few  years,  that  wherever  a  power  is  strong  enough 
and  persistent  enough  in  its  demands,  exclusive 
mining  and  railway  privileges,  even  when  they  in- 
fringe these  clauses  in  letter  and  in  spirit,  will  be 
granted.  Never  has  it  been  more  true  that  treaties 
are  simply  a  statement  of  existing  facts.  Treaties 
concluded  with  China,  and  treaties  framed  with 
regard  to  China,  are  simply  an  index  to  the 
present  position  and  power  of  the  various  govern- 

175 


WORLD   POLITICS 

ments  who  are  parties  to  the  respective  agree- 
ments. Wherever  an  opportunity  or  a  plausible 
pretext  to  disregard  the  treaties  offers  itself,  or 
wherever  a  power  feels  that  the  rival  nations  are 
so  occupied  with  other  matters  as  not  to  be  able  to 
insist  upon  the  enforcement  of  their  treaty  rights, 
the  promises  and  arrangements  contained  in 
treaties  will  have  very  little  restraining  influence 
on  political  action. 

During  the  past  six  months  a  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence has  been  going  on  between  the  minis- 
ters of  foreign  affairs  of  the  great  powers  who  are 
interested  in  Chinese  affairs  and  the  American 
Department  of  State.  The  United  States  ambas- 
sadors had  been  instructed  by  Secretary  Hay  to 
endeavor  to  obtain  from  each  of  the  various  powers 
claiming  "spheres  of  interest"  in  China  a  declara- 
tion substantially  to  the  following  effect :  — 

(i)  That  it  will  in  no  wise  interfere  with  any 
treaty  port  or  any  vested  interest  within  any  so- 
called  "  sphere  of  interest "  or  leased  territory  it 
may  have  in  China. 

(2)  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the  time 
being  shall  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or 
shipped  to  all  such  ports  as  are  within  such 
"  spheres  of  interest "  (unless  they  be  "  free 
ports "),  no  matter  to  what  nationality  it  may 
belong,  and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  col- 
lected by  the  Chinese  government, 

(3)  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbor  dues  on 
vessels  of  another  nationality  frequenting  any  port 

176 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

in  such  "  sphere  "  than  shall  be  levied  on  vessels 
of  its  own  nationality  and  no  higher  railroad 
charges  over  lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated 
within  its  "  sphere  "  on  merchandise  belonging  to 
citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities  trans- 
ported through  such  "  sphere  "  than  shall  be  levied 
on  similar  merchandise  belonging  to  its  own 
nationals    transported   over   equal   distances.^ 

By  March  20,  1900,  favorable  replies  had  been 
received  from  the  leading  European  powers,  — 
France,  Germany,  Great  Britian,  Italy,  Russia, — 
and  from  Japan.  At  that  date  Secretary  Hay  in- 
structed the  American  ambassadors  to  these  powers, 
and  the  minister  at  Tokyo,  to  notify  the  powers  to 
which  they  were  respectively  accredited  that  all  the 
governments  concerned  had  accepted  the  proposal 
of  the  United  States  and  that  therefore  the  consent 
of  each  would  be  considered  final  and  definite. 

The  portion  of  the  reply  of  Count  Mouravieff 
which  relates  to  the  imposition  of  customs  duties 
in  the  Russian  "sphere,"  reads  as  follows:  — 

"  In  so  far  as  the  territory  leased  by  China  to  Russia  is 
concerned,  the  imperial  government  has  already  demonstrated 
its  firm  intention  to  follow  the  policy  of  "  the  open  door  "  by 
creating  Dalny  (Talien-wan)  a  free  port ;  and  if  at  some  future 
time  that  port,  although  remaining  free  itself,  should  be  sepa- 
rated by  a  customs  limit  from  other  portions  of  the  territory  in 
question,  the  customs  duties  would  be  levied,  in  the  zone 
subject  to  the  tariff,  upon  all  foreign  merchandise  without  dis- 
tinction as  to  nationality." 

^  Open-Door  Policy  in  China.    House  of  Representatives  Docu- 
ment No,  547,  Fifty-sixth  Congress. 
177 


WORLD   POLITICS 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  answer  reserves  to 
Russia  the  right  to  levy  customs  duties  on  foreign 
imports  into  her  Chinese  "  leasehold,"  and  simply 
promises  not  to  make  any  distinction  between 
foreign  nations.  Furthermore  the  Russian  reply 
passes  over  clause  3  of  Secretary  Hay's  proposal 
in  silence;  i.e.,  it  makes  no  promises  with  regard 
to  railway  charges  and  harbor  dues. 

It  may  seem  that  this  diplomatic  reserve  on  the 
part  of  the  power  from  which  infractions  of  the 
"  open-door "  policy  have  been  especially  feared, 
renders  the  mutual  assurances  given  of  somewhat 
problematical  value.  The  informal  character  of  this 
correspondence  would  also  prevent  it  from  ranking 
as  the  foundation  of  mutual  treaty  rights  among  the 
powers  interested.  Nevertheless  it  is  important 
in  contemporary  history,  as  recognizing  the  regime 
of  spheres  of  interest  as  an  established  fact,  and  as 
containing  the  first  clear  declarations  on  the  part  of 
the  great  European  powers  in  favor  of  upholding 
the  policy  of  equal  opportunity  in  China.  To  have 
obtained  an  expression  of  international  opinion  on 
this  point  was  a  valuable  achievement  on  the  part 
of  the  American  Department  of  State. 

Among  recent  international  agreements  concern- 
ing China,  three  claim  our  special  attention.  In 
the  first  place  should  be  mentioned  the  Anglo- 
French  Siam  Convention  of  1896,  respecting  the 
exploitation  of  Szechuen  and  Yunnan,  by  which 
the  two  nations  pledge  each  other  to  enjoy  in 
common  all  the  privileges  and  advantages  of  any 

178 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

nature  conceded  to  either  nation  within  these  or 
other  provinces.  The  agreement  can  be  looked 
upon  only  as  a  temporary  modus  viveiidi.  In 
fact,  the  concessions  which  France  is  now  insist- 
ing upon  virtually  constitute  an  abrogation  of  the 
agreement.  Of  course  they  may  be  toned  down 
so  as  to  come  within  the  compass  of  the  proper 
share  of  that  nation  in  the  development  of  these 
provinces  on  an  equal  footing  with  other  powers, 
and  against  such  concessions  no  objections  could 
be  made. 

A  second  agreement  of  special  importance  is 
that  concluded  between  German  and  British 
financiers  in  September,  1898,  by  which  the  latter 
agree  to  recognize  and  respect  the  primary  right 
of  Germany  to  obtain  railway  concessions  in 
Shantung,  and  in  the  valley  of  the  Yellow  River, 
while,  reciprocally,  the  German  capitalists  recog- 
nize a  similar  preemption  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain  in  the  Yangtse  region.  This  agreement, 
entered  into  with  the  sanction  of  the  two  govern- 
ments, may  have  important  international  conse- 
quences, as  it  favors  a  more  complete  understand- 
ing between  the  two  nations,  and  a  strengthening 
of  the  common  purpose  to  prevent  further  en- 
croachments by  Russia  upon  the  centre  of  the 
Chinese  Empire. 

The  third  important  agreement  is  that  concluded 

between     Russia   and    England    in    April,    1899. 

The    substance   of   this    informal    treaty   is    that 

Great  Britain  will  not  seek  on  her  own  account, 

179 


WORLD   POLITICS 

or  in  behalf  of  her  own  subjects,  any  railway  con- 
cessions to  the  north  of  the  Great  Wall  of  China ; 
and  that  she  will  not  obstruct  any  application  for 
such  concessions  in  that  region  which  are  sup- 
ported by  the  Russian  government.  Russia,  in 
return,  enters  into  a  similar  engagement  with 
regard  to  railway  concessions  in  the  basin  of  the 
Yangtse.  The  following  paragraph  is  particularly 
significant :  — 

"The  two  contracting  parties,  having  in  no  wise  in  view 
to  infringe  in  any  way  the  sovereign  rights  of  China  or  the 
existing  treaties,  will  not  fail  to  communicate  to  the  Chinese 
government  the  present  arrangement,  which  by  averting  all 
cause  of  complications  between  them,  is  of  a  nature  to  con- 
solidate peace  in  the  far  East  and  to  serve  the  primordial 
interests  of  China  herself." 

The  agreement  also  includes  the  arrangement 
with  regard  to  the  Shan-hai-kwan-Newchwang 
line,  which  has  already  been  discussed. 

Although  the  last  two  agreements,  —  the  Anglo- 
German  and  the  Anglo-Russian, — refer  entirely 
to  railway  exploitation,  and  are  therefore  only  in- 
directly of  political  significance,  they  nevertheless 
serve  to  mark  a  spirit  of  mutual  forbearance  and 
an  intention  to  carry  on  the  work  of  opening  and 
developing  China  along  equitable  lines,  each  nation 
being  granted  an  adequate  sphere  in  which  she 
can  centralize  her  interests  and  from  which  she 
can  join  in  an  effective  cooperation  in  the  inter- 
national purpose. 

The  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan 
1 80 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

are  on  the  whole  friendly  and  favorable  to  active 
cooperation  in  the  affairs  of  the  far  Orient.  True, 
England  is  thought  by  many  Japanese  to  have 
entered  into  the  scramble  for  territorial  conces- 
sions in  China.  Thus,  the  Djimmin,  the  chief 
liberal  journal  of  Tokyo,  says:  — 

"  We  must  finish  once  for  all  with  the  idea  of  an  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  whose  mission  it  would  be  to  save  China. 
An  alliance  is  possible  only  between  nations  that  understand 
each  other  perfectly  and  that  have  a  common  enemy.  Now, 
who  is  the  probable  enemy  of  Japan?  We  see  several.  .  .  . 
England  having  forgotten  her  former  solemn  promises,  we 
cannot  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  alone. 
The  fate  of  the  Celestial  Empire  is  decided."^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  most  influential  statesmen 
of  Japan,  Counts  Ito  and  Okuma,  and  Viscount 
Aoki,  still  favor  cooperation  with  Great  Britain. 

Prince  Chung,  of  China,  has  been  agitating  at 
Peking  in  favor  of  a  Chino-Japanese  alhance.  He 
has  even,  on  his  own  responsibility,  sent  a  legation 
to  Japan  to  investigate  the  state  of  opinion  at  To- 
kyo regarding  such  an  alliance.  It  is  not  believed, 
however,  that  any  alliance  can  at  present  be 
concluded,  because  Japan  does  not  wish  to  commit 
herself  to  support  the  Manchu  government,  while 
the  latter  fears  the  sympathy  of  Japan  with  the 
reform  and  native  Chinese  element.^ 

^  Cited  in  the  Revue  Politique  et  Farlementairt,  Vol,  XXI., 
p.  645. 

2  It  is  also  reported  that  the   Japanese  were  scandalized  and 
offended  by  the  personal  and  social  insignificance  of  the  special 
envoys  sent  by  the  Chinese  government  to  negotiate  a  treaty. 
181 


CHAPTER   IV 

Summary  of  the  Actual  Condition  of  Affairs 
IN  China 

Having  now  reviewed  the  details  of  the  opening 
up  of  China  as  it  is  going  on  at  the  present  time, 
we  are  in  a  position  to  draw  some  general  con- 
clusions based  on  the  previous  discussion.  The 
general  situation  is  characteristically  outlined  in 
some  remarks  by  the  Japanese  Count  Okuma. 
He  says  in  substance  :  — 

"  If  the  powers  take  so  much  pains  in  making  a  new  map 
of  China,  it  is  a  result  of  their  ignorance  of  the  true  state  of 
that  unhappy  land  and  its  people.  We  may  best  compare  the 
Chinese  nation  to  a  gigantic  tree  with  mighty  roots  and  strong 
branches.  The  tree  itself  has  great  vigor,  but  its  fruit  falls 
from  time  to  time  at  the  merest  breath  of  wind.  Such  is  the 
Manchu  dynasty.  That  it  has  no  longer  any  authority  or 
power  does  not  justify  the  conclusion  that  the  Chinese  nation 
is  also  menaced  in  its  existence.  The  great  powers  may  yet 
repent  of  their  error.  If  the  four  hundred  million  Chinese, 
appealed  to  by  a  superior  spirit  in  their  common  sentiments 
and  beliefs,  should  rise,  what  would  become  of  the  few 
thousand  foreigners  ? "  ^ 

1  Cited  in  the  Revue  Politique  et  Parlemeniaire,  Vol.  XXL, 
p.  646. 

182 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

It  is  certainly  a  great  political  mistake  to  judge 
of  the  weakness  or  strength  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire from  the  condition  of  its  central  government. 
Chinese  civilization  is  still  a  clan  civilization,  never 
having  passed  through  feudalism  into  a  well- 
moulded  state.  Even  the  weakness  which  Okuma 
attributes  to  the  Manchu  dynasty  might  be  denied 
by  many.  Chang  Chi  Tung,  the  great  viceroy, 
speaks  of  the  present  dynasty  in  terms  of  the 
highest  praise,  and  contrasts  the  peace  and 
prosperity  of  the  empire  during  the  centuries  of 
Manchu  reign  with  the  rebellions,  revolutions,  and 
assassinations  that  have  filled  the  annals  of 
Western  history  during  the  same  period. 

The  actual  status  of  affairs  may  be  briefly 
summed  up  in  a  few  sentences.  The  Europeans, 
protected  by  their  fleets,  are  in  political  control  of 
a  few  coast  settlements.  Russia  has  obtained 
important  political  powers  in  Manchuria,  although 
even  there  she  meets  with  frequent  and  strenu- 
ous resistance  on  the  part  of  the  masses  and  has 
to  employ  an  army  to  protect  her  railway.  Ger- 
many refuses  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
China,  and,  in  line  with  this  policy,  has  recently 
declined  to  protect  Chinese  converts  to  Christian- 
ity, who  are  always  a  special  mark  for  persecution 
on  the  part  of  their  fellow-citizens.  German  politi- 
cal protection  is  restricted  to  her  own  citizens  and 
industries.  British  gunboats  now  patrol  the  Yang- 
tse  and  West  rivers,  but  it  is  only  to  prevent  piracy 
and  to  protect  European  trade,  a  duty  laid  upon 
183 


WORLD   POLITICS 

them  by  the  fact  that  the  torpedo  boats  which  the 
Chinese  government  detailed  for  duty  along  these 
rivers  promptly  engaged  in  turning  an  honest 
penny  by  towing,  while  the  pirates  plied  their 
trade  with  undisturbed  effrontery  !  The  question, 
outside  of  those  territories  which  have  actually 
been  leased,  is  up  to  the  present  moment  one  of 
security,  —  of  protecting  the  incipient  industrial 
and  commercial  interests  and  communications. 
No  power,  except  perhaps  Russia,  seems  to  be 
contemplating  any  actual  assumption,  at  least  in 
the  immediate  future,  of  sovereignty  over  large 
tracts  of  land. 

The  policy  of  "  spheres  of  influence "  is  not 
necessarily  opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  "open 
door."  At  present,  if  we  may  interpret  the  dec- 
larations of  the  great  powers  by  their  course  of 
action,  the  term  "  sphere  of  influence  "  in  its  most 
extended  meaning  refers  to  a  region  where  a  power 
holds  itself  specially  responsible  for  security  of 
life  and  investment,  and  uses  its  political  influence 
for  the  furthering  of  economic  development.  As 
long  as  freedom  of  opportunity  is  preserved  within 
these  spheres,  as  long  as  treaty  ports  are  kept 
open  and  their  number  is  gradually  increased,  the 
policy  designated  by  the  term  "open  door  "  is  prac- 
tically in  force,  even  although  the  policing  of  the 
empire  may  have  been  divided  up  among  the 
powers.  The  fact  that  a  nation  is  interested  in 
certain  portions  of  China  to  the  extent  of  desir- 
ing to  exclude  other  powers  from  far-reaching  con- 
184 


THE   OPENING   OF  CHINA 

cessions  within  such  territories  does  not  of  itself 
argue  that  it  contemplates  the  assumption  of  politi- 
cal sovereignty  therein. 

To  arrive  at  a  conception  of  the  difficulties  which 
would  meet  any  proposal  looking  toward  the 
immediate  assumption  of  complete  political  sover- 
eignty over  extended  districts  in  China,  we  need 
only  consider  the  actual  internal  conditions  of  the 
empire.  The  success  of  the  industrial  develop- 
ments thus  far  undertaken  is  a  question  yet  to  be 
answered.  It  is  not  even  known  how  the  popula- 
tions of  the  interior  will  bear  continued  exploita- 
tion by  European  capitalists.  We  do  know  that 
Russia  and  Germany  have  had  serious  trouble  in 
the  construction  of  their  railways,  and  while  the 
surveyors  of  the  Canton  railway  did  not  meet  with 
the  anticipated  resistance,  riots  in  other  parts  of 
the  empire  —  as  in  Szechuen,  arising  from  opposi- 
tion to  the  introduction  of  mining  machinery  and 
other  improvements  —  have  been  frequent  and 
violent. 

In  the  great  industrial  revolution  that  is  im- 
pending in  China,  the  inevitable  sufferings  will 
readily  be  attributed  to  foreign  influence  and  for- 
eign interference.  If  we  compare  the  probable 
situation  in  China  during  the  coming  days  with 
that  of  England  at  the  beginning  of  the  present 
century,  we  can  imagine  what  serious  disturbances 
may  arise.  It  may  be  said  by  some  that  the 
development  of  China  will  take  the  form  of  the 
introduction  of  new  industries,  which  will  give 
185 


WORLD   POLITICS 

employment  to  great  numbers  of  Chinese.  But, 
at  the  same  time,  the  old  industries  now  existing 
in  the  empire,  —  house  industries,  carried  on  by 
families  in  their  homes,  —  will  be  replaced,  as  they 
have  been  in  India,  by  the  modern  factory  system, 
so  that  the  revolution  may  be  even  more  intense 
than  it  was  in  the  cotton  manufacturing  districts 
of  England,  and  will  certainly  be  more  formidable 
on  account  of  the  vastly  greater  multitudes  affected. 

At  present,  for  instance,  the  construction  of  rail- 
ways is  giving  employment  to  large  numbers ;  but, 
once  completed,  they  will  drive  out  of  service  the 
private  carriers  who  are  now  a  very  numerous 
class  of  the  laboring  population.  Many  of  these 
carriers  do  not  even  have  any  beasts  of  burden,  but 
furnish,  none  the  less,  a  very  rapid  delivery  ser- 
vice at  remarkably  low  compensation.  As  the  rail- 
way net  spreads  and  covers  the  land,  their  services 
will  of  course  become  unnecessary,  and  they  will 
have  to  seek  employment  in  other  branches  of  in- 
dustry. So,  too,  in  all  branches  of  native  manufac- 
ture, the  introduction  of  European  machinery  will 
at  first  produce  intense  suffering  to  individuals,  by 
concentrating  the  industries  and  undoing  hosts  of 
trained  workmen. 

All  this  must  be  taken  into  account  in  framing 
any  policy  of  opening  the  resources  of  China  to 
European  exploitation.  Inevitably  the  disastrous 
consequences  which  reform  always  brings  in  its 
train  to  those  individuals  whose  accustomed  econ- 
omic function  is  destroyed,  will  be  attributed  to  the 

1 86 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

"foreign  devils,"  and  the  prejudiced  multitude, 
wrought  upon  by  the  evident  discomfort  of  large 
classes  of  laborers,  may  go  to  the  length  of  inflict- 
ing the  greatest  damage  on  foreign  industrial  prop- 
erty, and  may  perhaps  even  make  industrial 
operations  impossible.  Though  this  view  presents 
only  a  possibility,  it  is  a  possibility  that  must  be 
taken  into  account  as  an  unavoidable  risk  to  be 
assumed  by  foreign  investors,  and  as  an  element  in 
the  political  situation  that  may  lead  to  serious  com- 
plications if  European  powers  are  ever  called  upon 
to  protect  the  property  of  their  subjects  in  China,^ 
There  are  still  large  sections  of  Chinese  territory 
in  which  the  government  has  so  far  been  unable  to 
suppress  brigandage  and  piracy.  The  brigands  of 
Quangtung  are  especially  efficient  and  energetic.^ 
They  often  defeat  detachments  of  the  regular  army 
and  take  whole  towns,  above  which  they  float  their 
feudal  banners.  The  methods  of  the  pirates  are 
characteristically  practical  and  efficacious.  A  band 
of  pirates  will  buy  regular  passage  on  a  river 
steamer,  and,  when  they  come  to  a  convenient 
place,  overawe  the  officials  of  the  ship  and  the 
passengers,  pocket  whatever  valuables  are  to  be 
found,  and  have  themselves  landed,  to  be  received 
on  shore  by  their  associates  and  hurried  away  into 

^  The  great  secret  societies  of  China,  e.g.  the  Boxers,  are  already 
showing  signs  of  a  readiness  to  antagonize  foreigners  on  account  of 
their  interference  with  Chinese  customs  and  industries. 

^  Of  late  they  have  even  been  bold  enough  to  extort  money  from 
the  merchants  of  Canton  by  threats  of  dynamiting  their  hongs. 
187 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  mountain  regions.  As  pirates  are  convention- 
ally supposed  to  sail  in  a  ship  of  their  own,  it  is 
perhaps  doubtful  whether  these  river  robbers  should 
be  dignified  with  that  more  romantic  designation. 
But,  whether  they  are  pirates  or  robbers,  the  Chi- 
nese government  is  apparently  powerless  to  sup- 
press them,  and  there  is  in  this  another  dangerous 
obstruction  to  the  peaceful  development  of  indus- 
try and  the  avoidance  of  foreign  interference. 

The  condition  of  the  private  law  and  its  admin- 
istration is  also  of  such  a  nature  that  reform  is 
imperatively  demanded  before  foreign  capital  can 
be  safely  invested  and  business  arrangements  reg- 
ularly concluded.  There  is  practically  no  police. 
The  Yamen  runners,  unpaid  hangers-on  of  the 
mandarin  judges,  supply  the  place  of  a  regular 
police  in  the  most  unsatisfactory  manner.  As  they 
are  not  regular  officials,  they  have  absolutely  no 
sense  of  duty  toward  the  state,  and  will  use  every 
opportunity  to  extort  unlawful  payments  from  the 
unfortunate  individuals  who  fall  into  their  hands. 
So  inefficient  is  the  administration  of  the  law  that 
it  has  become  a  practical  tenet  of  Chinese  wisdom 
that  courts  must  at  all  risk  be  avoided,  and  from 
the  classics  down,  the  writers  unite  in  bewailing 
the  fate  of  the  man  who  becomes  involved  in  a 
lawsuit.  There  is  practically  no  civil  law  and 
no  commercial  code.  Courts  act  on  the  principle 
of  arbitration,  and  whatever  security  commercial 
dealings  now  have,  rests  on  the  unimpeachable 
honesty  manifested  by  the  Chinese  merchants. 
i88 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

The  reform  of  the  law  and  the  adoption  of  a 
commercial  code  to  be  used  by  Chinese  and 
foreigners  alike,  have  long  been  a  desideratum  of 
Chinese  commerce  and  industry.  As  far  back 
as  1876,  the  English  government,  through  Sir 
Rutherford  Alcock,  made  a  demand  upon  the 
Tsungli  Yamen  to  have  such  a  code  prepared  and 
enforced.  But  it  seems  hardly  probable  that  a 
sweeping  reform  of  local  administration  can  be  ex- 
pected of  the  central  government  at  the  present 
time.  Reform  will  have  to  be  begun  in  some  of  the 
more  populous  industrial  provinces,  where  a  strong 
public  opinion  in  favor  of  an  impartial  and  regular 
administration  of  justice  already  exists.  A  remark- 
able illustration  of  the  desire  of  the  Chinese  mer- 
chants for  settled  legal  conditions  is  found  in  the 
manner  in  which  they  crowd  into  those  territo- 
ries which  are  held  by  foreign  nations,  such  as 
Hongkong  and  the  international  settlement  at 
Shanghai.  Here  they  may  enjoy  the  advantages 
of  impartial  courts  and  consistent  rules  of  law 
which  they  so  highly  appreciate.  The  Chinese 
government  apparently  foresees  trouble  in  this 
matter.  It  has,  therefore,  indicated  its  refusal  to 
implicate  itself  in  private  controversies  between 
foreigners  and  Chinese.^  It  is  very  doubtful,  how- 
ever, whether  foreign  governments  will  take  the 
same  view  of  the  case.  They  will  certainly  insist 
upon  fair  play  and  an  equitable  administration  of 

*  See  "  Regulations  for  Mines  and  Railways  in  China,"  Note  2, 
at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

189 


WORLD  POLITICS 

justice  in  all  those  cases  in  which  their  own  citi- 
zens are  concerned. 

From  all  this  it  may  be  judged  how  easily  Chi- 
nese affairs  may  become  complicated  by  foreign 
intervention.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  develop- 
ment of  China  will  be  managed  with  such  tact  and 
careful  consideration  of  the  feelings  of  the  Chi- 
nese population  as  to  avoid  a  serious  collision 
between  foreigners  and  natives,  or  the  growth  of 
animosities  and  prejudices  which  may  arrest  for 
decades  the  work  of  reform  and  progress.  With 
this  careful  guarding  of  the  friendly  relations 
between  Europeans  and  Chinese,  there  must,  how- 
ever, go  a  firm  and  constant  pressure  for  adminis- 
trative and  legal  reform ;  for,  unless  the  insecurities 
which  are  bound  to  result  from  the  defects  above 
outlined  are  obviated,  the  relations  between  the 
Chinese  and  the  foreign  investors  and  industrial 
leaders  will  always  be  in  danger  of  far-reaching 
disturbance. 

Up  to  the  present  time,  Great  Britain,  counting 
on  the  willingness  of  the  Peking  mandarins  to 
reform  the  empire  if  given  the  active  assistance 
of  a  strong  foreign  power,  has  attempted  to  effect 
these  reforms  by  strengthening  the  central  power. 
Now,  however,  the  difficulties  of  this  pohcy,  — 
which,  moreover,  has  borne  little  fruit  in  the  past, 
—  have  become  almost  insurmountable.  On  ac- 
count of  the  international  jealousies  centring  at 
Peking,  the  exercise  of  influence  by  any  power, 
no  matter  how  humanitarian  and  unselfish  its 
190 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

motive  may  be,  would  to-day  arouse  the  ever  ready 
jealousies  of  other  nations,  if  it  desired  to  inter- 
fere in  Chinese  affairs  through  the  central  gov- 
ernment. Moreover,  the  decentralization  of  the 
Chinese  administration  is  such  that  it  could  be 
moulded  into  a  unified  organism  only  by  a  great 
revolution  or  by  the  work  of  an  overpowering 
genius.  The  Tsungli  Yamen  is  very  generous 
in  promises ;  but,  unless  there  is  at  hand  a  power 
ready  to  enforce  these  promises  against  other  for- 
eign nations,  they  have  absolutely  no  value,  since 
it  is  a  settled  principle  of  Chinese  action  to  put  a 
man  off  with  promises  in  order  to  make  him  feel 
satisfied.  Both  the  power  and  the  inclination  for 
any  really  far-reaching  reform,  therefore,  are  lack- 
ing in  the  imperial  council. 

It  is  different  with  many  of  the  local  govern- 
ments. Here  the  officials  come  more  directly  in 
contact  with  the  people  and  with  the  practical 
business  of  administering  the  law.  While,  as  a 
class,  they  receive  very  inadequate  salaries,  and 
are  consequently  given  to  the  universal  Chinese 
official  practice  of  extorting  from  ten  to  twenty 
times  their  legal  emolument,  they  have  among 
their  number  many  men  of  strong  character  and 
practical  experience.  It  is  through  these  men 
and  through  the  administrations  of  which  they  are 
the  heads  that  enduring  reforms  must  be  attempted. 

The  methods  of  controlling  the  Chinese  admin- 
istration from  the  capital  are  very  lax,  and  there- 
fore any  power  that  can  gain  the  support  of  the 
191 


WORLD   POLITICS 

local  authorities  will  be  able  to  effect  important 
reforms.  Of  late,  it  is  true,  the  imperial  govern- 
ment has  dismissed  several  local  administrators 
from  office  on  account  of  their  connection  with 
foreigners.  Thus,  the  governor  of  Shanse  was 
discharged  because  he  had  been  instrumental  in 
granting  the  concessions  of  the  Peking  syndicate 
and  of  the  Russian  Chengting-Taiyuan  railway  in 
his  province.  It  may  be,  however,  that  by  such 
action  the  central  government  simply  desired  to 
indicate  that  the  exceptional  privileges  there 
granted  were  not  to  be  set  up  as  precedents  for 
future  action.  Again,  the  Tsungli  Yamen,  on  the 
ground  that  the  mining  regulations  of  the  govern- 
ment had  not  been  complied  with,  recently  refused 
to  ratify  certain  mining  concessions  which  had 
been  granted  to  the  French  by  the  viceroy  of 
Szechuen.  While  in  matters  of  important  conces- 
sions of  this  kind  the  central  government  may 
interfere,  the  conduct  of  ordinary  administration, 
military  and  civil,  is  in  the  hands  of  the  local  offi- 
cials, and  it  is  through  them  that  the  beginnings 
of  actual  reform  must  be  made.  These  ofificials 
could  be  interested  in  reform  by  raising  their 
salaries  so  that  they  may  be  above  the  need  of 
extortion,  and  by  bringing  to  bear  upon  them  the 
strong  public  sentiment  of  the  Chinese  merchants 
in  favor  of  reform  in  the  administration  of  commer- 
cial law.  There  need  be  absolutely  no  interference 
with  the  prejudices  and  feehngs  of  the  masses. 
Through  the  viceroys  and  governors  the  admin- 

192 


THE  OPENING   OF  CHINA 

istration  of  finance  and  law  and  the  regulation 
of  the  armies  may  be  so  reformed  as  to  vitalize 
state  life  in  large  regions  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 
The  important  change  which  such  a  system  would 
effect  in  the  collection  of  taxes  would  tend  to 
satisfy  the  central  government,  whose  function 
it  would  be  to  represent  the  ideal  unity  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  and  to  act  as  the  formal  bearer 
of  the  sovereignty  which  no  European  power  is 
ready  to  assume  or  should  venture  to  claim. 

The  question  of  holding  China  by  force  and  add- 
ing large  portions  of  Chinese  territory  to  the  national 
domains  of  European  powers  must  appear  fan- 
tastic, when  we  consider  Chinese  conditions.  The 
secret  societies  alone,  which  are  the  most  active 
and  effective  social  organizations  in  the  empire, 
could  easily  prevent  the  actual  seizure  of  sover- 
eignty by  European  powers.  A  very  different 
condition  from  that  in  India  would  here  confront 
the  invader.  The  Chinese  are  an  active,  energetic 
race.  For  ages  there  has  been  with  them  a  sur- 
vival of  the  hardiest.  Trained  from  youth  to 
subsist  on  the  most  meagre  diet,  to  get  along 
with  little  sleep,  and  to  work  patiently  for  twelve 
or  fourteen  hours  a  day,  these  men  scoff  at  diffi- 
culties and  exertions  which  would  within  a  year 
weary  a  European  to  death.  There  is  no  over- 
strained sensibility.  Human  life  is  held  so  cheap 
that  people  often  commit  suicide  simply  to  cause 
inconvenience  to  others.  With  an  intense  vener- 
ation for  the  past  and  an  unusual   reverence  for 

o  193 


WORLD   POLITICS 

their  ancestors,  these  people  naturally  combine  a 
tenacious  conservatism  in  matters  of  every-day 
life  and  intercourse. 

Should  the  idea  spread  that  foreigners  are  about 
to  effect  a  radical  change  in  the  social  and  indus- 
trial constitution  of  their  empire,  a  violent  and 
frantic  resistance  would  be  offered.  When  we 
consider  that  most  of  the  four  hundred  million 
inhabitants  would  readily  be  drawn  into  the  exist- 
ing secret  societies  for  the  purpose  of  defending 
their  hearths  and  their  civilization,  the  futility  of 
any  effort  of  Europeans  to  govern  against  their 
will  an  intelligent  and  stubborn  race  like  this  at 
once  becomes  apparent. 

The  only  way  in  which  the  Europeans  can 
make  their  influence  count  permanently  in  China 
is  by  a  tactful  lightening  of  burdens  from  above 
and  by  the  introduction  of  more  settled  methods  of 
administration  and  law,  without  at  all  interfering 
with  the  local  habits  and  prejudices  of  the  masses. 
As  long  as  European  troops  shall  be  employed 
only  for  the  upholding  of  law  and  order,  for  the 
persecution  of  brigands  and  rebels,  the  Chinese 
masses  will  not  oppose  them.  The  multitudes  in 
China  are  peace-loving  and  orderly,  and  European 
powers  may  therefore,  without  danger  to  them- 
selves, assist  in  rendering  secure  the  highways  of 
Chinese  trade.  For  this  purpose  it  is  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  have  troops  on  the  ground, 
since  a  nation  that  claims  any  influence  in  Chinese 
affairs  must  primarily  be  able  to  protect  European 
194 


THE   OPENING  OF  CHINA 

investments  within  its  sphere  of  influence.  Should 
England,  for  instance,  not  be  able  to  protect  the 
property  of  Europeans  at  Hankow,  a  plausible 
pretext  would  at  once  be  furnished  for  Russian  or 
Japanese  interference.  While,  therefore,  all  un- 
necessary collision  with  the  details  of  Chinese  life 
must  be  avoided,  a  beneficent  influence  may  be 
exercised  from  above,  and  order  may  be  main- 
tained at  least  along  the  principal  highways  by 
which  European  commerce  enters  the  empire. 
Chinese  unity  can  be  preserved  only  through  the 
active  cooperation  of  the  great  commercial  powers 
in  keeping  open  her  markets  and  in  maintaining 
security  for  European  investments  throughout  the 
empire,  without,  however,  permitting  any  power 
to  acquire  other  political  rights  than  are  necessary 
for  this  purpose. 

II 
Note  i.    Bibliography  on  Chinese  Affairs 
I.   Official  Publications:  — 

Commercial  Relations  of  the   United  States  with  For- 
eign  Countries.      Issued   from    the    Bureau   of  For- 
eign Commerce,  Department  of  State,  Washington. 
An  annual  publication  based  on  the  monthly  Coiu- 
siilar  Reports. 
Customs  Gazette.,  Shanghai,  published  quarterly. 
Report  of  the    Trade  of  Central  and  Southern    China. 
Foreign  Office   Reports,   Miscellaneous    Series,   No. 
458.     London,  1898. 
Returns  of  Trade  at  the  Treaty  Ports  in  China.     Part  I. 
Abstracts  of  Trade  and  Customs  Revenue  Statistics. 
Shanghai,  published  yearly. 

195 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Report  by  Mr.   Bourne   of  a  Journey    in   Southwestern 

China.     London,  1888. 
Treaties  between   Great  Britain  and  China,  by  Sir  E. 

Hertslet.     2  vols.     London,  1896. 

IL  Treatises:  — 

Ball  (J.  D.),  Things  Chinese.     2d  ed.   London,  1894. 
Barrows  (John  Henry),  Ed.,   The  World''s  Parliament  of 
Religions. 

Beresford  (Lord  Charles),  The  Break-up  of  China.  Lon- 
don, 1898. 

Boulger  (D.  C),  History  of  China.  2d  ed.,  2  vols.  Lon- 
don, 1898. 

Brandt  (M.  von),  Ostasiatische  Fragen.     Leipzig,  1897. 

Die  Zukunft  Ostasiens.     Leipzig,  1895. 

Drei  Jahre  ostasiatischer  Politik.     1894-97. 

Die  chinesische  Philosophie  und  der  Staatsconfucian' 

ismiis.     Leipzig,  1898. 

Chirol  (V.),  The  Far  Eastern  Question.     London,  1896. 

Colquhoun  (A.  R.),  Across  Chryse:  from  Canton  to  Man- 
dalay.     2  vols.    London,  1883. 

China  in  Tratisfonnation.     London  and  New  York, 

1898. 

Curzon  (G.  N.),  Problems  of  the  Far  East.   London,  1896. 

Douglas  (R.  K.),  China.     London,  1887. 

Confucianism  and  Taoism.     London,  1893. 

Society  in  China.     London,  1894. 

Li  Hung  Chang.     London,  1895. 

Dudgeon  (Dr.  J.),  Historical  Sketch  of  the  Ecclesiastical, 
Political,  and  Commercial  Relations  of  Russia  zviih 
China.     Peking,  1872. 

Ehlers  (O.  E.),  Im  Osten  Asiens.     3d  ed.     Berlin,  1896. 

Gundry  (R.  S.),  China  and  her  Neighbors.   London,  1895. 

Chitia  Past  and  Present.     London,  1895. 

196 


i 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

Hosie  (A.),   Three  Years  in   Western  China.     London, 

1897. 
Hue  (L'Abbd  E.  R.),  VEmpire  Chinois.     2  vols.,  4th  ed. 

Paris,  1862. 
Travels    in  Tartary,  Thibet,  and  China,  1884-1886 

(translated  from  the  French).    2  vols.    London,  1898. 
Krausse  (A.),  China  in  Decay.     London,  1898. 
Laguerie  (V.  de),  La  Coree  Independante,  Russe  ou  Japo- 

naise.     Paris,  1898. 
Little  (A.),  Through  the  Vangtse  Gorges,  or  Travel  and 

Trade  in  Western  China.     3d.  ed.     London,  1898. 
Legge  (J.),  Chinese  Classics  with  Translations,  Prolegom- 
ena, etc.     7  vols.   Oxford,  1893.     In  progress. 
MacGowan  (J.),  Pictures  of  Southern  China.     London, 

1897. 

History  of  China.     London,  1897. 

Madrolle  (C),  Les  Peuples  et  les  Langues  de  la  Chine 

Meridionale.     Paris,  1898. 
Martin  (Dr.),  A  Cycle  of  Cathay .     Edinburgh,  1896. 

Mayers  (W.  F.),  The  Chinese  Government.  New  ed.  by 
G.  M.  H.  Playfair.     Shanghai,  1886. 

Norman  (H.),  Peoples  and  Politics  of  the  Far  East.  Lon- 
don, 1895. 

Reclus  (Elisde),  Nouvelle  Geographic  Universelle.  Tome 
VII.     Paris,  1882. 

Richthofen  (Ferd.  von),  China :  Ergebnisse  eigener  Reisen 
und  darauf  gegrundeter  Studien.  4  vols.  Berlin, 
1877-1885. 

Letters  on  the  Provinces  of  Chekiang,  Nganhwei; 

and  on  Nanking  and  Chiang.     Shanghai,  187 1. 

Smith  (A.  H.),  Chinese  Characteristics.     London,  1895. 

Younghusband  (F.  E.),  The  Heart  of  a  Continent;  Travels 
in  Manchuria.     London,  1896. 
—  Among  the  Celestials.     London,  1898. 
197 


WORLD   POLITICS 

III.  Articles: 

Brandt  (M.  von), "  Ostasiatische  Zustande,"  in  Die  deutscht 
Rundschau,  December,  1898. 

Courant  (Maurice),  "  Les  Commer9ans  Cliinois  et  les 
Corporations,"  in  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  June, 
1899. 

Fauvel  (A.  A.), "  Le  Transsinien  et  les  Chemins  des  Fer 
Chinois,"  in  Revue  Politique  et  Parletiietitaire,  Sep- 
tember, 1899. 

Gundry  (R.  S.),  "China:  Spheres  of  Interest  and  the 
Open  Door,"  in  Fortnightly,  July,  1899. 

"  The  Yangtse  Region,"  in  Fortnightly,  September, 

1899. 

Kang  Yeu  Wei,  '■'  The  Reform  of  China,"  in  Contemporary 
Review,  August,  1899. 

Leroy-Beaulieu  (Pierre),  Le  Problhne  Chinois:  I.  "La 
Classe  des  Lettr^s,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  No- 
vember, 1898.  II.  "  Le  Peuple  Chinois  et  ses  Rela- 
tions Actuelles  avec  les  Europeens,"  ibid.,  January, 
1899.  III.  "  La  Chine  et  les  Puissances," /(J/^.,  March, 
1899. 

Louis  (Paul),  "  L'Extreme  Orient,"  in  La  Revue  Socialiste, 
October,  1899. 

Moreing  (C.  A.),  "An  All-British  Railway  to  China," 
in  Nineteenth  Century,  September,  1899. 

Owen  (George  S.),  "Reform  Policy  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
peror," in  National  Review,  1899. 

Pinon  (Ren^),  "  La  France  et  la  Question  d'Extreme 
Orient,"  in  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  November,  1899. 

Salaun  (Louis),  "Apropos  des  Affaires  de  Chine,  1895- 
1899,"  in  Annates  des  Sciences  Politiqites,  May,  1899. 

Schumacher  (Dr.  Hermann),  "  Eisenbahnbau  und  Eisen- 
bahnplane  in  China,"  in  Archiv  fur  Eisenbahnwesen^ 
September,  1899,  ^"^^  January,  1900. 
iq8 


THE  OPENING  OF  CHINA 

Valbert,  "  Confucius  et  la  Morale  Chinoise,"  in  Revtie  des 
Deux  Mondes,  December,  1898. 

Yedburgh   (R.  A.),  "Our  Duty  to  China,"  in  National 
Revieiu,  August,  1899. 

Note  2.    Regulations  for  Mines  and  Railways  in 
China 

Prepared  by  the  Burean  of  Control  for  Mines  and  Railways, 
and  approved  by  the  Emperor. 

(i)  There  are  three  ways  in  which  railways  and  mines  can 
be  managed,  —  by  officials,  by  merchants,  and  by  the  two  in 
combination.  The  second  is  the  best  and  will  be  encouraged 
and  promoted  by  the  Government  as  much  as  possible  in  the 
future.  The  officials  should  do  all  in  their  power  to  encourage 
such  enterprises,  but  will  not  be  allowed  to  conduct  them 
themselves. 

(2)  All  such  enterprises  for  which  contracts  have  not  been 
completed  before  the  establishment  of  the  Government  board 
must  be  sent  up  to  the  Throne  for  sanction,  but  from  the  date 
of  the  establishment  of  the  said  board  they  will  be  subject  to 
the  regulations  of  the  board.  Enterprises  which  have  been 
previously  arranged  will  not  be  allowed  to  form  precedents. 

(3)  The  mines  and  railways  of  Manchuria,  Shantung,  and 
Lungchow  are  affected  by  international  relations  and  therefore 
will  not  be  allowed  to  form  precedents  either  for  Chinese  or 
foreigners. 

(4)  Railways  and  mines  are  entirely  separate  affairs,  and 
therefore  must  not  be  worked  in  combination.  Railway  agree- 
ments giving  mining  rights  along  the  route  will  not  be  allowed 
to  form  precedents  in  future.  In  cases  where  permission  is 
given  to  mining  companies  to  construct  branch  railways  to 
connect  with  waterways  and  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  the 
produce  of  the  mines,  such  lines  must  only  be  carried  as  far 
as  the  nearest  water  communication.  Such  railways  must 
not  carry  passengers   or   cargo  so   as  to   interfere   with   the 

199 


WORLD   POLITICS 

profits  of  other  lines.      Plans  of  such  proposed  railways  must 
be  submitted  to  the  Government  for  approval. 

(5)  All  mining  and  railway  companies  must  provide  a 
school  of  instruction,  as  already  ordered  by  the  Throne. 

(6)  When  applications  are  made  by  Chinese  gentry  or 
merchants  to  the  local  officials  for  permission  to  engage  in 
mining  or  railway  enterprises,  the  said  officials  must  inquire 
into  the  character  and  standing  of  the  applicants,  and  if  the 
latter  are  found  to  be  reliable  people  and  their  applications  are 
not  in  opposition  to  the  regulations,  they  may  be  submitted 
to  the  Government  board.  The  local  officials  have  no  power 
to  grant  such  applications.  If  such  applications  are  made  to 
the  board  direct,  inquiries  must  be  made  through  the  officials 
of  the  applicants'*  district,  and  only  such  applications  will  be 
granted  in  which  the  report  of  the  local  authorities  is  of  a 
favorable  nature. 

(7)  When  it  is  necessary  to  acquire  land  for  mining  and 
railway  purposes,  the  people  must  be  notified  by  the  local 
authorities,  and  the  former  must  not  show  wanton  opposition. 
When  land  is  so  acquired,  houses  and  graves  must  be  re- 
spected so  as  not  to  offend  the  feelings  of  the  people. 

(8)  All  enterprises  sanctioned  by  the  board  must  be  com- 
menced within  six  months  of  the  date  of  sanction  ;  otherwise, 
the  sanction  will  be  withdrawn,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  delay  was  unavoidable. 

(9)  In  all  cases,  every  endeavor  must  be  made  to  have  the 
Chinese  proportion  of  the  capital  of  such  enterprise  the 
greater.  There  must  be  a  proportion  of  at  least  three-tenths 
of  the  shares  owned  by  Chinese.  When  this  proportion  has 
been  raised,  foreigners  may  be  invited  to  buy  shares  or  foreign 
money  may  be  borrowed.  Sanction  will  not  be  given  in  cases 
where  all  the  money  employed  is  foreign. 

(10)  When  it  is  proposed  to  borrow  foreign  money,  the 
sanction  of  the  board  must  first  be  asked.  If  such  sanction 
is  given,  the  loan  must  be  regarded  as  being  made  by  mer- 
chants and  to  be  repaid  by  merchants  —  that  is  to  say,  the 
Chinese  Government  will  accept  no  responsibility.     If  loans 

200 


THE   OPENING   OF   CHINA 

are  concluded  without  the  sanction  of  the  board,  they  will  not 
be  recognized,  even  though  an  agreement  has  been  signed. 

(ii)  In  case  of  foreign  loans,  the  preliminary  agreements 
must  be  submitted  to  the  board  for  their  approval.  If  such 
agreements  are  contrary  to  these  regulations,  they  will  be  sent 
back  for  amendment.  In  case  they  are  not  amended  properly, 
negotiations  may  be  entered  into  with  other  parties.  Should 
foreign  merchants  enter  into  private  contracts  for  loans  and 
thereby  suffer  loss,  the  Tsungli  Yamen  and  the  board  will  not 
help  them  to  recover  their  money. 

(12)  When  Chinese  companies  are  authorized  to  borrow 
foreign  money,  the  board  will  advise  the  Tsungli  Yamen,  which 
will  communicate  with  the  minister  of  the  power  concerned, 
who  will  reply,  and  their  permission  will  then  be  considered  to 
be  given.  When  foreign  merchants  are  desirous  of  lending 
money  to  Chinese  companies,  they  must  request  their  minister 
to  communicate  with  the  Tsungli  Yamen,  who  will  ask  the 
board  if  the  company  is  authorized  to  borrow,  and  will  reply 
accordingly  to  the  minister.  Money  lent  in  any  other  way  will 
be  treated  as  a  private  loan. 

(13)  In  order  to  protect  the  sovereign  rights  of  China,  the 
control  of  all  railways  and  mining  companies,  irrespective  of 
the  I'oreign  capital  concerned,  must  remain  in  the  hands  of  the 
Chinese  merchants ;  but  the  accounts  of  such  companies  must 
be  open  to  the  inspection  of  foreign  shareholders. 

(14)  Promoters  professing  to  have  a  certain  amount  of 
capital  must  show  satisfactory  proof  of  their  assertion. 

(15)  The  local  authorities  must  in  all  cases  encourage  and 
protect  mining  and  railway  companies,  in  carrying  out  their 
duly  authorized  enterprises. 

(16)  In  case  of  disputes  between  companies  or  any  inter- 
ference with  the  rights  of  any  company,  the  local  authorities 
must  decide  the  question  fairly.  Appeal  may  be  made  against 
their  decision  to  the  Government  board.  Should  disputes 
arise  between  Chinese  and  foreign  merchants,  in  connection 
with  railway  or  mining  enterprises,  they  must  be  settled  by 
arbitration ;  the  governments  concerned  will  not  interfere. 

201 


WORLD   POLITICS 

(17)  Foreign  engineers  and  surveyors  sent  to  inspect 
mines  and  railways  must  be  protected  by  tiie  local  authorities. 

(18)  Rewards  will  be  given  to  Chinese  merchants  investing 
500,000  taels  and  upwards  in  mining  or  railway  enterprises,  or 
doing  extra  good  work  in  connection  therewith. 

(19)  All  such  enterprises  will  be  granted  a  monopoly  for 
a  fixed  period,  the  duration  of  which  will  be  determined  by 
the  circumstances  of  the  case. 

(20)  Customs  stations  will  be  established  on  all  railways 
for  the  levying  of  duties.  The  duties  on  mining  produce  and 
on  the  export  of  the  same  will  be  decided  by  the  Government 
board  in  conjunction  with  the  board  of  revenue,  which  will 
draw  up  regulations  for  submission  to  the  Throne.  The  pro- 
portion of  profits  to  be  paid  to  the  Government  for  railways 
will  be  four-tenths,  and  for  mines  25  per  cent,  to  be  handed 
to  the  board  of  revenue. 

(21)  The  affairs  and  accounts  of  each  company  will  be  ex- 
amined from  time  to  time  by  the  Government  board,  either  by 
having  the  books  sent  to  the  offices  of  the  board  or  by  deput- 
ing an  officer  to  examine  on  the  spot. 

(22)  A  detailed  account  of  the  aiTairs  of  the  railway  and 
mining  companies  at  present  in  existence  must  be  sent  to  the 
board  for  consideration.  The  board  will  also  prepare  forms 
for  setting  forth  such  details.  These  will  be  sent  to  all  the 
provinces,  and  must  be  filled  up  at  the  end  of  each  year  by 
such  companies,  and  sent  to  the  board  for  inspection. 

—  Translation  given  in  the  Consular  Reports,  April,  1899. 


202 


PART    III 

THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE 
OPENING  OF  CHINA  IN  WORLD 
POLITICS 


203 


CHAPTER   I 
Russian  Imperial  Politics 

Even  to  the  modern  mind,  accustomed  to  gigan- 
tic and  swift  changes,  the  possibilities  revealed 
by  the  opening  of  China  since  the  Treaty  of  Shim- 
onoseki  have  been  startling.  The  world  seems  to 
be  shrivelling  up.  Regions  that  were  akin  to 
fable-land  become  a  scene  of  prosaic  exploitation. 
Railways  take  the  place  of  picturesque  caravans, 
and  forests  of  chimneys  rise  in  places  that  were 
once  enchanting  Meccas  for  the  venturesome 
traveller.  The  Oriental  and  the  Occidental  civil- 
izations have  met  face  to  face,  and  the  future  con- 
stitution and  ideals  of  society  are  in  the  balance. 
The  general  effects  of  the  meeting  are  more  ob- 
vious than  definable.  We  can,  however,  mark 
certain  definite  influences  in  the  present  political 
situation  that  are  distinctly  traceable  to  the  devel- 
opments in  China. 

Let  us  first  consider  the  effect  of  this  develop- 
ment on  the  individual  countries  of  Europe,  begin- 
ning with  the  Empire  of  the  North.  There  have 
205 


WORLD   POLITICS 

been  three  stages  of  Russian  expansion,  which 
may  be  focussed  respectively  on  Constantinople, 
Afghanistan,  and  China.  The  first  natural  impulse 
of  a  strong  nation  confined  within  the  interior  is  to 
reach  an  unobstructed  port.  In  the  case  of  Rus- 
sia, this  desire  led  to  a  southward  expansion  and 
an  attempt  to  embrace  the  Balkan  states  within  its 
boundaries  and  thus  get  unimpeded  across  to  the 
Mediterranean.  This  movement  also  has  a  reli- 
gious and  idealistic  aspect,  since  Russia,  as  the 
chief  poHtical  representative  of  the  Greek  Church, 
feels  that  there  exists  a  historic  connection  be- 
tween the  Byzantine  Empire  and  the  Czardom; 
as  a  consequence,  the  restoration  of  Constanti- 
nople as  the  metropolis  of  the  Orthodox  Church 
and  as  the  capital  of  a  great  empire  has  always 
appealed  to  the  Russian  imagination. 

It  was  in  this  movement  to  the  southward  that 
Russian  and  English  interests  first  clashed.  When 
national  animosities  had  thus  arisen,  and  Russia 
still  continued  her  forward  movement  across  the 
Ural  into  Central  Asia,  her  plans  were  interpreted 
as  being  directed  against  English  sovereignty  in 
India.  Turkestan,  a  country  of  limited  resources, 
affords  comparatively  little  attraction  to  a  con- 
queror, and  its  occupation  was  therefore  supposed 
by  the  British  to  have  an  ulterior  aim,  —  that  of 
gaining  an  approach  to  India  across  the  mountains. 
Russian  advance  in  Central  Asia  thus  became  the 
second  great  cause  of  hostility  between  England 
and  Russia. 

206 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

Aside  from  the  ambitious  plans  of  Peter  the 
Great  and  the  Empress  Catherine,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  Russian  government,  up  to  the  stage  in 
the  development  marked  by  the  Afghan  question, 
consciously  plotted  for  the  establishment  of  a  vast 
Asiatic-European  empire.  But,  as  has  already 
been  stated,  the  expansive  energies  of  the  Russian 
nation,  combined  with  their  methods  of  agricul- 
ture, which  are  rather  extensive  than  intensive, 
naturally  led  to  the  absorption  of  more  and  more 
territory  for  the  purposes  of  Russian  agricultu- 
ral colonization.  Her  expansion  was  more  like 
a  formless  and  unresting  torrent  of  lava  than 
like  the  scientific  and  carefully  designed  work  of 
an  engineer.  When  once  their  government  had 
gained  a  foothold  in  Central  Asia,  Russian  offi- 
cials often  expressed  the  hope  of  finally  reaching 
the  sea  by  way  of  Persia  or  even  of  conquer- 
ing India.  Afghanistan  thus  became  the  second 
centre  of  interest  and  intrigue,  and  large  sums 
were  expended  by  the  great  hostile  powers,  Eng- 
land and  Russia,  in  strengthening  their  position 
at  this  critical  point. 

All  former  developments,  however,  have  been 
overshadowed  and  put  in  the  background  by  the 
vast  importance  of  the  more  recent  Russian  occu- 
pation of  Manchuria.  It  was  Russia  who  first  drew 
practical  consequences  from  the  demonstration  of 
Chinese  weakness.  By  a  series  of  exceedingly 
shrewd  moves,  she  undermined  the  English  influ- 
ence at  Peking,  and,  gaining  access  into  Manchuria, 
207 


WORLD   POLITICS 

extended  her  railway  into  that  province,  assumed 
virtual  control  over  a  large  part  of  its  territory,  and 
thus  at  last  realized  her  ambition  of  having  ports 
permanently  free  from  ice.  Moreover,  the  com- 
mercial success  of  the  Siberian  railway,  which  up 
to  that  time  had  been  exceedingly  problematical, 
was  brought  much  nearer  to  certainty,  and  a  vast 
and  inviting  field  for  Russian  colonization  and  the 
expansion  of  Russian  industry  was  opened.  The 
mineral  and  lumber  wealth  of  Manchuria  is  practi- 
cally untouched,  and,  considering  the  constantly 
increasing  demands  of  the  awakening  industries  in 
China,  Russia's  foothold  and  position  as  a  neigh- 
boring nation,  with  the  wealth  and  the  methods  of 
western  Europe  at  her  control,  are  bound  to  prove 
invaluable  to  her.  Russian  statesmen,  recogniz- 
ing the  importance  of  the  source  of  wealth  and 
power  thus  opened  to  their  government  and  na- 
tion, withdrew  their  attention  from  Constanti- 
nople and  the  Balkan  to  concentrate  all  their 
efforts  on  strengthening  their  position  and 
utilizing  their  advantages  in  the  newly  acquired 
province. 

Even  to  Russia,  however,  the  absorption  of  a 
vast  province  Hke  Manchuria  is  no  small  matter, 
but  demands,  on  the  contrary,  an  intense  concen- 
tration of  energy  ;  and  it  therefore  became  a  neces- 
sary part  of  Russian  politics  to  obtain  time  for 
peaceful  development.  At  present  the  position 
of  Russia  in  Manchuria  is  still  weak  against  the 
possible  attack  of  foreign  powers,  as  there  can  be 
208 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

no  effective  connection  between  that  province  and 
European  Russia  until  the  completion  of  the  Sibe- 
rian railway.  Russia  therefore  has,  at  present, 
nothing  to  gain  and  everything  to  lose  by  war  in  the 
Orient.  Moreover,  on  account  of  her  masterful 
management  of  Oriental  diplomacy,  she  could 
obtain  all  that  she  desired  if  only  peace  could  be 
maintained.  To  favor  a  policy  of  disarmament, 
as  she  has  recently  done,  was  therefore  thoroughly 
consistent  with  the  conditions  in  which  Russia 
found  herself.  Her  finances,  too,  had  been  strained 
to  the  utmost  by  the  vast  expenditures  for  strate- 
gical and  industrial  purposes  in  Siberia,^  so  that  in 
the  event  of  a  war  the  great  fabric  so  successfully 
constructed  by  her  diplomacy  might  not  have  stood 
the  test  of  fire. 

Having  become  a  naval  power  by  her  occupa- 
tion of  Port  Arthur,  Russia  needed  great  accessions 
to  her  fleet  in  order  to  maintain  her  prestige  effec- 
tively in  this  direction.  During  the  seven  years 
from  1893  to  1899,  461  million  rubles  were  spent 
on  the  Russian  navy;  between  1896  and  1897  the 

1  In  the  ten  years  between  1887  and  1897,  *^^  *otal  public  debt 
of  Russia  had  increased  27.5  per  cent.  On  January  I,  1897,  ^^ 
amounted  to  6,735,376,443  rubles.  The  debts  owed  to  the  state 
at  that  time  amounted  to  3,000,997,928  rubles.  —  Annual  Cyclo- 
padia,  1898,  p.  685.  The  ruble  is  the  unit  of  the  Russian  monetary 
system.  The  gold  ruble,  —  a  money  of  account,  not  a  coin,  —  is 
equal  to  5 1. 5  cents.  Up  to  1897,  the  silver  ruble  varied  in  value 
with  the  price  of  silver;  in  January,  1897,  "^^  ^^^  quoted  at  37.9 
cents.  At  present  subsidiary  silver  is  maintained  at  a  parity  with 
gold,  as  in  the  United  States. 

P  209 


WORLD   POLITICS 

expenditure  was  increased  by  26  million  rubles, 
and  an  extra  expenditure  of  90  million  rubles, 
beyond  the  regular  allowance,  was  provided  for  in 
the  imperial  budget  of  1898,  to  be  used  for  the 
construction  of  new  ships. ^ 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  the  charac- 
ter of  the  Russian  policy  of  expansion  has  changed. 
Whereas  it  formerly  occurred  only  in  response  to 
the  overpowering  needs  of  the  nation,  this  expan- 
sion' has  now  become  more  conscious,  and  is  at  the 
present  time  being  planned  on  a  truly  imperial 
scale.  The  development  is  largely  due  to  the 
feeling  that  the  available  portions  of  the  earth's 
surface  are  becoming  few,  and  that,  when  a  vast 
prize  like  China  is  at  stake,  nations  cannot  wait 
for  the  natural  forces  of  trade  and  colonization 
to  expand  their  political  influence,  but  must  an- 
ticipate the  operation  of  these  forces  by  reserving 
territories  in  which  they  may  later  assert  them- 
selves. 

A  further  cause  of  the  change  noted  is  found  in 
the  fact  that  of  late  the  military  aristocracy  of 
Russia  has  become  especially  ambitious  and 
desirous  of  imperial  expansion.  This  class,  which 
wields  the  real  political  power  in  Russia,  is 
bound  together  by  common  interests  and  senti- 
ments so  as  to  form  a  compact  society  with 
definite  aims.  Even  the  Czar  is  in  most  matters 
dependent  on  the  opinion  and  will  of  this  class, 
who  control  all  the  important  branches  of  the  ad- 

^  See  Statesman'' s  Year  Book,  1899,  P-  926. 
210 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

ministration.  Their  ambitious  and  unscrupulous, 
but  exceedingly  able,  statesmanship  has  made 
Russia  a  formidable  factor  in  international  diplo- 
macy and  has  given  a  decided  impetus  to  the 
policy  of  Asiatic  expansion. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  all  these  developments 
tend  to  emphasize  the  Asiatic  character  of  the 
Russian  Empire  and  to  estrange  it  more  and  more 
from  Western,  and  especially  English,  civilization. 
National  animosity  between  England  and  Russia 
has  become  so  intense  that  a  mutual  understand- 
ing of  motives  seems  almost  out  of  the  question. 
Whatever  England  may  do,  even  with  the  purpose 
of  merely  preventing  exclusive  exploitations,  will  be 
interpreted  as  an  extension  of  imperial  influence, 
while  the  efforts  of  the  vast  Russian  Empire  to 
gain  new  fields  for  its  teeming  population  are 
equally  sure  to  be  regarded  as  hostile  to  all 
civilization. 

It  does  not  admit  of  doubt  that  autocracy  in 
Russia  has  been  strengthened  by  the  recent  de- 
velopments. The  Russian  government  has  been 
so  successful  in  acquiring  new  territories,  in  giving 
new  outlets  to  popular  energy,  that  the  voices  of 
nihilism  and  of  liberalism  have  become  smothered 
in  the  universal  acclamations  that  rise  from  a  vast 
people  to  the  throne  of  the  Czar.  Never  have  the 
efforts  of  the  Russian  government  to  suppress 
manifestations  of  individual  nationality,  like  those 
of  Poland  and  Finland,  been  more  successful : 
never  has  the  power  of   this  great   empire  been 

211 


WORLD   POLITICS 

welded  into  more  compact  form.  Any  thought 
of  giving  the  state  a  constitution  based  on  Western 
models  has  been  definitely  abandoned. 

The  attitude  of  Russian  nationalism  toward  West- 
ern civilization  may  be  seen,  in  a  form  perhaps  some- 
what extreme,  in  Pobedonostseff's  recent  book  on 
religion  and  politics.^  The  writer,  who  is  the  chief 
spiritual  adviser  of  the  emperor  and  the  administra- 
tive head  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church,  believes 
that  Western  civilization  is  suffering  from  fatal  de- 
biHties  and  diseases.  Basing  his  case  on  the  growth 
of  anarchism  and  infidelity  and  the  increasing 
strength  of  the  dissolvent  forces  which  are  attack- 
ing individualistic  societies,  he  holds  that  social 
existence  cannot  successfully  withstand  the  corrod- 
ing influence  of  these  tendencies,  and  affirms  his 
belief  that  the  torch  of  civilization  has  passed  to 
Russia.  The  elements  which  in  his  eyes  make  Rus- 
sia great  and  are  bound  to  make  her  the  saviour 
of  the  world  are  autocracy,  religion,  and  the  village 
community,  the  last  named  being,  to  his  mind,  the 
best  antidote  to  socialistic  agitation,  since  it  con- 
tains within  itself  all  that  is  reasonable  and  healthy 
in  the  socialistic  propaganda.  The  religious  rev- 
erence of  the  Russian  masses  is  the  great  force 
that  holds  society  together,  while  the  autocratic 
power  of  the  Czar  provides  the  state  with  a  means 
of  quick  and  effective  action.  Unity,  harmony, 
subordination,  reverence,  and  simplicity  are  to  him 

^  Reflections  of  a  Russian  Statesman  (translated  from  the  Rus- 
sian), London,  1898. 

212 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

the  watchwords  of  Russian  civilization.  There 
comes  from  him  no  word  about  the  dignity  of 
human  nature,  the  independence  of  the  individual, 
the  right  of  the  individual  to  develop  his  aptitudes 
and  powers,  the  hope  that  vast  masses  of  human- 
ity may  be  raised  to  a  higher  plane  by  general 
education  and  participation  in  government,  for  to 
him  all  these  ideals  of  Western  life  appear  to  be 
merely  poison  administered  in  a  seductive  form. 
Though  Pobedonostseff's  work  is  extreme,  the  in- 
fluence and  position  of  its  author  make  it  a  note- 
worthy expression  of  Russian  nationalism. 

Indeed,  to  any  one  who  casually  peruses  political 
extracts  from  Russian  papers,  it  must  have  become 
evident  that  Russian  opinion  has  grown  more  nar- 
rowly nationalistic  than  it  has  ever  been  before. 
Up  to  a  few  decades  ago,  the  Russian  aristocracy 
was  considered  the  most  cosmopolitan  in  the  world, 
and  St.  Petersburg  was  a  second  Paris.  But  with 
the  growth  of  a  native  Russian  literature  there  also 
began  to  develop  among  the  upper  classes  a  dis- 
tinct feeling  of  separate  nationality.  The  political 
and  social  party  which  advocated  this  tendency 
was  in  the  sixties  given  the  name  Slavophiles.^ 
On  account  of  some  extravagant  tenets,  and  of  its 
democratic  sympathies,  the  sect  was  discredited. 
As  a  result  of  the  recent  developments,  however, 
with  the  more  conscious  expansion  of  Russian 
influence,  and  with  the  discovery  that  Russian  ad- 
vance is  irresistible,  the  whole  society  of  that  great 

1  See  Wallace,  Russia,  p.  415. 
213 


WORLD   POLITICS 

empire  has  become  practically  Slavophile.  In  line 
with  this  change  is  a  recent  edict  of  the  impe- 
rial government  which  has  entirely  remodelled  the 
system  of  education  and  makes  the  spread  of 
Russian  ideas  one  of  its  main  objects. 

By  this  same  edict,  the  education  of  the  official 
classes  is  sharply  separated  from  that  of  the  com- 
mon people,  in  this  way  emphasizing  the  caste  sys- 
tem, which  is  rapidly  taking  a  firm  hold  on  Russian 
society.  This  is  simply  another  of  the  ways  in 
which  the  semi-Asiatic  character  of  Russia  is  be- 
coming still  more  Oriental.  Conscious  opposition 
to  Western  ideals,  firm  allegiance  to  the  idea  of 
autocracy,  emphasis  laid  upon  the  distinctions 
of  a  caste  system,  employment,  for  political  ends,  of 
the  methods  and  teachings  of  a  theocracy  —  all 
these  indicate  that  Oriental  influences  in  Russia 
are  becoming  more  and  more  predominant. 

In  other  countries  the  chief  strength  of  religion, 
—  or  of  cult  as  a  social  system,  —  lies  with  the 
upper  classes ;  in  Russia,  religion  has  always  been 
essentially  national,  finding  its  chief  stronghold 
among  the  masses  of  the  agricultural  population. ^ 
The  Russian  state  has  not  yet  emerged  from  the 
religious  stage  of  development.^  The  Czar  himself, 
though  not  technically  an  ecclesiastical  officer,  has, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  a  decidedly  religious 
character.  The  ceremonial  of  coronation  is  of  far 
greater  importance  than  one  accustomed  to  West- 

1  Leroy-Beaulieu,  The  Empire  of  the  Czars,  Vol.  III.,  p.  41. 

2  In  the  sense  in  which  this  term  is  used  by  Comte  and  Seeley. 

214 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

em  methods  of  state  action  would  imagine.  In 
reading  Castelar's  Afio  '8j,  one  may  at  first  be  sur- 
prised at  the  importance  which  he  attributes  to  the 
coronation  ceremonies  at  the  KremHn.  But  Castelar 
was  right.  It  is  on  the  occasion  of  his  corona- 
tion that  the  Czar  appears  in  that  almost  super- 
human character  of  the  anointed  representative  of 
God,  borne  aloft  in  imperial  splendor,  and  striking 
reverence  into  the  hearts  of  the  countless  multitudes 
who  gather  from  all  parts  of  the  empire  to  admire 
the  greatness  of  their  exalted  master.  Especially 
in  Oriental  politics  will  Russia  profit  much  from 
the  impressiveness  of  her  imperial  dignity.  Tre- 
mendous, apparently  irresistible,  power,  wielded  by 
a  single  hand,  especially  when  emphasized  by  more 
than  regal  splendor,  impresses  the  Oriental  mind ; 
and  the  Kirghis  and  Tartar  chieftains  who  gather 
about  the  Czar  on  the  day  of  his  elevation  go  home 
to  their  native  tribes  with  astounding  reports  of  his 
splendor  and  power. 

The  religious  feeling  of  the  masses  in  Russia  has 
always  been  used  as  a  motive  power  for  political 
ends.  When  Russia  makes  war,  it  is  nominally  in 
defence  of  the  Orthodox  faith,  and  she  thus  enlists, 
not  merely  the  narrower  selfish  interests  of  her  vast 
population,  but  also  their  most  fervid  aspirations 
and  the  dearest  ideals  of  their  souls.  A  war  against 
Turkey  is  a  religious  crusade  to  win  back  the 
ancient  metropolis  of  the  Orthodox  Church.  From 
the  Russian  point  of  view,  a  war  against  Great 
Britain  would  be  a  contest  against  heretics  and 
215 


WORLD   POLITICS 

mfidels.  It  is  this  influence  that  moulds  the  Rus- 
sian nation  into  such  a  compact  mass,  wielded  by 
a  single  will.  The  Russian  state  polity  is  simply 
absolutism,  upborne  and  modified  by  superstition. 
That  Russia  has  not  left  the  religious  stage  of 
political  development  is  also  shown  by  the  fact 
that  she  identifies  complete  unity  of  faith  with 
her  national  existence,  and  subjects  the  Protestants 
of  the  Baltic  provinces  and  Finland,  and  the  Roman 
Catholics  of  Poland,  to  a  constant  political  persecu- 
tion, which  is  largely  directed  against  their  religious 
faith. 

The  conscious  and  systematic  character  of  the 
Russian  imperialistic  policy  of  to-day  is  especially 
apparent  in  the  vast  plans,  recently  executed,  for 
defending  the  southern  border  of  the  empire  and 
securing  its  naval  communications.^  A  revolution 
is  being  effected  in  southern  Russia.  The  Don 
is  to  be  united  with  the  Volga,  and  it  will  thus  be 
possible  for  ships  to  pass  from  the  Baltic  to  the 
Black  and  Caspian  seas.  The  sea  of  Azoff  is 
united  with  the  gulf  of  Perekop  by  a  canal  cut 
through  the  Crimean  isthmus.  On  September  i, 
1899,  the  port  of  Sebastopol  was  closed  to  naviga- 
tion under  the  pretext  of  making  it  a  marine  station. 
Recently,  however,  the  naval  headquarters  of  south- 
ern Russia  have  been  transferred  to  Nicolaiev  on 
the  river  Bug,  seventeen  miles  inland  and  beyond 
the  city  of  Odessa.    It  is  evident  therefore,  and  gen- 

^  See  an  article  on  "  Russia's  Great  Naval  Enterprise,"  Fort- 
nightly Review,  August,  1899. 

2r6 


ORIENT  AND    OCCIDENT 

erally  known  at  the  present  time,  that  Sebastopol  is 
to  be  turned  into  a  fortress  for  the  defence  of  the 
territory  of  the  Crimea.  The  arbitrary  methods  of 
the  Russian  government  are  here  very  well  illus- 
trated. Sebastopol  was  a  port  with  flourishing  and 
constantly  expanding  commerce  and  prosperous 
manufactures.  By  an  order  of  government  a  stop 
is  put  to  all  these  developments.  The  merchants 
have  to  migrate,  the  manufacturers  have  to  desert 
their  plants,  fortunes  are  ruined,  and  the  entire 
industrial  development  of  that  section  of  the 
country  is  arbitrarily  changed.  However,  the 
gain  to  the  defence  of  Russia  can  scarcely  be 
exaggerated.  Russian  fleets  can  now,  without 
coming  out  into  the  open  on  the  Black  Sea,  pass 
from  the  northwestern  part  of  that  sea  to  the 
Caspian,  —  from  Odessa  and  Kherson  to  Mikhae- 
lovsk,  the  Caspian  terminal  of  the  central  Asiatic 
railway,  —  while  invasion  by  land  is  rendered 
difficult  by  the  almost  impregnable  fortress  of 
Sebastopol. 

A  similarly  arbitrary  manipulation  of  vast  indus- 
trial interests  will  be  effected  by  a  law,  —  adopted 
though  not  yet  published,  —  by  which  the  chief 
ports  in  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic  and  in  the 
far  East  are  to  be  closed  to  foreign  vessels  in  the 
year  1901.  These  ports,  among  which  are  Nico- 
laiev,  Diinamiinde,  Cronstadt,  and  Vladivostok, 
are  then  to  be  used  exclusively  as  naval  stations 
and  bases  of  Russian  commerce,  while  foreign 
commerce,  thus  excluded  from  its  former  stations, 
217 


WORLD    POLITICS 

will  assist  in  building  up  new  and  prosperous  ports 
in  Russian  dominions. 

In  connection  with  this,  an  extensive  policy  of 
fostering  the  merchant  marine  has  been  entered 
upon.  The  right  to  trade  between  parts  of  the 
empire  has  been  restricted  to  Russian  vessels,^  and 
coastwise  navigation  will  therefore  be  entirely 
carried  on  by  ships  sailing  under  the  Russian  flag. 
The  government  has  given  a  guarantee  to  refund 
all  duties  paid  at  the  Suez  Canal  by  Russian  ships 
going  to  the  far  East  or  coming  thence.  The 
exclusive  tariff  policy  by  which  Russia  also  fosters 
native  shipping  is  well  known.  In  an  article  on 
the  industrial  development  of  Russia,^  Professor 
Oseroff  states  that  on  account  of  excessive  pro- 
tection of  Russian  manufactures,  there  is  really  a 
superabundance  of  profits,  and  that  there  is  no 
need  of  enterprise,  and  no  stimulation,  by  com- 
petition, of  new  inventions  and  methods.  Divi- 
dends of  the  established  manufactories  are  exceed- 
ingly high,  running  up  even  to  one  hundred  per 
cent.  Since  the  prohibition  on  the  investment  of 
foreign  capital  in  Russia  has  been  removed,  there 
has  been  a  considerable  immigration  of  capital 
from  abroad,  especially  from  England  and  Ger- 
many,   but    this    introduction    of    new   forces    is 

1  By  a  law  which  took  effect  January  i,  1900,  foreign  vessels 
sailing  froni  one  Russian  port  are  prohibited  from  touching  at 
another,  even  where  the  two  are  situated  in  different  seas. — 
Consular  Reports,  March,    1900. 

2  Oseroff,  "  Industrial  Development  of  Russia,"  Forum,  April, 
1899. 

218 


ORIENT   AND    OCCIDENT 

opposed  by  the  Russian  press,  and  the  adoption 
of  a  less  liberal  policy  is  constantly  being  urged, 

The  manufacturing  methods  of  Russia  are  in 
many  cases  archaic.  For  instance,  cold-blast  fur- 
naces are  still  extensively  used  in  the  manufacture 
of  pig-iron.  In  general  it  may  be  said  that  Rus- 
sian technical  knowledge  is  rather  encyclopaedic 
than  expert.  An  example  of  this  is  afforded  by 
the  gratification  which  Russian  railway  engineers 
displayed  at  having  planned  and  executed  a  very 
deep  cut  through  the  solid  rock,  where  engineers  of 
any  other  nation  would  have  employed  the  method 
of  tunnelling.  On  account  of  the  high  tariff  on 
iron,  the  construction  of  new  works  is  exceedingly 
expensive.  The  agricultural  population,  too,  is 
unprovided  with  the  most  necessary  iron  imple- 
ments. Wooden  plows  are  still  used  throughout 
the  empire. 

There  has  been,  however,  in  the  last  ten  years, 
an  enormous  increase  of  Russian  manufactures, 
which  now  employ  1,750,000  workmen.  Thus,  the 
output  of  blast  furnaces  has  increased  fourfold 
since  1887,  and  the  product  of  cotton  spinning  has 
been  more  than  doubled  since  1885.^  Mining,  on 
the  other  hand,  has  shown  but  little  increase. 
Efforts  of  the  Russian  government  to  aid  the  de- 
velopment of  industries  by  direct  bounties  and  by 
direct  privileges  and  tariff  reductions  on  the  rail- 
ways are  said  not  to  have  appreciably  stimulated 
industry,    because    these    were    looked   upon    by 

^  See  Statesman's  Year  Book,  1899,  p.  95 1. 
219 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  manufacturers  as  simply  an  additional  bonus 
obtained  from  the  government. 

There  has  therefore  been  practically  no  effort 
on  the  part  of  Russian  manufacturers  to  gain 
markets  beyond  the  borders  of  the  empire.  In 
this  connection,  it  may  be  well  to  repeat  the  fact 
that  Russian  expansion  is  not  so  much  a  struggle 
for  markets,  since  the  manufacturers  have  already, 
within  the  dominions  of  Russia  herself,  more  of  a 
market  than  they  can  supply ;  but  rather  a  struggle 
for  soil  to  afford  room  for  the  constant  agricultural 
expansion  of  the  empire.  This  essential  distinction 
between  the  purposes  animating  Russian  politics 
and  those  of  other  nations  must  always  be  borne 
in  mind.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment has  thus  far  succeeded  in  effectively  using 
political  means  for  stimulating  the  progress  of  in- 
dustrial methods  within  the  empire.  By  shutting 
off  foreign  competition,  she  has  simply  made  pos- 
sible the  perpetuation  of  antiquated  methods,  and 
has  enabled  manufacturers  to  receive  an  undue 
profit  for  inferior  goods,  while  the  population  of 
the  empire  suffers  from  a  lack  of  supply  of  the 
most  necessary  industrial  products.  It  can  hardly 
be  said,  therefore,  that  Russian  industry  is  ready 
for  the  work  of  developing  a  province  like  Man- 
churia. Only  by  inviting  and  protecting  the  in- 
vestment of  the  capital  of  other  nations  in  her 
newly  acquired  sphere  of  influence  can  Russia 
hope  to  draw  therefrom  within  a  reasonable  period 
the  advantages  which  nature  offers.     But  among 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

the  aristocratic  classes  of  Russia  there  is  even  a 
strong  feeling  of  contempt  for  an  industrial  and 
commercial  civilization.  They  consider  themselves 
called  to  propagate  the  ideas  of  Russian  civiliza- 
tion, rather  than  to  aid  the  industrial  development. 
A  Russian  diplomat  thus  expresses  this  feeling: 
"  The  Russians  are  not  a  commercial  nation.  The 
people  have  aspirations  toward  higher  ideals  than 
those  of  commercial  gain.  The  Dioujik  exists  for 
raising  the  sustenance  of  war." 

Some  writers  fear  that  in  the  mysterious  work- 
shop of  Asia,  Russia  may  elaborate  and  force  upon 
the  world  the  industrial  and  financial  preponder- 
ance of  Slavism.  It  should,  however,  be  borne  in 
mind  that  Russia  is  in  an  entirely  different  position 
in  Asia  from  that  which  other  nations  hold.  She 
came  there  originally,  not  from  a  desire  for  com- 
mercial exploitation,  but  by  following  her  destiny, 
the  inward  compelling  power  of  national  expan- 
sion. At  present,  by  abandoning  the  traditions  of 
this  expansion,  by  actually  planting  outpost  col- 
onies of  Russians  and  by  entering  upon  a  policy 
of  more  conscious  imperialism,  she  is  in  danger 
of  materially  weakening  herself  on  account  of  too 
rapid  an  advance.  Her  statesmen  have  recognized 
all  this,  and  hence  naturally  desire  time  and  peace 
in  which  industrial  developments  may  be  brought 
up  to  a  plane  with  the  political  achievements  of 
the  last  few  years. 

The  unconscious  instinct  of  the  masses  has  been 
a   foremost    guide   in    Russian    politics  —  a    con- 


WORLD   POLITICS 

sideration  which  is  of  prime  importance  in  judg- 
ing of  the  respective  positions  of  England  and 
Russia  in  China.  Russia  assimilates,  while  Eng- 
land merely  superimposes  her  authority.  Russians 
are  fond  of  likening  their  empire  to  Rome ;  the 
acid  by  which  national  and  local  organisms  are 
dissolved  into  their  elements,  to  be  precipitated 
again  in  the  form  of  a  higher  unity,^  is  the  Rus- 
sian national  spirit.  If  Russian  advance  should 
be  allowed  to  go  on  naturally  and  gradually  as 
it  has  in  the  past,  the  power  of  that  nation  in 
Asia  would  become  almost  irresistible ;  England 
in  opposing  her  would  have  the  unfortunate  posi- 
tion of  Carthage.  She  would  have  to  rely  for  her 
defence  on  unassimilated  subject  nations,  while 
Russia  could  summon  against  her  the  vast  masses 
that  will  gradually  become  penetrated  with  the 
spirit  of  Russian  polity  and  civilization.  In  gen- 
eral, economic  considerations  are  of  primary  im- 
portance in  British  expansion ;  in  the  expansion  of 
of  Russia,  they  are  only  secondary. 

^  Ihering,  Geist  des  romischen  Rechts,  §  i. 


CHAPTER   II 

The  Influence  of  the  Oriental  Situation  on 
THE  Western  European  Powers 

Turning  now  to  Great  Britain,  we  may  note  the 
same  important  effects  of  the  opening  of  China 
on  her  poHtics.  Originally,  England  considered 
herself  the  chief  agent  in  the  opening  of  China  to 
Western  influences,  and  having  by  far  the  greatest 
commercial  interests  there,  she  had  little  actual 
serious  competition  in  this  undertaking.  Now, 
however,  other  nations  have  appeared  upon  the 
scene  and  have  partly  succeeded  in  gaining  exclu- 
sive influence  over  certain  portions  of  Chinese 
territory.  This  has  tended  to  weaken  that  policy 
of  equal  opportunity  throughout  the  civilized  world 
for  which  England  has  so  long  stood.  For,  should 
other  nations  acquire  vast  portions  of  the  earth's 
surface  and  close  them  against  British  importa- 
tions, it  would  seem  a  necessary  act  of  self-defence 
to  erect  around  the  British  possessions  a  similar 
protective  barrier.  It  would  seem,  in  other  words, 
that  Great  Britain  must  soon  make  her  choice 
between  Cobdenism  and  a  policy  of  imperial  pro- 
tective federation.  The  English  public  recognizes 
223 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  importance  of  the  problem,  and,  as  a  result, 
other  questions  that  before  loomed  grandly  on  the 
political  horizon  have  sunk  away  into  insignificance. 
Who  can  now  become  enthusiastic  over  Welsh 
disestablishment,  or  even  over  the  reform  of  the 
House  of  Lords,  when  the  influence  of  Great 
Britain  on  the  progress  of  civilization  is  at  stake, 
and  when  her  commercial  and  industrial  suprem- 
acy is  threatened  ?  The  optimistic  spirit  in  which 
she  formerly  favored  and  championed  free  trade 
and  equal  industrial  opportunities  throughout  the 
world  has  become  "  sicklied  o'er  with  the  pale  cast 
of  thought." 

Continental  nations  have  usually  attributed  to 
selfish  motives  this  desire  of  Great  Britain  to  keep 
the  whole  world  open  to  international  commerce. 
It  was,  they  say,  because  the  English  nation  felt 
itself  the  strongest  power  in  the  field,  and  there- 
fore sure  to  profit  from  the  freest  competition. 
As  supporting  this  view,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  advance  of  German  manufactures  has  strength- 
ened the  protective  sentiment  in  Great  Britain. 
But  it  is  still  doubtful  whether  the  traditional 
poHcy  of  the  British  Empire  would  be  definitely 
abandoned  unless  large  portions  of  the  available 
surface  of  the  earth  should  come  under  the  per- 
manent control  of  exclusive  powers  like  Russia 
and  France.  At  present,  the  large  majority  of 
the  English  nation  still  believe  that  all  the  par- 
ticipants in  the  world's  commerce  are  benefited  by 
the  policy  of  free  trade. 

224 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

The  developments  in  China  have  been  one  cause 
of  the  recent  rapprochement  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States.  Both  have  the  same  in- 
terests in  the  Chinese  Empire.  Both  have,  so  far 
as  Chinese  poUtics  are  concerned,  the  same  oppo- 
nents. Therefore,  though  in  other  matters  these 
two  nations  are  most  eager  rivals,  they  may  well 
act  in  common  when  the  question  of  the  destiny 
of  China  is  at  stake.  Had  Great  Britain  not  been 
reinforced  by  the  American  republic  in  insisting 
upon  the  "  open  door "  in  China,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  that  policy  would  have  prevailed. 

The  relations  of  Great  Britain  with  other  nations 
have  also  been  strongly  influenced  by  developments 
in  the  Orient.  The  traditional  hostility  between 
the  Bear  and  the  Lion  has  been  intensified  by 
anticipations  of  a  coming  contest, — of  a  struggle 
for  influence  in  a  part  of  the  world  which  is 
destined  to  be  industrially  most  important.  Never 
have  these  two  powers  scrutinized  each  other  with 
greater  suspicion.  Never  has  there  been  a  keener 
diplomatic  contest  between  them  than  the  present 
one  regarding  the  Chinese  Empire. 

Again,  the  relations  of  England  and  Germany, 
which,  in  consequence  of  the  emperor's  telegram 
to  Kriiger  and  the  constant  invasions  of  the  Eng- 
lish commercial  domain  by  German  trade,  had 
become  dangerously  strained,  have  now  become 
decidedly  more  friendly  on  account  of  the  parallel 
interests  of  the  two  powers  in  China.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  bitter  and  apparently  enduring  hos- 
Q  225 


WORLD   POLITICS 

tility  has  been  engendered  in  Great  Britain  against 
France  on  account  of  her  subserviency  to  Russian 
policy  in  China,  as  well  as  on  account  of  the  com- 
bined intriguings  of  those  two  powers  in  the  Sou- 
dan. In  Chinese  affairs,  the  grouping  of  the 
powers,  so  far  as  diplomatic  influence  and  policy 
of  exploitation  are  concerned,  has  been  Russia  and 
France  against  Great  Britain,  the  United  States, 
Germany,  and  Italy.  The  existing  friendship  be- 
tween Italy  and  England  has  been  cemented  and 
strengthened.  Italy  has  always  looked  upon  Eng- 
land as  the  protector  of  the  freedom  of  the  Medi- 
terranean from  Franco-Russian  control.  She  now 
relies  on  England  for  the  protection  of  the  rich 
markets  of  China  against  the  insidious  influence 
of  the  two  exclusive  powers. 

It  remains  to  be  noted  how  radically  English 
anti-Russian  politics  have  changed  in  bearing 
and  scope  by  having  their  focus  transferred  from 
Constantinople  and  Afghanistan  to  China.  At 
Constantinople,  England  was  simply  protecting 
her  own  national  interests.  In  China,  on  the 
other  hand,  she  has  become  the  champion  of  the 
general  rights  and  interests  of  the  industrial 
nations.  The  interests  which  she  there  represents 
and  defends  are  so  much  broader  than  those 
involved  in  the  former  contests  that  the  earlier 
stages  of  Russo-English  animosity  have  for  the 
present  lost  much  of  their  importance. 

Germany,  more  than  any  other  European  nation, 
has  entered  upon  a  conscious  policy  of  imperial 
226 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

expansion  since  the  recent  developments  in  the 
Orient.  She  was  the  first  power  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  Russian  preoccupation  with  Manchuria. 
Judging  correctly  that  Russian  attention  was  now 
centred  in  the  far  East  and  withdrawn  to  a 
certain  extent  from  Constantinople,  she  concen- 
trated her  influence  and  succeeded  in  gaining  a 
firm  foothold  in  Asia  Minor,  receiving  valuable 
concessions  and  replacing  England  in  the  friend- 
ship of  the  Sultan.  In  China,  too,  she  acted  with 
rapidity,  tact,  and  clear-sightedness,  and  placed 
herself  at  one  stroke  in  the  first  rank  among  the 
interested  powers.  Together  with  France,  she 
assisted  Russia  in  taking  the  fruits  of  victory  from 
Japan ;  she  thus  gained  the  good  will  of  her 
powerful  northern  neighbor,  and  at  the  same  time 
secured  influence  in  China  and  a  free  hand  in  Con- 
stantinople. The  Sultan  is  now  the  dear  and 
exalted  friend  of  the  emperor,  and  the  German 
government  has  obtained  advantages  in  Asia 
Minor  which  could  formerly  be  hoped  for  only 
as  the  result  of  successful  warfare. 

As  Russian  interest  has  to  some  extent  been 
withdrawn  from  the  Balkan  states,  Austrian  fears 
in  this  direction  have  become  assuaged.  Russia 
is  beginning  to  recognize  that  she  has  more  to 
hope  from  expansion  in  the  Orient  than  from  the 
forcible  annexation  of  her  Balkan  neighbors,  the 
assimilation  of  whom  might  give  her  no  less 
trouble  than  she  has  experienced  in  Poland,  the 
Baltic  provinces,  and  Finland.  Moreover,  Austria 
227 


WORLD   POLITICS 

has  the  less  to  fear  from  Russia  because  that  power- 
ful empire  sees  its  vital  interests  opposed  by  Great 
Britain  rather  than  by  any  other  power.  In  gen- 
eral, it  may  be  said  that  the  relations  between 
Russia  and  the  Teutonic  empires  have  become 
decidedly  more  friendly  as  a  result  of  the  devel- 
opments of  the  past  few  years. 

A  twofold  influence  of  the  opening  of  China 
may  be  traced  in  the  case  of  France.  The  re- 
public was  suddenly  startled  by  the  peace  proposal 
of  the  Czar,  which  Paris  interpreted  at  first  as  a 
desertion  of  France  by  her  powerful  ally,  in  her 
most  cherished  plans.  The  French  had  expended 
a  vast  amount  of  sentiment  and  money  in  courting 
the  friendship  of  the  Russians.  Russian  sailors  on 
their  visit  to  France  had  been  idolized,  and  what 
Count  Tolstof  considers  an  epidemic  of  insanity  had 
seized  the  people  when  the  Czar  himself  appeared 
on  French  soil.  But  now,  with  the  proposal  for  a 
peace  conference,  the  Russian  government  seemed 
to  have  concentrated  its  entire  interest  upon  secur- 
ing and  maintaining  its  power  in  the  far  Orient, 
and  to  have  forgotten  poor  France,  with  her  long- 
standing woes  and  unsatisfied  ambitions,  though 
she  had  furnished  the  Russian  financiers  with  much- 
needed  loans  and  had  lavishly  poured  the  affection 
of  her  ardent  soul  upon  the  bushy  beards  of  the 
Muscovites. 

It  soon  appeared,  however,  that,  while  Russia 
might  not  he  ready  to  champion  the  French  policy 
of  revenge  in  Europe,  her  interests  in  China  were 

228 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

identical  with  those  of  France,  and  a  new  basis 
for  friendship  was  thus  found.  Both  France  and 
Russia  are  opposed  to  the  poHcy  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity in  their  possessions.  Both  desire  to  make 
their  territorial  acquisitions  a  direct  aid  to  national 
commerce  and  manufactures.  Both  desire,  too, 
to  exercise  a  decisive  influence  in  Oriental  affairs ; 
the  one,  from  Siberia  in  the  north ;  the  other,  from 
Indo-China  in  the  south.  Their  policy  coinciding, 
the  conditions  of  continued  alliance  and  coopera- 
tion were  present,  and  the  cordial  relations  between 
Russia  and  France  are  therefore  undisturbed,  not- 
withstanding the  peace  programme.  France  and 
Germany,  to  be  sure,  acted  in  concert  at  The 
Hague,  in  defeating  the  Czar's  project  of  disarma- 
ment, but  the  essential  unity  of  French  and  Rus- 
sian political  aims  was  not  thereby  disturbed. 

France,  as  we  have  seen,  is  endeavoring  to  join 
hands  with  Russia  across  the  English  sphere  of 
influence  in  China,  and  all  the  expressions  of 
French  statesmen,  as  well  as  their  actions  in  the 
far  Orient,  bear  out  the  conclusion  that  the  two 
nations  are  to  stand  together  in  the  struggle  for 
influence  in  China.  Former  causes  of  friction 
between  France  and  Great  Britain,  such  as  the 
Newfoundland  fisheries  and  the  possession  of  the 
Nile  Valley,  sink  into  relative  insignificance  when 
compared  with  the  tremendous  interests  at  issue 
between  the  powers  in  the  Celestial  Empire. 

A  word  as  to  the  influence  of  the  opening  of 
China  upon  the  lesser  nations  of  continental 
229 


WORLD    POLITICS 

Europe.  The  recent  developments  of  imperialism 
have  made  it  plain  that  it  is  not  for  them  to  play  a 
part  in  the  control  of  world  politics,  but  that  they 
must  confine  themselves  rather  to  a  development 
of  their  national  resources  in  Europe  and  to  a 
defence  of  their  own  independence.  Spain  has 
already  lost  her  colonies.  The  African  posses- 
sions of  Portugal  have  already  been  prospectively 
divided  between  England  and  Germany,  who  will 
secure  them  at  the  first  favorable  opportunity. 
Germany  is  evidently  seeking  means  whereby 
she  may  open  a  way  to  the  acquisition  of  the 
Dutch  colonies  in  Asia.  But  while  these  minor 
nations  must  tremble  for  their  transoceanic  posses- 
sions, their  national  existence  is  not  immediately 
threatened  by  present  developments.  The  great 
European  powers  have  too  much  at  stake  in  the 
struggle  for  world  influence  to  weaken  themselves 
by  the  attempted  assimilation  of  recalcitrant 
and  still  powerful  nationalities  in  Europe.  This 
accounts  for  the  evident  diminution  of  Russia's 
interest  in  the  Balkan  states.  For  the  same 
reason,  it  seems  certain  that  the  political  theo- 
rizing which  would  attribute  to  Germany  a  desire 
presently  to  swallow  up  Holland,  and  to  France 
the  policy  of  intriguing  for  sovereignty  in  Bel- 
gium, has  but  little  foundation. 

In  general,  the  political  perspective  is  widened 

and  extended  by  the  developments  in  China.     The 

narrow    arena,    within    which    European    contests 

seemed  destined  to  be  fought  out,  has  been  broad- 

230 


ORIENT   AND   OCCIDENT 

ened  to  include  the  whole  world.  The  pettier 
affairs  that  formerly  divided  nations  have  given 
place  to  vast  interests,  for  when  the  question  of 
civilization  is  itself  at  stake,  disputes  over  territo- 
rial boundaries  must  necessarily  give  way.  It  is 
a  grave  reflection  on  the  statesmanship  of  the 
present  government  of  England  that  it  should 
not  have  succeeded  in  quieting  the  uproarious 
spirits  of  South  Africa,  and  thus  have  prevented  a 
struggle  which  may  fatally  weaken  the  empire  at 
this  critical  moment  of  the  world's  history.  The 
energies  of  all  nations  should  be  concentrated  in  the 
far  East,  in  order  that  irretrievable  disaster  may 
be  prevented,  —  such  a  disaster  as  would  be  the 
abandonment  of  China  to  any  one  ambitious  power, 
or  a  mismanagement  of  Chinese  affairs  that  would 
make  forever  impossible  the  peaceful  fusion  of 
Oriental  and  Western  social  ideals  and  industrial 
capacities. 

Such  questions  as  that  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  of 
Newfoundland,  the  Balkans,  and  Trieste,  or  of  the 
impending  dissolution  of  the  Austrian  Empire, 
wane  before  the  vast  importance  of  these  recent 
developments.  There,  the  fate  of  a  nation  or  of 
nations  is  at  stake ;  here,  that  of  the  world :  there, 
some  millions  of  people  may  be  interested ;  here, 
not  only  the  four  hundred  millions  of  Chinese, 
but  also  the  members  of  every  civilized  state  feel 
that  their  dearest  interests  are  involved.  The 
total  revolution  of  European  political  ideas,  a  com- 
plete change  in  perspective  and  in  the  valuation  of 
231 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  various  aims  and  controversies,  is  therefore  the 
result  of  the  opening  of  China.  Never  have  the 
conditions  of  statesmanship  changed  more  within  a 
quarter  of  a  century,  —  perhaps  even  within  cen- 
turies, —  than  they  have  within  the  last  three  years. 
Events  have  moved  with  such  rapidity  that  it  has 
seemed  almost  impossible  that  human  ingenuity 
and  statesmanship  could  be  able  to  control  them, 
or  in  any  measure  to  influence  their  results.  Hu- 
manity seemed  to  have  been  drawn  into  a  tor- 
rent which  was  rapidly  hurrying  it  on  to  the  most 
destructive  contests  that  the  world  has  ever  seen. 
The  outcome  has  not  been  as  fierce  and  terrible  as 
might  have  been  expected  even  a  year  ago.  It  is 
now  time  for  those  to  whose  hands  the  destinies  of 
the  nations  are  intrusted,  to  take  stock  of  the  devel- 
opments, and  to  fix  on  a  rational,  conservative 
policy  to  be  pursued  with  regard  to  the  questions 
which  we  have  been  discussing. 

Passing  now  to  the  relations  of  the  European 
powers  to  southern  Asia,  we  find  that  no  less  im- 
portant changes  in  political  conditions  have  been 
brought  about  there  by  the  opening  of  China. 
As  Russian  attention  was  partly  withdrawn  from 
Constantinople  and  Afghanistan,  it  became  possi- 
ble for  the  balance  of  political  influence  in  these 
regions  to  be  shifted.  It  has  been  one  of  the  cen- 
tral ideas  of  German  imperial  politics  to  obtain  in- 
fluence in  Turkish  dominions.  The  culmination  of 
this  policy  in  the  visit  of  the  emperor  to  the  Orient 
and  the  obtaining  of  the  valuable  concessions  to 

232 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

which  reference  has  already  been  made,  will  be 
more  fully  discussed  in  a  subsequent  chapter.  In 
brief,  it  may  be  said  that  English  influence  at  the 
Porte  has  been  entirely  superseded  by  that  of  Ger- 
many. The  influence  of  France  in  the  Levant  is 
also  admittedly  on  the  decline.  While  French 
capital  is  still  interested  in  enterprises  in  Asia 
Minor,  the  Germans  are  engaged  in  active  coloni- 
zation, and  are  fully  alive  to  their  present  opportu- 
nities in  that  region, 

Afghanistan  has  for  a  time  ceased  to  be  the 
storm  centre  of  Asia.  The  attention  that  was 
formerly  concentrated  on  the  Afghan  mountains 
and  passes  has  now  been  directed  to  much  broader 
fields,  and  the  relative  importance  of  the  Afghan 
question  has  consequently  decreased.  As  it  is 
true,  however,  that,  should  a  contest  between  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  actually  come  about,  land  opera- 
tions would  be  of  exceedingly  great  importance,  and 
as  the  approaches  by  way  of  Afghanistan  to  India 
are  still  the  easiest  for  Russia,  Great  Britain  has 
continued  in  her  policy  of  fortifying  her  northwest 
Indian  boundary,  and  especially  the  Khaibar  Pass. 

Although  Russia  has  realized  her  ambition  of 
obtaining  an  ice-free  port,  and  her  desire  to  reach 
the  Persian  Gulf  has  consequently  abated  in  inten- 
sity, she  remains  fully  aware  of  the  value  of  diplo- 
matic ascendency  in  Persia  coveted  so  long  by  her.^ 

^  Ever  since  the  treaty  of  Turkmantchai  in  1828,  when  Persian 
Armenia  was  ceded  to  Russia,  this  power  has  exercised  great  influ- 
ence in  Persia. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Making  excellent  use  of  the  preoccupation  of 
her  great  rival  in  the  African  war,  Russia  has 
now  succeeded  in  firmly  and  definitely  establishing 
her  preponderating  influence  in  Persian  affairs. 
Through  the  Loan  Bank  of  Persia,  she  has  just 
advanced  the  Shah  the  sum  of  22,500,000  rubles, 
upon  condition  that  the  customs  revenues  of  north- 
ern Persia  be  mortgaged  as  security,  and  that  no 
other  foreign  loan  be  contracted  by  Persia  without 
the  consent  of  the  Russian  government.  At  the 
same  time,  Russia  obtained  extensive  railway  con- 
cessions within  Persia,  including  the  right  to  ex- 
tend the  trans-Caspian  railway  to  Bandar  Abbas, 
on  the  Persian  Gulf.  Thus  Russia  has  entered  a 
region  which  Great  Britain  was  especially  anxious 
to  reserve  to  herself  as  a  sphere  of  interest.  If 
Russia  now  succeeds  in  gaining  from  the  Porte  the 
coveted  concessions  of  railway  lines  in  northern 
Asia  Minor,  especially  along  the  shore  of  the  Black 
Sea,  the  triumph  of  her  diplomatic  policy  of  peace 
and  opportunism  will  be  complete. 

The  position  of  Great  Britain  in  India  has  cer- 
tainly been  rendered  more  precarious  by  recent 
developments.  The  Russian  line  of  approach  to 
the  Indian  Empire  has  been  extended,  especially 
by  the  advance  of  the  trans-Caspian  railway  into 
Persia,  and  by  the  acquisition  of  a  paramount  in- 
fluence in  northern  China,  Although  protected 
against  direct  attack  from  China  by  the  mountains, 
India  could  be  menaced  by  an  invasion  through 
Siam,  in  which  country  French  and  Russian  diplo- 

234 


ORIENT   AND   OCCIDENT 

macy  work  in  concert.  The  position  of  Russia 
receives  special  reinforcement  from  the  fact  that 
she  will  have  two  bases  for  naval  expeditions,  — 
Port  Arthur,  and  her  railway  terminal  on  the 
Persian  Gulf. 

It  therefore  becomes  doubly  important  for  Great 
Britain  to  fortify  her  rule  in  India  by  enlisting  the 
population  of  that  empire  in  her  support.  It  can- 
not be  said  that  England  has  succeeded  in  gaining 
the  affections  of  her  Indian  subjects ;  in  fact,  the 
separation  between  the  natives  and  their  Western 
rulers  is  rather  on  the  increase.  The  facilities  of 
modern  travel  tend  to  make  the  British  adminis- 
trators mere  sojourners  in  India,  very  unlike  the 
older  generation  of  British  Indians,  who  became 
thoroughly  intimate  with  Oriental  life  and  character. 
At  present  it  happens  too  frequently  that  ofificials, 
while  honestly  endeavoring  to  enforce  justice  and 
govern  for  the  best  interests  of  the  subject  race, 
entirely  disregard  the  susceptibilities  of  a  sensitive 
people,  and  by  a  haughty,  domineering  manner, 
antagonize  men  who  pride  themselves  on  their 
rank  among  the  natives.  Moreover,  English  ideas 
of  official  morality  and  conduct,  as  well  as  the 
higher  elements  in  Western  intellectual  civiliza- 
tion generally,  are  on  a  plane  rather  too  elevated 
for  the  masses  of  the  East.  The  Russians,  on  the 
other  hand,  do  not  demand  so  much  of  their  sub- 
jects, but  allow  them  to  continue  in  their  Oriental 
ways,  simply  superadding  a  thin  varnish  of  Rus- 
sian religion  and  civilization. 
235 


CHAPTER   III 

The  Meeting  of  Orient  and  Occident 

The  results  of  the  opening  of  China  on  the 
Chinese  Empire  itself  have  already  been  partly 
discussed.  We  have  not  yet,  however,  considered 
the  meaning  of  this  development  to  civilization 
in  general.  The  meeting  of  the  Orient  and  the 
Occident,  long  foreshadowed,  has  finally  taken 
place,  and  the  settlement  of  accounts  between 
the  two  civilizations  cannot  be  longer  postponed. 
Whenever  the  Orient  and  the  Occident  have  met 
before,  it  has  always  been  in  a  life-and-death  strug- 
gle for  leadership  in  civilization.  It  was  at  Mara- 
thon that  the  West  first  saved  itself  from  Oriental 
dominion :  later,  Alexander  carried  Western  in- 
fluences far  into  the  Orient;  but  the  wave  swept 
back,  and  the  European  nations  were  again  in 
turn  forced  to  fight  for  their  existence  against 
Moors,  Tartars,  and  Turks.  But  the  end  of  the 
struggle  is  not  yet.  Far  from  the  battlefields  of 
Tours  and  Wahlstatt  it  is  going  on  with  different 
means  and  under  new  and  more  portentous  circum- 
stances.  Western  civilization,  now  fully  developed, 

236 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

and  rich  in  the  accumulated  wealth  and  wisdom 
of  centuries,  stands  panoplied  in  all  the  glories 
of  history.  The  Orient,  which  believes  that  it 
has  learned  ages  ago  the  sum  of  knowledge  and 
the  essence  of  truth,  is  still  animated  with  the  same 
spirit,  and  still  has  in  great  measure  the  same 
social  and  political  institutions  that  existed  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Christian  era.  Though  these 
two  civilizations  have  in  some  degree  reacted  upon 
each  other,  they  still  maintain  a  distinct  character, 
with  little  real  mutual  understanding. 

The  great  question  that  now  agitates  thinking 
minds  is  as  to  the  future  predominance  of  either 
tendency  in  the  life  of  the  world.  Is  the  Western 
spirit  to  conquer  or  to  be  conquered,  or  is  there  to  be 
a  peaceful  union  of  the  two  ancient  civilizations, 
combined  into  a  higher  harmony  ?  Considerations 
like  the  above  may  seem  too  general  and  indefinite 
for  purposes  of  political  discussion.  Yet  it  must 
be  remembered  that  in  politics  we  should  be  aware 
of  the  widest  consequences  that  may  follow  from 
any  policy  or  situation ;  and  perhaps  at  no  other 
time  in  the  world's  history  has  the  general  devel- 
opment of  civihzation  so  hinged  upon  immediate 
political  action  as  at  the  present  day.  True,  the 
considerations  here  presented  are  mere  possibilities, 
but  they  are  possibilities  of  such  far-reaching  and 
tremendous  import  that  they  should  not  be  over- 
looked ;  and  to  one  who  wishes  to  understand  the 
forces  at  work  about  him,  and  to  witness  with 
appreciation  the  development  of  the  greatest 
237 


WORLD  POLITICS 

drama  of  the  world's  history,  the  knowledge  that 
the  fate  of  civilization  is  involved  will  not  make 
events  of  less  interest. 

While,  as  we  have  said,  the  two  civilizations  have 
mutually  influenced  each  other,  and  while,  in  places, 
they  shade  off  into  one  another,  their  general 
characteristics  may  nevertheless  be  clearly  stated 
and  distinguished.  The  Orient  has  the  pessimism 
of  completed  knowledge  and  disillusionment :  it  is 
quiet  and  serene,  because  it  sees  nothing  worth 
striving  for:  individual  existence  is  unimportant. 
The  West,  on  the  other  hand,  is  intensely  individ- 
ualistic, and  filled  with  an  optimistic  energy  which 
leads  it  to  believe  in  an  evolution  of  higher  forms 
and  in  progress  to  a  higher  civilization  :  not  always 
clear  as  to  the  final  aim,  it  yet  believes  above  all 
in  upward  struggle,  and  takes  for  granted  that 
humanity  can  progress. 

The  meeting  between  the  two  civilizations  has 
long  been  foreshadowed  in  philosophy  and  in 
general  thought.  The  opening  of  India  to  the  na- 
tions of  Europe  introduced  the  Western  mind  to  the 
treasures  of  Eastern  philosophy.  With  the  growth 
of  philological  studies  the  influence  of  Oriental 
thought  has  become  preeminent  in  many  fields. 
Schopenhauer,  the  philosopher  who  perhaps  best 
represents  the  attitude  of  continental  European 
thought  in  the  middle  of  the  present  century,  is 
a  Buddhist,  and  derives  from  Oriental  ideas  the 
life  and  spirit  of  his  pessimistic  philosophy.  Even 
Nietzsche,  standing  though  he  does  for  a  revival 
238 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

of  Western  individualistic  energy,  has  not  escaped 
the  same  influence.  His  individualism  is  after  all 
an  individualism  of  genius,  of  the  select  few,  with  a 
truly  Oriental  disregard  for  the  masses  of  humanity. 
Russia,  the  chief  Western  exponent  of  Oriental- 
ism, has  loomed  larger  and  larger  in  men's  minds, 
and  the  strange  fascination  which  her  power  exer- 
cises in  modern  political  life  is  due  in  no  small 
measure  to  the  anti-individualistic  tendencies  of 
her  civilization. 

But,  some  one  may  ask,  was  not  this  threatened 
meeting  of  Orientalism  and  Occidentalism  already 
accomplished  long  before  the  invasion  of  China, — 
when  Europeans  took  in  hand  the  guidance  of 
Indian  nations .''  It  must  be  remembered,  how- 
ever, that  in  India  very  few  Europeans  settle  per- 
manently, and  that  no  real  communication  has 
been  established  between  the  natives  and  the 
foreigners.  The  educated  Indian  regards  the 
English  as  masterful  barbarians  who  understand 
the  art  of  government,  to  be  sure,  but  who,  in 
matters  of  culture,  are  still  mere  children.  What 
the  West  is  striving  for  and  struggling  over,  their 
Oriental  mind  has  solved  long  ages  ago. 

In  China,  the  relations  of  the  races  will  be  dif- 
ferent. First  of  all  it  must  be  remembered  that 
China  is  in  a  more  temperate  zone,  and  will 
therefore  permit  and  even  invite  settlement  by 
Europeans.  Consequently,  more  direct  and  more 
far-reaching  relations  will  be  established  between 
China  and  the  Western  nations  than  was  the  case 
239 


WORLD  POLITICS 

in  India.  Moreover,  the  Russian  spirit  will  be 
present  there  to  act  as  an  interpreter  and  mediator 
between  the  two  civilizations,  and  should  Russia 
succeed  in  assimilating  large  areas  of  the  Chi- 
nese Empire,  Orientalism  will  be  furnished  with  a 
strong  political  organization  to  aid  it  in  impressing 
its  character  upon  the  world.  It  is  therefore 
evident  that  the  real  meeting  between  the  forces  is 
still  in  the  future,  and  that  it  will  be  a  meeting 
fraught  with  unprecedented  consequences.  The 
Chinese  themselves  are  tenacious  of  their  social 
and  religious  ideas.  While  often  ready  to  accept 
Western  methods  in  commerce,  they  have  received 
little  impress  from  the  Western  spirit  in  any  other 
way,  as  is  witnessed  by  the  slender  success  of 
Christian  missions  in  the  Chinese  Empire. 

Buddhism,  introduced  into  China  from  India,  is 
the  true  religion  of  the  Orient.  Its  pessimistic 
view  of  life,  its  weariness  of  existence,  and  its 
search  after  Nirvana,  the  quiet  of  the  soul,  are  the 
fruit  of  long  ages  of  suffering.  It  is  averse  to  all 
fretting  energy.  Its  ideal  is  a  quiet  life  of  con- 
templation and  the  extirpation  of  all  violent  pas- 
sions and  desires.  Buddhist  temples  are  a  true 
symbol  of  the  deepest  ideas  of  the  religion.  The 
shrines,  containing  the  seated  image  of  Buddha, 
rise  from  the  edge  of  a  translucent  pond  of  water, 
surrounded  by  tall  trees,  —  these  shallow,  limpid 
pools  fitly  symbolize  the  eye  of  consciousness, 
freed  from  passion  and  looking  serenely  out  upon 
life.  It  is  thus  that  the  Buddhist  would  pass  his 
240 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

existence,  contemplating  the  world,  making  it  his 
own  by  quiet  absorption, — not  wearing  out  his 
spirit  in  unavailing  strife,  —  and  awaiting  final 
Nirvana,  the  rest  of  the  spirit.  Though  the  Chi- 
nese are  not  so  imaginative  as  other  Orientals, 
Buddhism  is  the  only  true  religion  of  the  Chinese 
masses,  as  it  is  of  the  Japanese,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  mandarins,  whose  position  depends  upon 
upholding  the  political  importance  of  Confucian- 
ism, affect  to  despise  it. 

The  question  of  greatest  moment  at  the  present 
time  concerns  the  influence  of  Western  indus- 
trial, political,  religious,  and  intellectual  forces 
on  China.  Should  the  empire  remain  intact,  and 
should  friendly  relations  continue  to  be  fostered, 
much  of  Western  civilization  would  imperceptibly 
creep  in  and  become  a  part  of  Chinese  life.  On 
the  other  hand,  should  injudicious  political  meas- 
ures hopelessly  antagonize  the  Chinese  popula- 
tion, such  a  peaceful  union  could  not  be  effected. 
It  is  certain  that,  should  the  policy  of  partition 
which  has  been  advocated  in  some  quarters  be 
realized,  terrible  conflicts  between  the  far  East  and 
the  West  must  be  the  result.  The  broadest  inter- 
ests of  civilization  therefore  demand  that  the 
Western  powers  should  exert  all  their  influence  in 
maintaining  intact  and  open  to  Western  thought 
and  life  the  greatest  empire  of  the  East. 

Certain  pessimistic  spirits  have  already  proph- 
esied a  conquest  of  our  civilization  by  Oriental 
ideals.     They  believe  that  it  is  becoming  untrue  to 

R  241 


WORLD   POLITICS 

itself,  and  is  beginning  to  worship  at  the  shrine 
of  Oriental  fatalism.  There  has,  it  is  true,  been 
a  deepening  and  broadening  of  Western  thought 
within  the  last  few  decades.  The  influence  of 
Indian  philosophy  and  religion  on  Western  life  can 
have  escaped  no  one.  The  days  of  the  shallower 
rationalism  and  utilitarianism  are  over,  and  there 
is  instead  a  return  to  reverence  for  the  deep,  mys- 
terious forces  of  nature  and  of  life. 

Unhappily,  there  also  goes  with  this  in  many 
quarters  a  discountenancing  of  scientific  methods  in 
the  field  of  knowledge  and  an  impatience  with  lib- 
eral ideas  in  the  field  of  politics;  a  return  to  mystic 
romanticism  in  fiction,  —  to  a  worship  of  half-under- 
stood symbols  which  are  dealt  out  to  the  faithful 
as  the  essence  of  knowledge  and  experience.  The 
slow,  painful  methods  of  acquiring  knowledge  by 
scientific  investigation  are  viewed  with  impatience. 
The  electric  searchlight  which  science  sends  into 
the  hidden  recesses  of  existence  is  not  easily  or 
willingly  borne  by  weaker  eyes.  They  prefer  the 
romantic  dusk  of  Gothic  cathedrals  and  medie- 
val idealism.  In  politics,  progress  by  patient 
strength,  by  legitimate  industry,  by  continued 
effort,  is  too  slow.  The  imperial  idea  is  invoked 
in  a  movement  to  endow  nations  with  world  domin- 
ion through  manifestoes  supported  by  brute  force. 
The  simple  ideals  of  democracy,  of  social  equality, 
of  the  cooperation  of  the  governed  in  matters  that 
most  concern  them,  are  in  some  quarters  beginning 
to  be  brushed  aside  and  to  give  place  to  a  claim 

242 


ORIENT   AND    OCCIDENT 

of  the  right  of  the  stronger  to  govern  as  he  pleases. 
Western  civiHzation  has  certainly  lost  its  harmony 
and  cohesion. 

At  this  juncture,  the  East  with  its  swarming 
hordes  living  a  listless  life  from  century  to  century  ; 
the  West  with  its  energetic,  individualistic  impulses, 
but  without  any  consistent  philosophy  of  civiliza- 
tion, meet  face  to  face.  That  this  threatens  to 
accentuate  the  reactionary  forces,  to  strengthen 
autocracy  and  brute  force,  and  to  weaken  every- 
thing that  bases  itself  on  reason,  reflection,  and 
individual  right,  is  natural  and  evident.  While 
some  presaging  spirits  cherish  the  hope  that  East- 
ern thought  will  yield  a  harmonizing  principle  to 
the  life  of  the  West,  others  abandon  themselves 
to  the  fear  that  we  are  destined  to  be  driven  back 
into  another  period  of  darkness  in  which  intelli- 
gence will  slumber  and  brute  force  reign  supreme. 

The  unfavorable  influences  that  are  to  be  ex- 
pected from  Oriental  civilization  may  be  summa- 
rized briefly  as  follows  :  a  pessimistic  view  of  life  ; 
an  undervaluing  of  individual  rights  and  the  power 
of  individual  initiative ;  a  caste  spirit  which  looks 
upon  men  as  mere  incomplete  portions  of  a  larger 
unity  in  which  their  existence  is  entirely  swallowed 
up ;  the  degradation  of  women,  whom  Western 
ideals  have  placed  on  an  equal  intellectual  and 
moral  footing  with  men  ;  a  lack  of  sympathy ;  the 
preponderance  of  theocracy  ;  and  absolutism.  It  is 
paradoxical  that,  with  all  its  individualism,  the  West 
is,  nevertheless,  more  sympathetic  than  the  East. 
243 


WORLD   POLITICS 

This  sympathy  is  largely  a  result  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion ;  for  before  the  growth  of  Chris- 
tianity, the  Roman  world  was  dominated  by  the 
Stoic  spirit,  to  which  pity  for  the  sufferings  of 
fellow-beings  was  entirely  foreign.  Throughout 
the  Orient,  man  is  singularly  apathetic  and  un- 
touched by  the  woes  of  his  fellows.  It  may  be 
said,  indeed,  by  apologists  of  Eastern  thought,  that 
sympathy  merely  increases  human  suffering  a  thou- 
sand-fold by  making  every  individual  carry  the  bur- 
dens of  thousands  of  fellow-sufferers,  and  that  it 
leads  to  a  perpetuation  of  deformities  and  disease 
by  protecting  from  extirpation  the  victims  of  these 
evils.  Even  so,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that,  when 
we  come  to  consider  the  .feelings  and  ideals  which 
make  our  life  endurable,  the  bond  of  sympathy 
with  fellow-beings  is  to  be  counted  among  the 
first  of  these,  and  that  the  introduction  of  Ori- 
ental apathy  regarding  the  well-being  of  others 
would  impoverish  our  civilization.  No  one  who 
has  read  the  most  recent  European  philosophical 
and  critical  literature  can  have  failed  to  see  how 
deeply  this  question  is  agitating  the  European 
mind. 

Some  favorable  influences  that  may  be  exercised 
by  the  meeting  of  the  older  and  younger  civili- 
zations are  the  gaining  by  the  latter  of  a  deeper 
insight  into  the  mystic  elements  of  Hfe,  more  se- 
renity, and  greater  quiet  and  self-possession.  Our 
civilization  is  too  materialistic,  and  lays  too  much 
emphasis  on  mere  machinery.     The  Oriental  may 

244 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

well  ask,  Why  do  you  hurry,  and  struggle,  and 
make  inventions,  and  reduce  life  to  an  endless 
scramble,  when  you  have  not  time  left  to  think 
about  the  deepest  questions  of  the  human  soul  ? 

If  Chinese  partition  should  be  made  the  stepping- 
stone  to  world  control.  Western  nations  would  be 
forced  to  fight  for  their  civilization,  and  a  century 
of  terrible  conflicts  would  be  imminent.  Such  a 
struggle  could  only  end  in  the  final  preponderance 
of  one  power  in  a  world  absolutism  more  deadly 
than  that  of  Rome  in  that  there  would  be  left  no 
vigorous  elements  to  revive  a  dying  civilization. 
It  is  not  strange,  then,  that  many  should  be  look- 
ing forward  to  times  which  will  try  men's  souls, 
and  insisting  that  we  make  sure  of  rallying  about 
only  the  best  in  our  civilization,  and  of  struggling, 
not  for  material  gain  and  the  vulgar  glory  of  the 
hour,  but  for  the  permanence  of  our  highest  ideals, 
in  order  that  the  world  may  retain  an  abiding-place 
for  truthfulness  and  honesty  in  life  and  thought. 
No  one  who  sees  the  seriousness  of  the  present 
situation  will  rashly  cry  for  war  and  headlong 
national  aggrandizement. 

That  China  would  not  readily  yield  to  any  open 
and  forceful  imposition  of  Western  civilization  is 
evident.  The  easiest  and  surest  way  of  approach 
is  that  of  practical  life.  The  Chinese  are  intensely 
alive  to  any  real  improvements  in  the  every-day  con- 
cerns of  business  and  industry,  and  when  practical 
conveniences  are  brought  to  their  notice  they  are 
not  slow  to  profit  by  them,  as  the  multitude  of 
245 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Celestials  who  have  from  the  first  crowded  the 
trains  on  the  railways  in  Pechili  have  proved. 
There  is  no  doubt  that,  with  the  precedents  al- 
ready adopted,  Western  industrial  institutions  will 
very  rapidly  spread  and  be  accepted  throughout 
China.  The  telegraph  is  already  a  part  of  Chi- 
nese life ;  the  railways  will  be  within  a  few  years. 
Manufactures  are  rapidly  being  established  and 
the  methods  of  mining  reformed.  With  such  a 
change  in  the  economic  basis  of  life,  a  change 
in  ideas  and  in  customs  may  also  be  expected. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  avidity  with  which  large 
numbers  of  educated  Chinese  seek  every  possible 
chance  to  gain  information  on  Western  methods, 
and  the  rapid  spread  of  the  reform  propaganda  in 
1898,  show  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  people 
are  ready  for  far-reaching  changes.^ 

1  The  mandarin  Pung  Kwang  Yeu  advises  missionaries  to  ap- 
peal to  the  upper  classes  by  offering  them  advanced  learning  and 
technical  information.  See  "  Confucianism,"  in  The  World^s  Par- 
liament  of  Religions,  Vol.  I.,  p.  374. 


246 


CHAPTER   IV 

General  Consequences  of  the  Opening  of 

China 

It  is  a  question  of  great  moment  how  rapidly 
Chinese  industries  and  commerce  will  develop  under 
the  new  conditions.  Most  alarming  prognostications 
have  been  indulged  in  by  certain  European  writers 
who  believe  that  China  will  rapidly  become  the 
great  centre  of  industry,  leaving  Europe  a  deserted 
mother  o^  nations.  The  marvellous  extent  of  the 
resources  of  China  has  already  been  touched  upon. 
To  this  we  must  add  the  integrity  and  business  ca- 
pacity of  her  merchant  class.  At  present,  Japanese 
houses  generally  employ  Chinamen  in  positions  of 
trust,  and  the  business  in  Farther  India  and  in  the 
Philippines  is  almost  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  Chi- 
nese merchants.  It  is  not  certain,  however,  to  what 
extent  they  will  show  themselves  fitted  for  great 
undertakings  that  call  for  the  power  of  manipulat- 
ing millions  of  capital,  watching  markets  of  wide 
extent,  and  forestalling  the  needs  of  vast  popula- 
tions. In  huge  industrial  undertakings  of  this 
kind,  the  Chinese  are  as  yet  untried.     They  have 

247 


WORLD   POLITICS 

cheap  and  abundant  labor,  —  the  best,  the  most 
reliable,  and  the  most  frugal  in  the  Orient.  It 
must,  however,  be  remembered  that,  while  nom- 
inally cheaper  than  Western  labor,  it  is  at  the  same 
time  less  efficient,  needing  more  supervision,  and 
accomplishing  less  in  a  given  time.  Thus,  visitors 
to  a  government  arsenal  found  workmen  asleep  by 
the  side  of  their  running  machines.  With  all  the 
advantages  of  cheap  labor  which  the  Chinese  en- 
joy, the  cost  of  production  in  the  iron  industry  is 
still  much  greater  with  them  than  would  be  the 
price  of  the  articles  furnished  if  bought  in  a 
European  market.^ 

But  when  we  picture  to  ourselves  that  there  is  in 
China  one-third  of  the  world's  population  crowded 
into  eighteen  provinces,  many  of  which  in  their 
natural  wealth  surpass,  by  far,  countries  like  Ger- 
many and  France,  there  is  little  room  for  doubt 
that,  when  the  industrial  forces  of  this  region  have 
once  been  set  in  motion,  China  will  in  truth  become 
the  "realm  of  the  centre."  Unlike  Japan,  China  is 
most  abundantly  provided  with  coal  and  iron  in 
close  proximity  to  each  other,  so  that  the  distance 
and  cost  of  transportation  of  the  raw  material  will 
be  reduced  to  a  minimum ;  and  factories  can  be 
estabHshed  in  localities  where  fuel,  material,  and 
labor  exist  in  the  greatest  abundance. 

The  first  step  in  the  development  of  China  is  the 
providing  of  transportation,  which  will  redound 
largely  to  the  benefit  of  foreign  commerce.     Those 

1  See  Consular  Reports,  1898,  p.  1053. 
248 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

nations  that  are  most  patient  and  that  study  most 
carefully  the  requirements  of  the  market  will  carry 
off  remarkable  commercial  advantages.  It  is  true 
that  the  opening  of  river  navigation,  from  which 
much  had  been  expected,  has  not  proved  of  con- 
siderable advantage  to  commerce  on  account  of 
many  harassing  restrictions.  But  even  in  river 
commerce,  the  door  is  partly  open,  and,  with  a  few 
more  firm  remonstrances  at  Peking,  the  advantage 
already  gained  may  be  rendered  of  actual  use  to 
trade ;  whereupon  it  will  undoubtedly  be  extended 
also  to  railroad  communications. 

The  development  of  manufactures  and  mines  has 
but  just  begun,  although,  as  we  have  seen,  numer- 
ous concessions  have  already  been  granted  and 
many  manufacturing  establishments  have  already 
been  founded.  In  Shanghai,  alone,  five  great 
foreign  cotton  mills,  and  three  owned  by  Chinese, 
have  commenced  operation  since  1895.  The  Han- 
yang iron  foundery,  the  first  monument  to  the  new 
progressive  spirit  in  China,  is  now  turning  out  large 
quantities  of  rails  for  the  Chinese  roads.  The 
cost,  however,  is  still  considerably  above  that  of 
the  same  goods  in  the  European  market,  while  the 
quality  is  inferior  and  the  supply  inadequate  to  the 
present  needs,  so  that  large  quantities  of  rails  are 
still  being  purchased  from  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.  It  is  doubtless  to  be  expected, 
however,  that  China  will  soon  become  a  great 
manufacturing  centre  for  cotton,  woollen,  and  iron 
goods.     The  cheaper  grades  of  cotton  goods  are 

249 


WORLD   POLITICS 

already  manufactured  in  large  quantities,  and  foi 
these  grades,  Chinese  raw  cotton  is  adequate  in 
quality  and  quantity.  Little  raw  cotton,  therefore, 
is  imported  from  America  or  India  for  Chinese 
manufacture.  In  Japan,  the  case  is  quite  different. 
During  the  last  year,  about  twenty-two  million 
dollars  worth  of  raw  cotton  was  imported  for  the 
Japanese  cotton  mills,  and  one-third  of  this  came 
from  the  United  States. 

The  development  of  manufacturing  industries  in 
China  will  in  the  first  instance  bring  about  a  vast 
demand  for  European  and  American  manufactured 
products.  Machinery  for  cotton  spinning,  for  iron 
works,  and  for  paper  manufacture  is  already  being 
imported;  and  as  the  number  of  new  industries 
increases,  a  vast  market  for  these  articles  will  be 
opened.  Indeed,  no  immediate  shifting  of  the 
centre  of  industry  to  the  Orient  need  be  feared. 
Decades  will  elapse  before  China  will  be  able  to 
satisfy  even  the  newly  stimulated  demand  of  her 
own  population  for  manufactured  goods.  The 
prophecies  which  were  made  in  regard  to  the  im- 
pending competition  of  Japan  in  the  world  market 
have  failed  to  be  realized  in  any  but  the  slightest 
degree.  On  the  contrary,  Japan,  through  her  com- 
mercial and  industrial  development,  has  become  a 
far  better  customer  in  European  and  American  mar- 
kets ;  and  the  same  will  undoubtedly  be  true  in  the 
case  of  China,  although  the  latter  empire  is  in  a 
far  more  favorable  position  for  industrial  self-suffi- 
ciency than  is  the  Land  of  the  Rising  Sun. 

250 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

As  China  is  opening  up  to  commerce,  the  ques- 
tion of  currency  becomes  one  of  absorbing  impor- 
tance. At  present,  the  fluctuations  in  the  silver 
currency  of  China  are  such  that  even  the  most 
legitimate  business  partakes  of  the  nature  of 
gambling.  The  United  States  consul  at  Shang- 
hai, in  his  last  report,  states  that,  though  eight 
million  dollars'  worth  of  American  goods  had 
entered  that  port  during  the  fiscal  year,  prob- 
ably not  much  money  was  made  by  the  firms 
handling  this  business,  as  the  rapid  and  great  fluc- 
tuations in  the  price  of  silver  rendered  impossible 
any  accurate  calculations.  A  silver-using  country 
would  undoubtedly  have  a  great  advantage  in  trad- 
ing with  China;  but  as  even  Japan  has  now 
adopted  gold  monometallism,  and  is  rapidly  intro- 
ducing the  same  system  in  Corea  through  her 
commercial  influence,  all  the  great  nations  that 
have  important  dealings  with  China  are  gold  coun- 
tries. It  is  a  serious  problem  as  to  how  this 
great  impediment  to  international  commerce  can 
be  removed.  Unless  the  quantity  of  gold  con- 
tinues to  increase  rapidly,  it  seems  almost  impos- 
sible that  China,  a  vast  nation  of  four  hundred  mil- 
lion people  with  constantly  expanding  commerce 
and  industry,  can  be  raised  to  a  gold  basis  with- 
out entailing  dangerous  consequences  upon  the 
money  market  of  the  world.  This  problem, 
though  it  belongs  to  economics  rather  than  to 
politics,  nevertheless  deserves  the  closest  atten- 
tion of  thinkers  and  statesmen  in  all  those  nations 

251 


WORLD   POLITICS 

that  desire  their  share  of  the  coming  vast  trade 
with  China. 

With  the  growing  importance  of  China  in  the 
world  of  industry,  the  Pacific  is  becoming  a  most 
important  highway  of  commerce,  promising  to 
outstrip  the  Atlantic  as  a  centre  of  maritime  inter- 
ests within  the  not  distant  future.  The  countries 
that  immediately  border  upon  the  Pacific  contain 
a  population  of  about  550  millions  of  inhabitants, 
well-nigh  one-half  of  the  total  population  of  the 
globe  ;  and  this  mass  of  humanity  is  more  directly 
dependent  on  the  Pacific  Ocean  for  transportation 
facilities  than  are  the  Atlantic  peoples  on  that 
body  of  water,  because  railways  and  canals  have 
not  been  as  fully  developed  in  the  Orient  as  in  the 
countries  bordering  on  the  Atlantic.  The  whole 
perspective  of  the  industrial  world  will  thus  be 
changed :  what  formerly  seemed  almost  the  back- 
yard of  the  world  is  now  to  become  the  very  cen- 
tre of  interest.  Japan  bids  fair  to  rival  the  great 
island  kingdom  of  the  West.  Viewed  in  their 
relation  to  the  Chinese  markets,  the  Philippine 
Islands  are  in  a  position  of  great  importance. 
From  this  standpoint  also,  the  making  of  a  canal 
that  will  join  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  becomes 
a  matter  of  immediate  necessity.  The  South 
American  republics  that  face  on  the  Pacific  Ocean 
are  beginning  to  feel  their  neighborhood  to  the 
Oriental  world,  and  Chinese  emigrants,  excluded 
from  the  United  States,  are  seeking  fields  of  ac- 
tivity in  Latin  America.     Vast  transportation  com- 

252 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

panics  have  recently  been  formed  to  connect  the 
various  shores  of  this  great  basin.  Thus,  the  Im- 
perial Japanese  line  ^  is,  next  to  the  two  great  Ger- 
man lines,  the  largest,  richest,  and  best  equipped 
in  the  world.  This  whole  development,  with  all 
that  it  involves,  emphasizes  the  importance  of 
navies.  Any  nation  that  desires  to  have  its  voice 
heard  in  the  counsels  of  the  East  must  be  able  to 
support  its  demands  with  a  strong  and  efficient 
navy. 

That  the  United  States  is  most  intimately  inter- 
ested in  the  developments  here  discussed  is  too 
evident  to  call  for  argument.  It  is  especially  the 
states  of  the  Pacific  slope  that  may  hope  to  profit 
largely  from  the  developments  in  China,  as  their 
vast  lumbering  resources  correspond  to  one  of  the 
most  strongly  felt  needs  in  Chinese  industries.  The 
day  may  come  when  the  port  of  Seattle  or  of  San 
Francisco  will  show  a  larger  shipping  than  that 
of  New  York,  because  the  peoples  reached  by  the 
routes  that  diverge  from  these  points  are  so  greatly 
superior  in  numbers  to  those  that  border  on  the 
Atlantic,  and  are  growing  constantly  stronger  in 
their  industrial  requirements. 

When  the  starthng  import  of  the  events  that  we 
have  been  considering  first  dawned  upon  the  West- 
ern world,  there  was  a  feeling  of  bewilderment 
amounting  almost  to  fear.  As  the  situation  be- 
comes more  clearly  outlined,  however,  a  weight 

iThe  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha  in  1898  owned  sixty  steamers  of 
191,343  tons. 

253 


WORLD   POLITICS 

seems  to  be  lifted  from  Europe ;  for  not  only  is  a 
wider  perspective  given  to  politics,  vaster  interests 
involved,  and  greater  fields  thrown  open  to  the  en- 
deavor of  European  nations,  but  there  is  also  a  grow- 
ing feeling  that  a  grander  work  of  civilization,  in 
which  all  nations  can  participate,  is  claiming  their 
combined  exertions.  The  narrow  jealousies  of 
Europe,  and  the  rankling  hostilities  that  were  con- 
stantly endangering  the  world's  peace,  have  given 
way  for  the  time  to  broader  interests,  and,  although 
these  too  may  be  used  to  kindle  the  fire  of  national 
animosities,  there  is,  nevertheless,  within  them  a 
power  to  create  more  friendly  relations  among  the 
great  countries,  and  thus  to  bring  about  their  co- 
operation in  a  work  where  all  will  have  ample 
opportunity  to  employ  their  best  powers  and  most 
important  resources. 

The  day  of  alliances  is  over.  Within  the  last 
decade  we  have  had  a  kaleidoscopic  change  in  inter- 
national affinities.  We  have  had  a  triple  alliance 
and  a  dual  alliance,  with  secret  affinities  among 
the  various  members  of  the  two.  We  have  seen 
Russia,  France,  and  Germany  united  in  opposing 
the  projects  of  Japan  after  the  Chino-Japanese 
war,  and  aiding  Russia  to  take  the  place  of  Japan 
as  a  friendly  civilizer  of  the  Celestial  Empire  and 
to  reap  in  that  way  almost  all  the  direct  benefits 
of  the  war.  Thus,  too,  England,  Germany,  Japan, 
and  the  United  States  are  inclined  to  sympathize 
on  the  question  of  equal  opportunities,  while  Great 
Britain  and  the  American  republic  have  entered 
254 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

upon  a  stage  of  general  amity  strangely  in  con- 
trast with  their  former  strained  relations.  Germany 
and  England  work  together  in  Africa  in  the  matter 
of  the  Portuguese  possessions  around  Delagoa 
Bay.  France  and  Russia,  even  after  the  first 
enthusiasm  of  their  European  friendship  has  evap- 
orated, find  in  the  Asiatic  situation  new  grounds 
for  friendly  agreement.  France  and  Italy,  long 
inimical,  have  approached  each  other  in  the  com- 
mercial treaty  of  1898.  A  rapprochement  even  be- 
tween Germany  and  France  is  indicated  by  certain 
recent  events,  such  as  the  interchange  of  friendly 
messages  between  the  two  governments,  the  em- 
peror's visit  to  a  French  man-of-war,  and  the 
reception  accorded  the  actress  Agnes  Sorma  in 
Paris. 

All  these  instances  tend  to  show  that  general 
alliances  are  no  longer  the  order  of  the  day  in 
international  politics.  Understandings  on  definite 
points  may  be  reached,  but  a  nation  of  the  first 
rank  must  be  self-centred.  It  may  approach  other 
nations  and  cooperate  with  them  in  certain  defi- 
nitely prescribed  matters,  but  it  must  not  bind 
itself  completely  to  the  policy  of  any  other  power. 
The  position  of  France  has  been  decidedly  weak- 
ened by  her  constant  subserviency  to  the  policy  of 
Russia,  as  shown  especially  in  China.  While,  with 
the  constant  aid  and  connivance  of  France,  Russia 
practically  gained  a  rich  and  promising  province, 
the  former  country  has  obtained  only  concessions  of 
rather  doubtful  value  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
255 


WORLD   POLITICS 

empire.  The  state  that  allows  itself  to  be  drawn 
as  a  satellite  into  the  orbit  of  another  power  inevi- 
tably loses  prestige  and  endangers  its  own  national 
interests. 

If  the  forces  at  work  were  only  clearly  under- 
stood, the  result  would  be  rather  a  strengthening 
of  peace  than  a  heaping  of  additional  fuel  upon 
the  fires  of  international  hostility.  There  is  no 
need  of  narrow  suspicions.  The  field  is  vast 
enough  to  afford  room  for  the  exercise  of  all  the 
energies  of  civilization.  The  Empire  of  Great 
Britain,  by  its  most  valuable  work  of  policing 
dangerous  districts,  making  them  accessible  to  the 
world's  trade,  and  giving  them  an  equitable  system 
of  laws,  is  offering  to  other  nations  vast  markets, 
the  destruction  of  which  no  national  aggrandize- 
ment on  their  part  would  repay.  Thus  Egypt, 
from  being  a  sink  of  corruption,  has  in  the  short 
period  of  twenty  years  been  raised  to  the  position 
of  a  prosperous  nation  with  credit  sufficient  to 
carry  on  vast  internal  improvements. 

Russian  advance  and  Russian  efforts  to  push 
forward  the  bounds  of  civilization  are  likewise  of 
value  to  the  whole  world.  If  that  nation  is  actually 
most  successful  in  assimilating  Oriental  nationali- 
ties, if  she,  more  readily  than  any  other  European 
power,  can  give  to  them  a  certain  modicum  of  civ- 
ilization, resistance  to  her  progress  must  in  the  end 
prove  futile ;  and  in  the  meantime  such  resist- 
ance can  serve  only  to  antagonize  her  and  incense 
her  into  complete  hostility  to  Western  methods 
256 


ORIENT  AND   OCCIDENT 

and  ideals.  Her  progress  is  slow.  Any  attempt 
on  her  part  to  carry  out  vast  imperial  schemes 
without  the  foundation  of  true  interests  would 
result  in  the  collapse  of  her  whole  policy. 

Thus,  all  nations  may  cooperate  as  long  as  they 
expand  naturally.  What  must  be  prevented  at  all 
hazards  is  the  ruthless  preemption  of  territories 
not  yet  demanded  by  the  interests  of  national  ex- 
pansion. Even  if  the  nations  grow  normally,  the 
day  may  come  when  they  must  clash  and  prove 
their  right  to  survive.  But  that  day  is  distant  in- 
deed. Until  then,  it  is  only  necessary  to  repress 
the  tendencies  that  would  anticipate  natural  de- 
velopment, and  thus  create  an  artificial  spirit  of 
contention  and  competition  not  based  on  living, 
actual  interests.  To  oppose  the  natural  growth  of 
a  strong  power  is  unwise  and  futile ;  to  resist  the 
artificial  preemption  of  regions  not  yet  necessary 
for  national  life  is  the  part  of  statesmanship. 

Ill 

Bibliographical  Note 

Albrecht  (Max),  Russisch  Centralasien.     Hamburg,  1896. 
Bilbassoff  (B.  von),  Katharina  II.  im  Urteile  der  Weltlitera- 

iur  (translated  from  the  Russian).     Berlin,  1897. 
Bloch  (J.  von),  Der  Krieg  (translated  from   the  Russian). 

Berlin,  1899. 

Bodley  (J.  E.  C),  France.     New  York,  1898. 
Brandes  (George),  It)ipressions  of  Russia.     London,  1890. 
Clarke  (James  Freeman),  Essays.     Boston. 
257 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Clarke  (Sir  G.  S.),  Russia'' s  Sea  Power,  Past  and  Present. 
London,  1898. 

Foulke  (W.  D.),  Slav  or  Saxon?   2d  ed.    New  York,  1898. 

YidiXih2i\xstn,  Ldndliche  Verfassung  Riisslands.    Leipzig,  1866. 

Honegger  (J.  J.),  Russische  Literatur  und  Cultur.  Leipzig, 
1880. 

Issaeff  (A.  A.),  Emigration  and  its  Importance  for  the  Econ- 
omy of  the  Russian  Nation  (Russian).  St.  Petersburg, 
1891. 

Krausse  (A.),  Russia  in  Asia,  London,  1899. 

Krapotkin,  Memoirs  of  a  Revolutionist.     Boston,  1899. 

Leger  (L.),  Russes  et  Slaves.     Paris,  1896. 

Legras  (J.),  Au  Pays  Russe.     Paris,  1898. 

Leroy-Beaulieu  (Anatole),  The  Et/ipire  of  the  Czars  (trans- 
lated from  the  French).     London,  1 893-1 896. 

Pobedonostseff,  Refections  of  a  Russian  Statesman  (trans- 
lated from  the  Russian).    London,  1898. 

Popowski  (J.),  The  Rival  Powers  in  Central  Asia.  London, 
1897. 

Rawlinson  (Sir  Henry),  England  and  Russia  in  the  East. 
London,  1875. 

Reclus   (Elisee),  Geographie   Universelle.   Tome  V.     Paris, 

1880. 
Renan  (E.),  Discours  et  Conferences.     Paris,  1887. 
Thompson  (H.  N.),  Russian  Politics.     London,  1895. 
Tikhomirov  (L.  A.),  Russia,  Political  afid  Social  (translated 

from  the  French).     London,  1892. 

"Vladimir."  Russia  on  the  Pacific,  and  the  Siberian  Railway. 
New  York,  1899. 

Wallace  (McKenzie),  Russia.     1S77. 


258 


PART  IV 
GERMAN   IMPERIAL   POLITICS 


CHAPTER    I 

The  Nationalism  of  Bismarck  and  the  Impe- 
rialism OF  William  II 

The  expansionist  tendencies  of  Germany  to-day 
are  especially  interesting  under  a  twofold  aspect : 
as  showing  the  historical  development  from  nation- 
alism to  national  imperialism,  and  as  illustrating 
the  various  ramifications  which  that  expansionist 
policy  at  the  present  time  assumes.  Germany 
is  the  foremost  among  the  nations  that  have 
realized  their  unified  political  existence  during  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  her  whole  history  up  to 
1890,  to  be  rightly  understood,  must  be  read  in 
this  perspective.  Even  to-day  nationalism  is  the 
firm  basis  of  German  policy.  Her  colonial  expan- 
sion began  at  first  as  a  merely  commercial  devel- 
opment, political  considerations  being  secondary. 
The  change  which  has  been  wrought  by  recent 
events  will  be  best  illustrated  by  a  glance  at  Bis- 
marck's views  on  colonialism,  followed  by  a  more 
detailed  study  of  the  expressions  and  measures  of 
the  statesmen  of  a  more  recent  time. 

It  was  Bismarck's  idea  that  German  colonies 
were  to  maintain  a  strictly  commercial  nature. 
261 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Thus,  he  frequently  contrasted  them  with  the 
military  and  administrative  colonization  of  France. 
In  discussing  in  his  Memoirs^  the  future  policy 
of  Russia,  Bismarck  states  that  progress  of  that 
power  in  Asia  Minor  and  Turkey  v/ill  be  favorable 
to  Germany  by  withdrawing  the  attention  of  the 
Muscovite  Empire  from  the  German  border.  Ger- 
many, thought  Bismarck,  had  no  intention  of  ex- 
tending her  territory,  and  therefore,  of  all  European 
powers,  she  had  the  least  interest  in  the  Orient. 
He  believed  that  Germany's  policy  has  always 
been  characterized  by  respect  for  the  rights  of 
the  other  states,  and  this  essential  justness  he 
ascribes  to  the  objectivity  of  the  German  char- 
acter, and  also  to  the  fact  that  Germany  does 
not  stand  in  need  of  an  increase  of  territory. 
According  to  the  Memoirs,  the  nation  simply 
desired  to  realize  its  political  unity,  and,  this 
having  been  accomplished,  it  favors  peace  and 
the  maintenance  of  existing  conditions.  In  the 
view  of  the  Iron  Chancellor,  there  is  no  com- 
bativeness  or  irritability  in  German  politics.  He 
states  that  he  never  looked  upon  international  con- 
troversies from  the  point  of  view  of  the  duellist's 
honor,  but  that  he  always  rather  regarded  their 
effect  upon  the  right  of  the  German  people  to  lead 
an  autonomous  life.  Bismarck  even  favored  the 
formation  of  chartered  companies,  in  order  to  avoid 
the  assumption  of  political  control  in  connection 
with  colonization. 

^  Bismarck,  Gedanken  und  Erinnerungen,  Ch.  XXX. 
262 


GERMAN    IMPERIAL   POLITICS 

By  the  year  1890,  German  policy  had  already 
changed  materially.  Events  had  proved  that  com- 
mercial exploitation  leads  almost  inevitably  to 
political  interference  under  the  necessity  of  giv- 
ing protection  and  imparting  prestige  to  national 
undertakings.  Thus,  the  revolts  in  Zanzibar,  in 
1888,  had  led  to  far-reaching  political  interference 
on  the  part  of  the  German  government,  and  when 
in  1890  the  delimitation  agreement  was  concluded 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  the  latter 
empire  found  herself  in  the  possession  of  a  political 
domain  of  650,000  square  miles  on  the  African 
continent.  With  the  more  recent  developments  of 
imperial  politics,  the  methods  of  Germany  have 
thoroughly  changed,  and  the  principle  of  the 
necessity  of  political  assistance  in  the  work  of 
commercial  and  industrial  colonization  has  been 
fully  adopted. 

How  far  this  principle  is  carried  in  practice 
will  be  examined  immediately ;  but  we  may  well 
preface  that  consideration  with  a  few  represen- 
tative expressions  of  opinion  on  the  part  of 
the  German  emperor  and  other  statesmen.  Minis- 
ter von  Marschall  said  in  the  navy  debates  of 
1897:- 

"  German  politics  is  not  about  to  enter  on  an  adventurous 
stage.  We  must  defend  our  interests,  defend  tlie  Germans 
in  foreign  lands.  Emigration  must  be  directed  into  such 
channels  that  the  Germans  abroad  may  be  kept  German."^ 

1  Wilhelm  Miiller,  Poliiische  Gesckichte  der  Gegenwart,  1 897, 
p.  49. 

263 


WORLD   POLITICS 

The  manner  in  which  the  opposition  views  the 
policy  of  political  interference  is  shown  in  Deputy 
von  Kardoff's  answer  to  von  Marschall's  speech. 
Among  other  things,  he  said :  — 

"  Where  there  are  no  German  warships,  there  German 
commerce  flourishes  most.  The  protection  to  Germans  in 
foreign  lands  is  simply  a  prelude  to  a  policy  of  world  empire. 
That  is  a  poor  diplomacy  which  can  advance  only  when 
protected  by  gims."^ 

The  utterances  of  the  emperor  regarding  the  policy 
to  be  pursued,  are  of  special  significance  on  account 
of  his  influence  and  representative  character,  for 
his  speeches  have  come  to  be  looked  upon  as  im- 
portant declarations  of  the  government  policy ;  and 
it  is  well  known  that  he  selects  auspicious  occa- 
sions to  impress  his  leading  views  on  the  citizens 
of  Germany  and  on  the  world  at  large.  In  his 
speech  at  Cologne,  in  June,  1897,  he  said:  — 

"  We  have  great  duties  in  the  world.  There  are  Germans 
everywhere  whom  we  must  protect.  German  prestige  must 
be  preserved  abroad.     The  trident  belongs  in  our  hands."  ^ 

Upon  the  representative  occasion  of  delegating 
Prince  Henry  to  command  the  Oriental  fleet,  the 
emperor  took  occasion  to  express  himself  most 
unequivocally  on  the  new  tendencies  of  world  pol- 
itics, using  the  following  words  :  — 

"  The  expedition  which  you  undertake  is  the  logical  conse- 
quence of  what  our  sainted  grandfather  and  his  great  chancel- 
lor have  politically  organized,  and  what  our  magnificent  father 

1  Bid. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  127.     See  also  supra,  Part  I.,  Ch.  TV. 

264 


GERMAN    IMPERIAL   POLITICS 

fought  for  on  the  field  of  battle.  It  is  simply  the  first  realiza- 
tion of  the  transoceanic  ambition  of  the  newly  united  German 
Empire.  It  is  my  duty  to  follow  the  new  German  Hanse  and 
to  offer  it  the  protection  which  it  has  the  right  to  demand  of 
the  empire  and  its  ruler.  We  must  also  protect  the  German 
brothers  whose  ecclesiastical  duties  take  them  into  distant 
lands.  Our  mission  is  one  of  protection,  not  of  aggression. 
We  simply  wish  equal  rights  for  German  commerce  under  the 
imperial  banner.  Imperial  power  is  sea  power.  The  two  are 
mutually  dependent.  One  cannot  exist  without  the  other. 
Our  citizens  abroad  may  rest  absolutely  assured  that  the  pro- 
tection of  the  empire  will  everywhere  be  given  them  through 
the  imperial  navy.  Should  any  one  infringe  our  rights,  then 
use  the  mailed  fist  and  earn  your  laurel  wreath."^ 

A  still  more  significant  utterance  was  made  by 
the  emperor  at  Hamburg  on  October  i8,  1899, 
when,  at  a  banquet  given  in  the  town  hall  after 
the  launching  of  a  great  vessel,  he  said :  — 

"  Germany  is  in  bitter  need  of  a  strong  fleet.  This  mighty 
emporium  of  Hamburg  shows  what  the  German  people  can 
do  when  united,  and  on  the  other  hand,  how  necessary  to  our 
interests  is  the  strengthening  of  our  naval  forces.  If  that 
kind  of  reinforcement  had  not  been  refused  me  during  the 
first  eight  years  of  my  reign,  —  refused  despite  my  urgent 
requests  and  admonitions,  refused  with  scorn  and  even  mock- 
ery, —  how  ditTerent  matters  would  be  to-day.  We  should  be 
able  to  push  our  thriving  trade  and  commerce  over  the  seas." 

Expressions  like  these  might  be  cited  in  a  multi- 
tude of  instances,  but  the  above  suffice  to  summa- 
rize the  policy  that  is  at  present  governing  the 
counsels  of  the  German  Empire.     When  we  now 


» Ibid.,  p.  195. 

^  Reported  in  the  daily  press. 
265 


WORLD   POLITICS 

turn  to  that  policy  in  detail,  we  find  that  it  illus- 
trates all  of  the  aspects  of  the  new  imperialism. 
It  emphasizes  commercial  and  industrial  interests. 
Political  interference  and  control  enter  by  way  of 
the  protection  needed  for  industries  and  for  mis- 
sions. The  industrial  conquest  of  a  country  is 
initiated  by  the  building  of  railways.  Actual  col- 
onization is  everywhere  fostered.  Chartered  com- 
panies are  used  to  develop  backward  districts,  and 
the  method  of  protectorates  is  in  great  favor. 

In  general,  Germany  has  entered  upon  a  con- 
scious policy  of  imperial  expansion,  and  with  their 
well-known  thoroughness  of  method,  the  Germans 
have  developed  a  system  of  imperialism  more  com- 
plete and  well-ordered  than  that  of  any  other  coun- 
try, although  not  covering  so  much  territory  as 
does  that  of  Great  Britain  or  that  of  France.  To 
any  one  who  desires  to  study  the  present  tendency 
of  colonial  and  industrial  expansion,  the  methods 
pursued  by  the  German  Empire  are  therefore 
highly  interesting  and  instructive.  It  is  chiefly 
as  showing  the  sudden  transition  from  nationalism 
to  imperial  ideas,  and  as  bringing  out  clearly  the 
manifold  methods  by  which  this  tendency  mani- 
fests itself  in  contemporary  history,  that  the  writer 
presents  a  review  of  the  most  recent  developments 
in  German  colonization. 


266 


CHAPTER   II 

The  Interests  of  Germany  in  Africa  and 
Asia 

Germany  is  interested  in  widely  scattered  fields, 
and  her  methods  vary  according  to  the  conditions, 
—  political,  economic,  and  physical,  —  of  the  coun- 
try to  be  colonized.  The  South  African  colonies 
are  managed  largely  on  the  basis  of  English  prec- 
edent. Although  of  considerable  extent  and  likely, 
under  the  recent  understanding  with  Great  Britain, 
to  be  augmented  by  the  accession  of  a  portion  of 
the  Portuguese  possessions  in  Africa,  these  colonies 
may  be  omitted  from  our  consideration,  since  they 
present  elements  less  characteristic  than  those 
which  may  be  noted  in  other  parts  of  the  German 
colonial  field.  It  is  true  that  Germany  has  been 
obliged  to  solve  there  many  questions  of  colonial 
policy,  such  as  that  of  punitive  expeditions,  of 
treatment  *of  the  black  races,  and  of  the  best 
methods  for  commercial  expansion.  But  her 
plans  and  proceedings  in  other  parts  of  the  world 
are  so  much  more  interesting  and  important  that 
we  shall  not  dwell  upon  the  African  colonies,  nor 
267 


WORLD   POLITICS 

on  those  of  Oceanica,  where  the  chief  rights  of 
government  are  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  chartered 
company. 

It  is  chiefly  the  industrial  and  commercial  colo- 
nization of  China,  Asia  Minor,  and  South  America 
that  is  of  interest  in  this  connection.  Of  course, 
there  is  such  a  fluidity  of  development  that  it  is 
difficult  to  form  hard  and  fast  conclusions,  but  we 
can  gather  information  enough  to  apprise  our- 
selves of  the  evident  drift  of  circumstances,  and  to 
understand  better  the  situation  of  the  world  and  the 
interests  of  the  various  nations  at  the  present  time. 

It  is  often  stated  that  Germany  covets  the  Dutch 
colonies  in  Asia  and  South  America.  There  has 
been  considerable  newspaper  agitation  and  dis- 
cussion of  an  alliance  between  Holland  and 
Germany,  by  the  terms  of  which  Holland  is  to 
furnish  large  additions  to  the  German  navy, 
while  the  empire  is  to  defend  the  Dutch  kingdom  by 
its  mighty  army.  The  alleged  desire  of  England 
and  America  for  the  Dutch  colonies  is  used  to  stir 
up  feeling  in  favor  of  such  a  union,  and  the  Trans- 
vaal complications  lend  further  strength  to  this 
movement.  But  it  has  not  as  yet  passed  out  of 
the  stage  of  discussion  into  that  of  action ;  and 
while  it  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  poHtical  possibil- 
ity to  be  reckoned  with,  it  would  be  a  grave  mistake 
to  make  it  a  basis  of  political  reasoning  as  an  ac- 
complished fact. 

We  have  already  incidentally  discussed  the 
position  of  Germany  in  China,  and  it  will  there- 

268 


GERMAN    IMPERIAL   POLITICS 

fore  be  sufficient  if  in  this  place  we  summarize 
what  has  been  said  before,  merely  offering  addi- 
tional information  on  important  points.  It  is,  of 
course,  well  known  that  the  actual  seizure  of 
Chinese  territory  was  accomplished  under  the 
guise  of  retaHation  for  outrages  committed  on 
certain  missionaries  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church.  It  is  interesting,  in  this  connection,  to 
note  the  efforts  made  by  the  German  government 
to  obtain  the  protectorate  over  Roman  Catholic 
missions  in  the  Orient.  On  account  of  their 
cohesion  and  systematic  manner  of  proceeding, 
these  missions  are  more  effective  agents  for 
purposes  of  poUtical  extension  than  are  those  of 
the  Protestant  churches.  The  French  still  cling 
to  their  claim  of  being  the  regular  protectors  of 
Catholic  Christians  in  the  Orient ;  but  a  few  years 
ago  a  concerted  effort  was  made  to  displace 
France  from  this  office,  partly  or  entirely,  and  to 
substitute  instead  the  German  Empire.  The  move- 
ment was  assisted  by  the  German  party  at  the 
Vatican,  led  by  the  cardinals  Ledochowski,  Hohen- 
lohe,  and  Galimberti,^  which  exerted  its  influence 
to  have  a  portion  of  the  protectorate  transferred 
to  Germany,  using  as  arguments  against  France 
the  prevalence  of  religious  struggles  and  the 
power  of  Masonic  organizations  in  the  republic. 
As  Cardinal  Ledochowski  is  prefect  of  the  prop- 

^  See  article  on  "  La  Politique  Allemande  et  le  Protectorat  des 
Missions  Catholiques,"  in  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  September, 
1898. 

269 


WORLD   POLITICS 

aganda,  —  that  is,  virtually  colonial  secretary  of 
the  Holy  See,  —  he  was  an  important  ally  of  the 
German  cause.  An  attempt  had  already  been 
made  in  1886  to  supersede  France,  at  least  in  part, 
by  having  a  papal  nuncio  to  China  appointed. 
In  1 891,  Bishop  Anzer,  the  head  of  the  German 
missions  in  China,  placed  his  mission  under 
German  protection.  It  was  the  massacre  of  two 
of  his  missionaries  that  led  to  the  German  occu- 
pation. The  massacre  could  not  have  come  at 
a  time  more  suitable  for  the  Emperor  William's 
plans,  since  it  furnished  occasion  for  significant 
naval  demonstrations,  and  strengthened  the  em- 
peror's position  in  the  Reichstag  by  inducing  a 
large  portion  of  the  Centrist  or  CathoHc  party  to 
favor  the  naval  budget.^  German  efforts  at  the 
Vatican  not  being  completely  successful,  the  im- 
perial government  has  finally  declared  that,  even 
without  the  consent  or  expressed  wish  of  the 
Vatican,  it  will  undertake  the  protection  of 
German  missionaries  and  ecclesiastics  wherever 
they  may  be  found. 

The  territory  thus  gained  in  China,  —  the  port  of 
Kiao-chow, — is  to  be  made  the  centre  of  German 
exploitation  of  Shantung  and  the  Yellow  River 
valley.  Within  the  former  province,  railroads  are 
to  be  built  exclusively  with  German  capital  and  by 
German  engineers ;  for  a  distance  of  30  //  (about 

1  Telegrams  thanking  the  emperor  for  the  protection  afforded 
were  received  from  many  prelates,  including  the  archbishops  of 
Breslau  and  Posen. 

270 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

12  miles)  from  each  side  of  these  railways,  and 
along  their  whole  extent,  the  mines  are  to  be  devel- 
oped by  German  subjects.  If  the  Chinese  should 
at  any  time  be  in  need  of  foreign  capital  for 
the  development  of  Shantung,  German  capitalists 
shall,  in  the  first  instance,  be  applied  to  for  loans. 
Necessary  machinery  and  materials,  too,  are  to  be 
obtained  from  German  manufacturers.^  In  the 
upper  Yellow  River  valley,  no  such  exclusive  privi- 
leges have  been  obtained,  though  from  the  agree- 
ment made  between  German  and  British  financiers,  ^ 
it  is  apparent  that  the  German  government  intends 
to  foster  commercial  and  industrial  exploitation  in 
this  region. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the 
influence  of  Chinese  affairs  on  the  political  affini- 
ties of  Germany.  The  German  Empire  and  France 
assisted  Russia  in  preventing  Japan  from  deriving 
the  fullest  benefits  from  her  great  victory  over 
China,  and  as  a  remuneration  for  the  good  offices 
thus  offered  to  the  Celestial  Empire,  the  latter  has 
allowed  these  three  nations  exceptional  concessions 
within  her  borders.  Germany,  by  joining  this  tri- 
umvirate in  its  inception,  secured  exclusive  privi- 
leges to  which  her  former  relations  with  China  had 
scarcely  entitled  her,  and  she  still  occupies  a  privi- 
leged position  in  the  eyes  of  the  court  and  govern- 
ment at  Peking. 

It  is  not  at  all  to  be  expected,  however,  that 
Germany  will  bind  herself  in  any  way  to  act  with 

*  Comular  Reports,  December,  1898,  p.  558.  '  See  p.  123. 

271 


WORLD   POLITICS 

France  or  Russia  in  the  future.  Having  now 
obtained  a  foothold  in  China,  her  interests  will 
henceforth  rather  be  contrary  to  those  of  her  two 
former  allies,  and  more  similar  to  those  of  the  Brit- 
ish Empire.  Germany  will  not  act  rashly ;  she 
will  patiently  await  developments  and  act  at  every 
juncture  with  precision  and  due  regard  to  her 
interests.  It  is  not  certain  that  she  would  oppose 
further  advance  on  the  part  of  Russia,  if  she  her- 
self were  to  receive  additional  advantages  similar 
to  those  already  acquired,  and  if  she  were  also  to 
be  assured  that  her  present  trade  facilities  would 
not  thereby  be  diminished.  Should  the  course  of 
events  inevitably  lead  to  an  actual  partition,  the 
German  Empire  would  demand  its  share,  but  it  is 
not  to  be  expected  that  she  will  consciously  take 
any  steps  toward  bringing  about  such  a  devel- 
opment. Advances  looking  to  that  end  can  be 
expected  only  from  Russia. 

The  interests  of  Germany  in  China  are  primarily 
of  a  commercial  and  industrial  nature.  Her  com- 
merce is  rapidly  gaining  upon  that  of  England. 
At  Hongkong,  the  German  merchants  are  most 
prosperous  and  energetic,  and  more  and  more  of 
the  trade  is  passing  into  their  hands.  Kiao-chow 
must,  therefore,  not  be  looked  upon  primarily  in 
the  light  of  a  territorial  acquisition,  but  rather  as 
a  point  of  support  for  commercial  and  industrial 
development.  The  same  is  true  of  the  moderate 
territorial  concession  obtained  in  the  city  of  Han- 
kow, where  also  German  commerce  is  rapidly  gain- 

272 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

ing}  When  Prince  Henry  steamed  up  the  Yangtse 
in  imperial  splendor,  his  purpose  was  to  impress 
the  Chinese  mind  with  the  power  of  Germany  to 
afford  effective  protection  to  her  industrial  repre- 
sentatives. From  all  this  it  may  be  judged  that 
the  interests  of  the  empire  in  China  are  already 
large,  and  constantly  and  rapidly  growing. 

Such  being  the  case,  the  rational  policy  of  Ger- 
many is  one  of  equal  opportunity  and  opposition  to 
exclusive  appropriation.  Her  government  is  fully 
alive  to  the  vast  importance  of  the  Chinese  crisis, 
and  every  incident  in  that  great  historical  devel- 
opment is  keenly  watched.  Whatever  may  hap- 
pen, Germany  is  sure  to  insist  upon  her  just  share 
in  any  advantages  to  be  obtained.  It  perhaps  may 
be  doubted  whether  she  can  be  counted  on  to  oppose 
an  effective  barrier  to  the  Russification  of  north- 
ern China.  As  long  as  the  markets  are  left  open 
and  industrial  advantages  free,  she  would  not  be 
inclined  to  venture  blood  and  treasure  in  a  strug- 
gle with  Russia;  but  should  that  country  insist  upon 
absolute  exclusiveness  of  policy,  Germany  might 
be  relied  upon  as  an  ally  in  the  opposition  to  Rus- 
sian advance. 

The  countries  of  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Meso- 
potamia have  recently  come  into  prominence  as  of 
great  importance  for  colonization.  We  are  accus- 
tomed to  think  of  this  region  as  composed  of  vast 
plains  or  of  mountainous  and  barren  tracts,  over 
which  nomadic  horsemen  roam,  and  which  are 
*  See  Consular  Reports,  August,  1899,  p.  671. 

X  273 


WORLD   POLITICS 

studded  here  and  there  with  the  ruins  of  the  cit- 
ies of  former  empires.  Few  have  thought  of  the 
industrial  possibilities  of  this  vast  region ;  and 
yet  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  within  the  next 
few  decades  it  will  become  a  great  industrial  and 
commercial  centre.  Though  not  so  immensely 
rich  as  China,  its  resources  are  abundant  and 
accessible,  while  its  population  is  sparse.  More- 
over, European  colonists  could  settle  here  without 
being  subjected  to  the  inconveniences  or  dangers 
of  a  tropical  climate,  and  without  being  obliged  to 
modify  greatly  the  habits  of  their  homes.  They 
could  without  much  change  transfer  their  trade 
and  manufactures,  and  here  continue  their  accus- 
tomed industrial  activities.  Of  all  the  regions  still 
available  for  European  colonization,  this  is,  there- 
fore, by  far  the  most  promising. 

It  is  evident  that  from  the  very  first  the  present 
emperor  has  recognized  the  importance  of  Asia 
Minor.  Though  Bismarck  asserted  that  Germany, 
having  no  interests  there,  need  not  oppose  the 
Russian  advance  in  that  region,^  the  emperor  has 
from  the  beginning  taken  a  decidedly  contrary 
view.  He  has  moulded  his  entire  European  policy 
with  a  view  to  gaining  the  friendship  of  the  Turkish 
government  and  obtaining  from  it  complete  freedom 
in  developing  the  resources  of  Asia  Minor. 

1  Cf.  his  famous  saying,  "  In  the  whole  Oriental  controversy  (of 
1876)  there  are  no  German  interests  involved  that  would  be  worth 
the  sound  bones  of  a  single  Pomeranian  musketeer."  —  Speech 
of  December  6,  1876. 

274 


GERMAN    IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

The  German  missions  of  that  region  have  also 
been  placed  under  special  imperial  protection. 
The  Steele  Fathers,  whose  Paldstinaverein  is  a 
most  important  missionary  agency,  have  placed 
themselves  under  the  shield  of  the  emperor,  and 
though  Cardinal  Kopp's  mission  to  the  Vatican  to 
obtain  the  papal  sanction  for  a  German  protecto- 
rate did  not  succeed,  the  emperor  has,  as  has  just 
been  said,  declared  his  firm  purpose  to  maintain 
the  right  of  the  empire  to  protect  her  citizens 
wherever  found.  Besides  these  German  missions, 
there  are  already  in  Syria  and  Palestine  important 
industrial,  commercial,  and  agricultural  colonies, 
and  within  the  past  year  a  large  colonial  society 
has  been  formed  for  the  development  of  this 
movement. 

Of  the  greatest  significance,  however,  is  the 
emxperor's  visit  to  the  Holy  Land  in  1898.  Many 
have  been  inclined  to  put  this  visit  down  to  the 
account  of  the  emperor's  predilection  for  splen- 
did dramatic  presentations.  Taken  in  its  con- 
nection with  German  policy,  however,  it  is  not  to 
be  doubted  that  it  had  a  deep  political  significance. 
For  years  before  the  Sultan's  friendship  had  been 
cultivated,  and  especially  during  the  Greek  war, 
did  the  German  government  openly  evince  its 
regard  for  the  Osman  Empire.  Not  only  had  the 
German  officers  given  the  brave  Ottoman  fighters 
the  methods  needed  for  success,  but  even  the 
government  itself  was  prompt  in  taking  steps 
which  showed  sympathy  with  Turkey  as  against 

275 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Greece.  Some  writers  have  attributed  this  move- 
ment  to  Germany's  desire  for  the  preservation  of 
European  peace ;  ^  but  surely  such  a  desire  might 
have  been  evinced  without  active  manifestations 
of  sympathy  for  the  Turkish  government.  Thus, 
an  Armenian  professor,  Thumajan,  who  wished  to 
speak  in  Berlin  on  the  persecution  of  the  Armenian 
Christians,  was  not  allowed  to  give  his  address,  on 
account  of  his  attacks  on  "  our  friend,  the  Sultan."  ^ 
Germany's  manifestations  of  sympathy,  which  were 
of  substantial  value  to  Turkey  and  which  were 
highly  appreciated  by  the  Porte,  were  followed  by 
the  emperor's  visit  to  the  Orient.  With  great 
splendor,  which  might  well  be  taken  as  indicating 
a  lurking  desire  on  the  part  of  the  august  monarch 
to  figure,  at  least  in  the  eyes  of  the  impressionable 
Orientals,  as  a  vice-regent  of  God,  the  imperial 
"  progress  "  was  accomplished.^  The  imperial  visit 
to  Jerusalem,  like  the  visit  of  Prince  Henry  to 
Hankow,  indicated  the  purpose  of  the  emperor  to 
give  political  aid  to  commercial  and  industrial 
development  and  colonization. 

As  a  result  of  these  activities,  the  Germans  have 
assumed  a  leading  role  as  colonizers  in  Syria  and 
in  the  southern  part  of  Asia  Minor.  Their  com- 
mercial interests  are   rapidly   expanding,  and   no 

1  For  instance,  W.  T.  Stead,  in  The  Chief  Justice  of  Europe. 

2  Wilhelm  Miiller's  Politische  Geschichte  der  Gegenwart,  1897, 
p.  28. 

•  See  Etienne  Lamy,  "  La  France  du  Levant,"  in  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  January,  1899. 

276 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

efforts  are  spared  to  study  the  characteristic 
demands  of  the  market,  and  to  adapt  the  nature  of 
manufactures  and  of  the  credit  arrangements  to 
local  conditions. 1  In  order  to  give  greater  impulse 
and  unity  to  the  efforts  at  colonization,  a  German 
monthly  magazine,  Der  Orient,  is  being  published, 
in  both  the  French  and  German  languages.  To 
quote  from  the  opening  article :  — 

"  Its  purpose  is  to  strengthen  and  extend  the  mutual 
relations  of  Germany  and  the  countries  of  the  Levant.  It 
will  contribute  to  the  better  understanding  of  political  and 
commercial  undertakings  in  those  regions,  combat  ancient 
prejudices  among  the  Orientals,  and  prove  to  them  that 
we  Germans  have  no  political  axes  to  grind  in  the  Levant, 
but  simply  desire  to  be  allowed  to  appear  as  unseliish  friends 
and  as  pioneers  of  Western  culture.  Der  Orient  will  attempt 
to  increase  German  imports  into  the  Levant,  as  well  as  the 
exports  from  there  to  Germany,  and  it  will  strongly  advo- 
cate the  solidarity  and  authority  of  Turkey  and  the  Balkan 
states." 

Development  of  railway  communication  in  Asia 
Minor  is  chiefly  in  the  hands  of  German  capital- 
ists. The  Anatolian  Railway,  the  trunk  line 
intended  ultimately  to  connect  Constantinople 
with  Bagdad,  has  already  in  large  part  been  con- 
structed. In  1888,  the  German  'BdiVvk  {Die  Deutsche 
Bank)  of  Berlin  obtained  a  concession  to  build 
and  operate  for  ninety-nine  years  that  part  of  the 
line    between    Ismid    (near    Constantinople)  and 

^  See  Commercial  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1898,  pp.  142, 
1 161,  1 1 70,  1 1 78. 

277 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Angora,  a  distance  of  485  kilometres.  This 
section  of  the  line  was  built  by  the  German  Society 
for  the  Construction  of  Railways  in  Asia  Minor,  of 
Frankfurt,  and  was  completed  in  1892.  Two  fur- 
ther important  concessions  were  obtained  by  the 
German  Bank  in  1893, —  for  a  hne  between  Angora 
and  Kaisarieh  (425  km.),  and  for  a  branch  to 
Konia  (470  km.).  The  concession  for  the  part 
of  the  trunk  line  between  Kaisarieh  and  Bagdad 
is  reported  as  having  also  been  obtained  by  Ger- 
man capitalists,  in  1899.  One  great  difficulty 
which  confronts  the  railway  builder  in  that  country 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  government  wishes  the 
roads  constructed  on  strategical  rather  than  on 
commercial  lines,  and  it  is  therefore  often  no  easy 
or  simple  matter  to  arrive  at  an  agreement. 

The  resources  of  this  region  are  of  great  variety 
and  richness.  The  plain  of  Hauran,  west  of 
Damascus,  would  alone  be  able  to  furnish  the 
grain  necessary  for  the  sustenance  of  a  much 
larger  population  than  that  of  Syria  to-day,  and 
there  are  many  other  regions  of  equal  promise. 
The  mountains  are  rich  in  mineral  wealth. 

The  position  of  the  country  promises  to  make  it 
also  an  important  industrial  centre.  Should  the 
great  railway  line  from  Alexandria  to  Shanghai  be 
constructed,  Palestine  would  become  the  junction 
point  for  the  European,  Asiatic,  and  African  trans- 
continental lines,  a  position  that  would  redound 
most  favorably  to  the  commercial  importance  of 
this  region. 

278 


GERMAN    IMPERIAL   POLITICS 

Strategically,  too,  Syria  is  of  the  highest  value. 
Commanding  both  the  sea  and  land  routes  between 
the  continents,  it  is  easily  defended  on  account  of 
its  partly  mountainous  character,  a  condition  which 
is  certain  to  give  this  region  vast  political  impor- 
tance. The  power  that  can  control  it  will  thereby 
obtain  a  material  accession  to  its  weight  in  the 
politics  of  the  world.  At  present,  Germany  does 
not  aim  at  anything  beyond  an  industrial  conquest. 
But  should  this  be  accomplished,  it  would  doubt- 
less lead  naturally  to  the  assertion  of  political  in- 
fluence, at  least  to  the  extent  of  the  exclusion  of 
foreign  powers. 

It  is  here  that  Russia  and  Germany  are  most 
likely  to  clash.  Germany,  with  her  rapidly  expand- 
ing population,  is  looking  for  fields  suitable  for 
actual  colonization.  Hitherto  she  has  lost  her  col- 
onists, chiefly  to  English-speaking  lands.  To  avoid 
this  in  the  future  is  one  of  the  greatest  hopes  of 
the  present  government.  Nowhere  can  this  hope 
be  attained  more  readily  than  in  Asia  Minor, 
where  there  is  no  population  which  would  be 
at  all  likely  to  absorb  the  German  colonists,  and 
where,  on  the  contrary,  they  would  retain  their 
national  sentiments  and  keep  up  their  connec- 
tion with  the  mother  country.  Should  Germany 
succeed  in  fostering  considerable  industrial  and 
agricultural  colonies  in  Asia  Minor,  her  inheri- 
tance of  the  political  power  of  Turkey  in  these 
regions  would  be  only  a  question  of  time.  She 
might  still  leave  northern  Asia  Minor  to  the  Rus- 
279 


WORLD   POLITICS 

sian  Empire,  although  even  that  is  doubtful.  The 
southern  part  she  has  clearly  marked  out  as  a  field 
for  her  interests,  without,  however,  asserting  any 
present  policy  of  exclusiveness,  since  such  a  policy 
would  tend  to  defeat  the  ultimate  realization  of 
German  purposes. 


a  80 


CHAPTER   III 

German  Colonization  in  South  America 

The  nature  of  German  colonization  in  South 
America  and  the  manner  in  which  the  imperial 
government  views  the  industrial  and  commercial 
development  of  that  region  are  especially  interest- 
ing as  showing  how  thoroughly  the  Germans  are 
aware  of  the  true  character  of  modern  imperialism. 
Territorial  acquisitions  are  of  secondary  impor- 
tance, when  considered  by  the  side  of  the  necessity 
of  providing  ample  facilities  for  trade  and  industry 
throughout  the  civilized  world,  and  strong  and 
efficient  protection  of  the  industrial  colonists  by 
the  home  government.  Throughout  South  Amer- 
ica, German  commerce  and  industry  have  made 
rapid  strides  in  the  last  decade.  The  advance  of 
German  enterprises  has  undoubtedly  been  exagger- 
ated by  interested  writers,  whose  purpose  has  been 
to  add  fuel  to  existing  international  hostilities. 
The  present  absolute  volume  of  German  trade  in 
South  America  is  not  so  important  as  that  of  Great 
Britain,  but  the  significant  fact  remains  that  the 
investment  of  German  capital  and  the  formation  of 
281 


WORLD   POLITICS 

trade  relations  have  increased  relatively  more 
rapidly  than  those  of  any  other  nation. 

The  colonies  of  Germany  in  South  America 
have  a  basis  which  is  chiefly  commercial.  A  Ger- 
man merchant  settles  in  some  community,  extends 
his  business  relations  by  founding  branch  houses 
in  neighboring  towns,  and  draws  after  him  to  his 
new  home  other  relatives  and  friends.  Then, 
too,  by  the  side  of  their  commercial  establishments, 
agricultural  colonies  are  often  founded.  Finally, 
to  facilitate  the  exchange  of  products,  banking 
operations  are  carried  on  between  the  mother 
country  and  the  colony.  The  colonists  avoid  all 
interference  in  local  political  affairs,  leaving  sterile 
politics  to  the  native  population,  and  confining 
their  attention  to  the  development  of  the  country's 
wealth.  As  a  consequence,  they  generally  enjoy 
the  confidence  and  esteem  of  the  populations 
among  whom  they  work.  They  have  a  very 
clearly  expressed  purpose  to  which  they  tena- 
ciously adhere,  —  the  building  up  of  commercial 
relations  between  Germany  and  the  fields  of  col- 
onization. 

In  certain  parts  of  Central  and  South  America, 
a  very  large  portion  of  the  trade  has  come  into 
German  hands.^  Very  important  banking  corpo- 
rations have  been  estabhshed  to  mediate  between 
the  colonial  tradesmen  and   the  mother  country. 

1  Thus,  for  instance,  three-fourths  of  the  coffee  exported  from 
Guatemala  goes  to  Germany.     Ahnost  all  the    foreigners   in   this 
country  are  Germans.     See  StaUsman''s  Year  Book,  1899,  p.  706. 
282 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

Thus,  the  German-Brazilian  Bank  has  a  capital 
of  $4,000,000 ;  the  German  Transatlantic  Bank  of 
Buenos  Ayres,  $5,000,000.  Throughout  South  and 
Central  America,  and  especially  in  Chile,  Brazil, 
and  Argentina,  there  are  numerous  German  bank- 
ing firms,  which  are  of  the  greatest  assistance 
in  the  development  of  trade  with  Germany.  It  is 
estimated  that  more  than  $150,000,000  of  German 
capital  is  invested  in  Brazil  alone  in  industry  and 
large  holdings  of  real  estate.  German  capital  is 
interested  in  Brazilian  railroads,  and  also  in  the 
Gra7i  Ferrocarril — The  Great  Railway — of  Ven- 
ezuela. In  southern  Brazil  and  southern  Chile, 
important  agricultural  colonies  have  been  founded, 
while  in  the  Argentine  Republic  large  numbers  of 
the  middle  class  landholders  are  Germans.  ^ 

As  it  is  certain,  from  utterances  of  the  German 
press  and  political  declarations  of  the  government, 
that  Germany  has  directed  its  attention  to  the 
magnificent  field  opened  for  commerce  and  indus- 
trial exploitation  in  the  South  American  republics, 
it  is  to  be  expected  that  German  immigration  will, 
in  the  future,  be  directed  into  this  channel. 

The  political  aspect  of  this  expansion  becomes 
evident  when  we  consider  the  protection  which 
the  mother  country  feels  called  upon  to  afford  her 
colonists.  As  we  have  seen,  the  emperor  has 
repeatedly  declared  it  to  be  the  intention  of  the 

1  See  Kunz,  Chile  und  die  dentschen  Colonien,  Leipzig,  1891; 
F.  Vie,  "  Les  Colonies  Commerciales  des  Allemands,"  in  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  February,  1899. 

283 


WORLD   POLITICS 

government  to  use  its  political  power  to  defend 
the  civil  rights  of  her  citizens  wherever  found. 
In  this  connection  it  should  be  further  noted  that 
the  Russo-German  agreement  concerning  China 
contains  a  section  referring  to  South  America,  by 
which  Russia  promises  to  allow  Germany  a  com- 
pletely free  hand  in  following  out  her  interests 
and  developing  natural  resources  on  that  conti- 
nent. We  have  seen  that  Bismarck's  idea  of 
purely  commercial  imperialism  is,  in  the  long  run, 
untenable.  When  populations  on  different  planes 
of  social  advancement  come  together,  friction  can- 
not be  avoided,  and  political  interference  will  often, 
under  the  dogma  of  universal  protection,  be  the  re- 
sult of  purely  commercial  undertakings.  Should 
Germany,  therefore,  on  account  of  complications  in 
South  America,  find  herself  called  upon  to  defend 
the  rights  of  her  colonists,  she  would  undoubtedly 
take  the  necessary  steps,  even  though  this  might 
interfere  with  the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine by  the  United  States. 

It  is  claimed  by  European  powers  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  merely  an  expression  of  Amer- 
ican policy,  —  not  a  part  of  international  law,  — 
and  that  it  is  justified  only  so  long  as  it  rests  on 
actual  interests.  In  other  words,  they  acknowl- 
edge that  should  the  United  States  actually  have 
the  paramount  interest  in  South  American  affairs, 
there  would  be  a  just  foundation  for  the  doctrine. 
In  modern  politics,  they  insist,  mere  sentimental, 
ideal    affinities    have    lost   their   strength.      Any 

284 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

country,  therefore,  which  has  material,  actual  in- 
terests in  South  America  has,  they  assert,  a  right 
to  interfere  in  so  far  as  the  protection  of  those  in- 
terests may  at  any  time  demand. 

Recent  developments  in  American  politics  have 
given  European  nations  another  argument  by 
which  to  avoid  the  moral  necessity  of  recognizing 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That  doctrine  or  line  of 
policy  established  between  the  Old  World  and  the 
New  a  certain  balance,  with  a  guarantee  of  mutual 
non-interference,  which  had  an  appearance  of  jus- 
tice. But  now,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  centre 
of  Old  World  political  interests  lies  in  China,  or, 
more  broadly,  in  Asia.  The  United  States,  by  its 
avowed  intention  to  play  a  leading  part  in  Asiatic 
affairs  and  to  foster  actively  its  present  and  pro- 
spective interests  in  that  region,  has  left  the  sphere 
which  the  policy  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  seemed 
to  have  assigned  to  it.  According  to  the  interpre- 
tation of  European  writers,  the  balance  of  mutual 
forbearance  upon  which  the  justice  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  might  have  been  maintained  has,  there- 
fore, been  destroyed.  The  United  States,  according 
to  them,  can  no  longer,  on  m.erely  ideal  grounds, 
demand  the  exclusion  of  European  influence  from 
the  Western  hemisphere.  Wherever  its  legitimate 
interests  lead,  there  a  nation  has  a  right  to  follow. 
If  legitimate  interests  are  developed  in  South 
America,  such  as  may  in  time  necessitate  politi- 
cal interference,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  will  not  be 
allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  when  that  occasion 

285 


WORLD  POLITICS 

arises.  At  any  rate,  if  the  United  States  desires  to 
maintain  the  doctrine,  it  must  be  ready  to  assume 
the  responsibility  for  the  security  and  the  protec- 
tion of  European  interests  in  South  America. 

It  should  not  be  understood  from  this  that  the 
writer  wishes  to  imply  that  Germany  is  actively 
plotting  for  an  acquisition  of  South  American  ter- 
ritory. Her  policy  thus  far  has  been  simply  one  of 
fostering  to  the  utmost  possible  extent  her  national 
commerce  and  industry,  by  entering  regions  hith- 
erto unexploited.  If  the  general  lust  for  territorial 
aggrandizement  is  curbed ;  if  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  succeed  in  checking  the  further 
territorial  disintegration  of  China ;  and  if,  finally, 
they  put  proper  restraints  on  those  elements  within 
their  own  polity  which  are  crying  for  undue  terri- 
torial expansion,  —  then  South  America  and  the 
world  in  general  may,  for  a  long  time  to  come, 
remain  an  open  field  for  the  free  and  equal  ex- 
ploitation by  all  nations  that  possess  great  indus- 
trial power.  Should,  however,  a  poHcy  of  land 
seizing  be  continued  and  exaggerated,  great  inter- 
national struggles  cannot  be  avoided. 


286 


CHAPTER   IV 

General  Characteristics  of  German  Imperial 
Politics 

The  foregoing  considerations  have  given  us  a 
vantage-ground  from  which  to  view  Germany's  new 
imperial  poHcy  as  a  whole.  It  is  based  on  Bis- 
marck's idea  of  commercial  expansion  ;  its  purpose 
is  to  create  a  commercial  and  industrial  empire,  rest- 
ing on  a  strong  nationaUstic  basis,  —  one  founded 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  an  outlet  to  the  super- 
abundant energies  at  home.  As  far  as  possible, 
political  complications  are  to  be  avoided ;  but  since, 
in  regions  where  there  is  no  civil  law,  or  where  its 
administration  is  unsatisfactory,  the  colonists  may 
need  protection,  it  becomes  necessary  to  build  up 
a  strong  sea  power  for  this  purpose.  The  govern- 
ment aids  individual  undertakings  to  the  full  extent 
of  its  power  by  giving  them  information  and  pro- 
tection, and  within  her  own  protectorates  the 
empire  gives  the  preference  to  German  investors. 

An  object-lesson  in  the  protection  of  her  citizens 
abroad  was  given  in  the  case  of  Hayti  in  1897.  A 
German  citizen  had  been  arrested,  fined,  and  im- 
287 


WORLD   POLITICS 

prisoned  without  due  cause.  As  the  president  of 
the  repubHc  disregarded  the  representations  of  the 
German  ambassador,  two  ships  were  despatched  to 
support  the  demands  of  the  government  for  res- 
titution,—  which  was  immediately  afforded.^  This 
case  and  the  seizure  of  Kiao-chow  happening  just  at 
the  time  when  the  imperial  government  was  asking 
for  an  extensive  enlargement  of  the  navy,  they  were 
made  the  most  of  by  the  government,  with  the  re- 
sult that  the  grant  asked  for  in  the  budget,  which 
had  been  repeatedly  refused,  was  finally  allowed, 
the  navy  having  thus  amply  demonstrated  its  use- 
fulness and  even  its  indispensability. 

The  field  within  which  territorial  acquisition  is 
at  present  possible  has  become  decidedly  limited. 
The  German  Empire,  therefore,  confines  its  atten- 
tion chiefly  to  the  extension  of  commercial  rela- 
tions,—  to  founding  industrial  and  commercial 
colonies,  and  maintaining  assiduously  their  con- 
nection with  the  mother  country.  A  conscious 
effort  is  made  to  direct  German  immigration 
away  from  its  older  channels  into  those  that  lead 
to  regions  where  the  colonist  may  be  expected  to 
retain  his  allegiance  to  the  mother  country.  Com- 
mercially, such  German  colonists  remain  members 
of  the  empire  and  extend  its  sway  ;  politically,  they 
are  beginning  to  look  to  it  for  protection  whenever 
local  political  complications  arise.  An  exclusive 
policy  such  as  that  adopted  by  Russia  would  ruin 

1  See  Wilhelm  Miiller's  Politische  Geschichte  der  Gegenwart, 
1897,  p.  200. 

288 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

Germany ;  whatever  colonies  Germany  might  ac- 
quire would  not  afford  a  sufficiently  extensive 
market  for  her  national  industries.  It  is  in  the  free 
exchange  of  her  products  with  other  nations  like 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  therefore,  that 
the  salvation  of  Germany  lies.  Of  course,  if  these 
nations  should  adopt  in  any  extreme  form  a  policy 
of  exclusion,  Germany  would  be  driven  in  self- 
defence  to  the  policy  of  territorial  aggrandizement. 

Looking  now  to  the  relations  of  Germany  with 
other  great  powers,  we  find  that  the  empire,  as  far 
as  affairs  of  world  politics  are  concerned,  has  pre- 
served its  independence,  and  has  acted  as  its  in- 
terests at  any  given  time  have  dictated,  fostering 
friendly  relations  with  all  great  powers,  but  yield- 
ing to  none  in  matters  of  vital  material  interest. 

In  South  Africa,  Germany  and  England  seem 
to  have  come  to  an  understanding  with  regard  to 
the  eventual  partition  of  the  Portuguese  posses- 
sions. The  details  of  this  convention  are  not 
known,  but  it  is  at  least  certain  that  these  two 
great  powers  intend  to  work  in  harmony  on  the 
continent  of  Africa,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  no 
narrow  prejudice  will  succeed  in  separating  two 
nations  whose  interests  are  so  closely  allied  in  the 
matter  of  keeping  the  world  open  to  free  trade 
and  preventing  the  victory  of  a  narrower  com- 
mercial policy.  Though  great  rivals  industrially, 
they  are  both  enriched  by  having  a  free  opportu- 
nity to  supply  the  world  with  what  their  respective 
resources  and  capacities  enable  them  to  produce 
u  289 


WORLD   POLITICS 

at  the  greatest  advantage,  so  that  in  the  policy  of 
equal  opportunity  they  may  well  stand  shoulder 
to  shoulder. 

It  has  also  been  noted  that  relations  between 
France  and  Germany  have  of  late  grown  more 
amicable.  This  rapprochement  between  nations 
recently  so  hostile  to  each  other  can  only  be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  they  have  come  to 
realize  the  advent  of  an  era  of  much  broader 
interests  than  those  of  continental  Europe,  and 
to  recognize  that  in  the  great  work  of  opening 
the  world's  resources  there  is  room  for  all  the 
energies  of  the  civilized  world.  If  this  idea  can 
be  emphasized  in  the  intercourse  of  the  leaders 
and  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  great 
powers,  it  will  counteract  the  narrow,  chauvinistic 
nationalism  that  tends  to  sharpen  unreasoning 
hostilities. 

One  of  the  elements  that  have  favored  a  recon- 
ciliation between  France  and  Germany  is  the  con- 
sciousness that  both  countries  have  many  vital 
interests  in  common,  especially  as  against  the  other 
great  powers,  Russia,  England,  and  the  United 
States.  Should  a  policy  of  commercial  exclusive- 
ness  be  more  generally  adopted,  and  should  these 
latter  powers  all  erect  themselves  into  exclusive 
spheres,  as  Russia  has  already  done  entirely  and  as 
the  United  States  has  done  in  part,  the  nations 
of  central  Europe  would  be  forced  to  combine  for 
self -protection.  In  colonial  matters,  there  are  no 
violent  antipathies  between  France  and  Germany : 
290 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

in  Asia  Minor,  their  capitalists  have  combined  in 
the  matter  of  railway  exploitation ;  in  China,  the 
two  powers  have  often  acted  in  common,  although 
pursuing  different  commercial  policies.  As  indicat- 
ing a  certain  community  of  interest,  it  may  be  noted 
that  at  the  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague,  Ger- 
many and  France  opposed  the  disarmament  plans 
of  Russia  and  the  use  of  the  peculiar  bullet  of 
Great  Britain. ^ 

When  the  opinions  of  leading  publicists  of  both 
nations  were  recently  sought  on  the  matter,  many 
of  them,  on  both  sides,  favored  a  reconciliation, 
or,  at  least,  a  friendly  understanding.  Mommsen 
believes  that  the  future  of  Western  civilization 
depends  on  the  realization  of  such  a  movement, 
while  Professor  Schmoller  emphasizes  the  com- 
mon interests  of  the  two  nations  as  against  other 
powers.^  Major  Marchand,  the  hero  of  Fashoda, 
M.  Pierre  Leroy-Beaulieu,  and  the  Baron  D'Es- 
tournelles  believe  in  continental  federation  and 
a  friendly  understanding  with  Germany ,3  so  as  to 
permit  the  republic  to  carry  out  her  colonial  ideas. 

1  This  peculiar  bullet,  the  "  dum-dum,"  from  the  fact  that  on  im- 
pact it  spreads  out  and  wounds  a  greater  surface,  is  justified  by 
English  military  experts  particularly  for  use  against  savages  who, 
when  the  other  bullets  are  used,  often  fight  on  even  where  the  mis- 
siles have  passed  through  the  body  or  have  lodged  within  it.  In 
other  words,  the  older  and  more  commonly  used  form  of  bullet 
rather  disables  than  kills,  while  the  "  dum-dum  "  is  calculated  effec- 
tively to  check  the  onslaught  of  a  savage  horde. 

*  See  the  Deutsch-franzosische  Rundschau,  1898. 

8  See  article  on  "The  Relations  of  France  and  Germany,"  in  the 
National  Review,  August,  1899. 

29X 


WORLD   POLITICS 

The  idea  of  a  Central  European  League  has 
often  appeared  in  political  literature.  Count  York 
von  Wartenburg  expresses  the  matter  as  follows : 
"  There  are  only  four  great  powers,  —  the  United 
States,  England,  Russia,  and  central  Europe  under 
the  hegemony  of  Germany."  More  than  twenty 
years  ago  M.  de  Molinari^  advanced  the  idea  of  a 
customs  union  for  central  Europe,  which  has  been 
taken  up  and  discussed  in  detail  by  Professors 
von  Stein,  Hasse,^  Brentano,  and  other  prominent 
publicists  and  economists.  The  Austrian  foreign 
minister,  Goluchowski,  expressed  the  basis  of  this 
political  idea  in  a  speech  of  November  20,  1897. 
He  said  in  substance  :  — 

"  It  is  a  destructive  competition  which  we  have  already 
entered  upon  with  transoceanic  countries,  and  which  will 
increase  in  the  future.  This  necessitates  quick  and  radical 
retaliation,  if  injury  to  the  most  vital  interests  of  the  people 
in  Europe  is  to  be  avoided.  Shoulder  to  shoulder,  they  must 
fight  the  common  danger.  The  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries  were  given  up  to  religious  struggles.  In  the  eigh- 
teenth liberal  ideas  gained  the  day.  The  question  of  nation- 
ality characterizes  the  present  century.  The  twentieth  will 
be  for  Europe  a  period  of  struggle  for  existence  on  the  field 
of  commerce  and  industry."  ^ 

While  it  may  be  said  with  unhesitating  confi- 
dence that  the  day  of  political  coalitions  is  over, 

1  See  his  later  book,  VUnion  Douaniere  de  P Europe  Centrale, 
Paris,  1897. 

2  Deutsche  Weltpolitik,  Munchen,  1897. 

8  Cited  in  Dehn,  Koinmende  IVeltwirlschaftspolitik,  p.  80. 
Crispi  stands  for  the  same  idea. 

292 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

since  nations  are  governed  by  economic  interests 
which  will  not  permit  of  the  formation  of  perma- 
nent alliances,  it  is  yet  entirely  within  the  range  of 
possibility  that  customs  unions  may  be  formed. 
Should  British  imperial  federation  succeed,  and 
the  empire  adopt  a  protective  policy,  it  is  very 
probable  that  the  countries  of  central  Europe 
would  also  be  drawn  into  constantly  closer  com- 
mercial relations,  which  might  even  result  in  the 
formation  of  a  zollverein.  Indeed,  the  commercial 
treaties  concluded  on  the  continent  during  the 
present  decade  indicate  that  such  a  movement  is 
already  under  way.  But  to  look  upon  this  as  a 
movement  toward  political  coalition  against  Eng- 
land and  for  the  extermination  of  British  power  is 
an  utterly  unfounded  view. 

The  old  policy  of  the  most  favored  nation  agree- 
ment has  proved  too  unpliable  for  modern  use. 
Tariff  wars  are  too  destructive,  and  will  therefore 
be  avoided  as  much  as  possible  between  European 
nations.  A  policy  of  differential  tariffs  has  been 
entered  upon,  by  which  various  nations  may  estab- 
lish a  system  of  mutually  regulated  competition. 
It  is  believed  that  in  this  manner  sufficient  freedom 
will  be  given  to  the  development  of  national  indus- 
tries and  their  extension  abroad,  while  at  the  same 
time  an  effective  weapon  for  the  punishment  of 
exclusiveness  elsewhere  is  created. 

It  may  be  well  to  glance  for  a  moment  at  Ger- 
many's equipment,  and  at  the  preparation  which 
she  is  making  for  the  great  struggle  of  the  twen- 
293 


WORLD   POLITICS 

tieth  century.  She  has  clearly  recognized  that 
the  questions  of  coming  world  development  are 
those  of  communication  with  markets,  and  that  for 
this  purpose  three  things  are  needed,  —  a  mer- 
chant marine,  a  navy  for  its  protection,  and  certain 
territorial  bases  throughout  the  world.  Coming 
late  into  the  field,  Germany  has  not  been  fortunate 
in  acquiring  these  territorial  points  of  support.  In 
the  most  important  region,  —  the  far  Orient,  —  she 
has,  however,  acquired  Kiao-chow,  the  Ladrones, 
and  New  Guinea,  so  that  she  is  in  a  position  to 
afford  ample  protection  to  her  trade  in  those 
parts. 

By  the  law  of  1898,  the  permanent  prestige  of 
Germany's  fleet  is  assured.  That  law  marks  a 
great  change  in  German  politics.  In  the  debates 
which  preceded  its  adoption,  the  point  of  view 
seemed  to  be  that  Germany  could  afford  to  be 
merely  a  great  land  power,  and  that  it  needed  for 
its  defence  only  a  highly  efficient  army.  Events 
which  happened  during  the  course  of  the  debate, 
however,  persuaded  a  majority  of  the  German 
people  that  a  strong  fleet  had  become  a  prime  neces- 
sity for  a  great  power,  not  for  purposes  of  warfare, 
but  for  purposes  of  protection.  The  people  of  the 
empire  seemed  to  realize  that  the  great  struggles 
of  the  future  were  to  be  fought,  not  on  their  boun- 
dary, but  beyond  the  seas.  While,  therefore,  the 
army  is  for  the  present  to  be  kept  up  to  its  former 
standard,  special  attention  is  now  given  to  naval 
developments.  The  naval  budget  at  present  before 
294 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL   POLITICS 

the  Reichstag  involves  an  ultimate  doubling  of  the 
present  size  and  efficiency  of  the  German  fleet.^ 

The  progress  of  the  German  merchant  marine 
within  the  last  few  years  is  especially  remarkable. 
In  1 87 1,  this  portion  of  the  national  economic  ma- 
chinery was  insignificant.  Within  the  next  twenty- 
six  years  the  number  of  steamers  rose  from  1 50  to 
1 125  ;  their  tonnage  from  82,000  to  900,000.  Like 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Austria,  Germany  has 
entered  upon  a  policy  of  granting  liberal  subsidies 
to  her  merchant  marine.  Two  of  her  lines,  the 
North-German  Lloyd  and  the  Hamburg-American 
Packet  Company,  are  numbered  among  the  great- 
est and  richest  in  the  world.  Up  to  1896,  entries 
at  the  harbor  of  Hamburg  comprised  more  Eng- 
lish than  German  ships.  Since  that  year  the 
balance  has  been  reversed,  and  at  present  the 
larger  portion  of  German  commerce  is  carried  in 
German  ships.^ 

Another  form  of  preparation  for  the  intense 
commercial  competition  which  is  now  beginning, 

1  By  1904,  when  the  provisions  of  the  naval  law  of  1898  will 
have  been  carried  out,  Germany  will  have  19  ships  of  the  line  and 
42  cruisers.  The  present  naval  programme  calls  for  the  addition 
of  two  squadrons  to  the  two  already  existing  ;  this  increase  is  to  be 
completed  by  1920,  when  the  German  fleet  will  have  36  ships  of 
the  Ime  and  65  cruisers.  The  cost  involved  is  estimated  between 
4CXD  and  500  million  dollars.  The  number  of  ships  of  the  line  in 
the  principal  navies  at  present  is:  Great  Britian,  69;  France,  40; 
Russia,  24;  United  States,  18. 

2  Die  Seeinteressen  des  Deutschen  Reickes,  Publication  of  the 
Imperial  Navy  Department,  1898.  See  also  "Merchant  Marine  of 
Foreign  Countries,"  Special  Consular  Reports,  1900, 

295 


WORLD   POLITICS 

is  found  in  the  excellent  technical  education 
provided  by  the  German  government.  The  engi- 
neering and  commercial  schools  of  Germany  pre- 
pare with  special  reference  to  participation  in 
colonial  development.  The  character  and  con- 
figuration, the  industrial  and  commercial  possibili- 
ties of  any  country,  are  well  known  to  the  German 
engineer  and  the  commercial  clerk.  Thorough 
training  in  all  the  languages  used  in  colonial  under- 
takings is  also  given,  so  that  the  German  industrial 
colonist  enters  upon  his  work  with  a  full  mastery 
of  the  situation.  He  is  not  so  dependent  as  are 
colonists  of  other  nations  upon  aid  from  the  native 
population. 

In  the  method  of  manufactures,  as  we  have 
already  stated,  the  Germans  study  the  markets 
carefully  and  adapt  their  products  as  closely  as 
possible  to  the  needs  and  requirements  of  their 
customers.  They  are  not  satisfied  with  sending 
catalogues,  but  send  agents  and  samples,  and  pre- 
pare exhibitions.  They  are  free  from  that  some- 
what supercilious  disdain  of  foreign  eccentricities 
which  marks  the  Englishman.  If  men  wish  to 
wear  nonsensical  and  peculiar  looking  clothing, 
it  is  their  own  affair ;  and  the  Germans  are  glad 
to  manufacture  and  sell  to  them  whatever  they 
may  desire.  The  French  and  the  English  rather 
expect  the  natives  to  be  satisfied  with  the  superior 
articles  which  their  industries  ordinarily  furnish. 
The  Germans,  on  the  other  hand,  not  only  study 
the  special  likes  and  dislikes  of  their  customers, 

296 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

but  also  turn  out  vast  quantities  of  cheap,  even 
shoddy,  goods,  which  are  more  within  the  means 
of  poorer  populations,  and  thus  crowd  out  the 
more  expensive  manufactures  of  their  rivals. 

When,  under  the  English  trade-mark  law,  the 
provision  requiring  the  designation  of  the  origi- 
nal country  of  manufactures  was  enforced,  many 
merchants  in  all  parts  of  the  world  were  astonished 
to  find  that  goods  which  they  had  before  con- 
sidered of  English  manufacture  really  came  from 
Germany.  Without  delay,  they  made  inquiries  as 
to  the  more  direct  sources  of  supply,  and  as  a 
result  much  of  the  commerce  between  Germany 
and  colonial  regions,  which  before  passed  through 
British  hands,  is  now  carried  on  directly. 

The  policy  of  Germany  in  general  is  character- 
ized by  great  confidence  in  her  national  strength, 
and  by  the  apparent  purpose  of  being,  so  far  as 
possible,  self-centred.  The  speech  of  Colonel 
Schwartzhoff  at  The  Hague  expressed  this  per- 
fectly. The  German  nation  is  not,  he  said,  ex- 
hausted by  military  expenditure,  but,  instead,  feels 
to  the  full  the  strength  of  harmonious  develop- 
ment, and  the  army  is  really  an  assistance  to  it 
in  gaining  control  of  its  national  resources.^  The 
same  confidence  is  also  expressed  in  the  utterances 
concerning  German  policy  which  we  have  already 
quoted. 

^  See  also  W.  Blume,  Die  Grundlagen  unserer  Wehrkraft, 
Berlin,  1899. 


297 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Influence  of  Imperialism  on  Domestic 
Politics 

In  connection  with  our  consideration  of  German 
consciousness  of  power,  as  set  forth  in  the  last 
chapter,  we  have  also  to  note  a  further  fact  of 
equal  importance  but  of  different  bearing.  There 
must  be  noted  the  tendency  to  concentrate  national 
self-consciousness  more  and  more  in  the  person  of 
the  emperor.  His  own  view  of  the  proper  attitude 
of  the  nation  in  the  developments  that  are  about  to 
take  place,  he  expressed  in  a  speech  at  Hamburg, 
on  October  19,  1899.  After  remarking  upon  the 
necessity  of  strengthening  the  naval  forces,  in  order 
to  afford  protection  to  trade  over  the  sea,  he  con- 
tinues: — 

"  Yet  the  feeling  for  these  things  is  only  slowly  gaining 
ground  in  the  German  fatherland,  which,  unfortunately,  has 
spent  its  strength  only  too  much  in  fruitless  factional  strife. 
Germans  are  only  slowly  beginning  to  understand  the  ques- 
tions which  are  important  to  the  whole  world.  The  face  of 
the  world  has  changed  greatly  during  the  last  few  years. 
What  formerly  required  centuries  is  now  accomplished  in  a 
few  months.     The  task  of  Kaiser  and  government  has  con- 

298 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

sequently  grown  beyond  measure,  and  a  solution  will  only  be 
possible  when  the  German  people  renounce  party  divisions. 
Standing  in  serried  ranks  behind  the  Kaiser,  proud  of  their 
great  fatherland,  and  conscious  of  their  real  worth,  the  Ger- 
mans must  watch  the  development  of  foreign  states.  They 
must  make  sacrifices  for  their  position  as  a  world  power,  and, 
abandoning  party  spirit,  they  must  stand  united  behind  their 
prince  and  emperor."  ^ 

This  ideal  of  a  docile  nation  led  by  a  trium- 
phant emperor  whose  intelligence  embraces  every- 
thing, throws  considerable  light  on  the  relations  of 
imperialism  to  party  government  and  parliamen- 
tary institutions.  In  proportion  as  foreign  affairs 
take  up  a  greater  share  of  the  nation's  attention, 
a  decided  impatience  is  felt  by  the  party  of  expan- 
sion with  any  criticisms  passed  on  their  measures 
by  their  political  opponents.  It  is  claimed  by 
them  that  in  foreign  matters  the  nation  should 
stand  as  one  man ;  that  poHcies  once  entered  upon 
by  the  government  should  not  be  repudiated,  and 
that  criticism  should  be  avoided,  as  weakening  the 
influence  of  the  nation  abroad.  Unquestioning 
acceptance  of  the  measures  of  expansion  and 
whole-hearted  support  of  the  national  policy,  right 
or  wrong,  are  demanded  as  patriotic  duties.  Now 
it  is  evident  that,  so  long  as  foreign  affairs  are  of 
only  minor  importance,  such  enforced  unanimity 
in  regard  to  them  will  not  necessarily  break  down 
party  government,  inasmuch  as  there  are  in  in- 
ternal politics  measures  of  sufficient  importance, 

^  Reported  in  the  daily  press. 
299 


WORLD   POLITICS 

upon  which  it  is  permissible  and  not  unpatriotic  to 
divide.  In  the  present  stage  of  development,  how- 
ever, external  relations  are  taking  on  constantly 
increasing  proportions,  while  internal  affairs  are 
being  crowded  into  the  background.  It  is  evident 
that  when  the  most  important  concerns  of  a  nation 
are  thus  withdrawn  from  the  field  of  party  differ- 
ence, party  government  itself  must  grow  weak,  as 
dealing  no  longer  with  vital  questions.  In  his 
speech,  the  emperor  very  frankly  accepts  this 
interpretation  of  the  proper  attitude  of  a  nation 
toward  foreign  politics  ;  the  people  are  to  place  un- 
questioning confidence  in  the  existing  government, 
and  must  avoid  weakening  the  force  of  the  nation 
by  dissensions  and  criticisms.  Considering  the 
success  of  Russia  in  modern  politics,  such  an  atti- 
tude cannot  be  wondered  at.  In  Russia  there  are 
no  parties;  there  is  no  criticism  of  governmental 
action.  The  whole  force  of  national  life  may, 
therefore,  be  brought  by  the  government  to  bear 
upon  the  point  where  great  advantages  are  to  be 
obtained.^ 

There  are  many  other  expressions  of  the  em- 
peror which  indicate  an  almost  medieval  concep- 
tion of  his  office,  a  revival  of  the  theory  of  divine 
right.  The  emperor  beUeves  that  his  grandfather, 
had  he  lived  in  the  Middle  Ages,  would  have  been 
canonized,  and  that  his  tomb  would  have  become 
a  cynosure  of  pilgrimages  from  all  parts  of  the 

1  For  a  further  treatment  of  this  matter,  see  Part  V.,  Ch.  II. 
300 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

world.^  In  the  speech  from  which  a  quotation 
has  just  been  made,  referring  to  the  SociaHsts,  the 
"  party  of  revolution,"  the  emperor  says  :  "  They 
dare  to  attack  the  foundations  of  the  state ;  they 
rise  against  religion  ;  and  do  not  even  call  a  halt 
before  the  person  of  their  most  high  master  "  (the 
emperor).  In  a  speech  delivered  at  Coblenz  on 
August  31,  1897,  he  speaks  of  the  "kingship  by 
the  grace  of  God,  with  its  grave  duties,  its  tre- 
mendous responsibility  to  the  Creator  alone,  from 
which  no  man,  no  minister,  no  parliament,  can 
release  the  monarch."  ^  His  brother  talked  in  the 
same  strain  when  he  received  the  emperor's  com- 
mission as  commander  of  the  Oriental  squadron. 
"It  is  not  glory  nor  laurels,"  he  said,  "that 
attract  me,  but  the  opportunity  of  preaching  the 
gospel  of  Your  Majesty's  sacred  person  abroad  to 
all,  whether  they  are  willing  to  hear  it  or  not." 

Thus,  as  the  importance  of  the  executive  is 
enhanced,  that  of  the  legislative  is  lowered,  and 
parliamentary  action  is  looked  down  upon  as  the 
futile  and  irritating  activity  of  unpractical  critics. 
If  the  governmental  measures  are  to  be  adopted 
inevitably,  why  not  dispense  with  the  irritating 
delay  of  parliamentary  discussion  ?  It  is,  there- 
fore, the  policy  of  the  government  to  strengthen 
the  executive  at  the  expense  of  the  legislative. 
Large  branches  of  governmental  activity,  hereto- 

^  See  Miiller's  Politische  Geschichie  der  Gegenwart,  1897,  P*  ZSt 
where  he  refers  to  a  speech  of  the  emperor  at  Berlin. 
ilHJ.,^.  153. 

301 


WORLD   POLITICS 

fore  under  the  direct  supervision  of  the  parliament, 
are  given  a  permanent  institutional  form  and  are  pro- 
vided for  by  the  standing  portions  of  the  budget,^ 
so  that  both  in  foreign  matters  and  in  home  affairs 
the  importance  and  influence  of  the  Reichstag  is 
rapidly  decreasing.  Among  large  portions  of  the 
population,  the  sentiment  seems  to  be  that  the 
prime  need  of  the  empire  is  not  discussion,  but 
action ;  not  political  liberalism,  but  unity  and  har- 
mony, with  large  armies  and  powerful  navies  to 
represent  the  national  strength  abroad. 

It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  the  parties  of 
moderation,  —  the  liberal  parties,  —  have  within 
the  last  decade  grown  decidedly  weak.  Political 
opinions  are  going  to  extremes.  The  parties  in 
the  German  parliament  that  at  present  divide  the 
power  among  themselves  are  the  SociaHsts,  the 
party  of  the  Centre,  and  the  Conservative  party. 
The  last  named  is  a  true  party  of  reaction,  with 
a  strongly  nationalistic,  anti-Semitic  bias.  It  is 
violently  protective,  is  opposed  to  modern  develop- 
ments like  the  Rhine-Elbe  canal,  and  is  in  favor 
of  the  restoration  of  a  modified  form  of  serfdom. 
The  Centrists  represent  the  compact  masses  of 
Roman  Catholic  communities  in  the  south  and 
west  of  Germany,  who  judge  politics  constantly 
with  reference  to  ecclesiastical  affairs.  The  So- 
cialists, the  party  that  concentrate  their  attention 

1  H.  H.  Powers,  "The  Political  Drift  of  Germany,"  Yale  Review, 
May,  1899. 

302 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

chiefly  on  internal  reform,  are  discredited  by  their 
opponents  as  revolutionary  and  nihilistic. 

With  parties  divided  along  these  lines,  the  opera- 
tion of  party  government  is  out  of  the  question, 
since,  to  make  that  system  effective,  there  must  be 
a  certain  amount  of  mutual  respect  and  under- 
standing. Where  there  is  nothing  but  distrust, 
contempt,  and  calumny,  a  real  party  common- 
wealth cannot  exist.  In  such  cases,  on  the  con- 
trary, party  government  reduces  itself  to  the  more 
or  less  successful  manipulation  of  factions  by  the 
government.  Light  is  thrown  on  the  emperor's 
methods  of  management  by  the  threatened  dis- 
missal of  some  twenty  judges  who,  as  members 
of  the  Prussian  Diet,  dared  to  oppose  the  imperial 
policy  of  canal  extension. 

The  same  uncompromising  extremism  may  also 
be  noted  in  the  political  and  social  theory  of 
modern  Germany.  The  philosopher  Nietzsche, 
whose  writings  are  now  exerting  a  great  influence 
upon  the  youth  of  Germany,  who  is  heralded  as 
the  champion  sent  to  smite  the  giant  of  theoretical 
socialism,  is  an  aristocrat  of  the  most  pronounced 
type.  The  main  tenet  of  his  philosophy  is  that 
the  masses  of  humanity  exist  merely  for  the  sake 
of  the  chosen  few,  and  that  the  aim  and  purpose  of 
human  existence  is,  therefore,  not  the  happiness 
of  the  multitude,  but  the  production  of  choice  indi- 
viduals. These  heroes  are  exempt  from  all  moral 
duties;  theirs  are  the  impulses  of  victorious  beasts  of 
prey.  Any  brief  statement  of  this  writer's  theories 
303 


WORLD   POLITICS 

is  entirely  insufficient  to  indicate  the  true  character 
of  his  writings  and  the  source  of  their  power ;  but 
the  great  vogue  and  influence  of  such  theories  as 
that  just  mentioned,  especially  among  the  leading 
classes,  indicate  that  the  intellectual  temper  of  Ger- 
many is  largely  anti-liberal. 

In  summarizing  the  considerations  on  the  posi- 
tion of  Germany  at  the  present  stage  of  world 
politics,  we  must  emphasize  the  fact  that  Germany 
is  still  a  national  state,  and  that  its  politics  are  gov- 
erned by  considerations  of  nationalism  as  much 
as  by  those  of  imperialism.  Its  expansion  is 
therefore  in  the  main  commercial,  and  it  craves 
sea  power  chiefly  in  order  to  protect  its  trans- 
oceanic industries.  Of  course,  the  tendency  to 
emphasize  the  imperialistic  side  and  to  gain 
territorial  accessions  is  always  present.  Still,  the 
interest  of  Germany  is  rather  in  commercial  oppor- 
tunities than  in  territorial  acquisitions.  Extension 
of  her  commerce  into  all  parts  of  the  world  and 
the  effective  protection  of  nascent  industrial  inter- 
ests is  the  key-note  of  her  foreign  policy.  Fully 
persuaded  of  her  own  national  strength,  she  shows 
no  inclination  to  form  permanent  alliances  with 
any  power.  Forever  on  the  alert,  she  is  ready  to 
take  advantage  of  changing  conditions  and  to  act 
as  the  occasion  requires.  It  cannot  fairly  be  said 
that  she  is  pursuing  an  aggressive  policy :  to  be 
sure,  she  is  extending  her  national  industries  to 
the  utmost  of  her  power ;  yet  she  seems  to  recog- 
nize that  there  is  in  the  unopened  regions  of  the 
304 


GERMAN   IMPERIAL  POLITICS 

world  sufficient  work  for  all  civilized  nations. 
While  German  writers  show  a  natural  and  pardon- 
able pride  in  having  the  German  language  and  the 
German  trade  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  universe,^ 
the  idea  of  political  empire,  especially  over  unwill- 
ing civilized  nations,  is  entirely  foreign  to  the  Ger- 
man mind.  In  the  words  of  M.  Leroy-Beaulieu,  **  It 
is  in  the  interest  of  civilization  that  all  European 
peoples  should  place  their  special  impress  upon 
some  part  of  the  world  as  yet  unoccupied.  In 
this  manner,  the  world  will  preserve  a  little  more 
variety,  and  will  escape  the  danger  of  falling 
asleep  in  a  uniformity  of  methods  and  concep- 
tions." 

IV 

Bibliographical  Note 

Bismarck,  the  Man  and  the  Statesman  :  Reflections  by  Him' 
j^//"  (translated  from  the  German).     London,  1898. 

Blume  (W.),  Die  Grundlagen  miser er  Wehrkraft.  Berlin, 
1899. 

Bruckner,  Jahrbuch  der  deutschen  Kolonial-Politik.  Berlin, 
1899. 

Bulletins  of  the  Bureau  of  the  American  Republics.  Wash- 
ington. 

Deutsche  Kolonial  Zeitung.  Published  by  the  Deutsche 
Kolonial-Gesellschaft,  Berlin. 

Driault  (E.),  Za  Question  d' Orient.     Paris,  1898. 

Duboc  (Julius),  Hutidert  Jahre  Zeitgeist  in  Deutschland. 
Leipzig,  1889. 

Fitzner  (R.),  Deutsches  Kolonial-Handbuch.     Berlin,  1896. 

^  Even  a  broad  humanitarian  like  Hermann  Grimm  warms  to  this 
thought  in  his  essay  on  Goethe,  in  Die  deutsche  Rundschau,  1899. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

Franzius    (G.),    Kiautschon:    Deiitschlands    Eriverhung   in 

Ostasien.     Berlin,  1898. 
Handbuch  fi'ir  die  deutsche  Handelsmarine  auf  das  Jahr  i8g8, 

Reichsamt  des  Innern,  Berlin,  1898. 
Hesse-Wartegg    (E.   von),   SchatitiDig  tmd  Deutsch-China. 

Leipzig,  1898. 
Martens  (P.)>  S'tld  Amerika  miter  besonderer  Berucksichti- 

giing  Argetiii7iiens.     Berlin,  1899. 
Meinecke(G.),  Koloniales  Jakrbuch.  (An  annual  publication.) 
Miiller  (Wilhelm),  Politische  Geschichte  der  Gegenivart.  (An 

annual  publication.)     Berlin. 

Schaffle   (Albert),  Deutsche  Kern-  und  Zeitfragen.     Berlin, 

1894. 
Tischert    (Georg),    Fihif  Jahre    deiitscher    Hufidelspolitik. 

Leipzig,  1898. 
Vandelin-Mniszech    (Count),    Der    Spanisch-Amerikanische 

Krieg  und  seine  Riickwirkung  auf  die  deutsche  Flotten- 

u.  Kolonial-Pfllitik .     Frankfurt,  1899. 
Wippermann    (Karl),   Deutscher    Geschichtskalender.      (An 

annual  publication.)     Leipzig. 
Wilkinson  (S.),  77^1?  Brain  of  an  Army.     London,  1895. 
Ziegler    (Dr.  Theobald),  Die  geistigen   utid  socialen    StrO' 

mungen  des  Neunzehnten  Jahrhunderts,     Berlin,  1899. 


306 


PART   V 

SOME  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  THE 
POSITION  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES  AS  A  FACTOR  IN  ORI- 
ENTAL  POLITICS 


I 


CHAPTER   I 

The  Interests  of  the  United  States  in   the 
Far  East 

Among  all  the  interesting  developments  of  the 
last  decade  there  is  perhaps  none  more  significant 
than  the  change  in  the  traditional  foreign  policy 
of  the  United  States.  It  is  a  remarkable  coinci- 
dence, to  say  the  least,  that  the  United  States 
should  have  entered  upon  a  war,  the  outcome  of 
which  placed  it  unexpectedly  in  the  centre  of 
Asiatic  affairs,  just  at  the  time  when  the  resources 
of  the  Celestial  Empire  were  first  beginning  to  be 
really  opened  to  foreign  enterprise,  and  when 
European  nations  were  beginning  to  make  terri- 
torial encroachments  upon  various  portions  of 
China.  It  can  hardly  be  imagined  that  the  United 
States  would  have  continued  to  keep  aloof  from 
the  great  current  of  international  politics,  even  if 
the  country  had  not  become  involved  in  the  Span- 
ish war.  As  it  was,  the  events  of  that  contest 
served  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  masses  of  the 
American  people  toward  foreign  affairs.  This 
change  in  the  attitude  of  the  popular  mind  came 
309 


WORLD   POLITICS 

with  the  suddenness  of  a  revolution,  startling  to 
many  of  the  most  patriotic  citizens,  who  feel  that 
too  great  attention  to  foreign  matters  will  atrophy 
the  energies  of  reform,  and  that,  in  competing  for 
dominion  with  the  great  national  empires  of  the 
world,  we  shall  have  to  adopt  their  methods,  and 
thus  become  untrue  to  our  real  social  and  political 
mission. 

The  change,  however,  has  occurred,  and  no  force 
of  logic  can  reverse  the  current  of  history  or  com- 
pel the  national  consciousness  back  into  the  atti- 
tude where  it  found  itself  before  the  war.  In  all 
such  great  popular  movements,  there  is  a  powerful 
element  of  passionate,  unreasoning  enthusiasm, 
which  associates  itself  with  symbols,  ideas,  and 
words,  such  as  "  patriotism  "  and  "  the  flag  "  ; 
very  readily  takes  for  granted  certain  important 
premises ;  and  looks  upon  any  doubt  as  to  their 
universal  validity  as  indicating  a  lack  of  the  senti- 
ments proper  to  good  citizenship.  At  such  times 
it  is  difficult  to  make  the  voice  of  reason  heard. 
Happily,  a  nation  is  rarely  in  this  condition  of  over- 
powering enthusiasm.  And  yet,  if  its  vitality  has 
not  been  exhausted,  it  must  have  these  periodical 
outbreaks,  which  are,  indeed,  to  that  extent  a  sign 
of  health.  But  unless  they  are  followed  by  periods 
of  reflection,  in  which  stock  is  taken  of  the  ele- 
ments in  national  life  and  development,  purely 
passionate  impulses  seize  upon  government,  with 
the  inevitable  result  of  bringing  about  a  universal 
decadence.     A  nation  that  trains  itself  in  sober 

310 


THE   UNITED   STATES 

reasoning,  —  in  clear,  logical  analysis  of  the  facts, 
—  can  well  afford  an  occasional  outburst  of  patriotic 
feeling,  without  the  fear  of  being  driven  utterly  out 
of  its  course  by  the  storms  of  popular  emotion. 

That  the  United  States  is  to  play  a  leading 
part  in  international  affairs,  —  that  she  is  to  be  one 
of  the  five  leading  world  powers,  —  has  been  irrev- 
ocably decided  by  the  events  of  the  recent  past. 
A  nation  of  our  power  and  resources  would  be 
untrue  to  its  vocation  if  it  did  not  sooner  or  later 
reaHze  its  duty  in  this  important  position  to  which 
it  has  attained.  The  time  has  now  come  for  a  cool 
analysis  of  our  position  and  interests,  and  a  care- 
ful selection  of  modes  of  policy  and  action.  It 
will  not  do  —  it  will  not  be  possible  —  to  live  for- 
ever on  the  capital  of  enthusiasm  and  patriotism. 
These  may  be  used  effectively  in  great  popular 
movements,  such  as  the  one  we  have  just  seen  ; 
but  for  the  actual  conduct  of  political  life,  a  differ- 
ent attitude  of  mind  is  needed,  and  nothing  would 
be  more  dangerous  to  the  state  than  that  the  party 
in  power  should  endeavor  to  invest  all  its  actions 
with  the  sacred  character  of  a  great,  irresistible, 
popular  movement,  and  should  decry  as  traitorous 
and  unpatriotic  all  opposition  to  its  policy.  We 
shall,  therefore,  in  this  discussion,  take  the  present 
state  of  affairs  as  the  basis  upon  which  to  try  to 
arrive  at  a  just  estimate  of  the  interests  and  duties 
of  the  United  States. 

Though  we  have  entered  upon  an  active  share 
in  international  politics,  it  does  not  follow  that  we 
311 


WORLD   POLITICS 

must  throw  to  the  winds  the  traditions  of  the  past, 
and  become  the  docile  imitators  of  other  nations. 
More  than  ever  before  we  need  rather  to  empha- 
size those  wholesome  characteristics  of  our  national 
life  that  distinguish  it  favorably  from  the  more 
rigidly  stratified  societies  of  Europe ;  and,  before 
we  take  any  step  in  international  politics,  we 
should  first  consider  the  influence  that  it  is 
likely  to  exert  on  the  life  within  our  nation. 

Mere  territorial  expansion  appeals  to  the  un- 
thinking; there  is  a  certain  fascination  in  knowing 
that  new  territories  are  brought  beneath  the  sway 
of  our  national  power.  There  is,  therefore,  always 
a  strong  tendency  to  hoist  the  flag  wherever  an 
opportunity  offers  itself,  and  as  it  is  considered 
the  height  of  unpatriotic  feeling  to  haul  down  the 
flag  under  any  circumstances,  the  nation  is  often 
forced  into  undertakings,  the  scope  and  bearing  of 
which  are  only  dimly  perceived  by  even  its  best- 
informed  members.  Whether  the  sacrifices  in- 
volved in  taking  possession  of  such  territories  are 
at  all  proportionate  to  the  benefits  to  be  derived 
by  our  nation  and  by  the  so-called  inferior  races 
within  the  conquered  territory,  is  hardly  ever 
considered.  It  may,  therefore,  not  be  amiss  to 
endeavor  to  ascertain  where  the  most  important 
interests  of  the  United  States  now  are,  and  by 
what  political  action  and  methods  they  may  be 
developed. 

Our  nation  has  been  accustomed  to  a  feeling  of 
inexhaustible  resources  and  energy,  and  has,  there- 

312 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

fore,  felt  that  whatever  attracted  it  could  be  had, 
regardless  of  the  cost.  But  as  we  enter  upon 
closer  international  relations,  more  calculation 
becomes  necessary,  since  in  the  great  give-and- 
take  of  the  world's  politics,  a  nation,  no  matter 
how  strong,  must,  if  it  wishes  to  succeed,  adapt  its 
plans  to  its  resources,  and  not  expend  blood  and 
treasure  in  mere  fantastic  undertakings. 

When  we  consider  the  present  situation  and  the 
probable  future  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  it  seems 
only  just  to  conclude  that  the  share  of  the  United 
States  in  the  development  of  the  resources  of  that 
country  will  be  at  least  as  large  as  that  of  any  of 
the  European  powers.  Commercially  the  United 
States  is  the  nearest  neighbor  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire ;  for  even  when  the  Siberian  railway  is  com- 
pleted, it  will  not  materially  affect  the  freight  traffic 
between  China  and  Europe.  At  least  for  bulky 
freight  the  rates  must  necessarily  be  prohibitory, 
so  that  communication  between  European  Russia 
and  China  must  be  carried  on  by  sea,  as  before.  It 
may  be  said  by  some  that  the  position  of  Russia  in 
Manchuria,  after  the  development  of  the  resources 
of  that  province,  will  enable  Russian  manufacturers 
to  have  a  controlling  share  in  the  trade  of  China. 
This,  however,  even  if  it  is  to  be  realized,  is  a 
development  of  the  future,  and  cannot  therefore 
enter  into  our  estimate  of  the  present  condition  of 
nations  in  respect  to  Chinese  trade. 

It  is  difficult  to  estimate  with  accuracy  the  pres- 
ent state  of  American  trade  with  China.  In  the 
313 


WORLD   POLITICS 

first  place,  we  have  practically  no  merchant  marine 
trading  with  the  Orient.  Of  over  2000  merchant 
vessels  entering  the  port  of  Shanghai  in  1898,  only 
50  were  American ;  at  Chefoo,  in  northern  China, 
no  American  ships  entered  for  five  years  at  a  time, 
while  in  the  year  1876  alone,  205  American  ves- 
sels passed  the  custom-house  of  that  port.^  The 
absence  of  American  shipping  is  noticed  by  all 
writers  on  the  Orient,  and  the  Chinese  themselves 
are  reported  as  asking,  when  consuls  try  to  impress 
them  with  the  importance  of  American  industries, 
"  Where,  then,  are  your  ships  ? "  This  state  of 
affairs  is  attributed  partly  to  the  provisions  of  the 
opium  treaty,  proclaimed  October  3,  1881,  which 
prescribes  that  American  subjects  or  ships  are  not 
to  import  opium  into  any  of  the  open  ports  of 
China.  It  is  claimed  that  this  prohibition  has  vir- 
tually driven  the  American  flag  off  the  Chinese 
coast,  as  American  ships  cannot  receive  a  cargo 
which  contains  even  an  ounce  of  opium. 

In  addition  to  this  absence  of  American  ship- 

1  See  "  Commercial  Relations  of  the  United  States  with  Foreign 
Countries,"  1898,  Vol.  I.,  p.  989. 

The  total  percentage  of  American  shipping  in  Chinese  harbors 
for  1898  is  given  as  less  than  i  per  cent,  while  Great  Britain  has  53 
per  cent  and  Germany  10  per  cent. 

The  following  are  the  figures  for  American  ships  entering  the 
port  of  Chefoo,  in  the  respective  years :  — 

1868 132 

1876 205 

1884 93 

1888  to  1893 °o°e 

1897 3 

314 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

ping,  there  is  a  great  lack  of  American  banking 
and  trading  facilities.  Most  of  the  American 
goods  imported  into  China  are  handled  by  British 
firms.  Moreover,  all  imports  from  Hongkong 
are  credited  to  the  British  Empire,  so  that  the 
statistics  of  the  imperial  customs  administration 
cannot  be  relied  upon  for  accurate  information  as 
to  the  actual  country  of  origin  of  imported  manu- 
factures.^ 

Still,  we  know  that  the  construction  of  railways 
which  has  recently  been  entered  upon  has  brought 
about  an  important  demand  for  American  lumber, 
rails,  machinery,  and  locomotives.^  Indeed,  a  large 
portion  of  the  construction  material  needed  by  the 
Russian  and  Imperial  Chinese  railways  has  been 
supplied  from  American  sources.     The  president 

^The  estimated  value  of  American  imports  entering  Shanghai  in 
1898  was  $8,000,000.  There  was  a  substantial  increase  over  former 
years  in  cotton  goods  and  oil.  The  exports  from  Shanghai  to  the 
United  States  rose  from  $7;  11 6,000  in  1896  to  $11,666,000  in  1897, 
the  chief  exports  being  silk,  tea,  and  wool.  The  total  imports  from 
the  United  States  to  China,  according  to  the  custom-house  reports 
for  1898,  were  $11,911,000,  an  increase  of  45  per  cent  over  the 
figures  for  1896.  When  we  consider  that  almost  half  the  total 
foreign  trade  of  China  is  credited  to  Hongkong,  the  reason  of  the 
uncertainty  as  to  the  real  country  of  origin  of  Chinese  imports  is 
explained.  Out  of  a  total  export  trade  of  $225,819,000  for  1898, 
Hongkong  is  credited  with  $110,552,000.  This  also  illustrates 
incidentally  the  importance  of  Hongkong  as  an  entrepot.  For 
further  statistics  see  Consular  Reports  for  September,  1899. 

2  Ties  and  bridge  timbers  for  the  Imperial  Chinese  Railway  (the 
Pechili  line),  were  imported  chiefly  from  Oregon.  Of  the  engines 
used  in  1898,  64  were  of  Chinese  make,  38  English,  and  24  Ameri- 
can. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

of  the  Great  Northern  Railway  states  that  he  has 
been  compelled  to  refuse  a  shipment  of  6o,cx50 
tons  of  steel  rails  and  38,000,000  pounds  of  cot- 
ton to  Asia,  because  of  the  lack  of  transportation 
facilities  on  the  ocean. ^  The  great  need  of  lumber 
in  the  development  of  China  will  be  supplied 
largely  from  our  Pacific  coast,  and  from  the 
forests  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  Other  impor- 
tant articles  of  American  trade  with  China  are 
flour,  cotton  fabrics,  and  kerosene.  Concerning 
the  latter  it  has  recently  been  reported  that  the 
American  product  is  rapidly  being  replaced  by 
that  of  Russia  and  that  of  Sumatra,  which  are  of 
an  inferior  quality  and  are  sold  more  cheaply.  As 
yet  the  market  for  other  commodities  and  manu- 
factures has  been  rather  restricted,  but  notwith- 
standing her  lack  of  financial  and  mercantile 
facilities,  the  United  States  has  already  conquered 
an  important  share  in  the  actual  trade  of  China. 

As  we  have  seen,  American  capitalists  are  also 
actively  interested  in  the  development  of  Chinese 
resources.  For  example,  the  concession  for  the 
Hankow-Canton  line  was  granted  to  an  American 
syndicate.  A  regular  steamer  line  between  Vladi- 
vostok and  Canton  has  been  established  by  Ameri- 
can capitalists  and  is  now  being  operated  by  them, 
and  in  the  peninsula  of  Corea  Americans  are 
actively  and  successfully  engaged  in  the  exploita- 
tion of  gold  mines.^ 

*  See  "Commercial  Relations  of  the  United  States,"  1898,  p.  991, 

*  See  Consular  Reports,  March,  1898. 

316 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

American  manufacturers  are  just  awakening  to 
the  fact  that  there  is  growing  up  in  Siberia  an 
important  market  for  machinery  and  manufactured 
goods,  for  the  permanent  control  of  which  the 
United  States  is  most  favorably  situated.  At  the 
present  time  American  commerce  is  still  relatively 
unimportant  in  those  territories.^  The  fact,  how- 
ever, that  between  1896  and  1897  American  trade 
with  Vladivostok  increased  fourfold  shows  that 
the  Americans  are  alive  to  the  great  opportunities 
awaiting  their  industries  in  northern  Asia.  Public 
attention  has  recently  been  directed  to  the  large 
amount  of  construction  material  furnished  by 
Americans  for  the  Russian  railway  system  in 
Siberia  and  Manchuria.  Railway  ties,  bridge 
timber,  iron  work,  locomotives,  ice-machines,  and 
machinery  for  rolling  mills  have  been  imported 
in  large  quantities.  By  a  special  order  of  the 
Russian  government,  machinery  destined  for  the 
working  of  mines  is  to  enter  free  from  duty  up  to 
January  i,  1909.  The  port  of  Vladivostok  is  also 
for  the  time  being  free  except  for  alcoholic  liquors, 
tobacco,  petroleum,  sugar,  and  some  unimportant 
articles. 

It  seems  to  be  the  general  policy  of  Russia  to 
encourage  friendly  commercial  relations  with  the 

1  The  trade  of  Siberia  in  1897  was  divided  as  follows:  Germany 
led  with  30  per  cent,  Russia  followed  with  25  per  cent,  and  then 
came,  in  order,  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  China,  and  finally  the 
United  States  with  5  per  cent.  In  the  trade  of  European  Russia, 
too,  Germany  leads  by  a  large  amount. 

317 


WORLD   POLITICS 

United  States.  Indeed,  it  is  within  the  range  of 
possibilities  that  special  privileges  for  American 
importation  could  be  obtained  for  a  long  period. 
When  we  consider  that  our  western  states  face 
directly  upon  the  Russian  possessions,  while  other 
nations  can  reach  them  only  by  roundabout  routes, 
and  also  that  Russia,  because  she  is  in  need  of 
our  manufactures  for  an  efficient  development  of 
Siberian  resources,  is  disposed  to  treat  the  United 
States  very  favorably,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  field 
here  open  is  one  of  great  promise. 

As  we  consider  these  data,  they  may  seem  to  be 
of  less  importance  or  significance  than  might  have 
been  expected.  And  yet  we  can  hardly  wonder  that, 
with  its  manufacturing  population  chiefly  on  the 
Atlantic  coast,  and  with  a  vast  domestic  demand 
to  supply,  the  United  States  has  not  yet  equalled 
the  leading  manufacturing  nations  of  Europe, 
and  especially  Great  Britain,  in  the  extent  of  its 
foreign  trade ;  but  when  we  look  at  the  advan- 
tageous position  and  teeming  resources  of  our 
Pacific  states,  which  are  just  awakening  to  the 
magnificent  possibilities  of  commerce  across  the 
Pacific,  we  may  consider  it  natural,  —  even  neces- 
sary, —  that,  if  free  trade  opportunities  are  main- 
tained in  China,  we  shall  soon  absorb  our  full 
share  in  the  commerce  of  that  magnificent  market. 

It  is  in  connection  with  the  Chinese  and  Sibe- 
rian trade  that  our  position  in  the  Philippines 
becomes  of  special  importance.  Up  to  the  pres- 
ent our  commercial  interests  in  these  islands  have 

318 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

been  comparatively  slight.  In  the  year  1898  the 
total  exports  from  the  islands  to  the  United  States 
amounted  to  only  ^4,099,525,  while  the  imports 
from  the  United  States  were  insignificant,  amount- 
ing, in  fact,  to  only  $147,846.^  Up  to  that  date, 
wholesale  commerce  was  largely  in  the  hands  of 
Spanish,  British,  and  German  firms,  while  the  retail 
trade  in  the  larger  towns  was  almost  entirely  carried 
on  by  the  Chinese.    Very  little  foreign  capital  from 

^  See  "Commercial  Relations  of  the  United  States,"  Consular 
Reports,  1898,  p.  140.  The  following  table  of  trade  relations  for 
1897  is  there  also  given  :  — 


Countries. 


Great  Britain     . 

France 

Germany    . 

Belgium 

Spain 

Japan 

China 

India 

Straits  Settlements 

New  South  Wales 

Victoria 

United  States     . 


Total 


Imports  from 
Philippines. 


jS6,223,426 

1,990,297 

223,720 

272,240 

4,434,261 

1,332,300 

56,137 

7.755 

274.130 

119,550 

180 

4,383,740 


Exports  to 
Philippines. 


%^. 


,063,598 

359,796 
774,928 

45,660 
,972,637 

92,823 

97,717 

80,156 

236,001 

176,858 

178.370 

94.597 


;?I9,3I7,736       ;?i2,i73,i4i 


In  1893  the  exports  to  the  United  States  were  59,314,235.  The 
trade  with  Hongkong  is  not  noted  in  the  above  table;  it  seems, 
however,  to  be  quite  considerable.  In  1895  the  exports  to  the 
United  States  amounted  to  $4,731,000;  the  imports  from  that  source, 
to  $119,255.     Ibid.,  p.  1064. 

319 


WORLD   POLITICS 

any  country  was  invested  in  the  development  of  in- 
land resources.  In  general,  property  was  so  inse- 
cure, litigation  so  frequent,  and,  when  entered  upon, 
so  long-drawn-out  and  expensive,  that  few  capital- 
ists ventured  any  extensive  investment. 

The  future  commercial  importance  of  Manila 
and  other  Philippine  seaports  is  already  universally 
recognized.  That  the  former  half-forgotten  capi- 
tal will  rival  Hongkong  and  Singapore  as  an  entre- 
pot for  Oriental  trade  admits  of  no  doubt.  When 
we  consider  that  the  foreign  trade  of  the  Straits 
Settlements  is  almost  as  large  as  that  of  the  whole 
Dominion  of  Canada,^  while  that  of  Hongkong 
exceeds  both  these  by  a  considerable  amount,  we 
gain  some  conception  of  what  the  position  of  Ma- 
nila is  likely  to  be  when  Oriental  trade  really  begins 
to  develop.  It  is  this  that  constitutes  the  chief 
importance  of  the  possession  and  control  of  the 
Philippines.  Indeed,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  would  perhaps,  all  things  considered,  derive 
more  benefit  from  the  possession  of  Manila  than 
from  the  permanent  ownership  and  control  of  all 
the  rest  of  the  territory  in  the  islands. 

For  various  reasons,  not  so  much  benefit  is  to  be 
expected  from  the  development  of  natural  resources 
in  the  Philippines,  although  these,  too,  promise  a 
bright  future.     The  resources  of  the  islands  consist 

*  Between  1892  and  1896,  the  annual  average  was,  for  exports, 
Canada,  ;i^23,327,ooo;  the  Straits  Settlements,  _^2i,02i,ooo:  for  im- 
ports, Canada,  ;^24,029,ooo;  the  Straits  Settlements,  ;^i8,562,cxxx 
Stc  Journal  of  the  Royal  Statistical  Society,  Vol.  LXIL,  p.  495. 
320 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

of  mineral  wealth,  rich  agricultural  lands,  and  val- 
uable timber.  Coal  and  petroleum  are  found  in 
large  quantities  in  Cebu  and  Mindoro,  and  gold  and 
iron  in  Luzon  and  Mindanao.  Cebu  coal  is  a  highly 
carbonized  lignite  of  the  Tertiary  Age ;  analysis 
shows  that  it  has  about  two-thirds  the  calorific 
energy  of  Cardiff  coal.  The  Spanish  government 
has  been  hostile  to  the  development  of  industrial 
undertakings,  and  by  legal  quibbles  and  unfavor- 
able regulations  has  prevented  any  extensive  ex- 
ploitation. What  mining  there  has  been  has  not 
been  organized,  the  miners  living  in  isolated  dis- 
tricts and  selling  their  produce  to  Chinese  mer- 
chants. A  British  corporation  has  for  some  time 
been  carrying  on  gold  mining  operations  on  the 
shore  of  Peracele  Bay.  The  chief  agricultural 
products  are  hemp  and  rice,  while  the  forests 
abound  in  most  valuable  kinds  of  wood,  such  as 
ebony  and  mahogany. 

Before  these  resources  can  be  at  all  successfully 
exploited,  the  construction  of  adequate  means  of 
communication  and  transportation  will  have  to  be 
effected.  The  Spanish  government  in  the  Philip- 
pines degenerated  into  a  mere  taxing  machine, 
totally  unproductive  in  its  character,  since  practi- 
cally hone  of  the  funds  collected  from  taxation 
found  their  way  into  internal  improvements.  Such 
poor  roads  as  actually  exist  were  constructed  by 
natives  working  off  their  poll-tax  under  the  super- 
vision of  shiftless  officials. 

A  great  difficulty  that  will  be  encountered  in 
V  321 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  efforts  to  develop  the  mining  resources  of  the 
islands  lies  in  the  fact  that  labor  is  not  easily  ob- 
tained. Laborers  are  scarce.  They  must  usually 
be  brought  from  a  distance,  and  must  be  paid  a 
considerable  sum  in  advance.  The  wants  of  the 
natives  are  few.  They  soon  earn  what  they  con- 
sider a  competency  and  with  it  retire  to  their  native 
villages  to  live  their  accustomed  peaceful  life.  It  is 
said  that  employers  in  the  Philippines  have  rather 
preferred  men  who  drank,  gambled,  and  played 
the  gallera,  because  such  men,  having  more  wants 
to  satisfy,  would  work  with  greater  energy  and 
persistence.^ 

One  of  the  first  problems  that  will  have  to  be 
solved  in  opening  up  the  islands  to  modern  indus- 
trial methods  will  be  this  question  of  securing  a 
sufficient  and  lasting  supply  of  labor.  It  would 
be  very  difficult  to  induce  the  natives  to  work  hard 
and  long  unless  forced-labor  acts,  similar  to  those 
in  use  in  French  China  and  in  South  Africa,  should 
be  adopted.  The  administration  of  those  laws, 
however,  very  often  leads  to  terrible  suffering  and 
great  mortahty  among  the  natives ;  so  that  public 
opinion  in  the  United  States  could  not  be  expected 
to  tolerate  their  enforcement.  Another  plan  would 
be  to  import  gangs  of  coolies  from  China  and  India. 
Although  the  experience  of  the  French  with  this 
class  of  laborers  has  not  been  promising,  other 
nations  seem  to  have  had  better  success  with 
them.     It  may  be  that  in  the  case  of  the  French 

1  See  Dean  C.  Worcester,  The  Philippine  Islands. 
322 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

experiment,  the  nearness  of  Indo-China  to  their 
home  caused  the  Chinese  coolies  to  feel  too  in- 
dependent of  their  masters. 

The  question  of  the  climate  has  been  discussed 
at  length  by  many  writers,  most  of  whom  agree 
that  for  permanent  residence,  and  especially  for 
women  and  children,  it  is  hardly  suitable.  The 
great  profits,  however,  which  await  an  energetic 
development  of  resources,  would  make  it  possible 
for  interested  capitalists,  by  the  offer  of  large  sal- 
aries, to  induce  men  to  undertake  the  management 
of  their  projected  industries. 

When  the  situation  is  regarded  as  a  whole,  it 
seems  that  the  importance  of  these  islands  lies 
not  so  much  in  their  own  resources,  present  or 
prospective,  as  in  their  favorable  situation  on  the 
great  trade  route  between  China  and  America,  and 
between  China  and  the  European  colonies  in  the 
Orient.  At  this  point,  therefore,  we  meet  the  ques- 
tion of  the  importance  of  the  direct  control  of  ter- 
ritory in  the  development  of  national  trade  and 
industry.^  It  seems  that  such  control  is  not  so 
important  as  are  the  assurances  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity of  trade  throughout  the  Orient,  and  the  con- 
trol of  sea  and  water  communications.  Political 
connection  can  have  great  importance  only  where 
a  policy  of  exclusiveness  is  introduced ;  and  even 
there  it  will  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  in  the 
long  run,  to  interfere  with  the  natural  currents  of 

1  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this  subject,  see  supra.  Part  I. 
Ch.  II. 

323 


WORLD   POLITICS 

commerce.  It  is  clear  that  in  the  Philippine  Islands 
the  United  States  could  not  adopt  an  exclusive 
protective  policy,  without  inviting  ruinous  repri- 
sals. In  order  to  gain  an  inferior  market  in  the 
islands,  the  Americans  would  have  to  sacrifice,  to 
a  certain  extent,  the  superior  markets  which  other 
advanced  nations  offer;  for  the  extension  of  the 
American  protective  system  to  the  islands  would 
do  more  than  anything  else  could  do  to  bring 
forth  a  universal  spirit  of  hostility  to  the  Ameri- 
can nation,  and,  by  leading  other  governments  to 
a  policy  of  retaliation,  it  would  have  a  disas- 
trous effect  on  the  natural  relations  of  American 
commerce. 

When  we  come  to  the  control  of  trade  routes, 
we  enter  upon  a  subject  of  greater  actual  impor- 
tance than  that  of  the  possession  of  vast  tracts  of 
territory.  The  United  States,  being  in  possession 
of  Hawaii,  Tutuila  in  the  Samoan  group,  Guam 
in  the  Ladrones,  and  Manila,  will  have  sufficient 
points  of  support  to  protect  the  routes  which  her 
commerce  in  the  Orient  would  take.  The  building 
of  the  Nicaragua  canal,  the  laying  of  a  Pacific 
cable,  the  fostering  of  the  merchant  marine,  and 
the  establishment  of  banking  communications  with 
the  Orient  are,  in  the  vitally  important  fields  of 
commercial  and  industrial  exploitation,  the  matters 
which  should  occupy  American  statesmen  first  of 
all.  When  we  consider  that  with  a  proper  develop- 
ment of  our  relations,  American  trade  with  China 
should  exceed  that  with  the  Philippine  Islands  at 
324 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

least  tenfold,  the  true  relative  importance  of  the 
actual  possession  and  territorial  control  of  these 
islands  appears.  This,  of  course,  is  no  argument 
for  their  relinquishment ;  it  is  simply  intended  to 
point  out  that  there  are  more  important  interests 
in  the  Orient,  to  which  the  Philippine  question 
should  be  subordinated,  and  that  nothing  should  be 
done  in  the  PhiHppine  Islands  without  first  making 
sure  of  its  effect  upon  American  political  influence 
and  trade  relations  in  the  Orient  in  general. 

The  United  States  has  thus  far  wisely  refused 
to  enter  upon  any  plans  for  territorial  acquisition 
on  the  Asiatic  mainland,  at  the  same  time  insisting 
upon  an  unequivocal  maintenance  of  the  poUcy  of 
equal  opportunity.^  This  it  is  which  is  the  prime 
necessity  of  American  commerce  in  the  East.  No 
territorial  holding  that  it  would  be  possible  at  the 
present  time  to  obtain  would  compensate  the 
United  States  for  the  loss  of  commerce  which 
she  would  sustain  by  being  excluded  from  regions 
held  by  other  nations.  We  are  most  favorably 
situated  for  developing  a  great  and  flourishing 
trade  with  the  entire  Pacific  coast  of  Asia.  It 
would,  therefore,  be  the  height  of  folly  for  the 
United  States  to  join  in  a  rush  for  territorial  ac- 
quisition, which  could  only  lead  to  such  a  break- 
down of  the  friendly  commercial  relations  of  the 
civiHzed  powers,  as  would  entail  upon  all  of  them 
a  disastrous  loss. 

It  appears  from  the  above  considerations  that 

^  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  this  matter  see  supra.  Part  II.,  Ch.  III. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  fundamental  principles  of  American  policy 
ought  to  be  the  fostering  of  commercial  relations 
and  the  strengthening  of  industries  at  home,  rather 
than  the  acquisition  of  vast  reaches  of  territory. 
For  all  the  purposes  of  developing  a  high  civiliza- 
tion, the  United  States  is  in  a  more  favorable 
position  than  any  other  great  power.  She  has  a 
vast  territory  in  the  temperate  zone,  adapted  to 
the  growth  of  a  homogeneous  population.  Her 
resources  have  scarcely  been  touched,  and  for  cen- 
turies to  come  internal  development  can  go  on 
without  any  fear  of  approaching  exhaustion.  The 
prosperity  and  freedom  of  this  our  home  region 
should  take  precedence  of  any  other  considera- 
tions, and  it  seems  clear  that  we  ought  to  be  slow 
to  enter  upon  a  policy  of  ambitious  territorial 
expansion,  which  would  weigh  down  our  industries 
with  the  cost  of  maintaining  an  extensive  colonial 
service  and  naval  establishment,  without  any  pro- 
portionate gain. 


i 


326 


CHAPTER   II 

The  Influence  of  International  Politics  on 
THE  Party  System 

A  consideration  of  the  new  forces  in  politics 
leads  us  to  inquire  how  the  system  of  party  gov- 
ernment is  Hkely  to  be  affected  by  the  increased 
and  continued  concentration  of  public  interest  on 
foreign  affairs.  The  poHtical  experience  of  the 
last  two  centuries  has  proved  that  free  govern- 
ment and  party  government  are  almost  convertible 
terms.  It  is  still  as  true  as  when  Burke  wrote  his 
famous  defence  of  party,  in  his  Thoughts  on  the 
Cause  of  the  Present  Discontents,  that,  for  the 
realization  of  political  freedom,  the  organization  of 
the  electorate  into  regular  and  permanent  parties 
is  necessary.  Parliamentary  government  has  at- 
tained its  highest  success  only  in  those  countries 
where  political  power  is  held  alternately  by  two 
great  national  parties.  As  soon  as  factional  inter- 
ests become  predominant;  as  soon  as  the  stability 
of  government  depends  upon  the  artificial  grouping 
of  minor  conflicting  interests ;  as  soon  as  the  nation 
lacks  the  tonic  effect  of  the  mutual  criticisms  of 
327 


WORLD   POLITICS 

great  organizations,  the  highest  form  of  free  gov- 
ernment becomes  unattainable. 

It  might,  therefore,  be  argued  that  anything 
which  tends  to  decrease  the  importance  of  party 
government  contains  within  it  a  menace  to  free 
institutions.  But  however  that  may  be,  however 
possible  it  may  be  to  develop  a  substitute  for  the 
system  of  party  government  as  we  have  known  it 
during  this  century,  it  is,  nevertheless,  impera- 
tively necessary  that  we  should  ascertain  the  exact 
influence  upon  that  system  which  may  result  from 
the  new  prominence  that  international  relations 
have  obtained  in  political  life.  It  does  not  admit 
of  doubt  that  modern  imperialism  tends  to  withdraw 
public  interest  from  the  fields  within  which  party 
government  can  best  exert  its  influence.  Ques- 
tions of  international  relations,  of  measures  under- 
taken against  foreign  nations  or  in  concert  with 
them,  cannot  effectively  be  made  the  subject  of 
party  controversies.  When  the  national  honor  is 
apparently  at  stake,  when  the  statesmen  at  the 
helm  have  once  taken  a  position  withdrawal  from 
which  might  be  interpreted  as  national  weakness, 
divisions  of  opinion  on  questions  of  abstract  justice 
will  be  of  little  weight  in  the  balance  against  the 
powerful  passion  of  patriotism,  which  will,  in  such 
cases,  support  the  party  of  advance  and  aggres- 
sion. We  have  an  illustration  of  this  in  the  case 
of  the  Transvaal  war.  Before  hostilities  began, 
the  Liberal  leaders  and  the  bulk  of  the  Liberal 
party  were  decidedly  opposed  to  war,  and  to  the 
328 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

general  policy  of  the  Conservative  party.  When, 
however,  the  Boers,  in  sheer  self-defence,  in  order 
to  prevent  the  accumulation  of  a  crushing  force 
on  their  boundary,  had  been  forced  to  begin  hos- 
tilities, the  majority  of  the  Liberals  began  to  sup- 
port the  party  in  power,  or  at  least  to  refrain  from 
adverse  criticism.  Party  government  deals  most 
effectively  with  matters  of  domestic  concern.  As 
soon  as  the  foreign  interests  of  the  nation  are  at 
stake,  divergences  of  opinion  have  to  be  reconciled, 
and  a  common  front  presented  to  the  foreign  rival. 
It  has  always  been  the  tradition  of  the  English  gov- 
ernment that  no  administration  should  repudiate 
the  acts  of  its  predecessors  in  relation  to  foreign 
affairs,  and  that,  while  in  opposition,  a  party  should 
refrain  from  undue  interference  with  the  inter- 
national policy  adopted  by  its  opponent.  Inter- 
national matters  have  thus  been  largely  withdrawn 
from  the  domain  of  party  politics. 

We  find  the  same  principle  followed  and  the 
same  influence  at  work  in  other  nations.  In  the 
German  Empire,  matters  of  colonial  expansion,  of 
armament,  of  naval  strength,  and  of  foreign  rela- 
tions in  general,  are  left  largely  to  the  initiative  of 
the  administration ;  and  even  if  there  are  at  first 
marked  divergences  of  opinion,  the  government 
plans  are  usually  adopted  in  the  end,  so  that,  as 
regards  these  matters,  German  politicians  have 
come  to  look  upon  the  Reichstag  as  little  more  than 
a  burdensome  impediment.  The  Socialists,  who 
most  frequently  oppose  the  imperial  plans,  are 
329 


WORLD   POLITICS 

promptly  read  out  of  the  realm  of  national  sym 
pathy.  Their  political  action  is  set  down  as  that 
of  men  who  are  vaterlandslos,  —  who  have  no 
fatherland,  —  although,  in  some  respects,  they 
are  really  more  interested  in  the  country  itself 
than  are  their  opponents.  They,  however,  are 
more  concerned  about  the  internal  affairs,  about 
justice  in  social  relations,  than  about  the  splendor 
of  the  army  or  national  prestige  abroad. 

In  France,  all  parties  have  agreed  in  the  matter 
of  foreign  policy.  The  whole  national  life  there 
has  been  bent  upon  the  achievement  of  an  inter- 
national task,  the  rehabilitation  of  French  diplo- 
matic influence  and  military  prestige.  Thus,  with 
the  most  important  concern  of  the  nation  with- 
drawn from  the  realm  of  party  government,  and 
with  all  the  activities  of  the  administration  warped 
to  the  attainment  of  one  end,  about  which  there 
could  be  no  difference  of  opinion,  it  is  small  wonder 
that  party  government  in  France  has  degenerated 
into  a  mere  squabble  for  occasional  position  among 
factions  of  hungry  office-seekers. 

The  Russian  government  has  never  been  bur- 
dened with  party  opposition,  and  now  that  all 
the  national  energies  are  concentrated  upon  the 
expansion  of  the  imperial  domain,  the  growth  of  a 
party  system  on  Western  models  is  less  likely  than 
ever,  —  in  fact,  it  is  an  impossibility. 

We  see,  then,  that  in  the  countries  of  continental 
Europe,  which  have  to  give  paramount  attention  to 
foreign  affairs,  on  account  of  their  exposed  frontiers, 
330 


THE   UNITED   STATES 

party  government  has  never  been  so  prominent 
in  national  life  as  in  England  and  the  United 
States.  In  Great  Britain,  moreover,  the  system 
was  most  successful  during  the  decades  when  the 
national  consciousness  was  concentrated  on  the 
solution  of  questions  of  domestic  politics.  From 
the  time  when  the  dread  pall  of  the  post-Napo- 
leonic reaction  first  began  to  be  lifted  from  English 
politics,  down  to  the  birth  of  the  present  im- 
periaHstic  enthusiasm,  matters  of  domestic  poHcy 
controlled  EngUsh  political  life.  Reform  of  the 
representation,  corn-law  repeal,  free  trade,  church 
disestablishment,  manhood  suffrage,  proportional 
representation,  and  the  reform  of  local  govern- 
ment,—  these  are  the  principal  topics  about  which 
the  warfare  of  political  parties  in  Great  Britain 
was  waged  during  the  century.  Only  three 
decades  ago,  even  the  first  great  apostle  of 
imperialism,  —  Beaconsfield,  — was  still  so  unaware 
of  the  future  trend  of  politics,  to  which  he  him- 
self was  to  give  an  impulse,  that  he  looked  upon 
the  colonies  of  the  empire  rather  as  burdens  than 
as  a  source  of  strength.  "These  wretched  colo- 
nies," he  said,  "  will  all  be  independent,  too,  in  a 
few  years,  and  are  a  millstone  around  our  necks." 
While  political  energy  was  thus  concentrated  on 
tasks  of  internal  reform,  party  government  flour- 
ished as  never  before  or  since.  In  fact,  the  period 
covered  by  the  career  of  Mr.  Gladstone  marks 
the  zenith  of  parliamentary  and  party  government, 
and  his  attitude  toward  foreign  and  domestic  affairs 
331 


WORLD   POLITICS 

respectively  is  representative  of  the  true  political 
spirit  of  that  time. 

In  the  United  States,  questions  of  domestic 
policy  have  been  the  predominant  ones  until  very 
recently ;  and  here,  too,  with  the  exception  of  the 
period  of  transition  after  the  war  of  1812,  —  when 
for  a  time  there  was  neither  faction  nor  party, — 
and  the  second  period  of  transition  before  the 
accession  of  Lincoln  to  the  presidency,  —  when 
there  was  a  time  of  faction  rather  than  of  party, 
—  there  has  been  a  continued  existence  of  two 
strong  and  almost  evenly  balanced  parties. 

Of  late  a  very  marked  dechne  in  the  efficiency 
of  party  government  has  been  noticed,  especially 
in  Great  Britain,  but  also  to  some  degree  in  the 
United  States.  In  the  former  country  there  has 
been  much  shifting  and  rearranging  of  political 
parties.  As  long  as  the  old  Liberal  programme  of 
internal  reform  was  before  the  people  and  engross- 
ing their  attention,  parties  showed  a  high  degree 
of  organization  and  cohesion ;  but  since  imperial 
and  colonial  affairs  have  come  into  the  fore- 
ground, the  intensity  of  party  rivalry  has  de- 
clined. At  the  present  time,  the  Liberal  party  is 
disorganized,  practically  leaderless,  and  without  a 
poUcy.  Its  decline  is  generally  attributed  to  the 
position  taken  by  its  older  leaders  on  questions 
of  foreign  politics.  A  similar  disorganization  is 
observable  in  the  Democratic  party  in  the  United 
States,  although  this  may  be  due  in  part  to  other 
circumstances. 

332 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

The  question  is  a  pertinent  one,  whether  this 
evident  decline  in  party  government  is  a  result  of 
the  increased  interest  now  taken  in  foreign  affairs. 
It  seems  a  natural  a  priori  conclusion  that  the 
withdrawal  of  national  attention  from  the  field 
of  domestic  reform,  where  party  rivalries  may  be 
most  successfully  carried  on,  to  the  realm  of 
foreign  politics,  where  such  party  differences  are 
often  dangerous,  or,  at  least,  inadvisable,  would 
weaken  the  organization  and  efficiency  of  political 
parties ;  but  whether  this  is  the  primary  cause,  or 
only  a  secondary  one,  it  must  certainly  be  true 
that  it  will  tend  to  accentuate  the  decline  which 
has  already  begun,  although  there  may  still  be  at 
stake  internal  interests  sufficiently  important  for 
party  controversy  to  be  waged  about  them.  In 
general,  however,  it  seems  a  safe  conclusion  that 
the  more  fully  national  energy  is  concentrated 
upon  the  achievement  of  ends  concerning  which 
party  controversy  is  inadvisable,  the  more  com- 
pletely will  party  government  degenerate  into 
mere  factional  intrigue,  —  perhaps  even  to  the 
point  of  being  replaced  by  some  other  system  of 
political  action.  Could  a  nation  always  realize 
that  its  cardinal  interests  are  at  home,  that  national 
worth,  welfare,  and  strength  are  developed  from 
within,  not  conquered  or  acquired  from  without, 
could  it  always  assign  to  foreign  and  domestic  poli- 
tics their  true  relative  importance,  these  conse- 
quences would  also  be  avoided.^ 

1  See  also  Ch.  IV.  of  this  Part. 

333 


WORLD   POLITICS 

The  rationale  of  the  necessity  for  such  unanim- 
ity in  external  matters  is  simple  enough.  Action 
in  these  cases  must  be  quick  and  decisive ;  shifting 
and  changing  measures  are  disastrous,  and  a  policy 
once  undertaken  by  the  executive  cannot,  therefore, 
be  easily  reversed;  national  responsibilities  incurred 
by  authorized  agents  must  be  lived  up  to,  and 
that  interpretation  of  national  interests,  which  is 
adopted  by  the  government,  is  usually  conclusive. 
It  is  generally  believed  that  war  can  be  brought 
about  only  in  answer  to  a  strong  demand  for  it 
by  popular  opinion,  but  even  in  the  most  recent 
events  we  have  examples  that  show  how  easily 
the  current  of  affairs  may  be  turned  by  the  action 
of  the  executive.  Thus,  a  diplomatic  note  by  the 
government  of  Mr.  Cleveland  brought  us  to  the 
verge  of  war  with  Great  Britain ;  and  through 
the  initiative  of  Mr.  McKinley,  the  nation  has 
been  placed  in  the  position  which  it  now  occupies 
in  the  Philippines,  without  any  initial  impulse  on 
the  part  of  popular  opinion. 

A  policy  once  decided  upon  in  this  manner,  it 
is  difficult  to  abandon  or  to  reverse ;  even  honest 
criticism  in  these  matters  may  be  dangerous  and 
impolitic.  Sympathy  with  an  enemy  who  seems 
to  have  been  unjustly  attacked  may  often  render  a 
hopeless  struggle  more  extended,  —  may  swell  the 
account  of  bloody  sacrifices.  Thus,  a  patriotic  cit- 
izen who  would  have  his  country  realize  the  ideal 
of  justice  among  nations  often  finds  himself  in  a 
cruel  dilemma.  A  party  that  sympathizes  with 
334 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

armed  resistance  to  its  own  government  has  never 
yet  succeeded  in  rendering  its  opposition  effec- 
tual. In  England,  Beaconsfield's  policy,  though  it 
ran  counter  to  the  most  cherished  tenets  of  liber- 
alism, had  yet  to  be  adopted  and  carried  on  by  its 
opponents,  when  they  in  turn  came  into  power. 
We  cannot  escape  the  conclusion  that,  in  the  pres- 
ent stage  of  civilization,  it  is  difficult  for  citizens  or 
parties  to  place  themselves  on  the  basis  of  inter- 
national justice,  when  decisive  action  in  foreign 
affairs  has  once  been  taken.  In  such  instances, 
the  positive  element  ordinarily  carries  the  day,  and 
criticisms  and  resentments  have  to  be  suppressed. 
The  nation  is  still  to  us  the  ultimate  impersonation 
of  political  justice.  When  its  existence  or  inter- 
ests are  at  stake,  or  when,  by  its  authorized  repre- 
sentatives, they  are  judged  so  to  be,  effectual 
opposition  to  the  course  of  the  government  by  any 
party  is  usually  out  of  the  question.  Inner  dis- 
cords must  be  suppressed ;  nations  must  present 
to  one  another  an  undivided  front,  —  such  seems 
to  be  the  law  of  our  present  stage  of  political 
development.^ 

It  seems  difficult  to  escape  the  conclusion,  there- 
fore, that  as  a  nation  enters  upon  an  era  of  inter- 
national interests,  and  diverts  the  larger  share  of 

^  "  It  may  be  the  highest  duty  to  oppose  a  war  before  it  is  brought 
on,  but  once  the  country  is  at  war,  the  man  who  fails  to  support  it 
with  all  possible  heartiness,  comes  perilously  near  being  a  traitor, 
and  his  conduct  can  only  be  justified  on  grounds  which  in  time 
of  peace  would  justify  a  revolution."  —  Theodore  B.  Roosevelt,  on 
"Oliver  Cromwell,"'  in  Scribner^s  M.nihly  for  April,  1900. 

335 


WORLD   POLITICS 

its  political  energies  from  the  workings  of  party- 
government  to  the  promotion  of  these  interests,  the 
complete  and  effectual  criticism  of  governmental 
measures  must,  to  some  extent  at  least,  be  weak- 
ened. This  is  one  important  item  in  the  cost  of 
imperialism  which  must  be  considered  when  we 
weigh  the  compensating  advantages. 


336 


CHAPTER   III 

The  Increased  Importance  of  the  Executive 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  case  of  other  countries, 
and  particularly  in  the  case  of  Germany,  the  rela- 
tive importance  of  the  executive  is  enhanced  by 
the  present  developments  in  world  politics.  In 
Russia,  all  opposition  to  the  Czar's  government 
has  disappeared,  such  opposition  having  become 
so  hopeless  that  no  one  is  at  present  fantastic  or 
radical  enough  to  undertake  it.  In  Great  Britain, 
where  Parliament  was  formerly  the  cynosure  of 
political  interest,  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Lord  Salis- 
bury, the  protagonists  in  the  imperial  drama,  are 
at  present  monopolizing  all  attention.  And  so, 
too,  in  our  own  country,  the  management  of  the 
most  important  affairs  has,  since  the  Spanish  war, 
fallen  to  the  executive,  which,  for  the  time  being, 
has  overshadowed  the  importance  of  all  other 
departments.  In  the  matter  of  external  affairs,  es- 
pecially in  the  case  of  international  disputes,  it  is 
necessary  to  grant  great  discretionary  powers  ;  and 
when  important  interests  are  at  stake,  the  neces- 
sity of  quiet  and  expeditious  action  is  so  great  that 
z  337 


WORLD  POLITICS 

the  participation  of  Congress  could  hardly  be 
invited.  It  would  be  well  if,  with  this  increased 
power  of  the  executive,  we  could  also  have  in- 
creased responsibility  and  a  firm  guarantee  that 
none  shall  accede  to  supreme  power  without  hav- 
ing undergone  a  complete  and  strenuous  test  of 
political  ability  and  character. 

The  questions  which  American  statesmanship 
has  hitherto  been  called  upon  to  solve  have  ordi- 
narily not  been  of  overpowering  difficulty.  They 
have  been  confined  chiefly  to  matters  of  internal 
policy  and  tariff  legislation,  and  have  generally 
been  settled  in  a  rather  categorical  manner,  often 
riding  rough-shod  over  finer  distinctions.  With 
many  administrations,  the  main  problem  has  been 
that  of  finding  means  to  expend  a  treasury  surplus 
which  threatened  to  unsettle  the  financial  relations 
of  the  country.  Provided  by  nature  with  a  vast 
and  fertile  territory  and  abundant  means,  with  no 
threatening  questions  of  life  and  death  to  solve, 
America  has  of  late  enjoyed  a  freedom  from  care 
which  has  made  the  American  statesman  rather 
an  object  of  envy  to  the  rulers  of  Europe.  The 
politics  of  the  Old  World  were  vastly  more  com- 
plex and  difficult.  Surrounded  by  rivals  who 
are  eagerly  watching  every  opportunity  to  gain 
diplomatic  or  commercial  advantage,  their  re- 
sources so  limited  that  national  life  has  to  be 
carefully  fostered  in  order  to  support  the  vast 
expenditures  for  national  defence,  these  countries 
are  so  dangerously  circumstanced  within  and  with- 

338 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

out  that  any  miscalculation  of  means  is  likely  to 
bring  about  immediately  disastrous  results.  Ameri- 
can presidents  could  look  across  the  ocean  to  the 
storm-tossed  ministers  of  European  governments 
with  a  feeling  of  restfulness  and  general  ease. 

That  happy  state  of  things  is  perhaps  soon  to 
disappear.  With  our  entrance  upon  imperial  poli- 
tics, the  intricacy  of  our  governmental  relations  has 
markedly  increased.  Our  wealth,  it  is  true,  still 
seems  boundless,  but  for  what  we  possess  of  youth- 
ful vigor,  the  other  great  nations  make  up  by  long 
experience  and  astuteness  in  diplomacy.  The 
nation,  head  and  body,  has  felt  itself  in  a  very 
helpless  state  in  the  matter  of  the  Philippine 
Islands.  The  nature  of  that  region  and  the 
general  character  of  Asiatic  politics  were  a  closed 
book  to  American  statesmen  and  citizens.  Yet 
if  we  intend  to  play  a  part  in  the  far  East,  our 
government  must  put  itself  into  possession  of 
knowledge  of  all  the  many  elements  that  go  to 
make  up  the  life  of  that  marvellous  region,  and 
must  cultivate  the  methods  and  tactful  expedients 
by  which  alone  any  political  advantage  in  that  part 
of  the  world  can  be  gained.  We  may  be  able  to 
buy,  and  by  brute  force  to  conquer,  a  good  many 
things  ;  but  if  we  wish  to  compete  successfully  with 
other  nations,  we  must  begin  to  calculate  the  cost, 
and  not  count  on  the  apparently  inexhaustible  ex- 
tent of  our  resources.  The  time  when  our  states- 
men could  rely  merely  on  our  material  strength  is 
forever  past.  So  long  as  we  adhered  to  the  policy 
339 


WORLD   POLITICS 

of  isolation,  this  superior  attitude  of  confidence  in 
our  own  power  might  well  have  continued,  but  in 
order  to  compete  successfully  with  the  great  powers 
in  the  government  of  the  world,  a  policy  of  less  in- 
sistence on  mere  strength,  and  the  cultivation  of 
more  tact  in  the  intellectual  mastery  of  political 
affairs,  will  become  necessary. 

When  we  consider  the  manner  in  which  we  select 
the  man  within  whose  hands  these  enormous  in- 
terests of  the  republic  are  to  be  placed,  we  cannot 
escape  the  conclusion  that  our  system  of  govern- 
ment does  not  give  us  a  sufficient  guarantee  of  his 
ability  and  fitness.  Our  method  of  selection  is 
most  unscientific,  and  is  open  to  manifold  abuses. 
A  crowded  popular  convention,  summoned  for  a 
few  days,  cannot  develop  any  organic  unity  and 
feeling  of  responsibility ;  it  will,  therefore,  be  led 
either  by  political  machinations  or  by  merely  for- 
tuitous enthusiasms,  and  it  is  well  known,  from  our 
history,  how  rarely  statesmen  of  long  experience 
and  tried  character  have  secured  the  nomination 
for  the  presidency.  Another  unfavorable  element 
in  our  government  is  the  fixity  of  tenure  of  the 
presidency.  No  matter  how  great  a  statesman, 
or  how  utterly  inefficient  the  president  may  be, 
he  knows  that  his  term  is  limited,  not  by  his  suc- 
cess as  a  statesman,  but  by  the  passage  of  time. 
Continuity  in  American  political  careers  is  also  hin- 
dered by  the  general  custom  which  prescribes  that 
a  congressman  cannot  be  elected  to  represent 
another  district  than  that  within  which  he  resides. 
340 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

The  statesman  is,  therefore,  constantly  dependent 
upon  the  whim  of  a  narrow  constituency,  who  are 
often  unable  to  judge  of  his  real  services,  and  are 
guided  in  their  opinion  by  post-office  appointments 
and  harbor  bill  appropriations  affecting  their 
neighborhood. 

If,  for  the  purpose  of  comparison,  we  look  now  at 
the  English  government,  we  shall  find  that  it  pre- 
sents a  much  more  scientific  and  effective  system 
for  the  education  and  selection  of  great  political 
leaders.  Continuity  of  political  life  is  secured  by 
the  fact  that  law  and  custom  permit  a  statesman  to 
stand  for  election  in  any  district  of  the  kingdom, 
so  that  no  narrow,  local  jealousies  can  defeat  the 
reelection  of  a  prominent  man.  It  is  by  virtue  of 
this  fact  that  the  leaders  of  both  parties  are  con- 
stantly present  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Young 
representatives  of  marked  promise  are  first  admit- 
ted into  the  administration  as  under-secretaries,  and 
are  thus  given  an  opportunity  to  study  both  sides  of 
the  government,  —  the  administrative  and  the  legis- 
lative. The  laws  which  they  assist  in  making,  they 
are  bound  also  to  administer.  Within  Parliament 
there  is  constantly  going  on  the  most  vigorous  kind 
of  natural  selection,  by  which  promising  men  are 
gradually  advanced  to  greater  and  greater  power 
in  governmental  affairs.  Cabinet  statesmen  are 
here  subjected  to  a  fiery  test;  they  have  to  meet 
the  open  criticism  of  their  opponents  and  the  silent 
scrutiny  of  their  friends,  day  after  day,  as  they  pre- 
sent measures  or  engage  in  parliamentary  discus- 
341 


WORLD    POLITICS 

sion.  Responsibility  is  so  concentrated  that  the 
nation  really  knows  whom  to  praise  or  to  blame  for 
the  effects  of  any  particular  measure.  The  men  who 
have  passed  through  this  training  become  so  well 
knowis.  to  the  nation,  that  they  are  virtually  em- 
bodied policies,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  for  them 
to  stand  on  any  platform ;  their  character  and 
political  record  is  ordinarily  a  better  assurance  of 
their  true  purposes  and  principles  than  any  verbal 
declarations  could  be. 

It  is  evident  that  this  system  is  admirably 
adapted  to  the  management  of  the  imperial  side 
of  politics.  Although  Parliament  cannot  keep  the 
constant,  immediate  control  of  the  details  of  for- 
eign policy,  still  it  has  within  its  hands  the  selec- 
tion of  the  men  to  whom  these  great  interests  shall 
be  intrusted ;  and  the  people  of  the  nation  can, 
through  Parliament,  hold  their  agents  immediately 
and  constantly  responsible  for  the  faithful  admin- 
istration of  their  trust.  Leaders  are  thus  placed  at 
the  helm  upon  whose  qualifications  the  best  and 
most  experienced  public  men  of  the  nation  are 
agreed.  It  is  impossible  that  a  successful  general 
or  a  brilliant  orator  without  any  previous  prepara- 
tion should  be  suddenly  placed  in  control  of  Brit- 
ish imperial  affairs.  For  two  hundred  years  Great 
Britain  has  had  only  one  military  prime  minister, 
the  great  Wellington,  and  his  administration  was 
unsuccessful.  Military  training  does  not  develop 
those  powers  of  careful  and  judicious  management 
which  political  Hfe  requires.     No  matter  how  patri- 

342 


THE   UNITED   STATES 

otic  a  general  may  be,  his  experience  will  often 
make  him  the  victim  of  intriguing  factions.  The 
firm  moderation  that  subordinates  private  desires 
to  the  public  weal  and  the  intelligence  that  divines 
the  sober  public  sentiment  and  is  guided  even  by 
opponents,  are,  both  of  them,  the  fruit  of  civic 
training. 

Public  interest  in  England  has  always  been 
aroused  by  parliamentary  life  on  account  of  its 
dramatic  character.  Debates  in  Parliament  are  a 
series  of  closely  fought  battles  for  supremacy,  in 
which  every  point  counts  and  is  closely  watched 
by  the  whole  nation.  Reputation,  power,  and  vast 
interests  depend  on  the  turn  that  affairs  may  take. 
The  electorate  may,  at  any  time,  by  a  dissolution 
of  Parliament,  be  called  upon  to  determine  the 
questions  under  discussion,  and  the  incentive  to 
keep  informed  on  current  parliamentary  affairs  is, 
therefore,  stronger  than  in  other  countries,  where 
parties  are  not  so  closely  organized  in  Parliament, 
and  where  the  dependence  of  parliamentary  action 
on  popular  opinion  is  not  so  direct.  Indeed,  in 
other  countries,  where  the  principal  business  is 
transacted  in  committees,  the  debates,  which  rarely 
decide  anything,  fail  to  attract  public  attention,  and, 
in  general,  the  conduct  of  congressional  business 
has  been  too  uninteresting  to  attract  the  popular 
mind. 

Can  we  draw  any  practical  conclusions  from  the 
above  comparison .-'  It  certainly  seems  that  our 
system  does  not  afford  a  sufficient  guarantee  that 

343 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  vast  powers  which  an  imperiaHstic  policy  would 
require  us  to  place  in  the  hands  of  the  president 
shall  really  be  administered  by  the  person  most 
fitted  for  the  position.  Public  opinion  can  be 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  president  only  very 
indirectly,  and  it  is  easily  conceivable  that  in  the 
present  era  of  the  organization  of  giant  trusts,  a 
machine  might  readily  be  constructed  which  would 
retain  a  man  in  power,  even  against  the  best  judg- 
ment of  the  American  people.  Elections  under 
our  present  system  too  often  reduce  themselves  to 
a  choice  between  two  evils,  the  doubtful  balance 
between  them  almost  driving  the  conscientious 
elector  to  distraction.  But  however  desirable  a 
structural  change  in  our  system  would  seem  to  be, 
it  is  probably  out  of  the  question.  A  conscious 
legislative  imitation  of  the  system  of  another  coun- 
try no  one  would  advise.  Though  such  a  change 
is  practically  impossible,  we  may  assist  in  cultivat- 
ing such  a  proper  sentiment  as  will  be  favorable 
to  a  more  natural  selection,  and  we  may  strengthen 
those  political  developments  that  tend  to  favor 
continuity  of  political  careers,  —  advancement  for 
long  experience,  and  for  tried  capacity  in  dealing 
with  pubhc  affairs,  and  the  refusal  of  the  title  to 
supreme  power  to  mere  military  fame.  We  ought 
to  foster  a  system  of  organic,  instead  of  fortuitous, 
selection.  We  ought  to  discountenance  the  em- 
phasizing of  anything  that  merely  gives  notoriety 
to  a  name  without  containing  a  guarantee  of  effi- 
cient civil  administration. 
344 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

Some  germs  of  a  system  of  organic  selection  can 
be  observed  in  the  history  of  the  last  two  decades. 
Thus,  the  governorship  of  great  states,  the  chair- 
manship of  important  congressional  committees, 
and  prominence  in  the  Senate,  have  come  to  be 
considered  stepping-stones  to  the  presidential  office. 
Again,  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  grant  second 
terms,  and  thus  to  secure  a  continuous  career  to 
efficient  congressmen  and  senators.  And,  finally, 
the  former  disorganization  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives is  remedied,  to  some  extent,  by  the 
growth  of  the  Committee  on  Rules,  which  unifies 
and  digests  the  legislative  business,  and  acts  as 
a  responsible  body  representative  of  the  party  in 
power. 

Tendencies  and  developments  of  this  kind  should 
be  consciously  strengthened ;  for  while  it  may  be 
impossible  to  reconstruct  a  government,  it  certainly 
is  not  outside  of  the  range  of  legitimate  action  to 
assist  the  growth  of  favorable  institutions.  It  is 
well  known  that  the  marvellous  English  system  is 
entirely  an  unpremeditated  growth.  Its  essential 
elements  are  the  representation  of  the  crown  by 
the  prime  minister ;  the  solidarity  of  the  cabinet ; 
the  responsibility  of  the  latter  to  Parliament;  the 
power  to  dissolve  the  legislative  and  to  create  new 
peers ;  the  fact  that  the  ministers  are  members  of 
Parliament ;  and,  finally,  that  a  representative  may 
stand  for  any  electoral  district  in  the  realm :  all 
these  elements  are  indispensable  to  the  successful 
working  of  cabinet  government.  Yet  they  were 
345 


WORLD   POLITICS 

all  developed  separately,  at  periods  widely  apart, 
with  no  consciousness  at  the  time  of  their  future 
function  in  a  delicate  organism  of  government. 
No  human  intellect  could  have  thought  it  out,  yet 
it  is  certainly  no  empty  coincidence  that  the  Eng- 
lish nation,  the  people  who  of  all  others  do  their 
own  thinking,  should  also  have  developed  this  most 
highly  organized  and  most  delicately  responsive 
system  of  political  action. 


346 


I 


CHAPTER   IV 

The  Influence  of  Imperialism  on  Home 
Affairs  in  the  United  States 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  the  present  tendency  of 
popular  interest  to  become  concentrated  on  impe- 
rial questions  and  affairs  will  still  further  weaken 
the  public  interest  in  questions  of  home  politics, 
which  are  themselves  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be 
little  attractive  to  the  general  public,  no  matter 
how  important  they  may  be.  This  danger  of 
absorbing  political  energies  in  outside  matters  to 
the  damage  of  domestic  concerns  should  at  least 
be  noticed  and  guarded  against.  A  nation  that  is 
rapidly  expanding  and  is  directing  its  energies  to 
territorial  acquisitions  beyond  its  borders,  is  quite 
likely  to  suffer  in  its  social  and  political  well- 
being  at  home.  We  need  but  advert  to  the  example 
of  Rome,  where,  with  the  successive  stages  of  impe- 
rial extension,  there  was  a  growth  of  social  antipa- 
thies and  general  disintegration;  a  concentration 
of  wealth  with  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  city 
proletariat.  Similarly,  the  powerful  and  brilliant 
monarchy  of  Spain  was  ultimately  corrupted  and 
347 


WORLD   POLITICS 

ruined  by  territorial  conquests  which  were  used 
only  to  draw  sustenance  for  the  ever  increasing 
luxuries  of  the  home  country. 

The  danger  of  withdrawing  public  attention  from 
home  affairs  and  thus  giving  them  over  to  a  reac- 
tionary spirit  is  apparent  enough  to  cause  appre- 
hension. We  have  already  noted  it  in  the  case  of 
Germany.  In  Great  Britain,  questions  of  home 
government  have  fallen  into  apparent  neglect. 
The  older  liberalism  was  concerned  mainly  with 
matters  of  political  mechanism  and  structure,  such 
as  the  suffrage,  home  rule,  and  disestabhshment; 
but  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  spirit  in  which 
these  policies  were  brought  forward  and  supported 
was  that  of  fostering  the  intelligent  interest  of  the 
people  in  their  own  affairs;  and  never  has  the 
country  brought  more  direct  and  more  strict  super- 
vision to  bear  upon  its  representatives  than  during 
the  decades  in  which  these  structural  changes  were 
being  made.  At  present  public  opinion  and  politi- 
cal action  have  turned  from  these  matters  to  ques- 
tions of  social  reform,  but  the  spirit  of  politics  has 
also  changed ;  it  is  now  the  spirit  of  a  beneficent 
absolutism  dealing  out  protection  and  certain  eco- 
nomic advantages  to  the  dependent  classes,  rather 
than  that  of  a  liberal  policy  making  its  primary 
object  the  fostering  of  their  independence.  This 
is  another  of  those  apparent  paradoxes  in  which 
history  so  abounds.  On  the  surface,  the  intention 
of  governing  for  the  people  is  avowed,  while  in 
reality  their  virtue  and  their  independence  are 
348 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

being  undermined.  That  the  masses  have  an 
instinctiv^e  feeling  of  this  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  they  display  their  enthusiasm  on  imperial 
questions  rather  than  on  the  questions  of  social 
reform ;  for  in  the  former  their  patriotic  feeling  is 
a  great  motive  force,  while  in  the  latter  case  poli- 
tical action  partakes  of  the  nature  of  giving  alms 
to  them  as  a  dependent  class.  For  this  reason, 
imperialism  is  foremost  in  the  popular  mind. 

Turning  now  to  our  own  country,  we  also  have 
here  every  indication  that  popular  interest  is  being 
unduly  withdrawn  from  questions  of  domestic  pol- 
itics. This  indifferent  attitude  of  the  popular  mind 
has  emboldened  professional  politicians  to  seek  to 
strengthen  their  position  by  beginning  to  break 
down  the  system  of  civil  service  reform.  The  ques- 
tion suggests  itself.  What  will  be  the  relation  of  an 
imperial  policy  to  civil  service  at  home }  The  argu- 
ment has  been  advanced  by  Professor  Giddings  and 
others  that  increased  national  responsibility  will  pu- 
rify the  public  service  and  the  morale  and  wisdom 
of  American  administration.  In  support  of  this 
view,  the  example  of  Great  Britain  is  appealed  to, 
the  purity  of  its  civil  service  being  ascribed  to  the 
tonic  effect  of  continuously  expanding  responsibility. 

Such  a  view,  however,  seems  somewhat  too  opti- 
mistic. In  the  first  place,  the  primary  tendency 
of  unchecked  expansion  would  undoubtedly  be  an 
increase  of  the  speculative  spirit  and  of  recklessness 
and  corruption  in  public  affairs,  though,  of  course, 
such  tendencies  may  be  counteracted  by  a  well- 
349 


WORLD   POLITICS 

informed,  active,  and  vigilant  public  opinion. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  noted  that  English  experi- 
ence has  not  been  of  the  nature  suggested  in  the 
considerations  given  above.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
after  two  hundred  years  of  expansion,  and  up  to 
the  very  close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  English 
civil  service  and  the  general  political  life  of  Eng- 
land were  as  corrupt  as  ever.  The  great  and  last- 
ing reform,  on  the  other  hand,  was  effected  only 
in  the  era  of  liberalism,  when  public  interest  was 
concentrated  on  home  questions,  and  when  imperial 
and  colonial  interests  were  in  the  background. 

We  can  get  some  indication  of  the  character  of 
the  influence  of  colonialism  on  British  politics  from 
the  utterances  on  that  question  of  the  two  most 
advanced  statesmen  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Lord  Chatham,  in  speaking  of  the  use  of  colonial 
wealth  in  English  politics,  said  :  — 

"  For  some  years  past  there  has  been  an  influx  of  wealth 
into  this  country  which  has  been  attended  by  many  fatal  con- 
sequences, because  it  has  not  been  the  regular  natural  produce 
of  labor  and  industry.  The  riches  of  Asia  have  been  poured 
in  upon  us,  and  have  brought  with  them  not  only  Asiatic  lux- 
ury, but,  I  fear,  Asiatic  principles  of  government.  Without 
connections,  without  any  natural  interest  in  the  soil,  the  im- 
porters of  foreign  gold  have  forced  their  way  into  Parliament 
by  such  a  torrent  of  corruption  as  no  private  hereditary  fortune 
could  resist."  ^ 

And  Burke,  in  his  speech  of  December  i,  1783, 
describes  the  young  magistrates  who  undertake 
the  government  of  India,  as  follows :  — 

Cited  in  Sir  Charl  s  Wilson's  Clive,  p.  2IO. 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

"  Animated  with  all  the  avarice  of  age  and  all  the  impet- 
uosity of  youth,  they  roll  in,  one  after  another,  wave  after 
wave;  and  there  is  nothing  before  the  eyes  of  the  natives  but 
an  endless,  hopeless  prospect  of  new  flights  of  birds  of  prey 
and  of  passage,  with  appetites  continually  renewing  for  a  food 
that  is  continually  wasting ;  for  the  prey  is  lodged  in  England, 
and  the  cries  of  India  are  given  to  the  seas  and  winds." 

The  very  fact  that  an  attempt  to  reform  the 
administration  of  India  at  that  time,  however  in- 
judicious in  particulars  the  attempt  may  have  been, 
aroused  such  a  storm  of  opposition  as  to  aid  in 
excluding  the  Whig  party  from  power  for  twenty- 
five  years,  is  a  striking  commentary  on  the  relation 
of  colonial  politics  to  home  affairs  during  the  eigh- 
teenth century.  This  was  the  condition  of  affairs 
after  colonial  expansion  had  had  an  opportunity  of 
exercising  its  beneficent  influence  on  English  polit- 
ical life  for  about  two  centuries.  Colonial  admin- 
istration itself  was  at  that  time  still  most  corrupt 
and  selfish.  Even  after  Haileybury  College,  with 
its  special  course  of  study  for  the  Indian  civil  ser- 
vice, had  been  established,  the  system  of  patronage 
continued  to  govern  the  appointment  to  office, 
with  the  result  that,  as  late  as  1850,  corruption  and 
ignorance  were  common  in  the  colonial  service.^ 
At  that  time,  the  agitation  for  civil  service  reform 
and  the  introduction  of  the  merit  system  had  al- 
ready been  vigorously  pushed,  and  in  1853  Sir  Staf- 
ford Northcote  and  Sir  Edward  Trevelyan  made 
their  famous  report.     The  enlightened  liberalism 

1  Eaton,  Civil  Service  in  <^,  eat  Britain,  p.  1 78. 


WORLD   POLITICS 

of  the  reform  era  was  at  its  height,  and  within  two 
years  the  merit  system  was  introduced  in  England; 
in  1853,  it  had  also  been  put  in  force  in  India. 
Colonial  reform  and  home  reform  both  flowed  from 
the  same  source. 

The  loss  of  her  great  colonial  possessions  in 
North  America  exercised  a  beneficent  influence 
upon  England,  but  it  was  not  until  the  great 
reform  movement  of  this  century  had  purified 
English  home  politics  that  colonial  administra- 
tion itself  became  a  credit  to  the  English  nation. 
Unless  a  nation  trains  itself  in  political  character 
and  method  by  the  efficient  administration  of  its 
home  affairs,  it  cannot  hope  to  be  successful  in 
imperial  politics,  or  to  escape  the  detrimental  in- 
fluence which  expansion  is  likely  to  produce. 
England's  greatness  as  a  colonizing  power  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  her  foreign  administration  for  the 
greater  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  has  been 
subjected  to  the  criticism  of  an  enlightened  public 
opinion  at  home,  trained  in  judging  and  deahng 
intelligently  with  political  affairs.  It  is  the  habit 
which  the  British  people  have  acquired  of  watch- 
ing and  controlling  their  political  agents  that  ena- 
bles them  to  exercise  a  beneficial  influence  among 
inferior  nations.  Wherever  a  British  officer  or 
administrator  has  worked,  he  has  felt  himself 
responsible  to  a  critical  and  alert  public  opinion, 
accustomed  to  dealing  strictly  with  any  lapses, 
breaches  of  trust,  or  offences  against  political 
morality.  Instead  of  acquiring  purity  from  a  sense 
352 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

of  increased  responsibility,  as  some  have  argued, 
the  efficiency  of  the  English  government  has  pro- 
ceeded rather  from  home  affairs  to  those  abroad ; 
and  it  is  only  because,  under  the  regime  of  liberal- 
ism during  the  present  century,  the  English  people 
have  given  such  minute  attention  to  good  govern- 
ment at  home,  that  they  have  been  enabled  to 
introduce  that  blessing  among  inferior  races.  If 
the  sobriety  and  justice  of  Liberal  politics  are  to 
be  abandoned,  the  true  greatness  of  England  is  a 
thing  of  the  past. 

We  should  therefore  not  allow  ourselves  to  fall 
into  a  feeling  of  optimistic  security,  and  to  expect 
too  much  of  "  beneficent  reaction."  National  effort 
must  be  concentrated  on  the  task  of  producing  a 
pure  and  efficient  administration  in  domestic  affairs, 
and  national  public  opinion  must  insist  upon  the 
direct  responsibility  of  all  public  servants,  wherever 
stationed,  to  the  nation  at  home. 

The  same  redoubled  vigilance  must  be  devoted  to 
other  affairs  of  domestic  reform.  Whatever  with- 
draws attention  from  them  is  likely  to  strengthen 
the  forces  of  reaction.  It  is  but  natural  that 
the  central  government  should  to  some  extent 
strengthen  organized  interests  at  the  expense  of 
the  people  in  general.  Even  though  one  admits 
that  an  honest  effort  has  been  made  to  legislate 
with  equal  favor,  he  can  hardly  avoid  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  laws  of  the  United  States  government 
have  been  more  uniformly  favorable  to  capital  and 
its  concentrated  interests  than  to  the  poorer  classes. 
2  A  3S3 


WORLD   POLITICS 

It  is  certain  that  some  of  the  great  trusts  are  in- 
terested in  expansion.  The  part  taken  by  powerful 
trusts  in  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  and  the  agitation 
in  behalf  of  Cuba,  as  well  as  in  the  recent  distress- 
ing episode  of  tariff  legislation  for  Porto  Rico,  are 
too  well  known  to  call  for  more  than  mention.  At 
present,  the  Standard  Oil  Trust,  the  Carnegie  Steel 
Company,  and  other  great  organizations  are  in- 
terested in  a  Chinese  railway  concession.  To  be 
sure,  it  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  business  interest 
that  takes  them  there,  and  they  have  the  necessary 
capital  and  influence  to  open  tracts  of  the  Celes- 
tial Empire  to  American  trade ;  yet  the  connection 
between  trusts  and  our  national  policy  cannot  be 
too  carefully  watched.  It  is  the  interest  of  all 
citizens  that  the  central  government  should  not 
be  turned  into  an  instrumentality  for  advancing 
powerful  centralized  interests. 

Many  other  matters  of  domestic  government  are 
likely  to  suffer  by  a  withdrawal  of  public  interest 
from  them.  Among  these  are  the  questions  of  the 
purity  of  local  and  municipal  government,  the 
equitable  distribution  of  property,  the  administra- 
tive control  of  monopolies,  and  the  framing  of  laws 
for  equitable  inheritance  taxation.  It  would  be 
a  calamity  for  the  nation  to  give  up  the  deep 
and  careful  consideration  of  these  matters,  the 
right  settlement  of  which  is  of  prime  importance 
to  our  national  life,  in  order  to  pursue  a  policy 
of  territorial  expansion,  attractive,  indeed,  but  of 
doubtful  value.  In  this  connection  we  must  also 
354 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

notice  that  the  relative  importance  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  states  as  compared  with  that  of  the 
federal  government  is  to  be  decreased  still  further 
by  present  developments,  which  tend  to  increase  in- 
ordinately the  pubHc  interest  in  those  affairs  which 
are  solely  in  the  hands  of  the  central  government ; 
for,  without  detailed  explanation,  we  may  simply 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  imperiahsm  always 
favors  centralization.  It  may  be  that  as  one 
result  of  this  centralization  added  interest  will  be 
taken  in  government  in  general,  and  that  men  of 
ability  will  in  larger  numbers  devote  themselves 
to  the  service  of  the  state.  To  this  end,  however, 
steps  should  be  taken  to  assure  efficient  public 
servants  a  continuous  career  and  adequate  re- 
muneration. As  illustrating  the  vital  importance 
and  value  of  this  plan,  we  need  only  call  to  mind 
the  work  of  Lord  Cromer,  who  for  fifteen  years 
has  been  enabled  to  carry  out  his  consistent  and 
far-reaching  policy  with  regard  to  Egypt. 


355 


CHAPTER  V 

The   Influence   of   Imperialism   on  the 

International  Relations  of  the 

United   States 

It  remains  to  consider  briefly  the  influence  of 
the  new  developments  in  international  politics  on 
the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  other 
great  powers.  A  certain  feeling  of  aloofness  from 
Old  World  interests  characterized  American  politics 
up  to  within  the  last  few  years;  but  this  feeling 
has  now  entirely  disappeared  and  has  given  way 
to  a  sentiment  of  common  interests  and  of  rivalries 
centring  about  common  aims.  Many  are  inclined 
to  view  this  change  with  a  spirit  of  regret,  as  if 
the  United  States  had,  to  some  extent,  abandoned 
her  old  ideals  and  stepped  down  into  the  dusty 
arena  of  selfish  and  ignoble  combats  for  material 
dominion. 

It  is  indeed  true  that,  in  the  eyes  of  European 
nations,  the  fair  fame  of  the  American  Republic  has 
suffered  in  consequence  of  the  results  of  the  late 
v/ar.  Not  accustomed  to  grant  the  validity  of  purely 
humanitarian  and  altruistic  motives  in  guiding  their 
356 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

own  political  action,  they  set  down  to  the  account  of 
pure  hypocrisy  the  professions  made  by  America 
before  the  war,  and  believe,  or  affect  to  believe,  that 
those  professions  were  consciously  calculated  to 
veil  a  masterful  desire  for  territorial  expansion.  It 
will  probably  never  be  possible  to  make  European 
nations  understand  the  real  complexity  of  motives 
that  led  the  American  nation  into  a  war  with  Spain. 
Especially  will  it  be  difficult  for  them  ever  to  real- 
ize how  large  a  part  real  sympathy  with  the  suffer- 
ings of  a  neighboring  population,  and  impatience 
engendered  by  daily  reports  of  unceasing  warfare 
and  unrelieved  misery,  played  in  bringing  about 
the  war.  Any  representations  tending  to  give 
probability  to  the  importance  of  these  factors  are 
likely  to  be  discountenanced  in  consideration  of  the 
events  that  have  followed  the  war.  It  is  only  by 
strict  compliance  with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
declarations  made  when  entering  upon  the  war 
that  the  United  States  can  redeem  her  reputation 
for  honesty  and  a  straightforward  policy.  For  this 
reason,  no  effort  should  be  spared  to  allow  the 
populations  of  Cuba  and  the  Philippine  Islands  the 
greatest  measure  of  independence  consonant  with 
the  general  peace  of  the  world  and  the  security  of 
life  and  property  within  those  islands. 

There  has  of  late  been  much  conjecture  concern- 
ing the  international  relations  of  the  United  States. 
The  friendship  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
American  Republic  is  usually  accepted  as  firmly 
established,  and  it  may  be  looked  upon  as  one  of 
357 


WORLD   POLITICS 

the  most  fortunate  results  of  the  late  war  that  the 
unreasoning  bitterness  and  misunderstanding  be- 
tween these  two  great  nations  have  given  way,  even 
for  a  time,  to  a  feeling  of  common  interests  and 
mutual  good  will.  The  best  minds  of  both  nations 
have  long  realized  that,  with  all  the  commercial 
and  industrial  rivalry  between  them,  they  are  at 
one  on  the  essentials  of  civilization  and  govern- 
ment. In  view  of  the  suddenness  of  the  change  of 
attitude  among  those  poHticians  who  were  formerly 
most  radical  in  their  denunciation  of  British  policy, 
however,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  avoid  the  conclu- 
sion that  much  of  the  enthusiasm  in  favor  of  alli- 
ance must  be  identified  with  the  spirit  of  desire  for 
exaggerated  national  aggrandizement,  and  may  be 
ascribed  to  their  belief  that  these  two  powers  can 
without  let  or  hindrance  order  the  government  of 
the  world  according  to  their  own  convenience. 

More  recently  it  has  been  proposed  that  Ger- 
many should  be  included  within  the  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  alliance.  The  term  itself  is  open  to  criticism, 
since,  although  there  is  a  certain  racial  affinity 
among  the  majority  of  the  citizens  of  these  three 
countries,  the  Germans,  at  any  rate,  would  object 
to  being  included  under  the  suggested  designation. 
Moreover,  this  racial  affinity  would  not  be  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  insure  continued  political  unity,  if 
any  powerful  material  interest  should  arise  to  sep- 
arate the  three  nations.  Race  is  scarcely  a  suffi- 
cient bond  for  the  unity  of  a  single  national  state, 
much  less  for  an  international  alliance  of  many 
358 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

such  states.  If  we  pass  by  this  ethnical  element 
and  consider  the  question  of  social  and  political 
ideals,  there  seems  to  be  lacking  in  these,  also,  a 
sufficient  basis  for  cooperation  among  the  three 
powers,  —  for  they  differ  broadly  in  their  views  as 
to  social  customs  and  political  institutions.  The 
only  motive  that  may  be  expected  to  bind  them  to- 
gether and  to  offer  a  guerdon  of  continued  amity 
is  to  be  found  in  a  common  fear  of  Russia  and  of 
the  apparently  irresistible  expansive  tendencies  of 
that  power. 

Between  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  the  enmity 
is  probably  irremediable ;  but  if  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment will  pursue  a  liberal  trade  policy  in  her 
Asiatic  possessions,  it  does  not  seem  improbable 
that  friendly  relations  may  be  estabhshed  between 
the  Czar's  dominions  and  the  other  two  powers, 
Germany  and  the  United  States.  Russia  has  shown 
a  tendency  to  conciliate  the  United  States  and  to 
give  us  every  reasonable  advantage  within  her 
Asian  territory.  Our  views  about  Russia,  coming 
as  they  do  largely  from  British  sources,  are  perhaps 
unduly  severe  as  to  the  Russian  civilization  and 
government.  Of  course,  there  are  many  things 
in  Russian  affairs  against  which  we  must  always 
protest ;  but  it  would  be  a  calamity  if  Russia,  by 
constant  and  malign  misrepresentation  of  her 
motives,  should  be  driven  into  complete  hostility 
to  all  Western  social  and  political  ideals.  There 
certainly  are  elements  in  her  civilization  that  may 
do  good  service  to  the  world.  It  is  the  part  of 
359 


WORLD   POLITICS 

wise  statesmanship  for  the  United  States  to  assist 
in  setting  firm  bounds  to  the  undue  expansion  of 
Russian  political  influence;  but  it  is  equally  the 
counsel  of  wisdom  and  humanity  for  her  to  dis- 
countenance the  constant  aspersions  of  Russian 
political  motives,  and  to  foster  friendly  relations 
between  that  great  empire  and  the  Western 
nations. 

Germany  is  already  pursuing  this  policy  of  fos- 
tering friendly  relations  with  all  the  great  powers, 
while  at  the  same  time  firmly  insisting  upon  her 
own  international  rights.  The  thought  that  she 
would  cast  her  lot  completely  with  any  other 
power  is  little  complimentary  to  the  political 
sagacity  of  her  statesmen.  As  has  been  said 
before,  the  time  of  one-sided  alliances  is  past. 
Nations  at  present  group  themselves  as  the  cir- 
cumstances and  interests  of  the  time  dictate.  But 
there  is  in  the  world  a  growing  realization  of  a 
basis  of  common  interests  upon  which  interna- 
tional amities  may  rest,  and  everything  that  thus 
leads  to  a  better  understanding  between  the  na- 
tions should  be  welcomed  as  a  triumph  of  human- 
ity over  the  narrower,  blinder  forces  of  nation- 
alism. 

Viewing  the  whole  situation,  there  is  much  cause 
for  hopefulness  in  the  evident  effort  of  all  the 
nations  to  emphasize  their  common  interests. 
There  is  room  for  all  in  the  great  work  of  civiliz- 
ing and  developing  the  world.  While  we  are  still 
very  far  distant  from  a  millennium  of  peace,  —  for 

360 


THE  UNITED   STATES 

international  competition,  though  conducted  on  a 
high  ethical  plane,  is  intense  and  likely  to  lead  to 
memorable  conflicts,  —  it  is  none  the  less  reassur- 
ing to  note  that  nations  are  growing  less  Hable  to 
mutual  misunderstanding  on  matters  not  really- 
vital  to  their  existence. 

In  conclusion,  a  few  words  to  summarize  the 
considerations  presented  in  this  chapter  may  be 
not  without  value.  A  headlong  policy  of  territorial 
aggrandizement  should  be  avoided  by  the  United 
States,  as  it  would  entail  the  danger  of  burdening 
our  national  existence  with  elements  that  could 
not  be  assimilated  and  would  only  weaken  the 
state.  It  should  be  the  aim  of  our  nation  to 
counteract  everywhere,  at  home  and  abroad,  the 
ambitions  of  universal  imperialism,  by  fostering 
a  spirit  of  confidence  and  friendship  among  the 
nations.  Commerce  and  industry  should  be  de- 
veloped by  establishing  trade  depots  and  means 
of  communication,  and  by  upholding  the  policy  of 
equal  opportunity  throughout  the  colonial  world, 
rather  than  by  territorial  acquisitions.  Our  policy 
with  regard  to  the  Philippine  Islands  should  be 
guided  by  the  broader  consideration  of  Oriental 
politics.  In  the  treatment  of  the  populations  which 
through  the  force  of  circumstances  have  been 
intrusted  to  our  care,  we  should  follow  the  con- 
stitutional and  ethical  doctrines  upon  which  our 
government  is  founded.  Before  all,  and  above  all, 
we  should  guard  the  purity  of  domestic  politics, 
lest,  while  we  are  gaining  great  influence  in  the 
361 


WORLD   POLITICS 

affairs  of  the  world,  our  national  life  at  home 
weaken  and  deteriorate,  and  the  hopes  which  the 
best  men  of  all  nations  have  cherished  in  our 
behalf  be  deceived.  And  may  we  always  be  able 
to  apply  to  our  country  the  words  of  Wordsworth 
in  praise  of  his  own  land  :  — 

"  For  dearly  must  we  prize  thee  ;  we  who  find 
In  thee  a  bulwark  for  the  cause  of  men." 


362 


INDEX 


Acheen,  55. 

Afghanistan,  233. 

Agricultural  settlement,  56. 

Alcock,  Sir  Rutherford,  189. 

Algeria,  53. 

Alliances,  change  in  the  nature  of, 

254- 

American  China  Development  Co., 
128. 

Anglo-Saxon  alliance,  358. 

Anzer,  Bishop,  270. 

Austria,  fears  allayed  by  recent  de- 
velopments, 227. 

Autocracy,  in  Russia,  strengthened, 
211. 

Balkan  states,  Russian  interest  in, 
diminished,  230. 

Beaconsfield,  74,  331,  335. 

Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  154. 

Bismarck,  4,  274,  284 ;  on  colonial- 
ism, 261. 

Brodrick,  the  Hon.  St.  John,  135, 
172. 

Buddhism,  240. 

Buelow,  von,  164. 

Burke,  327. 

Cabinet  system,  English,  341. 
Canada,  tariff  of  1898,  38. 
Cape-to-Cairo  railway,  65, 
Castelar,  Emilio,  215. 
Chamberlain,  59,  155,  337;  project 
of  an  imperial  customs-union,  39, 
Chang  Chi  Tung,  102,  125,  183. 
Chatham,  77. 
Chauvinism,  7. 


China,  morality  in,  90;  conserva- 
tism and  formalism  in, 90 ;  classes 
in,  92;  mandarinate  in,  93;  ex- 
aminations in,  93;  ofificial  cor- 
ruption in,  95 ;  business  integrity 
in,  98  ;  lack  of  patriotism  in,  99; 
ideas  of  western  reform  in,  loi ; 
reform  movement  and  its  failure 
in,  102;  geomancy  in,  no,  141; 
railway  politics  in,  114;  Russian 
railway  concessions  in,  115,  133; 
British  railway  concessions  in, 
120,  123;  German  railway  con- 
cessions in,  121 ;  Belgian  railway 
concessions  for  Peking-Hankow 
line,  125  ;  American  railway  con- 
cession in,  128 ;  French  railway 
concessions  in,  135  ;  mining  con- 
cessions in,  138 ;  statistics  of  com- 
merce of,  152;  public  debt  of, 
157 ;  industrial  revolution  in,  185 ; 
brigandage  in,  187;  civil  law  in, 
188;  foreign  intervention  in,  190; 
reform  through  local  govern- 
ment, 191 ;  duty  of  Europeans  in, 
194;  impossibility  of  forcible 
seizure  of,  193 ;  regulations  for 
mines  and  railways  in,  199 ;  new 
industries  in,  249;   currency  in, 

251- 

Chinese  public  debt,  157. 

Chinese  as  merchants  and  labor- 
ers, 247. 

Chinese  government,  railway  policy 
of,  136. 

Civil  service,  349.* 

Cleveland,  President,  334. 


INDEX 


Commerce  and  political  protection, 
34;  and  geographical  situation, 
35 ;  and  banking  relations,  35. 

Committee  on  rules,  345. 

Comte,  78. 

Confucius,  91,  93,  99,  103. 

Corea,  175. 

Credit  Lyonnais,  138. 

Cromer,  Lord,  55,  355. 

Cruelty  toward  natives,  42,  43. 

Currency  in  China,  251. 

Delagoa  Bay  arbitration,  24. 
Destiny,  79. 

Dicey,  Professor  Edward,  20. 
Domestic  policy,  influence  of  im- 
perialism on,  347. 
Dreyfus  trial,  20,  73. 
Dumer,  167. 
Dutch  colonization,  54. 

Eternal  peace,  23. 

Executive  power  and  imperialism, 

337- 
Expansion,  motives  leading  to,  10 ; 
and  railways,  45. 

Faidherbe,  63, 

Finalism,  17. 

Finland,  70,  211,  227. 

France,  as  a  colonizer,  52;  rela- 
tions of,  with  Russia,  readjusted, 
228  ;  and  Russia  in  China,  229 ; 
in  the  Orient,  255 ;  and  Germany, 
rapprochement  between,  290. 

French  colonial  policy,  167. 

Gauge  of  railway,  118. 

German  banks  in  South  America, 
283. 

German  commerce,  51. 

Germany,  as  a  colonizer,  50 ;  con- 
scious policy  of  expansion  of, 
227;  influence  in  China  and 
Asia  Minor,  227,  in  China,  268  ; 
policy  of,  in  China,  272 ;  in  Asia 
Minor,  273 ;  railway  concessions 


to,  in  Asia  Minor,  277;  in  South 
America,  281 ;  one-man  power 
in,  300. 

Gladstone,  71,  331. 

Goldie,  Sir  George,  55,  63. 

Goluchowski,  minister,  292. 

Great  Britain,  an  example  to  other 
nations  in  colonization,  9 ;  as  a 
market  for  other  nations,  37, 
223;  change  from  industrialism 
to  capitalism  in,  40;  protectionist 
sentiment  in,  224;  international 
relations  of,  influenced  by  devel- 
opments in  China,  225;  change 
in  anti-Russian  politics  of,  226. 

Greek  Church,  206. 

Hague,  Peace  Conference,  22. 

Haileybury  College,  351. 

Hankow,  166;  industrial  impor- 
tance of,  132. 

Harcourt,  Sir  Vernon,  72. 

Hay,  Secretary,  and  the  open-door 
policy,  176. 

Hayti,  287. 

Hegel,  15,  17. 

High  finance  nationalized,  44. 

Home  rule,  71, 

Hongkong,  trade  of,  with  China, 

151- 
Hungarian  nationalism,  4. 

Imperial  federation,  39,  293. 

India,  234,  239. 

Individual    initiative    and    social 

action,  61. 
Investments  for  industrial  develojv 

ment,  41. 
Italy,  policy  of,  in  China,  173. 

Japan  and  China,  174. 

Java,  54. 

Jews,  persecution  of,  70. 

Kang  Yew  Wei,  93,  102,  107. 

Kant,  6. 

Kardoff,  Depuy  von,  264. 


364 


INDEX 


Kiao-chow,  33,  122,  165,  270,  288. 
Kingsley,  Mary  H.,  42. 
Kipling,  80. 
Kriiger,  President,  225. 
Kwang  Su,  Emperor,  93,  107. 

Ledochowski,  Cardinal,  269. 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  Pierre,  291. 
Liberalism,  decline  of,  71,  302,  332. 
Li  Hung  Chang,  121,  125,  127. 
Likin,  96,  149. 

Machiavelli,  14. 

Machiavellian  diplomacy,  18. 

MacKinnon,  Sir  William,  63. 

Manchuria,  resources  of,  119;  Rus- 
sian political  rights  in,  161 ;  im- 
portance of,  208. 

Marchand,  Major,  64. 

Marschall,  Minister  von,  263. 

McKinley,  President,  334. 

Merchant  marine,  German,  295. 

Missions  and  missionaries,  32,  146. 

Mommsen,  Professor,  291. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  284. 

Morgan,  Pritchard,  mining  con- 
cessions to,  139, 142. 

Mouravieff,  63. 

Napoleon,  3. 

Nationalism,  exaggeration  of,  6. 

Navies,    importance    of,   28,    253; 

and  democracy,  30. 
Navy,  German,  294. 
Nicaragua  Canal,  324. 
Nietzsche,  78,  238,  303, 
Nominating  conventions,  340. 

Okuma,  Count,  181,  182. 
One-man  power,  74. 
Organic  selection  of  political  lead- 
ers, 344. 
Orient  and  Occident,  66,  236. 
Oriental  characteristics,  243. 


Party  system,  as  affected  by  im- 
perialism, 327. 


Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague, 

22. 

Peking  Syndicate,  133,  139,  192. 

Persia,  Russia  in,  233. 

Philippine  Islands,  importance  of, 
in  foreign  trade,  320 ;  labor  ques- 
tion in,  321. 

Plato,  92,  109. 

Pobedonostseff,  212,  213. 

Poland,  5,  70,  211,  227. 

Port  Arthur,  116,  161,  162,  209. 

Portugal,  colonies  of,  289. 

Prince  Henry,  164,  264,  276. 

Protection  to  citizens  abroad, 60. 

Railways  and  expansion,  45. 

Reaction  in  France,  73. 

Realpolitik,  15. 

Renan,  78,  86. 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  63. 

Roman  imperialism,  13,  68. 

Rosebery,  Earl  of,  72. 

Rousseau,  J.  J.,  8,  15. 

Russia,  semi-Oriental  character  of, 
49,  211,  214;  and  the  Roman 
Empire  compared,  68 ;  religion 
in,  76,  214,  215,  216;  representa- 
tive of  the  Greek  Church,  206; 
three  stages  of  expansion  of,  206 ; 
influence  of  recent  developments 
in  China  on,  206;  attempts  of,  to 
secure  ice-free  ports,  207 ;  aided 
at  present  by  peace,  209,  221 ; 
power  of  the  military  aristocracy 
in,  210;  great  increase  in  the 
fleet  of,  210;  autocracy  in 
strengthened,  211;  the  "bearer 
of  the  torch,"  212;  extreme 
nationalism  in,  213;  recent 
changes  in  southern  part  of, 
216 ;  arbitrary  methods  of,  217 ; 
measures  to  foster  the  merchant 
marine  in,  218 ;  manufacturing 
methods  in,  219;  mining  in,  219; 
method  of  control  compared  with 
that  of  the  English,  222;  com- 
mercial policy  of,  317,  359. 


365 


INDEX 


Russian  colonization,  nature  of,  48. 
Russian  diplomacy,  19. 
Russo-British  agreement  of  1899, 
121,  179. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  75,  337. 

Schopenhauer,  78,  86,  238. 

Schwartzhoff,  Colonel,  297. 

Sea  communications,  31. 

Sea  power,  27. 

Sebastopol,  216. 

Shanse,  resources  of,  139. 

Shantung,  122,  270. 

Siberia,  immigration  into,  117. 

Siberian  railway,  commercial  and 

strategical    importance    of,  160, 

163. 
Slavophiles,  213. 
Social  reform  in  England,  72. 
Solidarity,    national,    required    at 

present,  70. 
Soudan,  63. 
South  African  War,  31,  56,  58,  231, 

328. 
Sphere  of  influence,  of  interest,  60, 

113,  184. 
Stevenson,  Robert  Louis,  42. 

Tael,  value  of,  125. 


Transvaal,  31,  56,  58 ;  war  in,  231, 

328. 
Treaty  ports  of  China,  148. 
Turkey,  232. 

United  States,  commercial  interests 
of,  in  China,  313;  with  Siberia, 
317;  trade  with  the  Philippine 
Islands,  319. 

Vatican  and  religious  protectorate, 
33. 

Walpole,  77. 

Wei-hai-wei,  170. 

Wellington,  342. 

William  IL,  of  Germany,  60,  76; 
speeches  of,  264 ;  visit  of,  to  the 
Holy  Land,  275;  on  solidarity, 
298. 

Wolseley,  General,  86,  98. 

World  state,  12,  23,  69. 

Yellow  River,  124,  128. 
"  Yellow  Terror,"  86. 
Yunnan,  French  and  British  inter- 
ests in,  169,  171,  178. 

Zanzibar,  263. 


366 


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